Abstract
National security agencies of four major powers—the United States, Russia, China, and the United Kingdom—see their militaries taking on additional roles in domestic disaster relief because of the effects of global climate change. Otherwise, national security actors show drastically different responses to climate change. The US and Russian militaries are planning for a thawing of the Arctic; but outside the Arctic, Russia seems not to regard climate change as a serious national security issue. The United States, the United Kingdom, and China are studying the effect of rising sea levels on coastal military installations; Russia apparently is not. The United States and the United Kingdom have begun significant efforts to cut energy use and greenhouse gas emissions, but because of low domestic energy prices, the Russian military has few incentives to reduce energy consumption or increase alternative energy use. And out of deference to the government’s official position that climate change is a development rather than security issue, China’s military has largely limited its climate-related activities to mass tree planting and disaster relief. Regardless of their positions on climate change, national security entities in these four countries are not expressing much urgency or taking aggressive stands, in part due to the paucity of established knowledge about the connection between a warming climate and national security.
Keywords
The perspective of national security actors on climate change is important, if for no other reason than one simple reality: Militaries are important political actors in most countries, and their views can influence the overall course a government takes. But there are other reasons. Armed forces use sizeable amounts of natural and financial resources, making them important factors in national energy balances and effective competitors for government spending on climate change. Also, climate change will alter the strategic and operational environments for militaries, providing them with new options and challenges. Finally, there is a danger that climate change could be “militarized” by defense officials who favor the use of force to deal with mass migration and other destabilizing responses to environmental disasters, even when better alternatives are available.
National security actors all over the world (although certainly not in all countries) see climate change as a future threat or threat multiplier that puts additional demand on military capabilities and capacities (Brzoska, 2012; Carmen et al., 2010; Spencer et al., 2009). What this demand might be and where it will play out, however, is seen quite differently in the countries that acknowledge a national security dimension to the problem. This variation may not be so surprising; knowledge about the climate change consequences that have potential relevance for armed forces—consequences relating, for instance, to armed conflict or humanitarian disasters—is actually quite limited (Salehyan, 2009; Scheffran et al., 2012).
Globally, the militaries of the United States and the United Kingdom have been the most involved, in both debate and action, on climate change. Russia and China are the largest military powers after the United States, so the perception of the issue in these two countries is of particular concern for future international security. 1 To thoroughly understand the current and future state of climate change affairs in the militaries in these four countries, four core issues can be compared: reductions of greenhouse gas emissions by armed forces; dangers that climate change poses to military installations, primarily through raised sea levels; potential conflict in the Arctic; and military operations in crisis situations, including wars and disaster relief.
It is difficult to analyze the perspective of militaries, defense ministries, and other national security actors since bureaucratic organizations generally do not provide, in publicly available documents, the true thinking inside the organizations. The available information does make one thing very clear, however: The eventual effects of climate on the many policy areas that affect the national security of these four major nations are not yet clear, and the appropriate responses are therefore uncertain. National security actors are, indeed, seeing increased roles for the military—in domestic disaster relief in all four countries, in missions in crisis situations in the case of the United States and the United Kingdom, and in the Arctic for the US and the Russian military. But as of now, available documents do not show national security organizations expressing much urgency or taking many aggressive stands on climate change—in part, no doubt, due to the paucity of information about the connection between a changing climate and the security of nations. Researchers are sometimes teased for ending long research papers with calls for more research. In this case, it is obvious at the start that further study is vital if the national security threats that might flow from climate change are to be properly identified, analyzed, addressed, and, one can hope, minimized.
United States overview
The US military and much of the country’s broader national security community have debated the seriousness of the threat posed by global climate change since the 1990s. The first official mention of climate change as a security threat occurred in the 1997 National Security Strategy (National Security Council, 1997): “Environmental threats such as climate change, ozone depletion, and the transnational movement of dangerous chemicals directly threaten the health of US citizens.” Among the document’s long list of actions aimed at preventing climate change, however, none relates to the US military. The major defense planning document implementing the military aspects of national security planning, the Quadrennial Defense Review of 1997, is likewise silent on the issue (Federation of American Scientists, 1997).
Because the George W. Bush administration questioned the anthropogenic causation of climate change, it was dropped from the list of security threats in official documents on national security, including the Quadrennial Defense Reviews of 2001 and 2006. Instead, the administration listed it as one of the challenges to be overcome to “ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade” in National Security Strategy documents (White House, 2002, 2006).
The Bush policy did not go unchallenged at the Pentagon. In their 2003 study, “An abrupt climate change scenario and its implications for United States national security,” Peter Schwartz, a CIA consultant and former head of planning at Royal Dutch/Shell Group, and Doug Randall of the California-based Global Business Network, painted a number of depressing scenarios of turmoil and war resulting from the consequences of climate change (Schwartz and Randall, 2003). As a contract job, the study had no insider status. Because it had been commissioned by the Pentagon Office of Net Assessment, directed by the legendary futurist Andrew Marshall, 2 however, the report was assured major attention both in the military and by the general public (Townsend and Harris, 2004). Just the same, there was little follow-up in the Pentagon until 2007, when members of Congress placed language in the National Defense Authorization Act requiring the military to consider the effects of climate change on facilities, capabilities, and missions.
Now under the Obama administration, climate change has become a major issue for the US military. As the US National Security Strategy of May 2010 puts it: “The danger from climate change is real, urgent, and severe. The change wrought by a warming planet will lead to new conflicts over refugees and resources; new suffering from drought and famine; catastrophic natural disasters; and the degradation of land across the globe” (White House, 2010). Following this analysis, the Defense Department’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review emphasized that climate change will have two broad outcomes, shaping “the operating environment, roles, and missions that we undertake” and having an impact on “our facilities and military capabilities” (Department of Defense, 2010: 84–85).
Among the services, the US Navy has been the most active on the climate change front. In 2007, CNA, a nonprofit research organization with close ties to the Navy, issued a widely noted report, “National security and the threat of climate change,” that focused on mitigation measures but also highlighted challenges the country’s military could face as a result of political instability in other countries, increased migration to the United States, and demands for disaster relief (CNA, 2007). Riding the wave of growing attention to the issue, the Navy appointed a climate change task force; the first document it produced was the “Navy Arctic Roadmap” of 2009 (Department of the Navy, 2009b) illustrating the importance the Navy attaches to adaptation to the growth of ice-free areas in the Arctic. In 2010, the Navy adopted a four-year “Climate Change Roadmap” (Department of the Navy, 2010) that includes studies, plans, and possible training and exercises, but only very limited investment in hardware and infrastructure. The Air Force has been considerably less active on the climate issue. It does plan major changes with respect to energy use, befitting an organization that is by far the largest user of fuel among the military services. The ground forces—the Army, Marine Corps, and National Guard—have shown the least interest among the services in addressing climate change, despite directives that they improve energy efficiency, particularly on the battlefield (Carmen et al., 2010).
Greenhouse gases and the US military
Its size and global reach make the Pentagon the largest single customer for energy in the world, buying more than $15 billion of various fuels in the 2010 fiscal year (Department of Defense, 2011). Among the world’s militaries, the United States, is probably the most conscious of the need to reduce energy demand. The main drivers of energy efficiency have been dependence on foreign energy sources and rising energy costs, but greenhouse gas emissions have also been a concern.
Beginning in 2009, all US military services began planning for detailed energy-reduction goals that include deep cuts in consumption and steep increases in the use of alternative energy. Some bits of information, highlighted by the services on their respective Internet pages, suggest at least some progress. The Air Force, for instance, is set to buy 50 percent of its domestic aviation fuel in an alternative-petroleum blend. The Army is in the midst of a significant transformation of its fleet of 70,000 non-tactical vehicles, deploying more than 500 hybrids and acquiring 4,000 low-speed electrics for use at domestic installations. Meanwhile, in 2009 the Navy tested an engine for its F/A-18 strike fighter that can run on camelina-based biofuel (Department of the Navy, 2009a; US Air Force, 2010). But the services’ published objectives refer to future years, and these scraps of public information give little indication of the scope of military energy savings or greenhouse gas emission reductions.
Climate change and US military installations
In 2008, the National Intelligence Council judged that more than 30 US military installations “were already facing elevated levels of risk from rising sea levels” (Department of Defense, 2010). But to date, the US government has announced no concrete plans or actions to adapt low-lying bases to rising sea levels.
US national security and a warming Arctic
The National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive of January 2009 lay out six goals relating to the changing environment in the Arctic region (White House, 2009):
Meet national security and homeland security needs relevant to the Arctic region. Protect the Arctic environment and conserve its biological resources. Ensure that natural resource management and economic development in the region are environmentally sustainable. Strengthen institutions for cooperation among the eight Arctic nations (the United States, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, and Sweden). Involve the Arctic’s indigenous communities in decisions that affect them. Enhance scientific monitoring and research into local, regional, and global environmental issues.
The Navy has detected a number of major deficiencies in its Arctic posture, including the lack of infrastructure and logistics support, the paucity of electronic and visual navigation, and a scarcity of coastal installations (Titley and St John, 2010). For the planning period of the Navy’s Arctic Roadmap, the emphasis is on further study. No decisions are foreseen before 2014, when the next Quadrennial Defense Review is due (Department of the Navy, 2009b).
In its official documents, the United States has emphasized cooperation in a thawing Arctic, particularly with Russia (Department of Defense, 2010: 59). The Navy puts it this way: “The opening of the Arctic waters in the decades ahead which will permit seasonal commerce and transit presents a unique opportunity to work collaboratively in multilateral forums to promote a balanced approach to improving human and environmental security in the region” (Department of the Navy, 2009b: 86).
Climate change, war, and disaster
Many assessments of the consequences of climate change make predictions of increases in the number of armed conflicts, failing states, and humanitarian disasters that will happen around the world. The US military, however, doesn’t purport to know where, when, and how often US forces may be sent to distant countries as an indirect consequence of climate change. A number of studies in this area have been commissioned, in the United States and elsewhere; most are not funded by national security institutions.
Planning is more concrete in one area. The US military (in fact, the militaries of all four countries) is sure that it will be called upon more often in the future to respond to floods, fires, droughts, and other disasters brought on by climate change and therefore argues that its disaster-response capacities be expanded.
United Kingdom overview
The Ministry of Defence and the UK military generally were late in adopting a climate change agenda; the Defence White Paper of 2003–2004, for instance, makes no mention of climate change (Ministry of Defence, 2003). By 2008, however, the agenda had changed, with the National Security Strategy putting climate change at the forefront: “Climate change is potentially the greatest challenge to global stability and security, and therefore to national security. Tackling its causes, mitigating its risks, and preparing for and dealing with its consequences are critical to our future security, as well as protecting global prosperity and avoiding humanitarian disaster” (Cabinet Office, 2008).
The latest National Security Strategy, adopted after the election of a new Conservative-Liberal government, takes a more cautious course but still highlights climate change as a major security threat: “The physical effects of climate change are likely to become increasingly significant as a ‘risk multiplier’, exacerbating existing tensions around the world” (HM Government, 2010a). In the accompanying defense planning document (HM Government, 2010b), the military presents its climate change responsibility as secondary to that of other ministries. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office is charged with “coordinating work relating to these security impacts of climate change and resource competition” (HM Government, 2010b), and the Department for Energy and Climate Change is to develop a strategy for critical national infrastructure.
Even so, the Ministry of Defence has published a document, “Defence in a changing climate,” which sets out principal objectives (Ministry of Defence, 2009a), and an accompanying Climate Change Strategy lists concrete targets for greenhouse gas reductions and areas of military concern (Ministry of Defence, 2009b). Implementation plans are laid out in the ministry’s Climate Change Delivery Plan 2010 (Ministry of Defence, 2010).
The UK military and greenhouse gases
The UK government has set quantitative goals for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions by the Ministry of Defence and military services; according to the government’s Carbon Transition Plan, adopted in 2008, the ministry is to reduce its emissions by about 15 percent a year until 2012 (Ministry of Defence, 2009b). To break these reduction requirements down for individual services and energy users, the ministry has started on a program of data collection and improvements in greenhouse gas emissions measurement. This process is to be completed in 2013.
In the meantime, many greenhouse gas reduction measures have already been introduced. There are new regulations for low-carbon buildings, weapon-system modernizations that use energy-saving propulsion, and renewable energy sources at domestic military installations; some success has been achieved. For instance, in the 2009–2010 fiscal year, the Defence Ministry reached a climate change target on government-owned property two years early, reducing carbon emissions by more than 12 percent compared with 1999–2000 levels. 3
Climate change and UK military installations
The Ministry of Defence has set 2015 as the target for having completed the assessment of effects of climate change on its approximately 4,000 sites (Ministry of Defence, 2009b). The United Kingdom has no current plans for investments to protect bases against sea-level rise.
UK national security and a warming Arctic
The UK government has not identified national security interests specific to a thawing Arctic.
Climate change, war, and disaster
The UK military operates globally—although at a smaller scale than the United States. As in the United States, UK researchers are studying the effects of climate change on armed conflict and humanitarian crises, and defense institutions have expressed interest in the results.
Russia overview
The most recent document on Russian military doctrine, made public in 2010, is overwhelmingly focused on narrow military objectives. The primary objectives of the Russian armed forces are to deter and prevent military conflict; climate change is not mentioned or seen as an issue with which the armed forces have to be concerned. The document mentions the armed forces and emergencies—the military was heavily involved in relief efforts related to extensive fires in 2010—but emergency response is clearly not a high priority. Among the main peacetime tasks for the Russian armed forces, it is listed last (Russian Federation, 2010).
One element of Russian military planning is heavily influenced by the consequences of climate change: its posture in the Arctic. Russia’s Arctic policy to 2020 (Russian Federation, 2008) emphasizes military readiness, listing as important “the upkeep of a favorable operational regime in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation, including the maintenance of the required combat potential of military groupings under the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations, and agencies in this region” (Russian Federation, 2008: paragraph 6b).
The Russian military and greenhouse gases
In Russia, incentives for the military to reduce energy consumption or switch to alternative energy are weak, given low domestic energy prices. No publicly available information suggests the military in Russia has plans to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Climate change and Russian military installations
Russia has taken no concrete action in regard to climate change and its effect on military bases, even though Russia will have to deal not just with rising sea levels, but with bases built on permafrost that will melt as temperatures rise.
Russian national security and a warming Arctic
In its Arctic policy strategy (Russian Federation, 2008: paragraph 4), Russia’s national interests are defined as:
Use of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation as a strategic resource base. Safeguarding the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation. Conservation of the Arctic’s unique ecosystems. Use of the Northern Sea Route as a national integrated transport-communication system.
Russia plans a general increase in its military deployments in the Arctic zone, including improvements in its coastguard and maritime surveillance capabilities (Russian Federation, 2008: paragraph 8b). Compared with the size of the operational area, however, current plans are modest.
The Russian focus in the Artic seems to stress cooperation, particularly in dealing with potential disaster. The Russian Artic policy document of 2007 lists as one of its strategic goals “the creation of a unified regional system of search and rescue, as well as the preemption of technogenic catastrophes and the elimination of their consequences, including the coordination of rescue services” (Russian Federation, 2008: paragraph 7b).
Climate change, war, and disaster
In Russia, the military has accepted a major role in domestic disasters possibly related to climate change. But except for the Arctic, the Russian government has not disseminated plans to increase its capacities for response to climate change-linked wars or disasters outside the country’s borders.
China overview
In the last few years, government documents have repeatedly mentioned climate change as being among the “new” security issues making the international situation more complex. The 2010 White Paper on National Defense (China Daily, 2011) reports, “Security threats posed by such global challenges as terrorism, economic insecurity, climate change, nuclear proliferation, insecurity of information, natural disasters, public health concerns, and transnational crime are on the rise.” But no further discussion of climate change is to be found in the authoritative document.
This ambivalence—recognition of climate change as a threat but reluctance to discuss its consequences—shows up in other documents, too. The People’s Liberation Army general staff has set up expert commissions and specialized bodies to study potential national security consequences of climate change. But those studies have not led to authoritative statements from the army on the issue (Freeman, 2010: 22). It almost seems as if the Chinese military is not allowed to dwell on the potential challenges of climate change.
China’s military is in the midst of a modernization drive. Chinese military spending has risen steadily and is now at a higher level than spending by any nation other than the United States (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI], 2011). The modernization effort aims to make the Chinese military competitive with any external enemy, but it has different goals than Western armed forces. The Chinese military has explicit roles in promoting economic development and providing disaster relief. As the White Paper on National Defense proudly notes, “The armed forces of China act as the shock force in emergency rescue and disaster relief.” The Chinese military is also involved in climate mitigation—not by reducing greenhouse gas emissions, but by planting trees. “The armed forces stationed in the western region have planted 11 million trees and afforested 3.2 million mu 4 of barren hills and desert land by large-scale forestation and aerial planting,” according to the white paper (China Daily, 2011).
The limited treatment of climate change in security documents and the lack of debate in the military are in line with the official Chinese policy. When climate change was debated in the UN Security Council, in April 2008 and July 2011, the Chinese representative rejected the idea that the Security Council should consider climate change. 5 The Chinese leadership is concerned that accepting climate change as a security issue might be used as a justification for Western military interventions in future crisis situations (Freeman, 2010).
The Chinese military and greenhouse gases
There are some reports of alternative fuel use by the Chinese military, but it is not clear how intensive or successful these efforts have been. Still, it is likely that the Chinese military is under pressure to improve energy efficiency and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. China has adopted overall targets on energy efficiency that will be more difficult to achieve if the military—a large energy consumer—is exempted. 6
Climate change and Chinese military installations
Military study groups apparently are looking at the potential consequences of climate change on naval bases. Official documents offer little detail on these studies or other efforts related to the effect of climate change and sea-level rise on military installations.
Chinese national security and a warming Arctic
China so far has no Arctic policy. It seems to be taking a wait-and-see approach rather than openly positioning itself (Jakobsen, 2010).
Climate change, war, and disaster
Already the Chinese military is often called upon to deal with domestic emergencies and expects this demand to increase substantially because of climate change. Official documents give no suggestion the military might play such a role outside the country.
Future plans
US and UK national security actors consider climate change to be a major issue, along several dimensions. Even though knowledge about the impact of climate change on the role of armed forces, military operations, and security installations is scant, planning for a future with climate change has begun, and some action, particularly with respect to greenhouse gas emission reductions, has been taken in these two countries.
Still, there are distinct differences in emphasis. In the United States, the Navy has been a leader in climate change policy making; the other service branches have joined in, but their focus has been on reducing energy consumption, with reductions in greenhouse gas emissions being only a welcome side effect. The UK military has adopted a detailed, specific climate change agenda, but in contrast to the United States, the United Kingdom national security actors have not been at the forefront of the national climate change debate.
Meanwhile, both the Russian and the Chinese military seem to have paid only minor attention to the consequences of climate change. But there are distinct differences in approach. In the Russian case, more immediately pressing issues, including the modernization and reform of Russian armed forces, have higher priority on national security actors’ agendas. Climate-change-as-national-security-threat is just not seen as a good argument for military leaders to make as they push for modernization, because there is little concern about climate change in Russian public discourse. The Arctic is a different case entirely. Here, the Russians have a keen interest, but for the time being the Russian national security apparatus prefers cooperative approaches.
Current policies and planning make it likely that there will be substantial increases in military deployments in the Arctic region by the United States and possibly Russia, as well as other Arctic states not discussed here, including Canada. There is little evidence that the US and Russian militaries see such deployments as threatening. Rather, defensive positions dominate the available documents on national security, climate change, and the Arctic region.
Contrary to the Russian approach, Chinese leadership seems to be quite aware of the potential effects of climate change on military operations and installations. Public pronouncements are, however, largely limited to tree planting and disaster relief. These operations, if one can call them such, are a result of limits set by the political leadership. A more active stand by the Chinese military on climate change issues would undermine the official Chinese position: Climate change is a development, not a security, issue.
National security actors see growing but varying climate change roles for the militaries in the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, and China. These roles have costs attached to them. The military is expected to have increased involvement in domestic disaster relief in all four countries, in overseas missions in crisis situations for the United States and the United Kingdom and in the Arctic for the US and the Russian military.
As of now, however, documents do not show much urgency or many aggressive stands by national security actors in regard to climate change. Despite the public discourse on potential future conflict over Arctic resources as polar temperatures rise, for example, both the US and the Russian military proclaim interest in cooperation, not confrontation. And there is one striking omission from the many documents reviewed for this analysis: The suggestion that military spending might be reduced to pay the increasing costs of climate mitigation is nowhere to be found.
Footnotes
Funding
The research for this manuscript was supported by the Integrated Climate System Analysis and Prediction Program, funded by the German Research Foundation.
Acknowledgement
Thanks to Lewis Smith for his assistance in the collection of documents.