Why Do Partisan Audiences Participate? Perceived Public Opinion as the Mediating Mechanism

Partisan Media and Political Participation

The recent proliferation of politicized media outlets has triggered a wave of interest among communication scholars (Holbert, Garrett, & Gleason, 2010). Considerably less attention, however, has been devoted to possible influences of exposure to such outlets on political participation: only a handful of studies appear to have dealt with this question directly. Using panel data, Dilliplane (2011) demonstrated that during the 2008 U.S. election campaign, exposure to congruent news increased participation whereas exposure to incongruent news decreased it. A similar pattern was observed in an analysis of two other survey data sets independently collected during the 2008 election, though in this study, the negative effect of crosscutting media exposure was contingent on participation in online political discussion (Brundidge, Garrett, Rojas, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2014). Congruent exposure to partisan news media was also associated with political participation in Stroud’s (2011) data with some indication from panel studies that exposure is linked to participation. In an experimental setting, Knobloch-Westerwick and Johnson (2014) demonstrated that participants who had been exposed to congruent content online assessed the likelihood of participating in politics at a future time more positively. Finally, in a field experiment manipulating the ideological content to which Ghanan public-transportation passengers were exposed, Conroy-Krutz and Moehler (2015) showed that incongruent exposure decreased participation whereas exposure to congruent content had no influence on it. Similar patterns can be found in work focusing on the influence of discussion network heterogeneity on participation. Crosscutting political discussion have been shown to depress various forms of political engagement and there is some evidence that likeminded discussion increases participation (Eveland & Hively, 2009; Mutz & Silver, 2014; however, see Huckfeldt, Mendez, & Osborn, 2004; McLeod et al., 1999; Scheufele, Nisbet, Brossard, & Nisbet, 2004). ¹

But why and how does congruent ideological exposure increase political participation? The current investigation explores the possibility that perceptions of opinion climate—what audiences think the public believes—mediate that process.

Partisan Media and Perception of Opinion Climate

Members of the public infer majority opinion from media coverage (Hoffman, 2013; Hoffman, Glynn, Huge, Sietman, & Thomson, 2007; Mutz & Soss, 1997). When gauging public opinion, individuals tend to rely on exemplars, such as people in their immediate surroundings, rather than on opinion distribution data (Zillmann, 1999; Zillmann, Gibson, Sundar, & Perkins, 1996), and the media supply catchy examples of what “the man on the street” thinks, coloring individuals’ perceptions of public opinion.

How can this principle be applied to those who rely on partisan media? We argue that if individuals consume one-sided partisan media, which are rife with homogeneous examples, their perception of the majority opinion may be tilted (Baum & Groeling, 2008). There is considerable evidence that the partisan news media tend to display greater support for their political camp. In the context of the Israeli pullout from the Gaza Strip (“the disengagement”), for example, content analysis demonstrated that Israeli right-wing newspapers’ coverage of this debate included relatively more opponents of the disengagement than mainstream newspapers, while also featuring fewer supporters. That is, the coverage included more exemplars that were consistent with the newspapers’ ideological stand (Dvir-Gvirsman, Tzfati, Menchen-Trevino, 2014, see in particular Endnote 2). In the United States, Baum and Groeling (2008) have shown that partisan outlets tend to highlight news favorable to the associated party. Similarly, analysis of partisan television news transcripts over a 12-month period shows that these outlets tend to use more positive language when referring to the favored party (Holtzman, Schott, Jones, Balota, & Yarkoni, 2011).

When exposed to congruent media outlets, a person is bombarded with anecdotal evidence that people share his or her views and will probably form an impression of false public consensus (Dvir-Gvirsman, 2014b; Wang et al., 2011; Wojcieszak, 2008). More specifically, the exposure to a biased sample of exemplars renders similar opinions cognitively more accessible and highly salient (Wojcieszak, 2011; Wojcieszak & Rojas, 2011), and as a result, facilitates the formation of public consensus consistent with the ideological media’s perspective (Wojcieszak, 2011; Wojcieszak & Rojas, 2011). Cognitive availability of an opinion is mistakenly interpreted as an indicator of its frequency among the public (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The opposite effect occurs on exposure to incongruent media outlets (Mutz & Martin, 2002; Wojcieszak & Rojas, 2011), which supply examples contravening one’s own views. As a result, one draws out exemplars from a more diverse “sampling frame.”

This is consistent with Wojcieszak’s (2011) finding that exposure to diverse news sources attenuates over-estimation of support for one’s personal opinion. A reverse process is outlined by Tsfati, Stroud, and Chotiner (2013), who demonstrated the bias-inducing influence of exposure to congruent media outlets. So far, however, only one study has tested concomitantly the effect of incongruent exposure and the complementary effect of congruent exposure on the accuracy of public opinion perceptions (Dvir-Gvirsman, 2014b). That study demonstrates that although incongruent exposure prevents over-estimation of support for one’s personal opinion, exposure to congruent content promotes it.

A person who is exposed to partisan media from one side of the political map does not, however, necessarily avoid the other side (Garrett, 2009). There is even some evidence that crosscutting and congruent exposure are positively correlated (Garrett et al., 2013; Holbert, Hmielowski, & Weeks, 2012). Given that congruent exposure and incongruent exposure are distinct yet sometimes linked behaviors and that the two types of exposure may propel individuals’ perception of public opinion in opposite directions, a comprehensive analysis is important. Moreover, testing both types of exposure helps to capture the range of exemplars provided by partisan media.

Perception of Opinion Climate and Political Participation

One of the most tested theories of public opinion, the spiral of silence, posits that when we feel that majority opinion is against us, we refrain from expressing our opinions out of a fear of social isolation (Noelle-Neumann, 1974; Scheufele & Moy, 2000). Extending this logic to an environment in which people believe they are in the majority, it follows that these individuals should feel safe to express their opinions (Mutz & Silver, 2014). Indeed, a case has been made regarding the effect of people’s perceptions of opinion climate on their willingness to express their opinions in public (Glynn, Hayes, & Shanahan, 1997). Only a handful of studies have tested whether people actually express their political opinions under the influence of such perceptions (Hayes, Uldall, & Glynn, 2010; Matthes, 2011) and even fewer have investigated a broader range of public participatory acts (Scheufele & Eveland, 2001).

One should recall that Noelle-Neumann’s original model focused specifically on an individual’s willingness to speak up in a hypothetical situation such as a future political discussion, interview, and so on. Yet, a number of researchers (e.g., Hayes, 2007)—including the authors of this article—assert that this theory should hold for a more diverse range of public expression, including political participation. Can we not view signing petitions, participating in protests, and posting and sharing political materials on Facebook as forms of political expression that should all be affected by fear of isolation? ²

It also has been argued that we should shift scholarly focus from individuals’ opinions regarding what they might do to what they have actually done (Hayes & Matthes, 2014; Scheufele, Shanahan, & Lee, 2001). Numerous findings show that the link between individuals’ expected behavior and their actual behavior is tenuous at best (Bohner & Dickel, 2011). People are poor judges of the social forces that might be at play in any given situation, influencing their actual behavior. Moreover, in many studies testing the spiral of silence, participants were asked about their willingness to express their opinions to unsympathetic listeners (Glynn et al., 1997). Such questions highlights one element of social context (namely, conflict) at the expense of other comparably relevant elements (e.g., the importance of the issue), potentially exaggerating the silencing effect. This methodological artifact can be reduced by asking people whether they, in actuality, tend to abstain from expressing their opinion. Among the very few studies that explored that avenue are Scheufele et al. (2001). The study compared replies to questions about a hypothetical scenario with replies to questions about behavioral intentions after participants had been told that they would be contacted in the future with the purpose of soliciting their political participation. The findings indicate substantially higher rates of abstinence when participants thought that they would be contacted in the future (see also Hayes, Shanahan, & Glynn, 2001). Going one step further, Hayes, Uldall, and Glynn (2001) conducted an experiment in which they asked participants to attend a discussion group. Two other notable studies, which targeted different issues, measured real-world political participation as part of their procedure. For instance, Scheufele and Eveland (2001) studied participation during the 1996 U.S. national election campaign, showing it to be related to participants’ perception of the chances for their preferred candidate to win the election. ³

Combining H1 and H2, we assert that when individuals are situated in congruent media enclaves, they tend to form the impression of false consensus and to feel socially safe, which leads them to take political action.

The Current Study

Our study focuses on election campaigns—a period when political participation is normally on the rise—using two cases, one from the United States and the other from Israel, and employing a similar panel design in both. The approach adopted here is innovative, as only a few studies have tested partisan media effects outside the boundaries of the United States, and fewer still have used data from more than one country (Goldman & Mutz, 2011).

Israel and the United States differ in their parliamentary system. The Israeli political system is in many ways an antithesis of its American counterpart, in that it is parliamentary, multi-party to an extreme, and is based on a coalition power structure. We harness this difference to our advantage, by studying complementary aspects of public opinion perception. Following Scheufele and Eveland (2001), we asked American participants to assess each candidate’s chances to win—a conventional approach to gauging perceptions of opinion climate during U.S. elections, where horserace-style news coverage is commonplace (Ladd, 2010). In Israel, with its coalition power structure, such a measure would require numerous items. Even asking about the three or four main parties and likely winners would be complex and would not capture the societal distribution of opinion, given that forming a coalition involves political skills and willingness for compromises and the coalitions sometimes do not properly reflect the societal distribution of opinion. Instead, we asked Israeli participants to assess public opinion regarding four key issues that stood at the center of the elections. Taken together, the two cases afford the opportunity to explore two dimensions prominent in the political arena—issues and candidates. Additionally, in contrast to the work reviewed above, the focus here will be on perception of public opinion and not on their accuracy (i.e., level of over-estimation of support for one’s personal opinion). This is due to the fact that in the individual-level analysis of spiral of silence theory, it is less important whether or not our perceptions are anchored in social reality; it only matters whether these perceptions position us in the minority or in the majority.

Study 1: Israeli 2013 Election

Results

Before turning to formal tests of our hypothesis, we note the level of political participation observed by those who consume partisan media and those who do not. Figure 1 presents the level of participation by those who reported never being exposed to partisan media and those who reported being exposed at least once (using a cut point of 1.3, on a scale ranging from 1 = never to 5 = regularly), before and after the elections. At a first glance, it is evident that participation is significantly higher among those exposed to congruent media, and although change is evident over time, the increase is rather small. Still, it should be noted that the observation period, though politically intense, is brief. As for consumers of incongruent media, here too, as suggested, we see a demobilizing effect over time. ¹¹

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Figure 1.

Descriptive statistics of political participation according to exposure patterns.

We begin by examining the influence of congruent exposure (H1a) and incongruent exposure (H1b) on perception of public opinion. As reported in Table 1, and presented visually in Figure 2, congruent exposure has a consistently positive significant effect on perception of public opinion. More frequent use of congruent outlets is associated with perceived public support for one’s view, in both self-report and behavioral data. In contrast, the hypothesized effect of incongruent exposure was not supported by the data (H1b). ¹² Importantly, political participation at Wave 1 was not significantly associated with perception of public opinion—a finding that helps in establishing causal direction in the model.

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Table 1.

Effects of Congruent and Incongruent Exposure on Perception of Public Opinion and on Change in Net Favorability Toward Parties (Israeli Case): Mediated Model.

	Perception of public opinion			Change in public political participation
	U.S.	Israel		U.S.	Israel
	(n = 377)	Self report (n = 340)	Behavioral data (n = 332)	(n = 377)	Self report (n = 340)	Behavioral data (n = 332)
Congruent exposure	3.11*	4.89**	2.38**	0.29*	0.02	0.01
	(1.43)	(1.97)	(0.79)	(0.14)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Incongruent exposure	−1.73	−1.08	−0.43	−0.19	−0.00	0.01
	(1.87)	(2.24)	(0.72)	(0.18)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Mainstream outlet use	−1.01	−2.24*	−0.40	0.12	0.01	0.02
	(2.45)	(1.12)	(1.14)	(0.24)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Political leaning a	5.09*	−1.36	−1.00	−0.23	−0.01	−0.01
	(2.04)	(0.62)	(0.65)	(0.20)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Ideological extremity	2.99*	0.26	0.47	−0.13	0.10	0.10
	(1.37)	(0.98)	(1.00)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.01)
Political participation in Wave 1	—			0.57***	0. 72***	0.73***
				(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Perception of public opinion	—	—		0.01*	0.01*	0.01**
				(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	71.43***	46.0***	47.1***	−0.77	0.11	0.11
	(7.27)	(6.42)	(6.70)	(0.80)	(0.80)	(0.08)
R 2	.342	.070	.090	.636	.538	.540

Note. Cell values denote unstandardized coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). Control for political knowledge, ideological extremity at a later wave (U.S. Wave 3, Israel Wave 2), gender, age, and education. In Israel, religiosity; in the United States, ethnic identity.

a

For the United States, political leaning is a dummy corresponding to Obama support; in Israel, higher values indicate more left-leaning political orientations. Behavioral data: control for volume of web browsing.

†

p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

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Figure 2.

Results of mediated model—Israeli case.

Our hypothesis regarding the association between perception of opinion climate and political participation (H2) was confirmed as well: Those who believed public opinion to be on their side reported stepping up their public political participation during the campaign (see Table 1). Recall that this effect was obtained after controlling for initial levels of participation at Wave 1.

Next, we tested the mediated association between congruent exposure and political participation (H3). As hypothesized, in both cases, the association between exposure to congruent outlets and political participation was mediated by perception of public opinion. Indeed, significant indirect effects were observed (effect size self-report = .0063, SE = .004, 95% CI = [.005, .019]; effect size behavioral data = .0043, SE = .002, 95% CI = [.001, .011]. The association between exposure and participation was fully mediated.

Study 2: The 2012 U.S. Presidential Elections

Results

Here, too, we began with a simple exploration of differences in participation according to exposure patterns (see Figure 1). ¹⁶ As in the Israeli case, those using partisan media (both congruent and incongruent) are more politically active with a rather small increase in participation over time.

Before turning to details of these results, we note the striking comparability of results across analyses. The magnitude and direction of coefficients are very similar across models for all three data sets, suggesting both that the self-reported data are reliable and that the theoretical mechanisms apply to a variety of circumstances.

All the significant paths emerged in the first study were significant in the second study as well. As reported in Table 1, and presented visually in Figure 3, more frequent use of congruent outlets is associated with stronger beliefs that one’s candidate would win the elections (H1a). This belief, in turn, was positively associated with participation, after controlling for initial level of participation (H2). As in the first study, here too, the effect of incongruent exposure was not significant (H1b), and political participation did not have a significant effect on perception of public opinion. Lastly, as per H3, the association between exposure to congruent outlets and political participation was mediated by perception of public opinion (indirect effect size = .033, SE = .025, 90% CI = [.003; .090]). Figure 3 illustrates the mediated effect of exposure on participation. As can be seen, the change is rather small; still, it is significant and occurred over a short but important period of time—namely, an election campaign. Lastly, it should be noted that, although the association between exposure and participation was fully mediated in the Israeli case, congruent exposure in the United States still had a significant direct effect on participation. This may indicate that the U.S. case is subject to other mechanisms and processes.

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Figure 3.

The mediated effect of congruent exposure on increase political participation.

Discussion

We derived two hypotheses based on spiral of silence theory: First, media exposure influences the perception of the opinion climate; second, opinion-climate perceptions have an impact on political expression. Our data support both of these individual-level predictions. The first hypothesis is validated by the finding that exposure to congruent media was associated with biased perceptions of public opinion. The second hypothesis is confirmed by the finding that perceived public support for one’s opinions was associated with political outspokenness and politically meaningful acts. The pattern was the same in both behavioral and self-report data and in the United States and Israel.

The finding that incongruent exposure had little effect on political participation—in contrast to congruent content, which did—may suggest that audience members react to these two types of messages quite differently. It seems that when a media message aligns with our preconceptions, we tend to be receptive to and influenced by it. In contrast, the results of this and other studies (Taber, Cann, & Kucsova, 2009; Taber & Lodge, 2006) suggest that people are far less open to incongruent messages and may even actively resist them; consequently, the effects of such exposure on political perceptions and political participation might be quite minimal. This stands in contrast to the negative effect of crosscutting exposure found in the context of interpersonal discussions (Mutz, 2006; Mutz & Martin, 2002). This result merits further elaboration, to the extent that together with our other findings it contributes to research on partisan media and the spiral of silence theory.

Partisan media exposure is relatively rare: Most people prefer entertainment over political information most of the time. Although partisan content may not suit everyone’s taste, it does appeal to certain segments of the public, especially politically engaged audiences with strong political views (Jamieson & Cappella, 2008; Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 2011; Levendusky, 2013a; Stroud, 2008; Taber & Lodge, 2006). Despite partisan news media’s rather modest reach, their audience may be uniquely influential, taking a more active part in the political process and exerting greater influence on politics than those who are not exposed to such media. Furthermore, our behavioral data affirm that even modest real-world exposure matters, significantly shaping individuals’ perceptions of political reality.

At the other extreme, scholars claim that the recent increase in politically motivated selective exposure marks a “new era of minimal effects.” This argument suggests that the media are losing their ability to influence attitudes because individuals are increasingly isolated from viewpoints that differ from their own (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008). The present study, however, is more consistent with Holbert et al. (2010), who assert that the media have not lost their ability to influence audiences for at least two reasons. First, as shown by a growing body of work, exposure to congruent content (selective approach) does not necessarily entail selective avoidance (Garrett, 2009; Holbert et al., 2012). Our data demonstrate further that congruent and incongruent exposure yielded different results, possibly due to different processing of media messages. Consequently, had these two indicators been merged into one, the depiction of partisan media effects would have been attenuated.

The second argument against the idea of “minimal effects” is that congruent exposure contributes to the creation of reinforcing spirals (Slater, 2007, 2014). In other words, exposure to congruent voices appears to reinforce one’s attitudes, perception of opinion climate, and the tendency to express one’s opinions publically. Moreover, a growing body of evidence suggests that this type of reinforcing influence is far more frequent than the impact of incongruent media messages (Slater, 2014).

Scholars have offered a number of theoretical accounts regarding the influence of partisan media on audiences, but relatively little empirical work has been carried out to examine these explanations. By testing whether the association between media exposure and participation is mediated by perception of public opinion, this study contributes to the development of a theoretical framework for partisan media effects. Of course, our data do not demonstrate that perceived opinion climate is the only mediator between congruent exposure and participation. On the contrary, the fact that in the U.S. data a direct effect was still found after controlling for perceived opinion climate suggests that other mediating mechanisms may underlie the association between partisan exposure and participation. ¹⁷

In light of accumulated evidence (Dvir-Gvirsman, 2014a; Kim, 2013; Tsfati et al., 2013), it seems that normative, cognitive, and emotional mechanisms are particularly promising when modeling the influence of partisan media. In the current work, the focus was on perception of public opinion that is one normative belief shaped by partisan media. By influencing perceptions about the acceptance of a political idea, partisan media may shape audience beliefs about which behaviors and attitudes are “right,” potentially motivating people to adopt more extreme opinions. For example, if an individual perceives racism to be widely accepted, he or she may be more likely to express racist views. However, other works allude to cognitive mechanisms such as argument repertoire (Garrett, 2009), knowledge (Jamieson & Cappella, 2008), attitude accessibility (Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 2011), and more recently, to the emotional mechanisms behind partisan media such as negative feelings toward those holding differing political views (Garrett et al., 2014; Lelkes, Iyengar, & Sood, 2013). ¹⁸

In addition to advancing research on the influence of partisan media, this study also contributes to the long tradition of work on the spiral of silence theory. Relying on data collected in two different countries and using complementary operationalizations of key concepts, we are able to explore important dimensions of opinion climate. We have shown that during elections, media shape perceptions of public opinion regarding both the issues and the candidates. It is also important to note that according to the original spiral of silence model, the relationship between public opinion perceptions and public expression is focused on harm: hostile opinions silence public expression. As previously noted (Mutz & Silver, 2014), the original hypothesis does not concern the beneficial relationship demonstrated here, namely, that supportive opinions may increase participation. Although our insight may be no more than the flipside of the coin, it highlights some of the normative assumptions underlying the spiral of silence model.

In focusing exclusively on the silencing effect, the spiral of silence theory implies that the “natural” state of an individual is to be politically active. Put differently, a tacit assumption of this theory is that people have a built-in propensity to speak up, but under some circumstances, this tendency is attenuated. Interestingly, this premise contravenes dominant approaches to participation such as mobilization, as well as rational choice theories (Finkel & Muller, 1998; Klandermans, 1984; Leighley, 1995; Olson, 1965). The latter approaches are premised on the assumption that individuals naturally tend to be passive and that action requires strong incentives. Furthermore, according to the rational choice theory, being in the majority reduces the incentive to take political action as individuals will be tempted to free ride. When a person belongs to the majority, she is less likely to act because she knows that others will uphold her cause. These expectations are a striking contrast to the patterns observed here.

The media landscape has dramatically changed since Noelle-Neumann proposed her theory of the spiral of silence. The variety and diversity of partisan voices offered by cable television and online channels in the contemporary media landscape were not present in the late 1960s, when the spiral of silence was first envisioned—although, to be sure, some sort of partisan media had always existed. Thus, as Katz (1984) put it, Noelle-Neumann assumed that “the media tend to speak in one voice . . . [a]lmost monopolistically” (p. 89). In other words, Noelle-Neumann assumed that even if there are several television stations operating in a given society, the climate of opinion projected by all these stations will be rather uniform (Noelle-Neumann, 1984).

In light of the above, although our data support the two most important individual-level predictions of the spiral of silence model, the consequences of our findings at the macro-level yield a dramatically different social dynamic than the one arising from the spiral of silence rationale. Under Noelle-Neumann’s assumption of consonance, people watching or listening to mainstream media see themselves as being either in the majority or in the minority, and as a result, they either feel confident to voice their opinions or are silenced by their fear of social isolation in the face of a hostile-opinion climate. The findings obtained in this study demonstrate that in the current media landscape, it is possible that two supporters of different political camps may selectively expose themselves to different ideological media—and as a result, form different perceptions of the public opinion climate, ultimately shaping their political participation level.

This research contributes to the understanding of motives underlying political participation, but it is not free of limitations. First, the Israeli survey uses an opt-in online panel for recruitment, which is based on self-selection. As such, the sample likely exhibits bias, especially in terms of participants’ heightened interest in politics. As this factor is a key variable in the present analysis, such a bias would be influential. There was, however, some variation in the sample: Of all, 10% of the sample reported no interest in politics and an additional 20% reported little interest. Thus, individuals with little interest in politics are represented in the sample, albeit not at levels found in the general population. Second, and more importantly, results based on the Israeli data are entirely consistent with those based on the U.S. data, which were collected from a nationally representative probability sample.

Other biases inherent in Internet-based sampling could also be influential. Participants in such panels are known to give more reliable answers (Chang & Krosnick, 2009). On the face of it, this constitutes a clear advantage, but the high reliability of responses may be due to participants’ frequent experience with surveys. In other words, participants’ familiarity with the format of the questions, including the Likert-type scale, may be greater than that of the general public—a discrepancy that would detract from the external validity of the study.

Finally, some indicators known to influence perception of public opinion were not included in the current analysis. Among these is the influence of social networks, particularly their level of homogeneity, on participation and perception of social reality—an issue addressed in many studies to-date (Eveland & Hutchens, 2013; Mutz & Soss, 1997). Our analysis of the U.S. case does not control for the possibility of such influence. Additionally, this analysis also misses another key factor: exposure to offline media. Given that different demographics rely on offline outlets, this lacuna might have biased the results presented. We also do not control for additional mediators between congruent exposure and participation: two possible examples are stereotypic perceptions of the candidates (Kim, 2013), which were shown in recent research to play a part in the process, as well as the emotional reaction that might be triggered by the passionate and uncivil nature of partisan content.

These limitations notwithstanding, our findings have important implications for democratic life. Noting that any discussion of the macro-level consequences is potentially plagued by the ecological fallacy, it could be argued that the process described in this article carries advantages for the public sphere by producing a “spiral of participation”: exposure to congruent political media leads to more participation, and the outcome may be higher levels of political participation in the political arena as a whole. For this deduction to hold true, though, a sizable number of citizens should consume partisan media. That is, for us to assume that level of participation increases over time among the public as a whole due to the penetration of partisan media, partisan media must reach a critical mass of the public. However, this question is highly debated (Dvir-Gvirsman, 2014a; Prior, 2013; Stroud, 2011). Our findings, together with the body of work that links partisan media to disrespect and intolerance toward the other side (e.g., Levendusky, 2013a; Mutz, 2006), suggest that more research should be conducted in order to examine the effects of the heightened activity on the political discourse more generally.