The Growth Model of the PT Governments: A Furtadian View of the Limits of Recent Brazilian Development

Abstract

Evaluation of the growth model of the PT governments based on the contributions of Celso Furtado reveals that the recent growth cycle has alleviated the typical characteristics of underdevelopment by developing a mass consumption market and improving labor market conditions. However, the limitations of the model prevented modernizing the structure of production to sustain changes on the demand side, including labor in sectors with higher productivity, limiting the control of foreign subsidiaries, and reducing the structural vulnerability inherent in specialization in basic commodities exports. The limits of the model were aggravated by the crisis of 2008–2009, revealing the difficulty of incorporating a peripheral economy like the Brazilian into global capitalism.

Uma avaliação do modelo de crescimento dos governos do PT a partir da contribuição de Celso Furtado revela que o ciclo de crescimento recente amenizou características típicas do subdesenvolvimento ao desenvolver um mercado de consumo de massa no Brasil e ao melhorar as condições no mercado de trabalho. No entanto, as limitações do modelo não permitiram modernizar a estrutura produtiva de forma a sustentar as transformações do lado da demanda, incluir a mão de obra em setores de maior produtividade, limitar o controle das filiais estrangeiras, e diminuir a vulnerabilidade estrutural inerente à especialização em exportações de commodities básicas. Os limites do modelo de desenvolvimento adotado se agravaram após a crise de 2008–2009, revelando as dificuldades de inserção de uma economia periférica como a brasileira no capitalismo global.

Keywords

Celso Furtado Growth model Neoliberalism Dilma Lula

The Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party—PT) government cycle ended dramatically, with a sharp contraction in economic activity in 2015 and 2016 after a few years of slowdown. In the context of political and institutional crisis, interpretations of the slowdown and the economic crisis are still affected by the lack of historical distance and by a fierce political dispute over the economic narrative. Although reflecting diverse theoretical positions, these interpretations focus mainly on possible errors in the conduct of economic policy.

Orthodox interpretations attribute the economic failure to the excesses of state interventionism and heterodox macroeconomic policies. In this interpretation, economic policy underwent an inflection of its previous orienting axis, the so-called macroeconomic tripod, with the adoption of policies aimed at promoting the growth of domestic demand. This new way of conducting economic policy, the “new economic matrix,” was incompatible with the rules that had guided the traditional tripod (Barbosa, 2015; Mesquita, 2014).¹ The resumption of the old management of the so-called tripod that took place after 2015 (along with strong fiscal adjustment) is defended by the adherents of this school as a way of bringing inflation toward the center of the target and thus regaining the confidence and productivity growth undermined by the adoption of interventionist policies.²

In the heterodox camp, some interpretations identify the neoliberal management of the instruments of macroeconomic policy as a determinant of deceleration and economic recession. Bresser-Pereira (2016) points to the overvaluation of the Brazilian currency as a central element of the deterioration of the Brazilian structure of production and the consequent economic deceleration.³ For Serrano and Summa (2012; 2015), the conservative management of the Dilma government’s fiscal policy had recessive effects and became the main cause of the subsequent deceleration, since a set of investments scheduled before the imposition of this “brake” on the economy was disarticulated.⁴ Others emphasize the failure of a set of economic policies of the first Dilma government aimed at stimulating aggregate supply in response to the structural deterioration of the Brazilian industrial complex and political pressure from business (Rossi and Biancarelli, 2015).

In addition to the macroeconomic policies highlighted in most of these interpretations, this article presents an explanation for the economic slowdown centered on structural aspects of the Brazilian economy, showing that the Brazilian crisis was a reflection of contradictions of the growth model beyond macroeconomic management and the ambiguity of its hybrid developmentalist/neoliberal orientation. For this analysis, we make use of the structuralist development literature, particularly the work of Celso Furtado, to show how, under the PT governments, the Brazilian economy underwent a process of modernization and massification of consumption patterns without, however, modernizing the structure of production to the point of sustaining the development process and overcoming the structural obstacles typical of underdevelopment.

This work is divided into three sections. The first discusses aspects of Celso Furtado’s view of underdevelopment that contribute to the understanding of recent Brazilian development. Based on the Furtadian approach and using illustrative literature and statistics, the second section describes the model of growth of the PT governments—the stimulus to the so-called mass consumption market and its impact on the demand structure, the structure of production, and the labor market. The third section highlights the contradictions and limitations of the model, whose viability stemmed from the relaxation of external constraints and which was accompanied by increasing denationalization of the structure of production. Finally, we summarize the main arguments of the text.

Celso Furtado and Underdevelopment

Celso Furtado’s greatest scientific contribution was probably incorporating the distinction between development and underdevelopment into the center-periphery model proposed by Raúl Prebisch and providing a broader and more comprehensive historical perspective to the analysis of Latin American structuralism (Furtado, 1961). For Furtado, underdevelopment was not a stage through which countries moved toward a final stage of development that mimicked the economic structure of the central countries but a structural situation characterized by the permanence of social heterogeneity, a restricted and unequal consumer market, and the prevalence of informality and underemployment in the labor market.

According to Oliveira (2015 [1972]) and Bielschowsky (2006), Furtado revived the discussion of the work of Arthur Lewis (1954)⁵ and introduced into the structuralist framework discussion of the difficulty that modern urban sectors face in absorbing the underemployed labor force of the subsistence sector. In his classic Development and Underdevelopment, Furtado (1961) argued that underdeveloped countries were not “developing,” as Lewis assumed, because of the effects of importing patterns of production and consumption that were not suited to their “factor endowment”: (1) technology that was intensive in capital and scale imported from the central and developed countries, which even when it was feasible saved on the abundant resource by not employing enough workers, and (2) the adoption by an economic elite of foreign consumption patterns that allocated resources to superfluous imports and wasted the resources needed to address supply bottlenecks. This income concentration limited markets and kept capacity in the modern sector idle, aborting new investment and generating a tendency toward stagnation (Furtado, 1966).

The resumption of Brazilian growth in the “economic miracle” of the 1970s and a set of criticisms from Keynesian and Marxist authors that questioned his adoption of neoclassical concepts led Furtado to deepen his critical analysis of underdevelopment, leading to a new phase of his work⁶ in which the key pair was now development and modernization. While the developed countries enjoyed technological autonomy to change their patterns of production and consumption, the underdeveloped imitated the most superficial aspects, the consumption patterns of minorities imitating lifestyles without mastering the techniques for their production and thus reproducing the country’s technological dependency (Furtado, 1968; 1972; 1974). According to Furtado (1992), one of the main causes of underdevelopment was the modernization of patterns of consumption restricted to a richer population without technological modernization. In other words, assimilation of the technical progress generated in the developed centers took place on the demand side of final consumer goods, leading to a structural conformation that limited growth and, more important, blocked the transition from growth to development.

Articulating the structure of demand and the structure of production, Furtado argued that the concentration of income and the narrowness of the domestic consumption market limited the scale of companies and the development of the production structure. This limitation tended to perpetuate itself by generating a poor income distribution and the coexistence of modern sectors of the economy with sectors of low productivity that harbored underemployment and informality. Furtado also combined a critique of modernization with an analysis of the tendency toward external bottlenecks, arguing that the divergence between the modernization of consumption and production technology led to an imbalance since, as was the case in the period of externally oriented growth in the peripheral countries, the income elasticity of exports was less than that of imports. In other words, the partial modernization of structures of production did not eliminate the balance-of-payments crises of peripheral and industrialized countries.

At the same time, a situation of an abundance of foreign exchange reserves was not necessarily conducive to development. It is true that proper planning of the use of foreign exchange reserves and the growth of exports could facilitate the overcoming of productive bottlenecks by allowing the import of capital goods and inputs required by deepening import substitution itself. In the absence of adequate planning, however, export growth could generate currency appreciation and further stimulate the import of consumer goods, disrupting the modernization of production and, even more so, development. This was the central message of Furtado’s (2008) studies of the Venezuelan economy: unless the modernization of consumption was controlled and the use of foreign exchange reserves planned, underdevelopment with an abundance of foreign exchange reserves was possible and even probable.

In the late 1970s, Furtado began to address the “new dependency” represented by the control over the production system of foreign affiliates and, to some extent, the cultural system of underdeveloped countries.⁷ Given the “internalization of dependency,” subsidiaries broke the connection between industrialization and national autonomy in underdeveloped countries: on the periphery, industrialization with dependency was the most likely pair. Under these circumstances, external constraints assumed financial characteristics through the transfer of profits, dividends, royalties, and interests abroad. The new dependency accentuated the tendency toward external disequilibrium unless two vectors stimulated by the foreign affiliates —the modernization of consumption and the accumulation of foreign debt—were controlled by national planning and compensated for by the diversification of exports.

In short, more than access to the modern technology typical of a “developed” economy, overcoming underdevelopment required identifying the purposes of development democratically and autonomously.⁸ In contrast to the omniscient technocrat, Furtado advocated democratically oriented development, in opposition to the global corporations, in the name of a domestically owned capitalism. Beyond the mere reduction of inequality of access to modern consumer goods, the development of technologies to meet basic needs, eliminate poverty, increase leisure time, and reduce dependency was at the heart of his concerns. Instead of attempting to generalize the style of imported consumption previously limited to the local elites and the middle classes, the objective should be universalizing the benefits of modern technology by expanding the supply of public goods and services to the point of changing the balance of private consumption. Without such a transformative aspiration, the various dimensions of underdevelopment would be reaffirmed as long-lasting structures beyond favorable conjunctures.

Furtado’s approach can serve as a tool for analyzing the growth model adopted by the PT governments, which achieved structural changes on the demand side and in the labor market through the expansion of the consumer market and the modernization of consumption patterns of a large part of the population by incorporating a large contingent of workers into the formal labor market but failed to overcome the barriers to underdevelopment.

The Growth Model of the PT Governments

The Mass Consumption Market

According to Bielschowsky (2014) and Bastos (2012), the constitution of a mass consumer market was a deliberate economic strategy of the PT governments made explicit in the party’s platform in 2002 and the Lula government’s multiannual plans. The formation of this mass consumer market was based on two pillars: the distribution of income, promoted by monetary transfer policies and an increase in wages, and the stimulus to bank inclusion and credit for families.⁹ Once established, this market was expected to stimulate the domestic structure of production to meet the expanding demand and, through economies of scale in domestic companies, to increase productivity and economic growth. As it turned out, the strategy of developing a mass consumer market was not just on paper; there was political intentionality in (1) the policy of raising the minimum wage, which achieved real growth of 70 percent throughout the PT governments and increased income from labor and contributed to the reduction of inequality;¹⁰ (2) income transfer policies, both the increase in the value of social security and social security benefits (linked to a large extent to the minimum wage) and the creation of transfer programs such as the Family Grant (Bolsa Família);¹¹ (3) policies to facilitate credit to families and companies such as payroll loans, housing loans, and credit from public banks, in particular after the 2008 crisis;¹² and (4) the increase of public expenditures in the social area from 21.9 percent of the GDP in 2005 to 25.2 percent in 2010, which had a large multiplier effect and contributed to the generation of formal and informal jobs (Castro, 2012).

Although it did not necessarily represent a break with neoliberalism, the emphasis on the creation of a mass consumer market, stimulated by state action, with stress on the increase in the minimum wage and social security transfers pointed to a new economic and political setup. Economically, the state and workers’ expenditures played a central role in the dynamics of the new growth model. Politically, the government adopted a new stance in its relationship with the power bloc. This new arrangement of forces, called the “neodevelopmentalist” front by Boito and Saad-Filho (2016), may have been responsible for making it possible to introduce measures rejected by important portions of the bourgeoisie and the middle class such as the increase in the minimum wage and in public participation in the decisions of allocation of investment through the public banks and state companies and through public purchases and the requirement of national content.¹³

Changes in Demand and the Labor Market

The impact of these policies was reflected in the reduction of poverty and income inequality as measured by the Gini index, which fell from 0.593 to 0.526 between 2001 and 2012.¹⁴ According to Castro (2012), the proportion of the population living on less than half a minimum wage per month went from 46.6 percent in 2003 to 29.2 percent in 2009. According to Quadros (2015), between 2002 and 2013 there was a significant decrease in the number of poor people, from 45 million to 16 million, with a significant increase in the middle-income levels (the lower middle class, for example, went from 54 million in 2002 to 89 million in 2013). In addition to the income increase, the credit market also included a significant portion of the population. Loans to individuals increased at high rates between 2008 and 2013, increasing from R$712 million to R$1.46 billion in 2013 (DIEESE, 2014).

With the increase in income and credit, the consumption of durable goods jumped, causing the proportion of the population with access to a set of durable goods (telephone, television, stove, refrigerator, radio, and washing machine) to increase from 28.2 percent in 2003 to 44.4 percent in 2012 (IPEA, 2013). A broad modernization of the consumption pattern of the Brazilian population had a major impact on the labor market, in which there was a substantial reduction of underemployment—one of the classic characteristics of underdevelopment pointed out by Furtado. There was also a significant decline in the unemployment rate and an increase in formal employment. The unemployment rate fell from 12 percent in 2002 to close to 5 percent in 2014 (IBGE, n.d.), and this, together with the growth of formal employment (which grew by 10 percentage points, reaching 63 percent of the workforce) and the increase in average real wages (17 percent), helped explain the improvement in social indicators (Komatsu and Menezes Filho, 2015). However, this reconfiguration of the labor market mainly benefited employment in the services sector, which rose 41.5 percent between 2004 and 2013, representing 79.6 percent of the nonagricultural jobs created (Baltar and Leone, 2015). Between 2001 and 2008, growth in investment and industrial production was accompanied by significant growth in industrial employment, 2,747,000 new employees, but from the peak in 2008 until 2014 the manufacturing industry lost 1,083,000 (IBGE, 2001–2015).

Changes in the Structure of Production

The profound changes in the structure of demand and the labor market were accompanied by supply-side changes, but the latter did not help to overcome the structural obstacles to development. According to Bielschowsky, Squeff, and Vasconcelos (2014), investment, measured by gross fixed capital formation, in sectors linked to the mass consumer market showed a sharp increase in the years of the strongest expansion of the Brazilian economy (2005–2008), with an average expansion of 13.2 percent per year, higher than the average aggregate investment growth rate (12.4 percent per year). However, this expansion occurred mainly in the services sector (14.4 percent per year) and in the nondurable consumer sector (12.9 percent per year), while investment in the durable consumer goods sector was close to zero (–0.1 percent per year).¹⁵ According to Bielschowsky and colleagues, domestic production covered only 50.6 percent of the variation in consumer demand for durable goods during the period 2006–2008, 36.1 percent of which was attended by increased imports and 13.3 percent due to a drop in exports. In these same industrial sectors, the import penetration rate increased from 8.1 percent in 2005 to 17.3 percent in 2008, and the export ratio from 12.8 percent to 9.3 percent. Thus, concerning the durable goods sector, mass consumption did not generate the expected dynamism in the supply of domestic products.

There are indications that the structure of production of the manufacturing industry and the ownership structure dominated by global corporations were determinants of the export ratio and the import penetration rates, with some degree of independence from the exchange rate and commodities prices.¹⁶ While such leakage of domestic demand for imports was already important in the period in which Furtado had criticized Brazil’s “new dependency,” it was aggravated by the integration of the Brazilian industry into global production chains from the 1990s on. Especially in the industrial sectors with more foreign ownership, the result of the trade opening was the loss of density of the structure of production as the subsidiaries began to import more capital goods, parts, and components for assembly operations to meet the final demand (Sarti and Laplane, 2003). Given this structure, when the mass market drove domestic demand in the 2000s, there was a substantial increase in the import penetration rates of both final goods and inputs and capital goods along the production chains. According to Morceiro (2016), the demand generated by the expansion of the mass market was mainly focused on high- and medium-technology goods controlled by global corporations—goods that typically materialize patented technological innovations and the demand for which has great income elasticity. Import penetration rates increased because the subsidiaries did not internalize the production technology.¹⁷

This problem was aggravated by the global crisis of 2007–2009, with a decline of demand in the developed countries and an advance of Chinese exports that dislocated Brazilian products both in the local market and in Latin America. As a result, demand for industrial products continued to grow in Brazil after 2009, but industrial production stagnated (Bastos, 2015; Bastos and Hiratuka, 2017). The deterioration of the Brazilian industrial sector after 2009 occurred despite industrial policies, public purchases, and investment by state-owned companies such as Petrobras and credit policies led by the Brazilian Development Bank. These policies led to gains in competitiveness and a reduction in the import penetration rate in sectors such as the petroleum and the automobile industry, but they coincided with the aforementioned general leakage of demand. Despite the specific problems of these policies (which are beyond the scope of this article), according to Rossi and Rocha (2016) there was also a lack of coherence in the interaction between industrial policies and macroeconomic policy.¹⁸ This is because the pro-industry agenda was hampered by macroeconomic policies that posed challenges to the sector, such as exchange-rate and interest-rate volatility, currency appreciation (until 2011), and a structurally elevated interest rate compared with international standards. Thus, these policies were unable to protect the industrial sector in the context of the reduction of demand from the central countries and the increase in exports from the central countries and China.

The denationalization of the industrial structure also advanced, deepening the process of regressive specialization of the production and export agenda initiated in the 1990s and the export of industrial products of low technological intensity and dependence on imports of goods of medium and high technological intensity. According to Sarti (2017), there was a marked decline in the proportion of Brazilian manufacturing value added in global manufacturing value-added and the increase of the import penetration rate in final demand and inputs since Brazilian industry specialized in the assembly of final goods. This resulted from the decisions of the large corporations that controlled the regional and global value chains and production networks, which dominated the leading sectors of Brazilian industry and expanded their control after 2008.¹⁹

Therefore, the growth cycle of the Lula governments was characterized by the broad modernization of the demand structure without equivalent modernization in the structure of production capable of supplying or even directing the demand. As is pointed out by Nogueira, Infante, and Mussi (2014), analysis of the productivity of various sectors of activity between 2000 and 2009 shows that the structure of production remained practically as heterogeneous as, historically, it had always been.

Contradictions and Limitations of the Model

Relaxation of External Constraints

As is highlighted by Medeiros (2015), the Brazilian growth cycle was made possible by the relaxation of external constraints due to the significant improvement in the terms of trade and the strong inflow of foreign capital as part of a global liquidity expansion before and after the crisis of 2008.²⁰ The improvement in the terms of trade played a dual and contradictory role. On the one hand, it contributed to the formation of the mass consumer market through the cheapening of industrial goods and the availability of foreign exchange for imports; on the other hand, it reinforced the reprimarization of exports. Between 2007 and 2010, the share of primary products jumped 10 percentage points, reaching 51 percent of exports (de Negri and Alvarenga, 2011), while the composition of imports was relatively stable, with the proportion of industrial goods about 40 percent of imports in spite of the relative decline in the prices of industrial goods and the relative increase in numbers of imported industrial products (Cano, 2012; Santos et al., 2015). Thus, there was no improvement in the composition of foreign trade that was considered central by Furtado (1971) and Pinto (1979); on the contrary, the asymmetry between imports and exports was reinforced.

One important contradiction of the model stands out: the cheapness of imported industrial goods and the productive surplus of the primary sector supported the mass consumption market but at the same time contributed to the deterioration of the foreign trade agenda and the structure of production.

Financial Opening and Macroeconomic Instability

The movement of peripheral currencies against the liquidity cycle can be seen as a concomitant of underdevelopment, corresponding to the context of liberalization and financial openness. In contemporary capitalism, countries with peripheral currencies and broad financial openness are subject to a macroeconomic instability that is transmitted from the volatility of financial capital flows to key economic prices such as exchange and interest rates (de Conti, Biancarelli, and Rossi, 2013). From this point of view, the PT governments did little to alter the reality of Brazil’s financial openness, maintaining the preconditions of the neoliberal period except for a brief period during the first Rousseff government when it sought control measures to limit the currency appreciation driven by the excess liquidity typical of the post-crisis period (Mello and Rossi, 2017). In particular, the strong negative correlation between these currencies and commodities prices, which were also conditioned by the liquidity cycle, mitigated the inflationary impact of the fluctuation of these prices but reinforced the incorporation of these economies into the old division of labor. In other words, while the exchange rate absorbed commodities price shocks for the domestic economy, it also created increased uncertainty for the industrial entrepreneur, who had difficulty forming expectations about price, risk, and return.

In this context, the inflow of foreign capital stimulated by elevated interest rates in Brazil contributed to a strong appreciation of the R$-US$ exchange rate,²¹ which in turn contributed significantly to the operation of the mass consumer market by reducing the prices of tradable goods and alleviating the inflationary pressures arising from the redistributive process.²² Concomitantly with the positive effects on the consumption cycle, the inflow of foreign capital through exchange-rate appreciation had effects on the industrial structure. Among them were the deconstruction of productive chains and the increase in the import penetration rate, which in the manufacturing industry, for example, increased from 10.2 percent in 2003 to 17.6 percent in 2014, and especially in industrial inputs, which went from 16.5 percent in 2003 to 25.8 percent in 2014 (CNI, n.d.).

Besides, the significant inflow of foreign capital allowed for greater absorption of imported products as well as affecting the structure of production. The increase in foreign direct investment in Brazil was especially significant, rising from US$108 billion in March 2003 to US$660 billion in March 2015 (BCB, n.d.). While these investments propitiated technology transfers and modernization of the domestic structure of production, the increasing denationalization of the structure of production conditioned investment decisions on the global strategies of the multinationals. As is pointed out by Pinto (1979), an excessive inflow of foreign capital causes “foreignization” and technological dependency besides “the alienation of the decision centers.”

Final Considerations

This article has dealt with the growth model of the PT governments in terms of a structuralist reading following Celso Furtado. At the heart of this growth model was the mass consumer market driven by a set of economic policies. The dynamics of this model alleviated the typical characteristics of underdevelopment by modernizing the consumption patterns of a significant portion of the population and qualitatively improving the labor market by reducing unemployment and informality under conditions of relaxation of external constraints. However, the growth model was unable to modernize the structure of production to sustain demand-side transformations, increase employment in higher-productivity sectors, limit the control of foreign affiliates over the modernization of consumption patterns and the global distribution of the activities of the manufacturing industry, or reduce the structural vulnerability inherent in specialization in basic commodities exports. In other words, there was modernization and massification of consumption patterns without modernization of the structure of production to support development and overcome the structural obstacles characteristic of underdevelopment.

Also, the growth model was marked by inherent contradictions, since some elements that helped support the consumption cycle contributed to damaging the structure of production. The significant improvement in the terms of trade relaxed the external constraints and contributed to the currency appreciation, cheapening industrial goods and consolidating a broad consumer market. However, it also increased the fragility of the industrial sector with a great increase in imported inputs. Likewise, the strong inflow of foreign capital in the context of an expansion of global liquidity before and after the crisis of 2008 increased the capacity utilization of the economy but generated pressure for currency appreciation and denationalization of the domestic structure of production. Regarding this last aspect, it should be pointed out that the PT governments did not confront the vulnerability resulting from Brazil’s financial openness with any structural measures.

Therefore, in addition to the errors in the conduct of economic policy throughout the PT period—in particular the continuation of certain neoliberal policies of the Cardoso government alongside developmentalist ones—the deceleration of the Brazilian economy must be understood in terms of the structural elements that constituted the formation of the consumer market and the production structure’s difficulty in keeping pace with the changes in demand. Finally, to sustain a model of distributive growth in Brazil, it is necessary to consider the changes in production structure required to overcome the structural obstacles that conditioned Brazilian underdevelopment. According to Furtado, overcoming these obstacles depended on (1) more coherence between macroeconomic, industrial, and commercial policies, with greater control over the strategies of foreign subsidiaries; and (2) strategic planning of Brazilian development focused on providing public goods and services capable not only of boosting the economy, increasing its productivity, and generating skilled jobs but also of changing the balance between public and private consumption, mitigating the limitations imposed by imported consumption patterns.

Footnotes

Notes

Pedro Rossi, Guilherme Mello, and Pedro Paulo Zahluth Bastos are professors in the Institute of Economics of the University of Campinas. Luis Fierro is a translator living in the Miami area.

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