Abstract
Since the early 2000s, civil–military relations in Turkey have been tremendously overhauled. The National Security Council (MGK) lay at the crux of this transformation. This semi-military council was considered to be the principal formal channel that allowed the military to intervene in politics. Therefore, the reforms toward more civilian domination in the MGK were extensively hailed and reckoned as the end of the military’s protracted political role. However, subsequent developments did not verify this initial optimism about the demise of the old pattern of strong military presence in politics. This study examines the political activism of the reformed MGK. It suggests that the reforms trimmed the military’s power through subjecting its functions to civilian control. Nevertheless, this shift proved insufficient to end MGK’s political role. The MGK still actively takes part in politics and preserves its executive authority, although this authority is now performed concertedly by civilians and the soldiers.
Introduction
Discussions on the power and influence of the military over politics have been one of the most debated topics of Turkish political history. Nevertheless, these discussions gained pace with the coming of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi [AKP]) to power in 2002. Since that day, civil–military relations in Turkey have been tremendously overhauled. The AKP governments initiated a series of constitutional and legal reforms that curbed the military’s power over politics. Some of these reforms targeted military courts and high councils, in which the military was represented. Yet, an important portion was particularly directed to the National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu [MGK]). Until that day, the MGK was the most effective and significant institutional instrument of the armed forces’ involvement in the political arena (Shambayati, 2004, p. 258). That’s why the restructuring of the MGK lay at the heart of the transformation of civil–military relations.
The military had been the most ardent antagonist of the AKP. Whereas it is traditionally considered as the bulwark of secularism (Bockel, 2001, p. 53; Warhola & Egemen, 2010, p. 428), the AKP is an Islamist political party, evolved from several parties belonging to the National Outlook Movement (Milli Görüş Hareketi) led by Necmettin Erbakan who lost his life in February 2011. The hostility between the AKP and the military revealed itself in the incessant speeches of the top military personnel during the initial years of the AKP’s rule; even on April 27, 2007, the Turkish General Staff interrupted the presidential elections by issuing an e-memorandum as to obstruct AKP’s candidate Abdullah Gül’s victory. It was not only that Gül was a formidable Islamist, but also his wife was wearing a headscarf, which meant that for the first time a headscarf wearing woman would become Turkey’s first lady. In such a context, e-memorandum stated that the presidency of Gül would disturb secularism, and the military was ready to intervene if secularism was put at risk by his election. 1 The AKP worried that the military would anytime organize a “soft” coup through the MGK, just like its February 28, 1997, intervention that toppled Erbakan’s government. Therefore, it deeply felt the need to reduce the impact of this council over politics if it was to govern and consolidate its power.
That being said, the article discusses political activism of the MGK after its reform. It starts with an examination of the MGK’s legal powers, duties, and constitutional status before the 2000s. The purpose of this retrospective study is to figure out why the MGK has been a problem for the democratic regime and to define the presence of this body within Turkish constitutional and parliamentary system with more substantial concepts than “tutelage” or “guardianship.” In this framework, the first part of the article argues that, in contrast to its ostensibly advisory character, in many respects, the MGK had executive authority before the reforms, which enabled it to act almost as a second executive body beside the council of ministers. In the second part, the AKP’s reforms are explicated. The article proceeds with an evaluation of the results of the reforms for the MGK. Accordingly, it is propounded that trimming of military’s power in the MGK proved insufficient to end its political involvement. Although functions of this body are subjected to civilian control in many respects, the MGK reserves its executive authority and actively takes part in Turkish politics in the postreform era.
Method
The article questions the effects of the reforms since the early 2001 on the political activism of the MGK. This institutional study is part of a broader research on the reform of the Turkish state under the AKP governments. It is a descriptive study that aims to reveal the association between reforms and political role of this semi-military institution. In this respect, the study compared the state of the council’s political activism in the prereform era (1961–2001) with the postreform era (2001–2015). It identified three elements that played significant role in the political activism of the MGK. The first one was the breadth of the term “national security.” The second was the council’s executive authority and status. The last one was its military character, which was called as the autonomy of the military. The following four factors were further identified as the basic components of the autonomy of the military: the status of the general chief of the staff (GCS), financial autonomy of the military, judicial autonomy of the military, and ratio of military members to civilian members within the council. The study compared the state of these elements and factors in respective periods and thereby analyzed the change that reforms initiated on council’s political activism.
The key sources of data used to determine the state of these elements and factors were the related articles of the legal texts, namely, the 1961 Constitution, the 1982 Constitution, the Law No. 11286 on the MGK (1962), the Law No. 2945 on the MGK (1983), the MGK Directive No. 6/1645 (1963), the MGK Directive No. 2003/6688 (2003), the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Act No 211 (1961), the Law No. 832 on the Court of Accounts (1967), the Law No. 6085 on the Court of Accounts (2010), and the Code of Criminal Procedure No. 5271 (2004). To demonstrate the outcomes of the reforms on the political activism of the council, this article collected data from 2010 to 2015. The main source of data was press releases of the council, the top military personnel, and the members of the council of ministers. They were reached through the MGK’s website, media outlets, and journals. To provide insight into the legal and the journalistic material, ideas of the prominent scholars in the literature (e.g., Cizre, Faltas, and Aydınlı) were reviewed. Additionally, reports of organizations such as the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation and Human Rights Watch were used.
Political Role and Status of the MGK (1961–2001)
Advisory Versus Executive Character of the Council
The MGK is a semi-military council established by the 1961 Constitution and retained in the 1982 Constitution. Both its initial establishment and preservation in the ensuant constitution are closely associated with its perceived “guardian” role. Beginning with the foundation of the Republic in 1923, Turkish military presented itself as the protector of the constitutional order and Kemalist principles: first and foremost, of the principle of secularism (Greenwood, 2006, p. 38). Throughout Republican history, it frequently intervened in politics via direct and indirect means in the guise of this guardian role. Nevertheless, this role is institutionalized for the first time in the 1961 Constitution. In the 1950 general elections, Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti [DP]) under Adnan Menderes’ leadership came to power, closing the long-lasting Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) reign. However, the DP’s policies that favored Islam such as opening of Prayer and Preacher Schools and increasing oppression toward political opposition was considered by the military as threats to secularism and democracy. In May 1960, the military organized a coup. Afterward, a new constitution was prepared under the aegis of the military junta. In such a context, the 1961 Constitution created the MGK and hence institutionalized military tutelage. Additionally, Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Act was enacted in 1961, which made the military legally responsible for the protection of the Turkish homeland and the Republic. In this respect, historical background of the MGK demonstrates its close ties with Turkish political system and uncovers the internal dynamics behind its establishment. 2
As a constitutional organ, the basic duty of the MGK is to assist the council of ministers in formulating national security policy. Its military members have steadily been the GCS and four force commanders. Yet, the composition of the civilian members has altered in time. According to the Law on the MGK No. 129 (1962), civilian members included the president of the state, the prime minister, the deputy prime ministers, the minister of defense, the minister of interior affairs, the minister of foreign affairs, the minister of finance, and the minister of transportation. The 1982 Constitution redefined the members. The deputy prime ministers, the minister of transportation, and the minister of finance were removed from the council and hence, the number of civilians was reduced. After 2001, the deputy prime ministers and the minister of justice became members of the MGK.
Generally, the MGK is thought to be an advisory council (Aybay, 1970, p. 79; Tanilli, 1996, p. 473). First and foremost, the MGK decisions have no direct legal effect; they must be issued as a notice or as a decree by the council of ministers. Second, the MGK’s decisions are not legally binding. The council of ministers is free to accept or decline them. The wording of the constitutional articles on the MGK ratifies this advisory status. In the 1961 Constitution, the duty of the MGK was stated as to communicate the requisite fundamental recommendations to the council of ministers. 3 After the 1971 amendments, the MGK advised the council of ministers. According to the 1982 Constitution, on the other hand, the council of ministers primarily considered the decisions of the MGK. 4 From “communicating” to “primary consideration,” the wording of the legal texts was strengthened. This increment in the force of the MGK’s decisions makes sense, as both of these changes came about after military interventions, namely, 1971 Military Memorandum and 1982 Military Coup.
Nevertheless, it is the constitutional status of the MGK that grounds the controversy about the powers of this organ. Armed forces and advisory institutions are administrative bodies in parliamentary democracies. As in the case of all other bodies of the administration, the MGK should have been set up in the constitutions under the clause of “administration.” However, both in the 1961 and in the 1982 Constitutions, and even after its reform since 2001, the MGK is still given a place under “executive,” that is, like the council of ministers. Its constitutional status causes some analysts like Ümit Kardaş (2004, p. 296) to claim that the executive power of the Turkish state is exercised by the MGK along with the conventional parliamentary organ of the council of ministers and the president. This point is also voiced by Taha Parla (2007, p. 86) who argues that the dual head of the executive in the parliamentary democracies is replaced by a triple head in the Turkish political system through the inclusion of the MGK.
It becomes virtually impossible to advocate that the MGK is merely an advisory council when we focus on the scope and depth of the powers allocated to this body by laws and directives. As the MGK is responsible for assisting the council of ministers in formulating the national security policy, the meaning of national security defines the area wherein the MGK can legitimately voice its views. For the period 1963–1980, national security included the resistance against any kind of attack and defeatist attempts initiated from within or without. 5 The term was even broadened in 1983, which then comprised protection of all political, social, cultural, and economic interests against any kind of internal and external threats. 6 Hence, the meaning of national security was kept so broad that any matter might be perceived as relevant to it (Güney & Karatekelioğlu, 2005, p. 446).
Strikingly, the MGK did submit its views not only on the national security policy but also on the modification and implementation of this policy, coordination of activities, and the legal and administrative measures that have to be taken in this direction. 7 Submitting its views on the “establishment and implementation of the national security policy” was also listed in the Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution as one of the tasks of the MGK. However, submission of views on the principles of national security is one thing; on the implementation and realization of this policy is another. The latter directly concerns the executive. Hence, these clauses endowed the MGK with certain legal executive authorities since its initiation.
Lastly, laws and directives empowered the MGK with other executive duties through the MGK secretary-general. The secretary-general has the power to monitor and control the implementation of the MGK decisions, following their approval by the council of ministers. 8 He or she also reported the state of their implementation to the MGK, the prime minister, and the president. 9 In 1983, the competences of the secretary-general were enlarged even more by the Law No. 2945. He or she was given the right to conduct joint works and cooperate with related ministries, organs, and other institutions on his or her own initiative, which endowed the secretary-general with unlimited access to state organs and civil institutions. 10
As long as the implementation of the MGK’s decisions is monitored, checked, and coordinated, these decisions cannot be called as mere advices, and the council that makes such decisions cannot be called merely an advisory body. In this direction, there is a great number of analysts who reconceived the MGK’s political role while emphasizing its legal executive authorities. For instance, Ümit Cizre (1997, p. 33) says that there had been two legs of the executive decision-making system in Turkey starting from 1961: one was the council of ministers and the other was the MGK. Similarly, Mümtaz Soysal (1997, p. 237) asserts that the MGK was the upper cabinet where decisions were taken together with high-ranking soldiers. As William Hale (1994, p. 173) propounds, it was a substitute cabinet, or Ahmet İnsel (1997, p. 15) utters that it was a second cabinet empowered with laws and directives.
Autonomy of the Military
Another issue concerning the MGK is the relative autonomy of the military from parliamentary control. Aylin Güney and Petek Karatekelioğlu (2005, p. 444) bring two issues pertaining to the problems of democratic control over the Turkish Armed Forces to the fore. The first one is the status of the GCS. According to the parliamentary democratic criterion of civilian control over the military, the GCS had to depend on and be accountable to the minister of defense. However, both in the 1961 and in the 1982 Constitutions, the GCS was made answerable only to the prime minister. Hence, the minister of defense had no power over the GCS.
Secondly, the military was financially autonomous. How the military spent its budget was outside the supervision of the parliament. In addition to these two aspects, the military enjoyed judicial autonomy as well. The military was subject to the Military Court of Cassation and High Military Administrative Court of Appeals, decisions of which were final for both criminal and administrative cases. As Vahap Coşkun (2010, p. 42) says, there lay in Turkey an autonomous military jurisdiction parallel to civilian jurisdiction, which virtually allowed the armed forces to shirk the rule of law of the state.
There are other elements that increased the military character of the council. According to the Law on the MGK (both 1962 and 1983), one of the civilian members was the president of the state. However, between 1960 and 1989, all of the four presidents were former generals, including 1960 and 1980 coup leaders. Therefore, for almost 30 years, numerical superiority of civilian members did not mean much. Other than this, starting with its establishment in 1961 (up until 2004), all the secretaries-general of the MGK were serving full generals or admirals without exception.
Looking at this picture, it is commonly accepted that the MGK was a military council despite the presence of top civilian authorities. It was the essential platform used by the military to establish its hegemony in politics and to express its political preferences (Akça, 2006, p. 351; Cizre, 1999, p. 69; Hale & Özbudun, 2010, p. 81). The military used the MGK to deliver its views unilaterally, issue warnings, and declare the necessary measures to be taken. Thereafter, warnings of the military were followed to the extent that the council of ministers was said to execute the decisions of the military directly (with only a few exceptions; Akgüner, 1983, p. 193; Çelik, 2008, p. 251). Hence, what İnsel (1997) calls an “uninterrupted coup” was nothing but the regular functioning of the MGK.
All in all, the MGK’s decisions were binding because of the breadth of national security, the council’s constitutional status, and executive authorities. The military’s autonomy, on the other hand, secured its hegemony over the civilians within the council. These traits of the MGK were also the reasons why it was a problem for Turkish democracy since its initiation.
Restructuring of the MGK (2001–2013)
Turkey’s European Union (EU) membership bid boosted the readjustment of civil–military relations. It was one of the principal dynamics behind the restructuring of the MGK and the legal reforms that limited the role of the military in politics. In 1999, Turkey was officially acknowledged as a candidate country at Helsinki. On March 8, 2001, the EU adopted the first Accession Partnership for Turkey’s compliance with Copenhagen criteria. Both the Accession Partnership and Regular Reports of the European Commission indicated the problem areas in civil–military relations. For instance, the 2000 Regular Report stated that civilian control over the military needed improvement and the GCS should be made accountable to the ministry of defense (Greenwood, 2006, p. 43). Similarly, the Accession Partnership demanded the alignment of the constitutional role of the MGK as an advisory body to the government in accordance with the practice of the EU member states (Greenwood, 2006, p. 33). Turkish government responded to these demands positively. On March 19, 2001, the government announced its National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis. This document demonstrated Turkey’s willingness to take necessary measures spelled out in the Accession Partnership to align itself with the acquis communautaire. In October 2001, the constitution was amended. Between February 2002 and July 2004, the government issued nine harmonization packages. Among them, seventh harmonization package of August 2001 (Law No. 4963) was particularly important. This package amended both the Law on the MGK and the Directive on the MGK.
Within this context, before the establishment of the AKP government, Article 118 of the Constitution had already been amended and the number of civilian members of the MGK had already been increased by the inclusion of the minister of justice and the deputy prime ministers in October 2001. In addition, the wording of the constitution had been changed in 2001. After the amendment, the MGK submits its views to the council of ministers as advisory decisions. More significantly, the council of ministers is no longer obliged to consider the decisions of the MGK primarily but only to evaluate them. Apart from this amendment, the other reforms are carried out by the AKP, which have allegedly democratized and civilianized the MGK.
A major amendment in the Law on the MGK No. 2945 was made in July 2003. 11 After the reform, the MGK no longer provides its views but makes advisory decisions on issues pertaining to determination, establishment, and implementation of the national security policy. 12 The reforms abolish secretary-general’s authority to follow-up the implementation of the MGK’s decisions as well. 13 According to the amended Article 13, the secretary-general only conducts the secretariat services of the MGK and carries out the duties given by the MGK and the relevant laws. Secondly, the legal provision that gives the secretary-general the right of access to civilian public agencies or legal persons is annulled. 14 Therefore, the reforms curb most of the secretary-general’s executive authority and limit this post essentially to secretarial duties. After the reforms, the prime minister nominates one of its deputy prime ministers for the task of submitting the MGK’s decisions and opinions to the council of ministers. Additionally, the deputy prime minister secures the coordination and the implementation of the MGK’s decisions in case they are approved by the council of ministers. 15
The appointment procedure for the secretary-general was also reformed. Contrary to previous regulation, the amended law states that the prime minister nominates the secretary-general who can be a civilian. Depending on this, in September 2004, Yiğit Alpagon (a retired ambassador) was appointed as the first civilian MGK secretary-general. Since then, all the MGK secretaries-general have been civilians. Besides, with an aim to limit its political involvement, the MGK henceforth meets bimonthly. 16
Curbing Military Autonomy
Reformation of the MGK is accompanied by further changes in other state institutions, which eventually trimmed the soldiers’ power. For a start, financial autonomy of the armed forces is limited. In 2003, the Court of Accounts was authorized with a law amendment to supervise the accounts and transactions of the armed forces including the state properties on the request of the parliament. This reform was also substantiated by the amendment of the Article 160 of the Constitution, which previously excluded the armed forces from the review of the Court of Accounts. The second step toward that end came in 2010. In December 2010, the parliament adopted the new Law on the Court of Accounts No. 6085. The new law states that oversight of the military spending will be carried out by the Court of Accounts on behalf of the parliament, which was missing in the previous law (Kemal, 2012). Hence, military members of the MGK seem to succumb to the civilians financially.
The other area is the judicial autonomy of the military. In June 2009, military personnel were subjected to the jurisdiction of civilian courts in peacetime for crimes regulated by the Code of Criminal Procedure like coups d’état, crimes affecting national security, and organized crimes (Cizre, 2011, p. 66). This provision was strengthened by constitutional amendments in 2010. In the 1982 Constitution, military courts were in charge in times of both war and martial law. However, reforms restrict military jurisdiction to times of war. Similarly, “offences committed in the military places” are removed from the jurisdiction of military courts. 17 Additionally, the 1982 Constitution formerly stated that nonmilitary personnel would be charged in military courts for military crimes and crimes committed in military places against military personnel. This clause was repealed in 2010 as well. After the repeal, nonmilitary personnel are tried in civilian courts, except during war times. Hence, from 2010 onward, military courts and military disciplinary courts have only jurisdiction to try military personnel for military offenses connected to military services and duties. The reforms also limited military’s judicial autonomy by subjecting the decisions of the Supreme Military Council in respect to all kinds of leaving (except retirement due to absence of position) to judicial review. 18 Consequently, the scope of military jurisdiction is narrowed down both spatially and temporarily. Seeing this, Cizre (2011, p. 66) announced the end of the military’s judicial autonomy.
Within the context of narrowing down judicial autonomy of the military and its succumbing to civilian courts, prosecution of 1980 military junta must also be mentioned. For 30 years, Provisional Article 15 of the 1982 Constitution granted judicial immunity to 1980 coup leaders, which prevented their trial. This article was repealed in September 2010 through a referendum. In April 2012, the trial of two surviving coup members, ex-GCS Kenan Evren and ex-Air Force Commander Tahsin Şahinkaya, began. In June 2014, the court gave life sentence to Evren and Şahinkaya for their role in the coup. Both of them lost their lives in 2015 before being jailed; yet, the trial symbolized that the military was no longer “untouchable.”
Additionally, military representatives were removed from the Supreme Board of Radio and Television (Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu) in 2003 and from the Council of Higher Education (Yüksek Öğretim Kurulu) in 2004. Most recently, Article 35 of the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Code was amended in July 2013. The former wording of the article said that the duty of the armed forces was to protect and safeguard the Turkish homeland and the Turkish Republic. In the past, this expression was used by the military as a legal justification for military interventions. After the amendment, the article states that the duty of the armed forces is to protect the Turkish homeland against threats and dangers that come from abroad. Hence, the emphasis is shifted from domestic affairs to external threats.
Lastly, in some areas of the public life, military’s authority was restricted and its public visibility was obfuscated. For instance, since December 2011, security of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi [TGNA]) is being ensured by the police, rather than the military. The military was also replaced by the police in the security of the presidential palace in April 2013. In an effort to eliminate military’s influence from the education system, the national security course that was taught by soldiers in high schools was abolished starting from 2012 to 2013 education year. Moreover, the ministry of education canceled the May 19 celebrations in stadiums, in which military troops and high school students in military formations used to parade. In general, military parades were replaced by civilian festivities in all major official events.
New Political Activism of the MGK: Toward a Civil–Military Partnership
Without any doubt, restructuring of the MGK is one of the most comprehensive transformations that civil–military relations have undergone since the 1960s. The point of controversy is, however, its effects and meaning. In the concomitant period, the MGK reforms have been celebrated as democratization and civilianization of the political regime in Turkey. For instance, Sami Faltas (2012) says that after the reforms, the military’s role in decision-making within the MGK has diminished; the military’s political influence has waned, and the political responsibility for national security policy now entirely lies with the prime minister (p. 138). Similarly, starting from 2001, the role of the MGK in the Turkish political regime is claimed to be truly converted into an advisory body (Michaud-Emin, 2007, p. 28).
However, subsequent developments do not verify this initial optimism on civilianization and democratization of politics. On the contrary, they revivify the old pattern of strong military presence in politics with an important twist. While the government adjusts its initial position vis-à-vis the attitude of the military, hereinafter the military adjusts itself vis-à-vis the provably perdurable power of the AKP, which engenders a partnership among them rather than friction.
For instance, in December 2010, Selahattin Demirtaş, the leader of the Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi), stated that bilingualism is going to be promulgated in the Kurdish Southeast. Then President Abdullah Gül responded somehow positively by saying that although Turkish will remain the sole official language, “all the languages spoken by our citizens are our languages.” However, the GCS posted a memorandum on its website, announcing its deep concern that the founding ideology and principles of the Republic were being jeopardized by the introduction of bilingualism and reiterated that the military remains committed to preservation of the Republic, as it was originally conceived. In its meeting on December 29, 2010, the MGK accepted the basic views of the GCS and stated that no attempt to challenge the Turkish nationalism of the state was going to be tolerated (Karaveli, 2011). Secondly, it is known that the Group of Communities in Kurdistan (Koma Civaken Kurdistan [KCK]) lawsuit (acclaimed urban establishment of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, i.e., Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane [PKK]) was discussed in depth in the February 2012 meeting of the MGK. Looking at this picture, it will not be wrong to say that the Kurdish issue is veered off by the government and the military jointly.
Another example to the government’s policy adjustment is its national education reform. The Minister of National Education was invited to the aforementioned February 2012 meeting of the MGK. There, the education policy of the government and the improvement of education in the South East and East of Turkey were discussed beside other issues. Right after the MGK meeting, the Minister of National Education announced that the government had revised its reform proposal concerning the compulsory education system, which can be interpreted as a direct result of the interference of the military on education policy of the government (“Köşk’ten 4+4+4 Açıklaması,” n.d.).
Practical Autonomy of the Military After Its Reformation
Where the judicial autonomy of the military is concerned, it is doom and gloom for the proponents of civilian control of the military. Among many incidents showing that military members could not be charged and sentenced for their misconduct, what is commonly known as the “Uludere Massacre,” caused a heated public discussion. In this incident, a group of 40 Kurdish villagers of Turkish nationality crossing the Iraqi border were fired at by Turkish military’s jets on December 28, 2011, mistaken as the PKK militants. Thirty-four of them were killed. It was announced as a mistake; however, no military personnel were held responsible and charged for this mistake. The GCS, the Ministry of National Defence, and the National Intelligence Service did not provide the requested documents and did not respond to inquiries (“HRW: Uludere’de adalet,” n.d.). Finally, in January 2014, the General Staff’s Military Prosecutor’s Office had dismissed the investigation, saying that military officers had made an “inevitable” mistake while performing their duty (“Turkish military prosecutors,” n.d.).
In another example, on September 5, 2012, 25 soldiers were killed due to an explosion at a munitions depot in Afyonkarahisar while they were conducting a night-time inventory. The case was heard by the Military Court in Eskişehir, where Major Ali Duran, Colonel Veysel Özbay, and Lieutenant Tuncay Aydın were charged. The cause of the explosion was declared as negligence according to the initial report and Turkish Land Forces declared the explosion to have been a “natural disaster” (“Cause of ammunition,” n.d.; “Military refers Afyon,” n.d.). Although nearly 3 years have passed since the incident, the court could not yet arrive at a decision. Furthermore, court proceedings were marred by hearsays. Lawyer Altan Ulutaş claimed that some parts of the display images of the initial investigation were missing, and about 218 photos were deleted (“25 askerin şehit,” n.d.).
These examples manifest that the military is still shirking after the reforms by providing poor advice to courts, delaying the judicial process, and preparing sketchy reports. Yet, what is striking and tragic is the civilians’ backing of the military’s practically judicial immunity. In the Uludere incident, the then Prime Minister Erdoğan defended the military by saying that “our Armed Forces took the necessary step. That region is a terror region” (“Military Took Needed,” n.d.). In the Afyonkarahisar incident, on the other hand, he uttered that a private soldier who handled a grenade out of curiosity might have caused the armory blast and continued: “Some say ‘the prime minister and the ruling party’s yes-men are not appropriate in that position.’ How can we explain such an expression? This army is ours. They are fighting against terrorism, and they are demoralized by such insults (…)” (“Prosecutor: No sabotage,” n.d.).
In sum, no major improvement is observed in respect to the military’s judicial liability after the reforms. Military personnel still cannot be charged for their misconduct and offenses. Even worse, civilians act in a manner to acquiesce and tolerate the military’s practical immunity.
MGK’s Role in the Fight Against the Gülen Movement
The most recent example of the reformed MGK’s political activism is its decisions on the Fethullah Gülen Movement. The AKP and the Gülen Movement had been close allies for a long time. However, since 2012, this alliance has started to break apart. The controversy between them became apparent for the first time on February 7, 2012, when the prosecutor of the KCK case Sadrettin Sarıkaya wanted to summon the Undersecretary of the National Intelligence Organization Hakan Fidan and three other top officials. The prosecutor, allegedly a Gülenist, accused them of being involved in the meetings conducted secretly among the AKP and some senior PKK leaders between 2009 and 2011 in Oslo. However, none of the summoned names showed up to testify. Then, the prosecutor’s office issued an arrest warrant. The investigation of the prosecutor offended the AKP. It is mainly because, the Oslo meetings reportedly happened at Erdoğan’s personal command, and Fidan was personally representing Erdoğan according to the records that were later leaked on the Internet.
Later on, the controversy between the AKP and the Gülen Movement turned into an open fight. On December 17, 2013, a criminal investigation uncovered a bribery and corruption scandal, in which four of the active AKP ministers and their sons were involved. Recordings of phone-taped conversations that Erdoğan instructed his son to dispose large amounts of hidden funds from their private home were leaked to the Internet as well. The AKP accused the Gülen Movement of conducting the investigation and leaking the recordings. Erdoğan argued that the Gülen Movement formed an illegal “parallel state structure” and that it established a terror organization with the objective of ousting the AKP. In the following days, the prosecutors of the investigation, Celal Kara and Muammar Akkaş, were removed from the case; afterward, one judge and four prosecutors including Kara and Akkaş were dismissed from their professional duties. Tens of thousands of policemen have been displaced. In the anniversary of the investigation on December 14, 2014, two flag bearers of the Gülen Movement were taken into custody by the police. The chief editor of Zaman Newspaper Ekrem Dumanlı and the head of the Samanyolu Media Group Hidayet Karaca were accused of being members of a terror organization. While Dumanlı was released, Karaca was arrested.
The AKP and specifically Erdoğan brought this issue to the MGK’s agenda. The October 30, 2014, meeting of the MGK, which lasted 10½ hr, marked the longest ever meeting of the council in its history. In that meeting, the MGK publicly documented the Fethullah Gülen Movement as one of the leading threats against national security. In a written statement released after the meeting, the MGK announced that the struggle against parallel structures and illegal formations, which conduct illegal activities under legal cover in both domestic and international realm, will be continued with determination. 19 It is not a coincidence that in the first MGK meeting chaired by Erdoğan as the President of the Republic, the MGK embraced the AKP-suggested term parallel structure to refer to the Gülen Movement. Similarly, in the next meeting on December 30, 2014, the MGK reiterated its determination to fight against parallel state structuring and illegal formations. 20
Nevertheless, the April 2015 meeting of the MGK was ground breaking in this regard. In an almost 7-hr-long meeting, the Gülen Movement was included in the amended version of the National Security Policy Document. One more time referred to as parallel state structure, the Gülen Movement was conceived as a threat for national security. The amendment of the national security document of the state in line with the threat allegedly posed by the Gülen Movement evinces that the MGK decisions are used by the civilians as a weapon to fight against a foe (“Cemaat yeniden Kırmızı Kitap’ta,” n.d.).
There is another significant example as to how the military was involved in AKP’s struggle with the Gülen Movement. This is the Balyoz (Sledgehammer) case. The Balyoz case started in July 2010. The main suspects were soldiers including 89 generals and admirals, 24 of whom were in active service. At the heart of the case, there lies the allegation about planning a military coup led by the Commander of the First Army Çetin Doğan against the AKP government. The case almost thoroughly relied on shady evidence recorded in a single CD. Police forensic reports claimed that Balyoz coup plan was burned to the CD in March 2003, thereafter no amendments or additions were made. However, the plan included references to events as late as 2008. Additionally, some of the institutions named in the plan did not exist in March 2003 under the names appearing in the documents. For instance, in a document named “Ally Elements” in the CD, Turkey Youth Union (Türkiye Gençlik Birliği) was named. However, this Union was established in 2006 under this name. When such errors were traced, it appeared that the CD must have been produced in 2009, not in 2003 as the police claimed (Rodrik & Doğan, 2010, pp. 24, 27).
The case proceeded relatively quickly. In September 2012, the court brought in its verdict. Accordingly, 330 of the 365 defendants have been found guilty. The court sentenced 325 members of the military to imprisonment between 13 and 20 years (Ananicz, 2012). The defendants accused the associates of the Gülen Movement in police, courts, and media for fabricating fake evidence, giving biased decisions, and disseminating false information mainly through the Gülenist daily Zaman to discredit the defendants in public eye. Actually, the case was itself regarded as a conspiracy against the military acted by the Gülen Movement and supported by the AKP government in company.
When the alliance between the AKP and the Gülen Movement broke apart, the course of affairs was reversed in Balyoz case. On June 18, 2014, the Constitutional Court ruled that defendants’ right to fair trial was violated. A day after, İstanbul 4th High Criminal Court released 234 generals. For many, the decisions of the high courts were supported by the government in its ongoing conflict with the Gülen Movement. More interestingly, another case was opened for those involved in fabrication of fake documents and making misleading news in Balyoz case. In a nutshell, all the misdoings in the Balyoz case were attributed to the Gülen Movement, and the absolution of the generals and appealing process of Balyoz case in general turned into a revenge of the AKP government on the movement.
Reasons of Inefficacy of the Reforms
Ultimately, the high hopes built around the reforms were not well grounded from the beginning. The reforms were scant and shallow. Therefore, the restructuring of the MGK reached only halfway and continued to incorporate a legal ground for military’s political involvement. To start with, there is no revision in the definition of the term national security. After the reforms, national security still covers all political, social, cultural, and economic interests and fights against any kind of internal and external threats. 21 Therefore, the military reserves the capacity to militarize political issues.
Secondly, the MGK still voices its opinions on the necessary conditions with regard to the formulation, establishment, and implementation of the national security policy, 22 revealing that it reserves its executive authority after reformation. The agenda of the MGK, on the other hand, is asserted to be drawn up by the president after consideration of the proposals by the prime minister and the commander of the Turkish Armed Forces. 23 Additionally, implementation of the MGK’s decisions is still being followed up, this time by the deputy prime minister. Hence, the council of ministers is not yet free to reject the MGK’s decisions. The primary difference between the former and the latter regulations on these issues is that these duties are taken from the secretary-general and delegated to the deputy prime minister, whom the prime minister empowers. Consequently, neither the executive authority of the MGK is cut back nor is the force of the MGK’s decisions downgraded.
Reforms proved far from delivering their promises in thwarting the autonomy of the military as well. First of all, the GCS is still directly responsible to the prime minister, not to the minister of defense. Supremacy of the GCS over the minister of defense can be observed from their places in the order of precedence, where the GCS comes as the third after the chairman of the TGNA and the prime minister. Secondly, although the Court of Accounts is authorized in 2003 through a law amendment and in 2010 by Law No. 6085 to oversight the accounts, transactions, and the spending of the armed forces, judicial supervision of the defense expenditures is practically obsolete due to a number of reasons. To launch this supervision process, the prime minister shall lie down the relevant implementing regulations for the functioning of the Court of Accounts. However, this step has not yet been taken. Therefore, the Court of Accounts cannot in practice audit military properties (Misrahi, 2004, p. 25). Moreover, the budget of the ministry of defense includes extra-budgetary funds. These funds are not subject to normal budgetary procedures and hence fall out of full parliamentary control (Bilgiç, 2009, p. 806).
Still more problematic are the subsequent developments on the authority of the Court of Accounts, which muddied the water more and raised doubts about AKP’s intention to audit military expenditures. On June 29, 2012, the Law on the Court of Accounts No. 6085 was amended. By this amendment, the capacity of the Court of Accounts to monitor military spending was restricted. Additionally, in August 2012, “principle of secrecy” took effect through a regulation of the government regarding the Court of Accounts’ reports on the oversight of the security institutions’ assets. Consequently, public access to monitoring results was blocked as well. At the end, claims concerning the financial control of the military remain unfulfilled. On the contrary, Lale Kemal (2012) argues that recent legal changes have resulted in a regression of the Court of Accounts’ monitoring capacity; the parliament’s control over the military expenditures was also reversed: “(…) the defense and military spending in Turkey still lacks both transparency and accountability and remains mostly secret and closed to public and parliamentary scrutiny.” 24 After all, where are we in the political activism of the MGK? A quick look at the agenda of the council throughout 2015 will give us a succinct answer. In its six meetings between February and December, the term national security was used by the council in an ambiguous way to mean any “threats to internal and external security of the country” and all the factors effecting the “peace and security of the citizens.” Within such an equivocal frame, the MGK got the opportunity to participate actively in critically important political issues under the aegis of national security. For instance, in its meeting on September 2, fight against terror organizations at home and abroad and internal and external threats to national security were iterated one more time as the top priorities of the council. 25 In depth, discussions in these six meetings ranged from the Peace Process with the PKK to Turkey’s energy policy, Syrian migrants in Turkey and Turkey’s policy toward Iraq, Russia, Iran, Yemen, Lebanon, and Northern Caucuses. Hence, the agenda of the MGK shows no reservation in interfering in internal politics after the reforms and rebuts past ventures in this direction.
Aberration in council’s attitude toward Peace Process with the PKK after June 7, 2015, general election, on the other hand, is indicative of the harmony and political convergence between the AKP and the MGK. The MGK endorsed the phrase “Peace Process” in its June 25, 2013, meeting for the first time. In the following 2 years, the council was tolerant toward the process. For instance, in its meeting on October 30, 2014, the council stated that the Peace Process created a positive and peaceful environment, and it would prevent any provocative event which aimed to disturb this environment. This moderate attitude can also be tracked in its two successive meetings on February 26 and April 29, 2015, where the MGK stated that it reviewed the developments in Peace Process and that the struggle to end terrorism would continue. However, after the general elections, Peace Process dropped from the council’s agenda. Rather, fight against terrorism is started to be underlined with strong language. Recently in its December 18, 2015, meeting, the MGK said in a written statement released after the meeting that, it will continue to fight against the separatist terror organization with perseverance, which oppresses and coerces inhabitants of the Eastern and Southeastern regions, until terror comes to an end. 26 Number one cause of this aberration was the result of the general elections, in which the AKP lost its absolute majority in the parliament. The AKP accused the Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi) for passing 10% election threshold and gaining 81 seats in the parliament. It was also in line with the President Erdoğan’s statement on July 28 that Peace Process was not possible any longer.
Limitations
The present study has certain limitations. The role of the Turkish army within politics has a long history dating back to its Ottoman past. For more comprehensive conclusions, this role should have been studied within its historical context. However, this study provided only a scant historical background. Furthermore, the MGK is only one facet of civil–military relations. Military’s influence on politics or military tutelage surpasses the MGK and comprises military’s economic and industrial power through the Turkish Armed Forces Assistance Fund (Ordu Yardımlaşma Kurumu) and the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Geliştirme Vakfı [TSKGV]), and its control over society through conscription. However, this study also paid no attention to these factors. Moreover, the MGK is a closed book and it is hard to have insight on the actual nature of civil–military dialogue within the council, other than commenting on press releases and utilizing journalistic research. Hence, there is a pressing need for future research to answer whether the military retains its historical role as the guardian of the constitutional order and secularism after the reforms.
Concluding Remarks
The restructuring of the MGK has mixed results. After the reforms, bifurcation within the MGK ceased and public affray between the government and military has come to an end. However, this ceasefire does not mean the military’s utter subordination to the civilians. Although it legally lost some ground, both the financial and the judicial autonomy of the military still practically continue with the acquiescence of the government. This point raises skepticism about the success of the reforms and verifies the view that normalization of civil–military relations has not yet achieved full success. Additionally, the picture shows that the AKP is not yet risking or welcoming an effective democratic control over the armed forces (Cizre, 2011, p. 72). As a matter of fact, reforms establish a new balance of power among civilians and the military. In this new order, the AKP overlooks the military’s budgetary freedom; in return, the military puts up with growing civilian control within the MGK and over civil–military relations in general.
This conclusion is far from supporting any claim of a complete expulsion of the military from politics. After the reforms, the MGK preserves its executive authority. Thereby, it can still be deemed as the second executive body or the second cabinet of the Turkish parliamentary system. However, the reforms notably augment civilian influence on its agenda and decisions as well. Whereas the agenda is set and decisions are made almost singlehandedly by the military in the prereform era, now they are formulated in a way to converge the interests of the both sides. Eventually, the restructured MGK reflects the cooperation between the AKP and the military, or as Aydınlı (2009, p. 592) says, the harmony between the erstwhile foes.
Does this cooperation and harmony mean that the MGK has totally been transformed into the military arm of the AKP government? One shall not rush into such a conclusion. The cause of the harmony may be structural or may spring from the personal traits of the President Erdoğan and the GCS Necdet Özel, who left the office in August 2015. The emergent era with the new GCS Hulusi Akar is significant in this respect to test the determinants of this cooperation. Nevertheless, as of today, both the government and the military benefit from this cooperation. On the one hand, as long as it is in concordance with the preferences of civilian leaders, the MGK is allowed to continue its political role. On the other hand, the MGK meetings and decisions give the AKP the chance to amplify its power with military backing, hence creating a more capacious civilian rule.
When the manipulation of the MGK agenda in line with the pressing political needs of the civilians is considered, the reforms seem to have an adverse effect as well. Rather than ripping the council out of the political system or thinking an alternative way to present military expertise to the government, the reforms consolidate the MGK’s status. The council more and more becomes a part and parcel of the state administration after the reforms. In the first place, membership of the minister of justice and deputy prime ministers strengthens the representation of civilian authorities within the council. In return, this freshened representation entrenches the presence of the council of ministers in the MGK. It means that the binding force of the council’s decisions and the political accountability of their implementation enhances. To this respect, it will not be wrong to say that the MGK’s role in the politics is gradually relapsing into the old pattern, where its decisions strictly bind the council of ministers. Consequently, the MGK still besets normal civilian democratic procedure in Turkey.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.