An Analysis of the Factors Affecting the Employment Tenure of Federal Political Executives

Abstract

The issue of tenure among political executives has been hypothesized to be important in understanding the ability of presidents to implement policy. While it has been demonstrated that these executives remain in their appointed position for a very short period of time and theories have been developed to explain this short tenure, previous work has not tested these hypotheses statistically. This article uses data from a 1985 National Academy of Public Administration survey of political appointees and, using multiple regression methods, addresses the specific factors that have been theorized to influence the tenure of these executives. Specifically, two key factors are found to negatively impact tenure: poor relations with the career bureaucracy and the lure of greater private sector salaries. Other hypotheses are tested as well. The results provide a clearer picture of the motivations of these officials and may be of assistance in promoting an increased length of service through better recruitment and retention methods.

Get full access to this article

View all access options for this article.

References

Ban, C. , & Ingraham, P. (1990). Short-timers: Political appointee mobility and its impact on political-career relations in the Reagan administration. Administration & Society, 22, 106-124.

Bonafede, D. (1987). The White House personnel office from Roosevelt to Reagan. In G. C. Mackenzie (Ed.), The in-and-outers (pp. 30-59). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Borjas, G. (1982). Labor turnover in the U.S. federal bureaucracy. Journal of Public Economics, 19, 187-202.

Brauer, C. (1987). Tenure, turnover and postgovernment employment trends of presidential appointees. In G. C. Mackenzie (ed.), The in-and-outers (pp. 174-194). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Fisher, L. (1987). Fifty years of presidential appointees. In G. C. Mackenzie (ed.), The in-and-outers (pp. 1-29). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Heclo, H. (1977). A government of strangers: Executive politics in Washington. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Ingraham, P. (1987). Building bridges or burning them? The president, the appointees, and the bureaucracy. Public Administration Review, September/October, 425-435.

Ingraham, P. , & Ban, C. (1986). Models of public management: Are they useful to federal managers in the 1980s? Public Administration Review, 46, 152-160.

Light, P. (1987). When worlds collide: The political-career nexus. In G. C. Mackenzie (Ed.), The in-and-outers (pp. 156-173). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

10.

Lowery, D. , & Rusbult, C. (1986). Bureaucratic responses to antibureaucratic administrations. Administration and Society, 18, 45-75.

11.

Mackenzie, G. C. (Ed.). (1987). The in-and-outers. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

12.

National Academy of Public Administration . (1985). Leadership in jeopardy: The fraying of the presidential appointments system. Washington, DC: Author.

13.

Pfiffner, J. P. (1987). Political appointees and career executives: The democracy-bureaucracy nexus in the Third Century. Public Administration Review, 47, 57-65.

14.

Pfiffner, J. P. (1988). The strategic presidency: Hitting the ground running. Chicago: Dorsey.

15.

President's Committee on Administrative Management . (1937). Report of the Committee. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

16.

Rusbult, C. , & Lowery, D. (1984). When bureaucrats get the blues: Responses to dissatisfaction among federal employees. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 15, 80-103.

17.

Schlesinger, A. (1965). A thousand days: John F Kennedy in the White House. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

18.

Stanley, D. , Mann, D. , & Doig, J. (1967). Men who govern. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.