Reward Expectancy and External Whistleblowing: Testing the Moderating Roles of Public Service Motivation,Seriousness of Wrongdoing,and Whistleblower Protection

Whistleblowing in Thailand

This study centers on the whistleblowing system in Thailand, where corruption remains the country’s most pressing, unresolved issue (Vichit-Vadakan, 2017). In this context, various agencies play direct and indirect roles in combating corruption (Potipiroon & Wongpreedee, 2021; Vichit-Vadakan, 2017). The National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) and the Public-Sector Anti-Corruption Commission (PACC) are the two primary agencies responsible for investigating and addressing corruption complaints. The NACC is an independent body that handles corruption cases involving high-ranking officials and politicians, while the PACC, operating under the Prime Minister’s Office, handles corruption cases involving mid-level and lower-level employees. Individuals who observe corruption activities, whether they are public-sector employees or ordinary citizens, are encouraged to report to the respective agency depending on the position of the alleged offender. Nonetheless, these two agencies maintain open lines of communication and will facilitate the process in cases where a complaint is filed with the wrong agency. The Ombudsmen’s Office and other government bodies such as the Ministry of Interior and the Police Department also handle citizen complaints, but any corruption-related grievances ultimately reach the NACC or PACC.

Whistleblower rewards were first introduced in the NACC’s Anti-Corruption Act in 1999. According to Section 137 of the most recent revision of the act in 2018, whistleblowers may recover financial bounties from the NACC in cases where offenses arise from the “unusual wealth” of politicians and senior officials. The Regulation on Whistleblower Rewards (2015), a subsidiary law under the act, further stipulates that whistleblowers can recover a financial bounty worth up to 10% of the damages, or no more than 100 million baht, for the said offenses. ¹ This provision had sparked interest among both Thai citizens and netizens. Moreover, whistleblowers may be eligible for recognition awards and promotions from the NACC and PACC, subject to the discretion of the governing boards of these agencies. However, since the enactment of these reward programs, not a single bounty or award has been granted to any informant. ²

According to the NACC’s Anti-Corruption Act (2018), public-sector whistleblowers are protected via three specific measures: (a) the prohibition of dismissal or other disciplinary actions motivated by retaliation, (b) protection against physical harm, ³ and (c) grant of immunity for key witnesses directly involved in corruption crimes. Public-sector whistleblowers are also protected against unfair work practices under the PACC’s Executive Measures in Anti-Corruption Act (2008), but these matters need to be forwarded to the Prime Minister, who considers appropriate measures to protect or remedy the whistleblower. In practice, the enforcement of these protection measures can be arduous, as top executives of Thai government agencies are virtually immune from penalization should they decide to retaliate against the whistleblower (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2018). Conceivably, these existing laws are fragmented, and Thailand has yet to develop a dedicated law to protect whistleblowers (OECD, 2018).

Whistleblowing: Its Costs and Benefits

Whistleblowing has been defined as “the disclosure by organization members (former or current) of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to effect action” (Near & Miceli, 1985, p. 4). Although whistleblowing can come from many sources including contractors and citizens, organizational insiders play a key, if not the most important role in exposing organizational corruption and bringing those responsible to justice (Dyck et al., 2010).

The choice of whether or not to blow the whistle depends on the available alternatives and whether the benefits outweigh the associated costs (Keil et al., 2010; Miceli & Near, 1992). For example, whistleblowers can benefit from disclosing serious misconduct that personally affects them when corrective measures are enforced (Miceli & Near, 1985). In such cases, whistleblowing can lead to intrinsic rewards such as managerial attention to the complaint and public attention to the wrongdoing (Near & Miceli, 1985) as well as an improved work environment or the resolution of problems (Keil et al., 2010). Indeed, whistleblowing is often viewed as a prosocial behavior that supports organizational objectives (Dozier & Miceli, 1985).

Nonetheless, it is generally agreed that whistleblowers stand to lose much more than they gain (Dyck et al., 2010). Indeed, whistleblowing carries significant costs that result from retaliation from colleagues and superiors (Alford, 2007; Cho & Song, 2015; Gundlach et al., 2003; Rehg et al., 2008). Common retaliatory practices include isolation, verbal attacks, and career derailment (Chang et al., 2017; Gottschalk, 2017) as well as intimidation, defamation of character, or even death threats (Keil et al., 2010). Rothschild (2008) reported that fear of retaliation is the single most important reason underlying the decision not to blow the whistle. In some cases, whistleblowers also lose their home and experience strain on their marriage (Alford, 2007). Moreover, whistleblowers must be ready to have their personal backgrounds scrutinized, to have their charges challenged as falsehood, and to face the accusation of undermining their organizations (Howse & Daniels, 1995), which often leads to guilt and humiliation (Jalan, 2020). Whistleblowers must also be prepared to go through protracted court procedures and to bear legal costs as well as the burden of providing convincing proof (Kenny & Fotaki, 2023).

While these potential costs may apply to both internal and external whistleblowers, it is the latter who often find themselves incurring a more substantial cost, if not loss. According to Dworkin and Baucus (1998), although external whistleblowers are more effective in eliciting organizational change, they often experience more hostility and retaliation. Similarly, Park et al. (2020) reported that the experience of bullying by superiors and colleagues was particularly severe among South Korean external whistleblowers. This is due to the fact that external whistleblowing is generally viewed as a direct challenge to organizations authorities, which results in bad publicity and legal intervention (Berry, 2004; Miceli et al., 1991). As such, external whistleblowers tend to experience more negative physical and psychological health effects (Park & Lewis, 2018).

Expectancy Theory

A relevant theory for understanding the role of rewards in motivating whistleblowers is expectancy theory (Kellough & Lu, 1993), initially formulated by Vroom (1964) and later refined by Porter and Lawler (1968a). As a cognitive theory of motivation, expectancy theory posits that individuals make voluntary and rational choices about their actions based on what they believe will lead to the most desirable outcomes (i.e., enhancing pleasure and avoiding pain). While expectancy theory has undergone various iterations throughout the years, it is acknowledged that an individual’s motivation to engage in a specific behavior is influenced by three factors (see also Fudge & Schlacter, 1999; Van Eerde & Thierry, 1996). Notably, as a “process” theory, this theory emphasizes that individuals’ motivation and performance is based on a complex interplay of both individual and situational factors that influence their expectancies (Vroom et al., 2015).

Expectancy refers to an individual’s belief that his or her effort will lead to the desired level of performance, which can be influenced by self-efficacy and perceived control (Chiang & Jang, 2008; Fudge & Schlacter, 1999; Isaac et al., 2001). Instrumentality refers to the belief that performance will lead to rewards or outcomes, which can be influenced by trust and organizational policies (Chiang & Jang, 2008; Fudge & Schlacter, 1999; Isaac et al., 2001). Valence refers to the value one places on those rewards or outcomes, which must outweigh the costs associated with the effort. The level of valence is a function of one’s needs, goals, values, and preferences (Chiang & Jang, 2008; Fudge & Schlacter, 1999; Isaac et al., 2001). In this respect, one’s motivational force is generally defined as the product of these three factors: if any one of them is absent, so would motivation (Fudge & Schlacter, 1999; Van Eerde & Thierry, 1996). Thus, this theory is often referred to as VIE (valiene-instrumentality-expectancy) theory (Vroom, 1964).

Clearly, expectancy theory relies heavily on extrinsic motivators to explain causes for behaviors at work (Isaac et al., 2001). According to Gagné and Deci (2005, p. 311), extrinsic motivation “requires an instrumentality between the activity and some separable consequences such as tangible or verbal rewards, so satisfaction comes not from the activity itself but rather from the extrinsic consequences to which the activity leads.” However, subsequent versions of the theory also recognize that intrinsic rewards, such as the enjoyment of the work itself, are linked to the perceived valence of outcomes (see also Vroom et al., 2015). Specifically, Lawler (1981) proposed a basic model of expectancy theory, which considers various factors that can influence the effort-reward expectancy. For example, Lawler proposed that first-level outcomes such as extrinsic rewards can serve as a pathway to achieving second-level outcomes, such as feelings of accomplishment and pleasure that derives from doing meaningful work.

When applied to whistleblowing, the framework proposed by Lawler (1981) suggests that an individual’s motivation to blow the whistle depends on the beliefs (a) that efforts will lead to performance (E-P expectancy) (e.g., stopping a corruption crime and litigation of the wrongdoer), (b) that the performance will result in positive outcomes (P-O expectancy [instrumentality]) (e.g., receiving some forms of rewards), and (c) that the outcomes are personally important (valence) (e.g., doing important work that positively affects society). As discussed below, this study draws attention to three relevant factors in the whistleblowing literature, which may enhance the salience of these key components of the theory. It is important to note that this study does not employ the mathematical formula of the theory per se but, rather, draws inspiration from its theoretical insights. This is consistent with the recommendation by Van Eerde and Thierry (1996), who clearly indicated that, due to the numerous variants of the theory, researchers can just focus on (some of) the individual components of the model, instead of adhering to the model in its entirety.

Reward Expectancy and External Whistleblowing Intentions

This study conceptualizes reward expectancy as the extent to which individuals believe they will receive some forms of rewards—both monetary and non-monetary—for reporting corruption activities (Cho & Perry, 2012; Shoaib & Baruch, 2019). In the language of expectancy theory, this conceptual framing reflects the effort-outcome (E-O) expectancy (Lawler & Suttle, 1973; Porter & Lawler, 1968a). Specifically, reward expectancy captures the perception that exerting effort will result in rewards or recognition (e.g., “My hard work will fetch me rewards or recognition”) (see Shoaib & Baruch, 2019), which is suggested to predict both efforts and performance (Porter & Lawler, 1968b).

A predominant view suggests that financial rewards serve as a form of compensation that helps to alleviate potential costs that result from job loss and legal fees (Butler et al., 2020; Kenny & Fotaki, 2023). When the potential harm or negative consequences are substantial, individuals may be more hesitant to blow the whistle without the promise of rewards. In an experimental study, Rose et al. (2018) found that rewards can enhance the likelihood of managers blowing the whistle especially when substantial rewards are available. In another study involving corporate fraud in large U.S. companies between 1996 and 2004, Dyck et al. (2010) reported that in specific industries where rewards are available, employees’ reporting contributed to the disclosure of up to 41% of all corporate fraud cases.

Whistleblower rewards can also be viewed as a specific form of performance-based pay because they are based on the significance of the information provided and the impact of the disclosure. In this respect, whistleblower rewards can become a crucial source motivation when they offer individuals with valued outcomes such as a sense of validation and recognition for their actions. As indicated by Fudge and Schlacter (1999), rewards can be made more “meaningful” when they are closely tied to one’s performance, such as by explicitly rewarding employees for acting ethically. In this respect, Iwasaki (2019) showed that it is not just the financial incentives but also non-monetary rewards that exert significant positive impacts on individuals’ external whistleblowing intentions. This finding suggests that combining financial rewards with public recognition or acknowledgment may further validate a whistleblower’s contribution. Thus, while whistleblower rewards are often seen as a way to compensate for the costs of reporting wrongdoing (Kenny & Fotaki, 2023), they can also serve to endorse whistleblowers’ actions.

To date, the topic of whistleblower rewards remains the subject of a contentious debate (Nyreröd & Spagnolo, 2021). In a critical review article, Howse and Daniels (1995) cautioned that financial rewards may result in false claims, and unintentionally act as an disincentive to internal reporting and also as an incentive to delayed reporting (to claim larger rewards), eroding trust and team spirit. In the same vein, Stout (2013) argued that financial incentives kill conscience and promote selfishness and opportunism. Butler et al. (2020, p. 3) further indicated that “if whistleblowers get remunerated for their reporting, this may change the public judgment of their actions, turning them from heroes to greedy snitches.” This is perhaps why several countries including Thailand have included the “good faith” requirement (i.e., whether the disclosure has been made with honest motives and not for personal gain) to determine whether a whistleblower’s actions can be classified as a “protected disclosure” in the court of law (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2015).

The Moderating Role of PSM

PSM has been defined as “a particular form of altruism and prosocial motivation that is animated by specific dispositions and values arising from public institutions and missions” (Perry et al., 2010, p. 682). Past research suggests that individuals with high PSM are more willing to blow the whistle because they care about benefiting society at large through their actions (e.g., making sure that the public is not affected by misconduct) (Cho & Song, 2015; Dungan et al., 2019; Potipiroon & Wongpreedee, 2021). Indeed, the motivation of those with high PSM is based on their loyalty to their community and people (Rainey & Steinbauer, 1999) as well as on their adherence to specific values that influence one’s ethical decision (Stazyk & Davis, 2015). In line with this, Waytz et al. (2013) indicated that fairness (e.g., bringing the offender to justice) serves as the primary motivation for whistleblowing. However, the question remains as to how individuals with high PSM view the prospect of receiving whistleblower rewards and how it influences their decisions. As indicated by Fudge and Schlacter (1999, p. 297), “different individuals will value certain rewards differently.”

A dominant perspective suggests that government officials with high PSM, in comparison to those with low PSM, are less likely to be motivated by extrinsic rewards (Perry et al., 2010). In particular, it has been indicated that individuals with high PSM are intrinsically motivated to report wrongdoing regardless of extrinsic rewards (Brewer & Selden, 1998). According to motivation crowding theory in the economic literature (Frey & Jegen, 2001), performance-based pay can undermine the altruistic motivation of public-sector employees (Houston, 2009; Moynihan, 2008; Perry et al., 2009). Weibel et al. (2010) illustrated that, while financial incentives increase extrinsic motivation (the so-called price effect), they also crowd out individuals’ intrinsic motivation by undermining their autonomy, competence, and relatedness. At the same time, scholars indicate that extrinsic rewards can crowd out the prosocial image of public servants (Carpenter & Myers, 2010; Georgellis et al., 2011) due to fear that they would be perceived as being more motivated by greed rather than a sincere desire to do good for the public (Bellé, 2015). Based on this view, individuals with low PSM need more extrinsic rewards to nudge them toward whistleblowing, whereas those with high PSM are already intrinsically motivated to blow the whistle, and therefore, they need fewer extrinsic motivators to motivate them to do so. This is confirmed in a recent experimental study by Ki (2022), which showed that both monetary and non-monetary rewards had a stronger effect on the willingness to learn among officials with low PSM.

However, this current research argues that the above view may have less explanatory power in the context of whistleblowing. Instead of crowding out individuals’ intrinsic motivation, this study contends that whistleblower rewards are likely to be perceived favorably by those with high PSM because such rewards can serve as a validation and acknowledgment of their extra efforts and sacrifice in exposing wrongdoing. The underlying logic here is that those with high PSM are highly committed to public service (Perry & Wise, 1990), such that they may anchor their expectations about their jobs and the work environment at a comparatively higher level than others (Potipiroon, 2023). From the language of expectancy theory (Fudge & Schlacter, 1999), such expectations can enhance the perceived value (i.e., valence) of rewards in motivating one’s whistleblowing intentions.

Furthermore, based on the insights from the self-determination theory (SDT) (Deci & Ryan, 2012; Ryan & Deci, 2000), one must recognize that rewards do not necessarily crowd out a person’s intrinsic motivation as long as they do not exert external control (e.g., reinforcing the idea of “if you do this, you get that”), but instead support autonomy (e.g., conveying rewards as a celebration of one’s dedication to a cause rather than simply treating them as a commodity). The idea is to foster a sense of internal motivation rather than making the person feel like they are solely pursuing the reward. Hence, rewards can coexist with intrinsic motivation if they align with an individual’s sense of personal agency and choice (Deci & Ryan, 2012; Ryan & Deci, 2000). To the extent that whistleblowing is viewed as an act of valor, extrinsic rewards can offer additional validation and endorsement for individuals’ whistleblowing actions. On the contrary, individuals with high PSM may develop a less favorable view toward the act of whistleblowing if they believe their efforts and actions will go unnoticed or, worse, result in retaliation. Past research has shown that individuals with high PSM may develop more negative views toward the organizations when they experience unfair treatment (Conway et al., 2014) and low intrinsic motivation (Potipiroon & Ford, 2017) as well as when they feel that they are not able to contribute to society (Taylor, 2008).

To date, it remains unclear whether whistleblower rewards are favored by those with high or low PSM. Furthermore, in the broader literature on work motivation, there are still conflicting findings regarding the interplay between rewards and PSM. For example, some studies reported non-significant interaction effects of monetary rewards and PSM in predicting job performance (Belle & Cantarelli, 2015; Dal Bó et al., 2013), whereas Alonso and Lewis (2001) reported that a perceived merit-reward link has a strong positive impact on the performance among high-PSM individuals. Stazyk (2013) also found that performance-related pay is associated with greater job satisfaction, especially among U.S. local government managers with high PSM. More recently, Xu et al. (2023) also found that individuals, regardless of their PSM levels, value tangible extrinsic rewards similarly. These conflicting findings suggest that further research is needed to understand the interactive effects of extrinsic rewards and PSM, especially in the context of whistleblowing, which remains underexplored. Thus, the first two hypotheses are formulated as follows.

The Moderating Role of Perceived Seriousness of Wrongdoing

This study conceptualizes perceived seriousness of wrongdoing in terms of the degree to which corruption activities are perceived to be severe. Even within the realm of grand corruption, there can be variation in how people perceive the seriousness of such activities. To illustrate, individuals in corrupt organizations may exhibit higher tolerance toward grand corruption, whereas individuals in less corrupt organizations may be particularly sensitive to it.

The general argument in the literature indicates that perceived seriousness of wrongdoing motivates observers to pay special attention the potential harmfulness of the alleged wrongdoing (Caillier, 2017a; Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Miceli et al., 2008; Richardson et al., 2012). In other words, when wrongdoing is perceived to be serious, there is less uncertainty that a crime needs to be impeded as there is a greater sense of responsibility to report the misconduct to prevent the potential harm or the negative consequences (Andon et al., 2018; Caillier, 2017b; Feldman & Lobel, 2010). In fact, perceived severity is often regarded as a reflection of one’s “internal” motivation to report wrongdoing (Feldman & Lobel, 2010) as well as one’s tolerance of corruption (Su & Ni, 2018).

This study draws from expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964) to propose that the valence of rewards can become more salient in cases of serious wrongdoing. According to Pinder (1984), individuals tend to place higher value on outcomes that they believe are more difficult to achieve, a phenomenon known as the “goal gradient effect” (Kellough & Lu, 1993). Whistleblowing is an inherently difficult endeavor, and this difficulty can be heightened in cases of serious wrongdoing. To illustrate, obtaining direct proof of wrongdoings perpetrated by top officials may prove more challenging (and meaningful) than doing so for lower-level supervisors. Accordingly, it is expected that individuals facing heightened levels of arduousness in the whistleblowing process are more likely to perceive greater marginal valence in whistleblower rewards. This is because the effort required to attain difficult outcomes can instill a sense of accomplishment and personal fulfillment. In other words, the greater the difficulty, the higher the perceived value of achieving the outcome (Mento et al., 1992).

To date, limited research attention has been paid to the interactive effect of extrinsic rewards and seriousness of wrongdoing in predicting whistleblowing intentions. Among those that do, mostly in the corporate setting (Andon et al., 2018; Dyck et al., 2010; Feldman & Lobel, 2010), the results indicate that there is no discernible difference in reward effects among those who view the misconduct to be severe. This research aims to provide further empirical evidence regarding this issue using the insights from expectancy theory. This leads to the following two hypotheses.

The Moderating Role of Perceived Whistleblower Protection

In this study, perceptions of whistleblower protection refer to the extent to which prospective whistleblowers believe they will receive equitable treatment and safeguards against retaliatory actions, which may include termination, demotion, harassment, and physical harm, as well as protection against the exposure of their identity (Chang et al., 2017; Feldman & Lobel, 2010; Howse & Daniels, 1995; Lee et al., 2020; Onyango, 2021). This definition underscores the importance of enforcing whistleblower protection policies, rather than the mere existence of a protective framework. Clearly, whistleblower protection is essential in encouraging whistleblowing as fear of retaliation is a major deterrent for potential whistleblowers (Feldman & Lobel, 2010; Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Rothschild, 2008).

This study aims to shed light on the synergistic impact of rewards and whistleblower protection, which are recognized as the prototypical incentives for motivating whistleblowers (Guthrie & Taylor, 2017; Lee et al., 2020; Schechter, 2017). Many countries, including Thailand, have adopted the U.S.-style whistleblowing laws, including the provision of financial incentives (the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 and the False Claims Act [FCA]) of 1986) and protection against retaliation (the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002; Lee et al., 2020]. In the public-sector sphere, it is also important to mention the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) of 1989, which aimed to prohibit reprisals against federal employees. However, the WPA had its shortcomings, leading Congress to pass the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA) in 2012. Despite improvements brought about by the WPEA, which also catalyzed changes in state-level legislation (Exmeyer & Jeon, 2022), critics argue that it has not fully delivered on its promises (Peffer et al., 2015). Notwithstanding the limitations, protected disclosures in the United States are considered more comprehensive than those in many other countries (Nyreröd & Spagnolo, 2021), encompassing a wide range of misconduct, including gross mismanagement, the gross misuse of funds, abuse of authority, and threats to public health and safety—areas yet to be incorporated into the Thai whistleblowing laws. It is also worth noting that the Notification and Federal Employee Anti-discrimination and Retaliation (NoFEAR) Act in 2002 is another important statue that works alongside the WPA and the WPEA to strengthen protections for federal employees (Rubin & Alteri, 2019).

This study expects that individuals’ intentions to blow the whistle will be at their highest when both rewards and whistleblower protection mechanisms are in place. According to Guthrie and Taylor (2017, p. 15), “it is imperative to have and enforce policies to protect whistleblowers from retaliation; only then might monetary incentives be effective.” First, it is posited that when potential whistleblowers perceive a high degree of protection and support, it can signal to them that their concerns and grievances will be treated seriously. This perception can further strengthen the belief that reporting misconduct will lead to meaningful actions, such as successful legal action against wrongdoers (Miceli et al., 2008). Furthermore, when there is minimal fear of retaliation and strong support for whistleblowers, the provision of monetary rewards may reinforce the positive message that the organization truly values its employees’ contributions, thereby increasing trust and whistleblowing intentions (Guthrie and Taylor, 2017). As also highlighted by Kellough and Lu (1993), cultivating a climate of trust within the organization is pivotal in enhancing the instrumental aspect of extrinsic rewards. On the contrary, if both rewards and protection are perceived as inadequate, it can signal to prospective whistleblowers that the organization is not fully committed to this cause. In light of expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964), this suggests that individuals may question whether their whistleblowing efforts will yield the desired outcomes, potentially leading to decreased intentions to blow the whistle. Guthrie and Taylor (2017) further argued that in an environment where retaliation is prevalent and support for whistleblowers is lacking, the introduction of monetary incentives, while seemingly positive, might even be seen as inconsistent, leading to lower levels of whistleblowing intentions.

To date, our understanding of whether and how these factors interact to influence external whistleblowing intentions remains limited, and the literature presents mixed findings on this issue. In an experimental study conducted by Lee et al. (2020), it was found that, among accountants in the United States, the presence of anti-retaliation protection fully buffers the effect of monetary rewards, whereas in the German sample, where there exists a strong distrust and weak protection of whistleblowers, anti-retaliation protection actually enhances its effect. Corresponding with the latter finding, the experimental study conducted by Guthrie and Taylor (2017) in the U.S. context also demonstrated that the presence of monetary rewards and a low threat of retaliation increased individuals’ trust, in turn leading to greater external whistleblowing intentions. This raises the question of how such interaction effects may manifest in other cultural contexts such as Thailand, where there is also a strong emphasis on organizational loyalty and distrust toward whistleblowers. It is worth noting that despite the conflicting findings in terms of interaction patterns, both studies report consistent results: the highest levels of whistleblowing intentions are observed when protection and rewards work in synergy. The final two hypotheses are thus formulated as follows.

Participants and Data Collection Procedures

Survey data were collected from central government employees in Thailand. This research was funded by Thailand Science Research and Innovation’s (TSRI’s) Fundamental Funds (FF) in 2022 and received ethics approval under PSU-HREC-2023-004-1-1. The sample size of 3,000 was determined a priori. A multi-stage sampling design was used. In the first stage, a purposive sample of 14 ministries located in Bangkok and its vicinity provinces were selected. These ministries offer diversity across various government functions. In the second stage, 2-3 departments within each ministry were selected, totaling 38 departments. In the last stage, about 50-150 employees from each department (depending upon their size) were invited to participate in the study. This sampling procedure represents a non-probability design, which is a common approach in most behavioral research (Memon et al., 2020). Nonetheless, meticulous efforts were made to ensure the representativeness of the sample, with particular attention to gender and hierarchical position distributions.

A formal invitation letter was submitted to each department about two weeks prior to the data collection. A team of researchers were hired to hand-distribute the survey questionnaires. A key strength of in-person survey lies in the high response rates (Baruch & Holtom, 2008). Each questionnaire informed the respondents that: (a) their responses were entirely voluntary and that they could opt out anytime; (b) their personal information and responses would be kept confidential, and (c) no traceable identifiers were to be provided by the respondents. To ensure further confidentiality, each respondent was asked to fold and staple the completed questionnaire before returning it to the researchers. Any opened questionnaires were excluded from the data entry. Over a period of three months, out of 3,000 questionnaires distributed, 2,710 (unopened) questionnaires from all the 38 departments were successfully returned to the lead researcher, with a response rate of 90.33%.

Measures

The focus of this research is on the disclosure of grand-corruption, which refers to large-scale misconduct involving high-level government officials and large sums of money, often including the embezzlement of public funds, whereby lower-level employees are complicit (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016). The respondents were first asked to rate the seriousness of the following corruption activities: (a) diverting funds from public works projects financed by the government; (b) accepting bribes from contractors to carry out inspections on work they know is substandard; (c) requesting a commission or kickbacks from a contractor as a condition for awarding a contract or completing a transaction; and (d) colluding with bidders in a major government auction. The list was drawn from previous work on corruption crimes in Thailand (Vichit-Vadakan, 2017). The scale for this measure was based on a 5-point Likert-type, where 1 = not serious at all to 5 = most serious. The respondents were also asked to rate the perceived risk of reporting these activities using a 5-point Likert-type scale, where 1 = not at all risky to 5 = most risky) (see also Keil et al., 2010). Next, the respondents were asked to rate their external whistleblowing intentions (α = .90) by indicating how likely they would blow the whistle via the following outlets: (a) the NACC and the PACC; (b) the Office of the Auditor-General and the Police Department; (c) the media as well as social media outlets; and (d) watchdog organizations. This summated measure was adapted from the 4-item Likert-type scale developed by Park and Blenkinsopp (2009), where 1 = not at all and 5 = very certain.

Next, the respondents were asked to indicate their reward expectancy, PSM, and perceived whistleblower protection. Reward expectancy (α = .90) was measured by adapting the items from previous research, which comprise both monetary and non-monetary components (Cho & Perry, 2012; Dungan et al., 2019; Shoaib & Baruch, 2019). Specifically, the respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which they agree with the following: “I expect that I will receive a monetary reward if I blow the whistle ” (monetary), “I anticipate that I will be fairly compensated if I blow the whistle” (monetary), and “I believe that if I blow the whistle, I will be commended or awarded for my actions” (non-monetary). A 5-point Likert-type scale was employed where 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree. PSM (α = .90) was measured using two items, whereby the respondents were asked to indicate how important they personally consider opportunities to “help others” and “be useful to society” (Westover & Taylor, 2010; Wright et al., 2013). A 5-point Likert-type scale was employed where 1 = not at all important and 5 = very important. Finally, perceived whistleblower protection (α = .96) was measured by asking the respondents to indicate the degree to which they agree with the following items: (a) “If I blow the whistle, I am confident that my identity will be protected”; (b) “If I blow the whistle, I am confident that my physical and psychological well-being will not be harmed”; and (c) “If I blow the whistle, I am confident that I will be treated fairly in the process.” The respondents were also asked to provide their own demographic information including gender (coded 1 for women and 0 for men), age (in years), education (coded 0 for below a bachelor’s degree, 1 for a bachelor’s degree, 2 for a master’s degree and 3 for PhD), organizational tenure (in years and/or months), hierarchical positions (coded 0 for contract workers, 1 for clerical workers, 2 for professional workers, 3 for managerial workers and 4 for executives) and salary (0 = less than 15,000 baht and 8 for more than 50,000 baht).

Data Analytics

Given the clustered nature of the data, it is possible that the observations were non-independent, which can result in underestimated standard errors and exaggerated tests of statistical significance (Hox et al., 2010). Thus, all the analyses were conducted using hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) in STATA, Version 13.0 (StataCorp, 2012) with the command xtmixed and maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). Because all predictor variables were conceptualized and assessed at the individual level, this study follows the recommendations by Preacher et al. (2010) by focusing on employee-level effects while also accounting for unit-level effects (i.e., random intercepts). By placing the outcome variable at the unit level, this study recognizes that levels of external whistleblowing may differ across units, while the primary focus remains on individual-level effects. This consideration is particularly relevant given that rewards and whistleblower protection are exclusively provided by the NACC and/or the PACC rather than by the government agencies themselves. Since employees were nested under departments and ministries, it was possible to model an error term at each level of analysis. Null (intercept-only) models were first estimated to determine the degree of non-independence in external whistleblowing intentions at each level. The results showed that the ministry-level variance is minimal (the intraclass correlation [ICC] = .012) compared with the department-level variance (ICC = .127). Because there was nearly no variation at the ministry level, the decision was made to exclude the ministry-level effect and retain only the department-level effect (see Hox et al., 2010).

For the main analyses, all the independent variables were first regressed on the outcome variable in one block with the control variables. Following the recommendation of Dawson (2014), separate analyses were conducted for each of the three interaction terms. This approach allows for the calculation of Cohen’s f², a measure of effect size, which assesses the proportion of variance in the dependent variable that can be explained by the interaction between the predictor variable and the moderator variable, after accounting for the main effects of both variables (Aiken & West, 1991). For comparison, a model in which all the interaction terms were entered simultaneously was also tested. Note that all the predictor variables were grand-mean centered before creating the interaction terms to avoid multicollinearity (Dawson, 2014). Simple slope tests were also conducted to determine the significance of slopes at the high and low levels of each moderator (one SD above or below the mean) (Aiken & West, 1991; Dawson, 2014).

Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations

The characteristics of the respondents are presented in Table 1. The majority of the respondents were female (63.84%), compared with 59.21% of the population. Regarding the position classification, most of the respondents were professional workers (54.72%), followed by contract workers (24.83%) and clerical workers (17.56%), managers (1.96%), and executives (0.37%). In comparison, the population had the following characteristics: contract workers (26.19%), clerical workers (17.10%) professional workers (55.41%), managers (1.09%), and executives (0.18%). In terms of education, most of the respondents had a bachelor’s degree or higher (92.29%), compared with 82.42% of the population. In general, these results suggest that the sample characteristics closely mirror those of the overall workforce. The average age of the respondents was 38.71 years (standard deviation [SD] = 11.05). The average tenure is 11.08 years (SD = 9.71).

OPEN IN VIEWER

Table 1.

Demographic Information (n = 2,710).

Demographics	Description	Frequency	Percent (%)
Gender	Male (0)	964	35.57
	Female (1)	1,730	63.84
	Missing	16	0.59
Age (years)	21–30	561	20.7
	31–40	983	36.27
	41–50	671	24.76
	51–60	435	16.05
	Missing	60	2.21
Education	Below bachelor’s	178	6.57
	Bachelor’s	1,477	54.5
	Master’s	984	36.31
	PhD	40	1.48
	Missing	31	1.14
Tenure (years)	0–10	1,433	52.88
	10–20	618	22.8
	20–30	403	14.87
	30–40	160	5.9
	Missing	96	3.54
Positions	Contract-based workers	673	24.83
	Clerical workers	476	17.56
	Professional workers	1,483	54.72
	Managerial workers	53	1.96
	Executives	10	0.37
	Missing	15	0.55
Salary (in baht)	<15,000	265	9.78
	15,000–19,999	769	28.38
	20,000–24,999	463	17.08
	25,000–29,999	328	12.1
	30,000–34,999	258	9.52
	35,000–39,999	164	6.05
	40,000–44,999	178	6.57
	45,000–49,999	88	3.25
	≥50,000	179	6.61
	Missing	18	0.66

Due to some missing values in the dataset (less than 3.59% for the demographic data and less than 0.7% for the main constructs), Little’s missing completely at random (MCAR) test was conducted. The result showed that the chi-square was 163.484 with 146 degrees of freedom, for a significance of 0.153, which indicates that the missing data were MCAR. With MCAR and less than 5% of missing values, the decision was made to replace the missing values with the mean or mode values for the continuous and categorical variables, respectively, for all the following analyses (Schafer & Graham, 2002).

As shown in Table 2, the bivariate correlations analyses showed that reward expectancy, PSM, perceived seriousness of wrongdoing, and whistleblower protection were all positively correlated with external whistleblowing intentions (r = .165, p < .01; r = .272, p < .01; r =.177, p < .01; r = .397, p < .01, respectively). The Cronbach’s alphas of all the key constructs were .90 or above.

OPEN IN VIEWER

Table 2.

Bivariate Correlations and Descriptive Statistics (n = 2,710).

No.	Variables	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1	Extwhis	2.90	.97	(.90)
2	Gender	.64	.47	−.05**	—
3	Age	38.71	11.05	−.07**	−.01	—
4	Education	2.32	.62	.02	−.01	.13**	—
5	Tenure	11.08	9.71	−.08**	.00	.81**	.11**	—
6	Positions	2.35	.88	−.04	−.11**	.29**	.48**	.23**	—
7	Salary	3.64	1.26	−.07**	−.04*	.76**	.33**	.79**	.45**	—
8	Risk	3.84	2.30	−.03	.05**	−.08**	.08**	−.05**	.04*	−.04*	—
9	Reward	3.46	.82	.16**	.00	−.05**	−.02	−.06**	−.07**	−.05**	.00	(.90)
10	Seriousness	3.78	1.29	.17**	.05**	−.13**	.04*	−.11**	−.01	−.10**	.63**	.08**	—
11	PSM	3.92	.70	.27**	.00	.05**	.08**	.05**	.07**	.08**	.02	.23**	.13**	(.90)
12	Protection	3.00	.97	.39**	−.00	−.02	−.05**	−.04*	−.06**	−.06**	−.20**	.11**	.05**	.25**	(.96)

Note. Extwhis = external whistleblowing intentions; PSM = public service motivation.

*

= p < .05. ** = p < .01.

Confirmatory Factor Analysis

Confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) were conducted to show the discriminant validity of the constructs containing multiple items (Hair et al., 2006). The results showed that the four-factor model, which comprised external whistleblowing intentions, reward expectancy, PSM, and whistleblower protection, had an acceptable fit to the data (χ² = 943.500, df = 48, p < .001; RMSEA = .08; CFI = .97; TLI = .96). This model was significantly better than other alternative models. For example, a one-factor model in which all the items were combined under one factor resulted in significantly poorer fit (χ² = 17,585.739, df = 54, p < .001; RMSEA = .34; CFI = .41; TLI = .28).

Common Method Bias

As self-reported data were used, Harman’s single-factor test was conducted to examine whether common method bias (CMB) was present (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Although Harman’s test does not control for method effects, it is a commonly employed diagnostic tool for detecting CMB (Fuller et al., 2016). Based on the unrotated principal component factor analysis, the results showed that four factors accounted for 87.56% of the variance and that the first largest factor accounted for 40.22 % of the variance, less than 50%. These results suggest that CMB was unlikely to be a serious concern.

Hypothesis Testing

Direct Effects: Hypotheses 1, 3, and 5

Table 3 reports all the results from the HLM analyses. As can be seen in Model 1, the results showed that reward expectancy, PSM, seriousness of wrongdoing and whistleblower protection were significantly related to external whistleblowing intentions (b = .072, p < .01; b = .203 p < .001; b =.107, p < .001; b = .305, p < .001, respectively). These results provide full support for Hypotheses 1, 3, and 5. The results in Model 1 also showed that external whistleblowing intentions were lower among female workers (b = −.116, p < .01), whereas those with higher education reported higher levels of external whistleblowers intentions (b = .067, p < .05). Although the results were marginally significant, those with longer organizational tenure (b = −.005, p < .10) as well as those who perceived a high risk of reporting (b = −.034, p < .10) were found to have lower external whistleblowing intentions. The explained variance (R²) for this model is .2403.

OPEN IN VIEWER

Table 3.

Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) Analyses (n = 2,710).

Predictors	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Constant	2.93***	.103	2.91***	.102	2.92***	.103	2.93***	.102	2.93***	.101
Control variables
Gender (1 = female)	−.116**	.036	−.112**	.035	−.116**	.036	−.114**	.036	−.111**	.035
Age (years)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Education	.067*	.032	.064*	.032	.069*	.032	.065*	.032	.065*	.032
Organizational tenure	−.005 t	.003	−.005 t	.003	−.005 t	.003	−.005 t	.003	−.005 t	.003
Salary	−.001	.014	−.000	.014	−.000	.014	−.000	.014	−.000	.014
Positions	−.019	.023	−.014	.023	−.017	.023	−.017	.023	−.013	.023
Perceived risk of reporting	−.034 t	.019	−.028	.019	−.032 t	.019	−.033 t	.019	−.026 t	.019
Independent variables
Reward expectancy	.072**	.021	.054*	.021	.071**	.021	.075**	.021	.056**	.021
PSM	.203***	.026	.223***	.026	.206***	.026	.206***	.026	.224***	.026
Seriousness of wrongdoing	.107***	.018	.107***	.018	.107***	.018	.105***	.018	.106***	.018
Whistleblower protection	.305***	.019	.306***	.019	.306***	.019	.301***	.019	.305***	.019
Interaction terms
Reward × PSM	–	–	.137***	.025	–	–	–	–	.118***	.026
Reward × seriousness	–	–	–	–	.035*	.015	–	–	.022	.018
Reward × Protection	–	–	–	–	–	–	.060**	.018	.029	.019
Variance of random effects		.158		.140		.151		.136		.131
Variance of residuals		.849		.845		.848		.848		.844
R2		.2403		.2525		.2433		.2477		.2554

Note. Snijders/Bosker R² was obtained in STATA using “mltrsq.” PSM = public service motivation.

t = p < .10. * = p < .05. ** = p < .01. *** = p < .001.

Moderation Effects: Hypotheses 2, 4, and 6

As shown in Models 2-4, the results showed that the influence of reward expectancy on external whistleblowing intentions was significantly moderated by PSM (b = .137, p < .001), seriousness of wrongdoing (b = .035, p < .05), and whistleblower protection (b = .060, p < .01). The R² observed for Models 2-4 was .2525, .2433, and .2477, respectively. Accordingly, the effect sizes (Cohen’s f²) for Models 2, 3, and 4 (in comparison to Model 1) is 0.0161, 0.0039, and 0.0098, respectively, which are higher than the mean and median effect sizes of .0.009 and 0.002 observed in moderation research (Aguinis et al., 2005).

Furthermore, as shown in Figure 2, simple slope tests revealed that reward expectancy was more positively related to external whistleblowing intentions when PSM was high (b = . 0.152, p < .001) than when it was low (b = −.044, p = ns). Likewise, as shown in Figure 3, reward expectancy was more positively related to external whistleblowing intentions when seriousness of wrongdoing was high (b = .117, p < .001) than when it was low (b = .026, p = ns). Finally, as shown in Figure 4, reward expectancy was more positively related to external whistleblowing intentions when whistleblower protection was high (b = .134, p < .001) than when it was low (b = .016, p = ns). The results provide full support for Hypotheses 2, 4, and 6. Note, however, that when all the three interaction terms were entered simultaneously in Model 5, only PSM had a significant moderating effect (b = .118, p < .001), whereas the moderating effects of perceived seriousness of wrongdoing and whistleblower protection were nonsignificant.

OPEN IN VIEWER

Figure 2.

Interaction plot (reward expectancy × PSM) (Table 3; Model 1).

OPEN IN VIEWER

Figure 3.

Interaction plot (reward expectancy × seriousness of wrongdoing) (Table 3; Model 2).

OPEN IN VIEWER

Figure 4.

Interaction plot (reward expectancy × whistleblower protection) (Table 3; Model 3).

Supplementary Analyses: Contrasting the Effects of Monetary Versus Non-Monetary Rewards

This study conducted additional analyses to explore whether the interaction results would differ when distinguishing between monetary rewards (using Items 1 and 2) and non-monetary rewards (using Item 3). Although these analyses were not based on formal hypotheses, they can offer a nuanced understanding of the possible differential interaction effects between monetary versus non-monetary rewards and PSM, seriousness of wrongdoing, and whistleblower protection. As presented in Table A1, which can be found in the Appendix, the results showed that, for the “monetary reward” models, all the three interaction terms were significant in the predicted directions. For the “non-monetary reward” models, all the interaction terms were also significant, except for that of reward expectancy and wrongdoing seriousness. Furthermore, when all the interaction terms were entered simultaneously in the “monetary reward” model, only PSM and seriousness of wrongdoing showed significant moderating effects, whereas the moderating effects of whistleblower protection were nonsignificant. Finally, for the “non-monetary reward” model, only PSM and whistleblower protection had significant moderating effects, whereas the moderating role of wrongdoing seriousness was nonsignificant. Overall, it appears that PSM had the most consistent moderating effect across different analyses.

Theoretical Implications

The provision of whistleblower rewards remains a controversial debate in both the public administration literature (Bellé, 2015; Kellough & Lu, 1993; Perry et al., 2009) and the broader whistleblowing literature (Feldman & Lobel, 2010; Howse & Daniels, 1995; Nyreröd & Spagnolo, 2021). Although the influence of reward expectancy was found to be relatively modest compared with other factors, the findings from this research indicate that whistleblower rewards can offer additional incentives for individuals to consider taking the risk of reporting large-scale corruption activities. The current findings are consistent with previous research—mostly carried out in the U.S. corporate setting—which examined both actual whistleblower data (Dyck et al., 2010) and whistleblowing intentions via experimental (Andon et al., 2018; Feldman & Lobel, 2010; Guthrie & Taylor, 2017; Lee et al., 2020; Pope & Lee, 2013; Rose et al., 2018) and field research (Iwasaki, 2019). To date, research on the effect of rewards on public-sector whistleblowing remains sparse and further research is needed to understand their potential benefits especially in non-Western contexts.

Notably, this research contributes to the whistleblowing literature by shedding light on both individual and situational factors that can enhance the influence of whistleblower rewards on external whistleblowing intentions. As pointed out by Perry et al. (2009, p. 44), “a variety of contextual factors appear to moderate the effectiveness of performance-related pay systems [in the public sector].” The central argument of this research, which is based on the insights from expectancy theory (Porter & Lawler, 1968a; Vroom, 1964), is that individuals make decisions about whether or not to blow the whistle based on the multiple factors that affect their beliefs about the outcomes. The results, which are consistent with the predictions, indicate that the positive influence of reward expectancy on external whistleblowing intentions is more pronounced among individuals with high PSM, in cases where corruption is perceived to be serious, and when whistleblower protection is perceived to be present. Although previous research indicates the effect of whistleblower rewards may vary depending on a variety of factors (e.g., Berger et al., 2017; Feldman & Lobel, 2010; Rose et al., 2018), few studies have shed light on the relevance of PSM, seriousness of wrongdoing and whistleblower protection.

First, let us revisit the original research question: Do extrinsic rewards crowd in or crowd out the PSM of prospective whistleblowers? The current findings indicate that individuals with high PSM appear to place more value on the prospect of receiving rewards for their whistleblowing actions than do those with low PSM, which provides strong support to the crowding in effect. This result holds true for both monetary and non-monetary rewards (see the supplementary analyses). Therefore, in the realm of whistleblowing, it appears that extrinsic rewards do not necessarily crowd out the motivation of high-PSM individuals. This study adds to the extant literature by being among the first to shed light on the interplay between external rewards and PSM in predicting whistleblowing intentions. The closest empirical evidence to date is that offered by Feldman and Lobel (2010), who showed that whistleblowing intentions are highest in the presence of high rewards and high legal duty to report wrongdoing. Thus, apart from serving as a direct form of compensation for the costs incurred by whistleblowers (Kenny & Fotaki, 2023), the current results lend strong credence to the notion that the provision of extrinsic rewards can serve to validate the efforts and public service dedication of potential whistleblowers with high PSM.

The question thus arises as to why the prospect of receiving external rewards not dilute the motivation of those with high PSM but enhance it? According to Deci and Ryan’s (1985) cognitive evaluation theory, upon which Frey and Jegen’s (2001) motivation crowding theory was built, the crowding out effect occurs when individuals perceive rewards as controlling. In situations involving task performance (Frey & Jegen, 2001; Weibel et al., 2010) or learning (Ki, 2022), offering extrinsic rewards for tasks that individuals would otherwise perform voluntarily can undermine their intrinsic motivation as it sends a message that they are engaging in the behavior solely for the sake of the reward, rather than because they find the task inherently satisfying or aligned with their values. However, insights from Deci and Ryan (2012) also suggest that whistleblower rewards need not undermine individuals’ intrinsic motivation to blow the whistle if they allow individuals to feel a sense of autonomy (e.g., by offering choices and transparency), competence (e.g., by emphasizing their dedication), and relatedness (e.g., by highlighting the positive impact of their actions). To the extent that rewards are framed appropriately, potential whistleblowers with high PSM may be further motivated to blow the whistle because they perceive such rewards as strong validation for their moral conviction and courageous acts. These arguments align closely with the underlying logic of expectancy theory (Lawler, 1981; Porter & Lawler, 1968a; Vroom, 1964). Thus, while previous research indicates that public-sector whistleblowers are more motivated by their willingness to sacrifice to society and are less motivated by monetary rewards (e.g., Brewer & Selden, 1998), the current findings suggest that it may be unrealistic to assume that public-sector employees would be willing to put their career on the line solely for purely altruistic reasons, devoid of any rewards.

Second, the results from this study shed light on the role of wrongdoing seriousness in enhancing the effect of reward expectancy. In particular, the results suggest that when wrongdoing is perceived to be serious, individuals view the potential harm to the organization or society as substantial, thereby enhancing the perceived valence of rewards. In other words, the prospect of receiving rewards gains greater personal significance in the context of challenging tasks such as whistleblowing. The current findings contradict those from previous experimental research, which found that individuals feel obligated to report serious financial crime regardless of whether financial rewards are offered or not (Andon et al., 2018; Dyck et al., 2010; Feldman & Lobel, 2010). A plausible explanation for such divergent findings is that, in the current research context, individuals may simply be more inclined to take greater risks due to the perception of substantial potential gains that result from the recovery of damages in cases of large-scale corruption (i.e., the seriousness of the corruption crime results in the prospect of receiving a larger reward). This is further corroborated by the results from the supplementary analyses, which showed that perceived seriousness of wrongdoing only interacted with “monetary” rewards to predict external whistleblowing intention. In this respect, a higher reward may be seen as a necessary incentive to outweigh these risks and motivate individuals to come forward with valuable information (Buccirossi et al., 2021).

Finally, this research reveals the importance of whistleblower protection in strengthening the effect of reward expectancy. While rewards and whistleblower protection are suggested to be among the most important regulatory mechanisms for motivating whistleblowing (Feldman & Lobel, 2010; Lee et al., 2020; Schechter, 2017), few studies have examined their combined effects. In line with expectancy theory (Porter & Lawler, 1968a; Vroom, 1964), the results suggest that whistleblower protection may serve to augment the instrumental aspect of external rewards. When individuals believe that the reporting system is trustworthy, and that responsible agencies are committed to rectifying wrongdoing, it can endow individuals with additional confidence and conviction that their actions will lead to a positive outcome (Fudge & Schlacter, 1999). Remember that whether a whistleblowing action results in a financial bounty or not hinges upon a successful litigation of the offender. Thus, in a high-retaliation environment where support for whistleblowers is lacking, the introduction of monetary incentives, while seemingly positive, might be seen as inconsistent and hypocritical, leading to the erosion of trust (Guthrie & Taylor, 2017). This finding is especially pertinent to the current research context where few whistleblowers manage to recover the rewards from authorities, whether monetary or non-monetary, let alone going through protracted court procedures and bearing significant legal costs. Thus, as noted by Kenny and Fotaki (2023) “where we cannot safely minimize this risk, it is not reasonable to compel them to come forward.”

Practical Implications

The findings offer several practical implications for regulatory policy in relation to whistleblower rewards. First and foremost, regulatory bodies such as the NACC and PACC must demonstrate a strong commitment to their reward programs. If potential whistleblowers believe that their actions will not result in the prospect of receiving a reward, it is unlikely that they will come forward with information. These agencies must foster an environment where potential whistleblowers can have confidence in the efficacy of the reward system. In this respect, it is advisable that a dual approach be employed, using both monetary and non-monetary incentives to motivate whistleblowers. In fact, this study argues that non-monetary rewards can be a powerful motivational tool even in the absence of financial incentives. To illustrate, publicly showcasing the unwavering dedication of whistleblowers who expose public-sector corruption in the interest of the public can send a compelling message to society. This recognition may also include awards, certificates, or even public statements praising their courage. Such efforts hold the potential to inspire those with strong dedication to public service. Moreover, the current findings suggest that when dealing with serious misconduct such as large-scale corruption, regulatory bodies should offer commensurate rewards or other forms of compensation that adequately offset the potential risks involved in reporting (Buccirossi et al., 2021).

In addition, to maximize the effectiveness of whistleblower reward systems, it is crucial to enact and enforce a strong whistleblower protection system. Such a system should include various elements including (a) protection of whistleblower identity, (b) whistleblower support programs (e.g., legal counseling and financial support during the prosecution process), (c) safeguards against retaliation (e.g., temporary relocation to secure workplace, shielding whistleblowers from potential harm, and protecting their employment status), and (d) an emphasis on fair and timely processes (e.g., how corruption cases are investigated, processed, and adjudicated and regular updates). Many employees hesitate to report misconduct simply due to concerns that their actions may have no discernible impact (Pope & Lee, 2013). Furthermore, whistleblowers may face the risk that the disclosed information is not sufficient to secure a criminal conviction against the wrongdoer (Howse & Daniels, 1995), who are often cushioned by existing laws and bureaucratic disciplinary processes (Onyango, 2021). In such cases, unless the protection of whistleblowers is “sufficient to redress the imbalance between the disincentives and incentives for whistleblowing, there is a plausible prima facie case that additional incentives are needed to achieve a socially optimal level of whistleblowing” (Howse & Daniels, 1995, p. 534).

Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that offering rewards and over-protection of whistleblowers carry the potential for unintended consequences, such as the risk of encouraging bad faith reporting and false accusations (Feldman & Lobel, 2010; Nyreröd & Spagnolo, 2021). In this respect, it may be critical for regulatory bodies to weigh the benefits and costs of adopting “belief-based” versus “fact-based” whistleblowing regimes. In the former, protection is granted immediately after a claim is filed, whereas in the latter, protection is typically only granted after the validity of the whistleblower’s claim has been established (Mechtenberg et al., 2020).

Study Limitations and Areas for Future Research

Despite the above findings, this study has certain limitations that warrant consideration. First, like most research in this area (e.g., Andon et al., 2018; Cho & Song, 2015; Park & Blenkinsopp, 2009), this study examined whistleblowing intentions rather than actual behavior. This is due to the general difficulty in collecting large survey data on actual whistleblowing behavior (Bjørkelo & Bye, 2014). Nonetheless, asking what individuals intend to do should they become aware of the wrongdoing can be a better reflection of the current organizational context than retrospectively studying their past behavior (Kaptein, 2011). Second, the data used in this research were cross-sectional, and their causality cannot be definitively inferred. Third, the data were drawn from the same source of respondents, which may still raise concerns about CMB. Although public administration scholars indicate that interaction effects are robust against CMB (Jakobsen & Jensen, 2015), future research should try to collect data from multiple sources when possible.

Furthermore, it is important to recognize the findings could be influenced by collectivistic cultural values in the current research context, which may have diminished the potential benefits of rewards (Lee et al., 2020; Park et al., 2005). In collectivistic cultures, such as Thailand, whistleblowers who are motivated by financial rewards might be perceived (or fear that they will be perceived) less favorably for prioritizing personal gain rather than acting in the best interest of the organization or society (Lee et al., 2020; Park et al., 2005). Thus, while it has been indicated that rewards could be a game-changer that dramatically increases detection rates (Dyck et al., 2010), it is important to recognize that the influence of rewards is context-specific. Future research needs to be conducted in different cultural contexts to replicate the current findings. Moreover, future research can extend the current study by investigating the differential effects of monetary versus non-monetary reward in the context of citizen whistleblowers (Su & Ni, 2018). It is plausible that citizen whistleblowers may place less importance on non-monetary rewards, as they may not prioritize status as employees do. Up until now, our understanding of whether financial incentives lead to an increase in the number or quality of disclosures is also lacking, which deserves future research attention (Nyreröd & Spagnolo, 2021).