Arctic 2030: What are the consequences of climate change?

Canada has always seen itself as an Arctic state with a need to defend its northern border from the outside world. This view is demonstrated in its literature and its mythology, and it can be found in lines from the Canadian national anthem—“The True North strong and free! From far and wide, O Canada, we stand on guard for thee.” The reality, however, is that the vast bulk of the Canadian population is found along its southernmost border, and political decisions throughout its history have looked not northward but southward.

Canada has been concerned about its northern security only when pushed by outside events—more particularly, by the actions of its American and Russian or Soviet neighbors—and even then, it has accepted the need to take action only reluctantly. When the threat has been framed as a US challenge to Canadian sovereignty, Canadian decision makers have always made bold statements at the height of the perceived crisis, but quickly moved on to other topics, seldom actually spending money on the protection of Canada’s Arctic security. The impacts of climate change, however, have finally forced Canada to take Arctic security needs seriously.

Climate change is fundamentally transforming the Canadian north—and not just in a physical way. Climate change has also altered the geopolitical environment facing Canada, opening the Arctic to the world in both perception and reality. Canada has always been protected by the extreme climates and the ice cover that prevented all but a small, determined few from entering the northern-most reaches. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union devoted vast resources to build and operate large fleets of nuclear-powered submarines in the region. Likewise, it was only these countries that had the capability of designing and operating the icebreakers needed to penetrate Arctic waters. As a result, Canada did not need to devote much effort in the north; the United States was willing to do so for the common security of the Western world—as long as Canada was willing to allow the placement and maintenance of defensive radar sites on its northern territories.

But now the ice is melting, the Arctic is perceived as opening, and Canadian leaders are forced to deal with new security challenges as the Arctic countries set their economic zones, and companies from around the world are drawn to the area’s abundant natural resources.

In response to climate change and increased interest in commerce in and through the Arctic, the Canadian government has recently developed a comprehensive strategy to improve the country’s surveillance and enforcement capabilities in the north; the strategy includes military exercises with allies. Canada has also engaged its Arctic neighbors on several diplomatic fronts, including attempts to reach agreements on the economic zones the countries will claim. Rising commercial interest in the Arctic from the rest of the world—notably China and the European Union—has created the possibility of difficulties to which Canada has not yet responded. And one other problem looms as a result of increased interest in the Arctic: the security of the people who live in the far Canadian north and who inevitably will be affected as the area develops.

As climate change advances, the Arctic is being transformed in many interconnected ways. New technologies are increasing the reach of non-Arctic actors, including South Korea, which has recognized the economic possibilities of an opening Arctic and positioned itself as a leader in the design and construction of Arctic-capable commercial vessels. Such innovative shipping technologies will accelerate the abilities of other nations to ship through the Arctic Ocean, even as some ice remains.

At the same time, there is growing recognition of the vast amounts of natural resources that remain undeveloped in the Arctic. In 2008, a US Geological Survey study estimated that the Arctic region contains more than 30 percent of all undiscovered natural gas and 13 percent of undiscovered oil in the world (USGS, 2008). Canada is now waiting to develop one of the world’s largest deposits of iron ore at the northern tip of Baffin Island. And these are just two in a rapidly expanding list of Arctic resources that could be available for exploitation as ice recedes and new technologies come online.

Another factor influencing the transformation of the region is the development of international law that creates new maritime zones of control. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea gives coastal states the right to establish maritime zones of control off their coasts. All of the Arctic coastal states, including Canada, have now created 200-nautical-mile “Economic Exclusive Zones” and are now in the process of determining the outer limits of their extended continental shelves; once established, those outer limits will extend far beyond the 200-mile zone and allow the Arctic coastal states to control the seabed of most of the Arctic Ocean. Canada is now completing the necessary mapping to determine what region will be included in its extended zone.

Recognizing that climate change will make the region more accessible, Arctic states have built military forces that can operate in and near the region. With the exception of Iceland, all of the Arctic states have now begun to spend significant resources on such forces.

Finally, Canada is facing a dramatic transformation of its northern societies, particularly the northern indigenous populations. And the health, economic, and educational security of these societies are increasingly coming under strain.

What, then, do all of these transformational forces mean for Canadian Arctic security? First of all, these changes have required Canada to understand its Arctic interests. To this end, the government headed by both the Liberal Party’s Paul Martin and the Conservative Party’s Stephen Harper have made the development of a comprehensive Arctic strategy a core Canadian priority. The current government issued its Northern Strategy in 2009. Of its four main priorities, the first was the exercising of Canadian Arctic sovereignty for the protection of Canadian Arctic security, with a focus on improving Canada’s surveillance and enforcement capabilities in the Arctic. The Canadian government has committed to the construction of six to eight offshore patrol vessels for use in the Arctic, marking the first time since the 1950s that the Canadian Navy will have the ability to operate in northern waters. The government has also committed to the construction of a large icebreaker and has expanded the numbers, training, and operations of the Canadian Rangers—a volunteer unit composed of large numbers of indigenous northern people who provide patrol assistance to the Canadian Forces. The rangers’ traditional knowledge of and ability to operate in the Arctic has proved invaluable. The Canadian Forces will also develop a small-scale refueling site in Nanisivik, a former mining port on the Northwest Passage in Canada’s Nunavut territory, as well as a training facility in the Inuit hamlet of Resolute.

Like most other Arctic states, Canada stopped military exercises in the Arctic at the end of the Cold War. They were resumed in 2002, and since then Canada has slowly increased their scope and complexity, recently including Danish and US military forces in the practice operations.

Canada’s effort to protect its Arctic security includes efforts to engage its Arctic neighbors diplomatically. In May 2008, Canadian decision makers met with officials from Russia, Denmark, Norway, and the United States to discuss the efforts to establish the outer limits of their continental shelves. At this meeting, all five coastal states agreed to follow the terms of international law and to manage overlaps in claimed areas of control in a cooperative, diplomatic fashion. Canada has also worked within the Arctic Council—a body whose membership includes all eight Arctic countries, six northern indigenous organizations known as permanent participants, six other states, nine intergovernmental and interparliamentary organizations, and 11 nongovernmental observers. Very recently, Canada played a leading role in the creation of an Arctic search-and-rescue treaty negotiated within the council, a move that has been hailed as a major step forward for Arctic security. In short, the impacts of climate change have required Canada to become more serious about this security. ¹

But Canada is facing new Arctic security challenges to which it has not yet responded. The first such challenge concerns the non-Arctic actors who are becoming increasingly interested in the region. To name but a few, the European Union, China, and Japan have all begun to develop Arctic policies and the means with which to enter the region. These new actors are adding complexity to the security policies of Arctic states. The Canadian response has been guarded to the EU’s request to be granted permanent observer status at the Arctic Council. In part, this has been driven by a European ban on seal products that has been harmful to Inuit interests in the region. There’s also concern that other elements of the European Arctic policy may be in conflict with Canadian interests. The Europeans have become increasingly vocal in their opposition to the development of oil and gas fields in the high Arctic, which may create further tension if the Canadian government decides to develop such assets.

China has begun to develop an Arctic policy, but more important, it has begun to develop the assets to conduct substantial programs of research in the Arctic region. China has given every indication that it wishes to cooperate closely with Canada on such efforts. Canada is more favorably inclined toward granting China permanent observer status on the Arctic Council than with the European Union. Of course, the potential diplomatic problems involved with approving one but not the other are obvious.

Canada may also be facing a future diplomatic challenge from Russia, Denmark, or the United States in regard to its continental shelf claims. Canada, Denmark, and the United States have cooperated closely in the mapping effort on their side of the Arctic, which will determine the Canadian claim, but there still remains a potential that the states will make overlapping claims. ² All of the states have indicated they will resolve possible overlaps with diplomacy and within the rule of law. Whether the states remain true to their word is an open question.

Finally, one of the most important issues that Canada will face in its Arctic region will involve the security of its own northern population. The decrease of ice cover and the increasing interest of the outside world in the Arctic are drastically changing the lifestyle, environment, and economic realities facing all Canadians who call the north home. In coming decades, Canada will need to ensure that it not only provides for international security in an increasingly complicated environment; it also must put the security of its people at the forefront. Canada needs the means to identify and respond to foreign actions in its Arctic territory. It will also need to ensure for the health, education, and economic security of its people as the impacts of climate change on them become ever more obvious.