Constrained urban aspirations: Development,structural precarity and inequalities within Thai migration

Abstract

This work foregrounds changing state development policies in Thailand as a way to consider the complex drivers and motivations within internal migration. Using uncertain outcomes of state development and broader socio-cultural divisions as structure, ethnographic data detail the ways personal agency marks one's aspirational character and possible futures in the pursuit of well-being and economic security. Ultimately, I argue that ongoing state development efforts to reduce poverty, increase socio-economic equity, and facilitate people's capacity to cope with daily life confront enduring challenges. Reframing development must address people's existential needs and consider how structural precarity interrelates with persistent socio-cultural inequities and prejudices.

Keywords

development aspirations urbanization domestic migration Thailand

Introduction

The literature on state-induced migration traditionally draw from the rhetoric of drivers or pressure. Structural conditions created through development and associated changes in socio-political and ecological landscapes may facilitate labor migration and the restructuring of household economies, livelihood strategies or provisioning tactics for self or family. Structural factors commonly underpinning migration are inequalities in wealth and opportunities, labor market imbalances, uneven infrastructural development, reduced natural resource access or socio-political conflict (e.g., Castles et al., 2014; Czaika and De Haas, 2010, 2014; Düvell, 2005; Radel et al., 2017). By focusing on the changing conditions of political economies, natural resource access, or socio-economic and cultural systems, scholars may form an analysis of structure. However, migration rarely results from a single cause and reflects “a complex process shaped by multiple social, political, economic and spatial drivers” (Radel et al., 2017: 3). Further, while multiple drivers provide a foundation to influence migration, scholars have also recognized the role of agency and choice in migration decision-making (e.g., Castles, 2010; De Haas, 2014; Stark and Bloom, 1985; Taylor et al., 2003). Conceptual and theoretical frameworks, such as the new economics of labor migration, systems and network theory, positive and negative liberties or social transformation, note the significance of people's interpretation of broader conditions and ways to mitigate constraints or capitalize on opportunities. Thus, research in mobilities prioritizes understanding how human agency conditions the responses to structural factors (Castles, 2010; De Haas, 2014). Motivations for migration may exist independent of or complementary to structural conditions. An individual may move due to various changes introduced by development or urbanization, and others may move due to various personal aspirations, and certainly both could be active within a given actor.

In the context of Thailand, research has considered the connections between development outcomes and migration patterns (e.g., Huguet et al., 2012; Lightfoot and Fuller, 1983; Sternstein, 1977; Sussangkarn and Chalamwong, 1994). Historical studies primarily analyzed the structural components of development policies—often rooted in technocratic and econometric approaches. Researchers considered the ways in which Thailand's development policies created inequities and poverty, thereby shaping migration as a strategizing behavior. The Thai state has recognized that development policies largely formed in the 1960s—which prioritized development of the extended Bangkok metropolitan region in top-down fashion—created decades of domestic inequities. While imperfect, state agencies have argued for thorough social, political and economic restructuring to correct longstanding inequalities (Baxter, 2017; Doner, 2009; Raquiza, 2013).

Of interest here are the ways in which development policies and associated economic reorganization and urban expansion change the types of work available and where that work is located. In particular, the need for more workers in urban areas supports a growing stream of “rural” migrants into city centers. This demographic shift is further complicated by state plans to introduce smart technologies to agricultural production and thereby lower human labor requirements in the agricultural sector (Kaur, 2010: 17; National Statistical Office, 2017; Rukumnuaykit, 2009). Thus, Thai development changes the types of economic sectors that characterize national political economies, inadvertently expedites demographic changes and shifts where and how people will find employment, stability and well-being.

The changing conditions of state development policies in Thailand provide a way to consider the intersections between structure and agency. Ethnographic data collected in the central and northeastern regions of Thailand from 2009 to 2013 demonstrate the complex ways that labor mobilities reflect individual or familial motivations and aspirations, even as such hopes might draw from pragmatic decision-making strategies on how to restructure micro-economies to mitigate development-induced changes.

This article seeks to holistically consider the socio-cultural phenomenon of Thai internal migration by analyzing both the motivations within sending households and the experiences of Thai migrants who relocated to Bangkok. Ethnographic data collected among origin households primarily located in peri-urban¹ spaces demonstrate the ways socio-cultural and economic aspirations underpin migration efforts to gain entry into Bangkok's labor markets. However, migrants working in Bangkok confront urban socio-cultural and political fields that are often framed through symbolic divisions between rural and urban spaces, including different valuations placed on people coming from (supposed) rural areas or families embedded in agrarian economies. By repositioning ethnographic data within the contexts of unfolding development and urbanization policies, I explore how people subjectively determine one's agency and place within changing domestic political economies. This approach builds on work in aspirations and subjectivities by considering “how people (try to) act on the world even as they are acted upon” (Ortner, 2006: 110). As such, the analysis gives attention to understanding the intersections between development, urbanity and agency. Against the structural context of state development and broader socio-cultural divisions, ethnographic data detail the ways Thais form “aspirational capacities” to achieve a sense of well-being and worth, seek new types of work and accrue additional socio-cultural capital and status for themselves and their families.

Subjectivities, aspirations and development

Setting aside moral questions concerning the legitimacy of development interventions, a central concern in critical analyses remains that even with laudable intentions, planning and sufficient capital and inputs, development outcomes often remain ineffective, unimaginative or detrimental (e.g., Escobar, 2011; Gardner and Lewis, 2015; Olivier de Sardan, 2005; Sachs, 2006). Over successive decades, development has created social, economic and environmental disorders that have ranged from natural resource depletion, widening socio-economic inequalities and uncontrolled urbanization to political instabilities, social disorder and hegemonic market rationalities. Such manifestations derive from the overwhelmingly technocratic and econometric nature of development, particularly interventions advanced by state agencies with vested interests in securing control over the process and derived benefits. Furthermore, most state-designed and planned interventions are schematic and radically simplified in nature, ignoring complex and crucial features of socio-economic, political and environmental systems (see Scott, 1998). The result is development projects that often fail state agencies and intended recipients.

As noted by scholars, such as Appadurai (2013), Clammer (2012), Escobar (2011), Ferguson (1994, 2006), and Sen (2000), this failure partly arises from the domination of development studies by practitioners and agencies that view development as a science of calculation, focusing on immediate wants and choices made by actors and, therefore, failing to account for any higher order desires or diversities of experiences that might inform the intervention.² The loss of philosophical, humanistic or subjective investigation into poverty and inequality creates forms of development separated from experiences of suffering and interpretations of that suffering. According to Clammer (2012: 10), “development studies, paradoxically and ironically as it presents itself as the front line of engagement with the pressing social issues of the day, is often deeply anti-humanistic, for its real subjects, in all their existential depth, escape its grasp.” Should development and state interventions fulfill their objectives at reducing poverty, increasing socio-economic equity and ensuring people's capacity to cope with daily life and find well-being, development must be reframed to attend to people's existential needs (see also Sen, 2000). This requires placing matters of dignity, fairness, happiness, freedom, moral well-being, rights and entitlements at the center of not only an economic and political enterprise, but an ethical and humanistic one.

In efforts to distance development and allied studies from a reliance on calculations—what Appadurai references as an “avalanche of numbers”—scholars have drawn from theories that consider spatial imaginaries, cultural capacities, subjectivities and the like (e.g., Appadurai, 2013; Bunnell et al., 2018; De L'Estiole, 2014; Fischer, 2014; Ortner, 2006). The goal is to deeply integrate cultural considerations into development and betterment, as well as ensure that researchers attend to the diverse experiences associated with (and attempts to escape) poverty, marginalization, exclusion or suffering, particularly as they might exist as unfortunate outcomes of development and the very experiences it attempts to alleviate. Of concern here are the ways in which people strategically deploy migration as one response to development effects, in turn producing complex sets of socio-cultural, political and economic experiences associated with efforts to find work, stability and well-being. This particular inquiry necessarily foregrounds humanistic and ethical frameworks to consider the intersections between structure and agency.

Integrating humanistic considerations into migration and development studies extends from the recognition that those at the center of analysis are existentially complex subjects. As noted by Ortner (2006: 111) people “are always at least partially ‘knowing subjects,’ that they have some degree of reflexivity about themselves and their desires, and that they have some [emphasis added] ‘penetration’ into the ways in which they are formed by their circumstances.” This approach blends Giddens’ (1979) recognition of an individual's agency and partial awareness with Bourdieu's (1977) insistence on the deeply internalized and somewhat inaccessible underlying logics to the formation of one's social knowledge and practices. Thus, subjectivities consider the individual as a complex mixture of thoughts, feelings, hopes, desires and reflections, formed partially by the condition of subjection, as well as their creative attempts to overcome such circumstances.

Similar approaches have been advanced by Fischer (2014), drawing on Nussbaum's (2011) work with human development and dignity, who argues that quantitative and econometric analyses of material goods and income miss subjective dimensions of poverty and people's sincere efforts to obtain the “good life.” Sen's (1985, 2000) seminal work in “Capability Approach” considers the subjective and ethical but deepens the analysis by detailing how poverty severely diminishes one's freedom to pursue various life opportunities and ability to construct a life with value and purpose. Here development's effects and externalities become entangled with the subjective dimensions of poverty and deprivation, including the ways in which individuals and families handle development's benefits and harms.

As noted above, people employ migration and labor mobilities to varying degrees to overcome their circumstances. Scholars such as Bayly (2013), Mills (2012), Hairong (2008), among others have demonstrated that migration and accessing new labor markets or diversifying household economies contribute to increased status, raised living standards, occupational prestige and improved life satisfaction, among other desirable qualities. Yet, individual deprivation and structural constraints frustrate pathways to obtaining a fulfilling life—one with value and purpose. Newly relocated migrants confront pervasive forms of discrimination or prejudice that arguably result in impoverished freedoms or “capacities to aspire” (e.g., Appadurai, 2004, 2013).

Ultimately, while personal agency marks one's aspirational character and possible futures in the pursuit of well-being, economic security and a life with dignity, those individual choices and behaviors are restricted or facilitated through opportunities within broader socio-political and economic structures. For the purposes here, when considering how individuals view what might be possible within changing and newly encountered urban spaces, research must also attend to how such individual pathways are affected by structural changes, uncertainties and opportunities. Given that the Thai state's development policies alter national political economies and urban spaces, I seek to consider how migration and the diverse range of associated socio-cultural and economic experiences are subjectively understood by people attempting to mitigate the structural uncertainties engendered through the state's new spatialities and economies. Certainly, decisions to migrate may form through both structure and agency; however, the concern herein is what this means for migrants' aspirations in Bangkok and how people experience the various types of poverty and deprivation so intimately bound to development.

Methodology and sample profiles

Since 2009, I have conducted ethnographic research in Thailand, primarily relying upon participant observation and unstructured and semi-structured interviews.³ The overall focus of my work has considered the various connections between development and urbanization outcomes and the ways in which households and individuals strategically use migration, labor mobilities and economic diversification in response.

Ethnographic research conducted in Bangkok starting in 2009 focused on migrants’ experiences working in the capital. This included considering migrants’ (n = 45) propensities to remit to families in origin provinces and the degree to which they culturally identified with Bangkok, which might influence duration of stay or remittance volume (Gullette, 2013, 2014). Migrants interviewed from 2009 to 2011 broadly originated from Thailand's northeast (or Isaan) region and represented “highly skilled migrants” (those with high socio-economic standing and tertiary education) and ‘migrant workers’ (those in less skilled occupations and usually without tertiary education). Most migrants interviewed lived or worked in Bangkok's districts of Ratchathewi, Phaya Thai and Bang Khae.⁴ Chain-referral and purposive sampling were used to locate those with diverse experiences and characteristics (Table 1).

Table 1.

Selected socio-demographic profile of internal migrants working in Bangkok, ethnographic research, 2009–2011 (n = 45).

Variable	No.	%
Gender
Female	24	53.3
Male	21	46.7
Age (years)
<18	1	2.2
18–30	15	33.4
31–44	23	51.1
45 or older	6	13.3
Marital status
Single	23	51.1
Married	17	37.8
Divorced	4	8.9
Widowed	1	2.2
Education level
Primary	5	11.1
Secondary	10	22.2
High school	7	15.6
University	13	28.9
Postgraduate	10	22.2
Primary reasons for migration
Employment	28	62.2
Education	2	4.4
Employment and education	11	24.4
Family	1	2.2
Cultural/social issues	3	6.7

In 2011, I began another line of inquiry: working with agrarian households in peri-urban spaces that often sent family members to Bangkok to find work. Ethnographic data collection occurred from 2011 to 2013 among “origin households” in Nakhon Ratchasima (n = 38) and Samut Prakan (n = 25) in the northeastern and central regions, respectively. Through purposive sampling, I sought to capture among a diverse set of households the socio-economic, political and environmental variables that might influence decisions to send family members to Bangkok or to restructure household economies (see Tables 2 and 3 for the socio-demographic profile of sampled households and those responsible for household agricultural production). The objective was to consider the ways in which agrarian families in urbanizing spaces used economic diversification, labor mobilities and migrant remittances to cope with or adjust to urbanization effects (see also Gullette and Singto, 2015; Gullette et al., 2017).

Table 2.

Socio-demographic profile of agrarian households in the peri-urban sections of Nakhon Ratchasima and Samut Prakan, ethnographic research, 2011–2013 (n = 63).

Variable	No.	%
Gender
Female	41	65.1
Male	22	34.9
Age (years)
18–30	2	3.2
31–44	16	25.4
45–59	38	60.3
60 and over	7	11.1
Marital status
Single	4	6.3
Married	55	87.3
Divorced	1	1.6
Widowed	3	4.8
Length of residence in district (in years)
1–19	5	7.9
20–39	11	17.5
40–49	24	38.1
50–59	16	25.4
60 or more	7	11.1
Education level
Primary	30	47.7
Secondary	14	22.2
High school	13	20.6
University	6	9.5
Postgraduate	0	0

Note: Data represent respondents primarily associated with agricultural responsibilities in the household.

Table 3.

Socio-demographic profile of agrarian households located in the peri-urban sections of Nakhon Ratchasima and Samut Prakan, ethnographic research, 2011–2013 (n = 63).

Variable	No.	%
Highest level of educational attainment in household
Primary	1	1.6
Secondary	6	9.5
High school	26	41.3
University	28	44.4
Postgraduate	2	3.2
Household income per month in THB (baht) (Including remittances, if applicable)
8,000–14,999	11	17.5
15,000–24,999	23	36.5
25,000–34,999	14	22.2
35,000 and above	15	23.8
Substantial household income derived from secondary economic sector
Yes (>40%)	29	56
No	34	54
Landing holdings, including rented and owned land in rai^a
4–19	22	34.9
20–39	22	34.9
40–59	8	12.8
60–79	4	6.3
80–99	3	4.8
100 and above	4	6.3

Rai is the common Thai measurement for land. One rai equals 1,600 sq. meters or 0.40 acres. One rai is composed of four ngaan, or commonly wa (0.25 rai).

Though the peri-urban sections of Nakhon Ratchasima and Samut Prakan have unique characteristics, such as ecological conditions or landholdings, field sites in both provinces exhibit varied types of industrial growth and patterns of urbanization that influence vulnerabilities experienced by households connected with agricultural production. In particular, Samut Prakan is woven into the historical expansion of the Bangkok metropolitan region and the expansive Eastern Seaboard Project. Districts immediately adjacent to the mueang district (or city center) are densely populated and reflect echoes of Bangkok's portrayal in the collective conscience: a sprawling urban landscape with high-rise buildings, industrial production, traffic congestion and dynamic socio-cultural and economic activities. However, Samut Prakan's easterly districts exhibit notable (though decreasing) agricultural activities supported by the Chao Phraya River. Districts, such as Bang Bo and Bang Sao Thong, demonstrate the tensions within Thai development policies, where families continue agrarian activities even as industry expands due to their proximity to the Laem Chabang deep seaport and Chonburi.

Similarly, Nakhon Ratchasima maintains a sizeable agricultural economy in its peri-urban spaces, supported by the northeast plateau and relatively stable landholdings. In comparison to agrarian households in Samut Prakan—which experienced greater land fragmentation and increased leasing arrangements (partly influenced by widespread acquisition of agricultural lands during the Chatichai Choonhavan administration's development efforts (1986 to 1991))—households in Nakhon Ratchasima generally retained larger landholdings and greater ownership of lands. Yet, agrarian families in Nakhon Ratchasima's peri-urban spaces also experienced increased constraints on agricultural production. The province's namesake mueang district has emerged as an essential industrial, economic and transportation hub for the lower Isaan, creating similar conditions of precarity for agrarian families adjacent to the mueang district. As seen below, the expanding nature of both provinces' urban center and their integration into national development strategies have produced structural conditions influential in migration patterning. Please note that names in all ethnographic excerpts below are pseudonyms.

Findings: Development, migration and subjectivities

Structure and migration

Interviews conducted among origin households considered the ways in which development interventions and shifting priorities in the national political economy have existed alongside individuals' attempts at providing for self and others. As seen in literature on risk aversion strategies among rural people's livelihoods (e.g., Forsyth and Evans, 2013; Scoones, 2009), though smallholders exhibit degrees of agency in adjustments to development effects (further discussed below), structure remains influential. Respondents noted the increased economic, social and ecological precarity created through state development and urbanization strategies. Among households in both the central and Isaan regions, concerns centered on the changing priorities within the government—particularly increased attention and resources directed toward urban expansion and industrial growth. Peri-urban transitions occurring in the field sites created degrees of anxiety within households that derived a majority of their livelihood from agricultural production. Farming households discussed the ways in which urban expansion facilitated land fragmentation, dispossession and degradation. While individuals reflected on the damages and threats to crops, livestock or aquaculture due to urban pollution (such as runoff, increased sewage, leaching of heavy metals into ground water and the like), many also focused on the difficulties of acquiring additional land should they seek to increase their investment in primary sector economies (see also Gullette et al., 2017). As government policies supporting agricultural production faltered⁵ in favor of industrial expansion, land fragmentation was common due to unfolding and competing zoning regulations. Furthermore, expanding secondary sectors drastically raised land prices, frustrating most smallholder's attempts at agrarian expansion.

The manner in which the state's development agenda promotes the transition of the Thai economy from its agricultural base to an industrial economic system (and eventually post-industrial economy as seen in Thailand 4.0 Policy) created uncertain futures for many families tied to primary sector production. Agrarian households considered such conditions when making decisions on mitigation strategies, which included diversifying livelihood portfolios and employing labor migration. On the one hand, as seen in literature that explore Southeast Asian agrarian households' engagement with multi-local economic systems (e.g., Barney, 2012; Hirsch, 2009; Kelly, 2011; Rigg and Salamanca, 2011), many families participated in regionally expanding secondary sectors. This entailed having at least one family member (perhaps a spouse or child) working in non-agricultural sectors, while, simultaneously, individuals responsible for agricultural production also engaged with secondary or tertiary economies to supplement household income.⁶ On the other hand, while some families in the regions engaged in or considered international migration, the “class bias” associated with such movement and the capital necessary to secure overseas employment (see Baulch, 2011; Cohen and Sirkeci, 2011) generally acted as deterrents. In turn, the ease of internal mobilities favored “rural–urban” migration.

Agrarian families in both field sites commonly sent family members to either Bangkok or larger urban centers for work. Unsurprisingly, families in Samut Prakan more often sent family members to Bangkok for work, in part due to their position within the extended metropolitan region, as well as more restrictive land pressures resulting from Bangkok's expansion and historical development policies (e.g., the Chatichai administration's acquisition of agricultural lands). Yet, even in Nakhon Ratchasima, over 40 percent of families had one or more members working away from home. Building from literature that critically analyzes the role of remittances in shaping development potentialities (e.g., Bang et al., 2016; Lim and Basnet, 2017; World Bank, 2017; Yang, 2011), ethnographic data indicate that increased labor mobilities helped change the local contextual dynamics of poverty, labor availability, and as noted below, subjectivities on agricultural production. Landed families tied to migration networks could access additional forms of capital through remittances and productively invest those monies in primary sector expansion.⁷ Other families might use those funds for local enterprises, such as restaurants, food stalls or beauty shops. Remittances were also directed toward family support, such as elderly care or education, or used to purchase expensive consumer items. However, sending family members to work in Bangkok or other urban centers also contributed to labor shortages when managing agricultural crops or aquacultures (for more on household labor organization, see Gullette and Singto, 2015). Depending on the household's economic flexibilities, remittances might prove a poor substitute for the loss of labor created from migration, particularly as families pursue other lucrative, yet labor intensive crops. Still, the process of incorporating migration into livelihood strategies enabled some households to confront the uncertainties of development and urbanization on agricultural futures.

Agency and aspirations

As demonstrated, migration and economic diversification may reflect structural considerations—land availability, urbanization's ecological effects, development's urban bias, waning rice subsidies, and so forth. Studying out-migration, Rigg and Salamanca (2009: 263-264) noted that “migration and mobility have come to be defining features of life [in Thailand] … migration is not an aberration” but an essential component of economic realities. Yet, ethnographic data herein highlight too the broader socio-cultural motivations for migration. Families framed their discussions on the generational abandonment of agriculture around ideas of being modern, increasing wealth and status (such as moving from khon jon [poor] to khon ruay [rich]), and simply obtaining a “good life.” In part, such socio-cultural aspirations are derived from assumed differences between (supposed) rural and urban spaces, including ascribing differential value to people in/from those places (see also Boccuzzi, 2013; Hairong, 2008; Mills, 2012; Vorng, 2011). According to Saiphon,⁸ who had worked in Bangkok for about ten years as a laborer before moving back home to take another factory job before finally settling into farming her family's plot in Samut Prakan, different valuations were used by everyone, though their effects were unequal.

Well, city people, they usually look down on those from the countryside (khon ban nok). Sometimes if you go to Bangkok and work, they might give you disapproving looks because maybe you look dirty, but really, it's because they think you look dirty. Certainly, it could be the type of job you're doing, but they shouldn't make someone feel bad about their situation [lot in life].

When asked if this situation works the other way, Saiphon replied:

[Laughing] We might think they're rich and arrogant. Not always, but we definitely think that at times. And sometimes they're nice. They might be rich but they're friendly, and they smile, and they talk to me. Though I suppose mostly they're rich, and they can be condescending to us … not the other way (Saiphon, female, 51 years old, married; interview in Samut Prakan, 2012).

While processes of migration, labor flexibilities and new capital spatialities challenge rigid dyadic city/countryside constructions (e.g., Hirsch, 2009; Rigg, 2016; Rigg et al., 2008), the social memory and reification of class and status structures frame Thai social orders, including individuals' attempts to escape devalorized work and upwardly integrate into socio-cultural hierarchies.

Most origin households in Nakhon Ratchasima and Samut Prakan discussed the desire, particularly among the youth, to exit agrarian work for more prestigious positions in larger mueang districts or Bangkok. The youth might seek to find work in a “higher” profession such as in a bank, a government office or perhaps a law firm—often with support from their parents. A central goal was to increase one's distance from “lower” occupations, where manual labor in a factory or agricultural field dominated.⁹ Thus, migration from peri-urban spaces and “rural” provinces proved attractive. As considered more fully below, both origin families and migrants working in Bangkok often saw a host of benefits: greater prestige and status, advancement opportunities, higher wages or a better life. Such assertions made by respondents reflect those of Fischer (2014: 5) who states, “to understand the good life, wherever it may be found, we must take seriously not only material conditions but also people's desires, aspirations and imaginations—the hopes, fears and other subjective factors that drive their engagement with the world.” Mills (1999: 11) made similar arguments framing women Isaan migrants as “conscious agents, making decisions and pursuing goals within—and, at times, despite—their difficult circumstances.”

Even as agrarian households attempted to overcome socio-economic inequalities created by state development and changes within broader political economies, their connections to urban labor markets enabled them to access economic and cultural capital that enhanced household status. In this case, migration and labor mobilities became pathways for social mobility. Yet, as seen below, integrating into Bangkok's cultural and economic landscape presented opportunities and limitations for migrants relocating from regions long-viewed as “other” or distant.

Subjectivities and boundary making

While the fluidities and mobilities noted above problematize dyadic spatial constructions, Thailand's development policies over successive decades have exacerbated infrastructural differences within the country. Material indicators of marked uneven development include rural deficiencies in electrical grids, telecommunication systems, social services and support systems, public transportation and business opportunities (Doner, 2009; Glassman, 2004; McGregor, 2008; Rigg, 2016). Though these infrastructural deficiencies more strongly characterize Nakhon Ratchasima's rural and peri-urban spaces, such patterns exist to lesser degrees in Samut Prakan's more easterly districts, such as Bang Bo, which continue to support agrarian economies and receive less infrastructural state investment. As noted by Keyes (2014: 136), “the marked unevenness of economic growth proved to be a major source of the dissatisfaction and increasing disaffection that rural [people] felt toward governments that paid little heed to their concerns.”

Origin families and migrants who relocated to Bangkok generally agreed with such academic assessments. Woven throughout interviews was the notion that Bangkok represented a developed and cosmopolitan center that contrasted with the simplicities of rural life. Here, material and economic differences between rural and urban meshed with socio-cultural and political valuations of such places and people. Personal evaluations of rural life combined with popular media's simplistic portrayals of rurality—backward, undeveloped, wanting, and so forth (see also Ferrara, 2017; Vorng, 2012).

Many migrants relocating to Bangkok carried such understandings with them. Even as migrant workers found employment in Bangkok's marginal economies—street vending, factories, industrial plants or taxi stalls—they argued that incomes were higher than in comparable work back home, if available. Diverse job opportunities also proved attractive. During a conversation with Boonsri, who then worked as a cleaning woman, several of these themes were interrelated. Boonsri had migrated to Bangkok about three years prior to our interview. After her husband unexpectedly passed, she attempted to make ends meet in Khon Kaen by growing vegetables, rice and sugar cane. However, with a young son to raise, she decided it was best to migrate to Bangkok.

It was a job opportunity that brought me here [Bangkok]. If I had stayed and worked on growing sugar cane or potatoes, I wouldn't make it. My son was starting school and I had so many expenses … meals, clothes, and other things. I needed more money. This job, well, my first job, paid more than what I would have made in Khon Kaen. Plus, work there is more seasonal.

When asked if it was more stable in Bangkok, Boonsri replied:

I think so, yes, and the jobs pay more. With this job, I can send money back home to my parents so they can pay for things my son needs. But you have to work … work a lot. There's competition and employers can hire whomever they want. If they don't like you or you don't do exactly what they want, they might fire you. I've been fortunate here. I would still like to find something else to do [on the side]. But finding other jobs is hard. Living and working here, it's difficult. [She continues discussing life in Bangkok]. My parents were concerned with me coming here, but I call and tell them, “It's not that bad, don't worry. I can make it.” Some things are great. Bangkok's more convenient, more modern. But there's bad stuff. Traffic can be terrible and it makes the day so much longer. I've also had bosses and coworkers say mean things, sarcastically and biting [using the term siiat-sii] … I think because I'm not from here. That's when I say, “Oh, I want to go back home so much!” (Boonsri, female, 41 years old, widowed; interview in Bangkok, 2010).

Highly skilled migrants made claims similar to Boonsri's on the advantages of Bangkok's employment options and improved incomes. Yet, they also noted socio-cultural advantages, such as occupational prestige, social advancements and lifestyle improvements.¹⁰ Certainly, highly skilled migrants' middle-class status enabled greater degrees of mobility in exclusive Bangkok spaces, such as condos, shopping malls or universities. Freedom of movement reflected one's ability for cultural and material consumption. Working and living in Bangkok provided some migrants economic security and livelihood possibilities, as well as allowed for the creation or reification of forms of symbolic distinction between those viewed as modern (thansamai) and provincial (laa lang) or cosmopolitan (inter/trendy) and working class (chon chan kammakon), or in part, rural and urban.¹¹ While these data do not support the notion that such consumptive freedoms and mingling in elite spaces exist as forms of resistance enacted by relatively privileged migrants (one might even consider the ways such activities make durable socio-cultural boundaries between people), they do indicate an ease by which one might consider one's self legitimate and a modern consumer-citizen (see also Mills, 2012; Vorng, 2012).

Migrant workers rarely enjoyed such privileges, which resulted in a greater proportion seeking to return to their origin province after working in Bangkok for a set time. For example, socio-economic data revealed that those staying or likely to stay in Bangkok earned nearly double the monthly income of those that had definite plans to return home. Aside from economic constraints, some felt uncomfortable working and living in Bangkok partly due to, at times, a sense of social isolation and exclusion. During an interview with Supoj, we discussed his motivations for migrating to Bangkok, when he moved the conversation to how he missed home. Though he had worked in Bangkok for over ten years, he always looked for times when he could go back home.

I always go back to see my family [in Surin province], as much as I can. My family comes to visit too, but they don't like it! [Laughing] The environment and the atmosphere … they're different from [Surin]. I mean everything is heavy. The air is filled with pollution. And everything is spread out. Back home my aunt's house is down the street. My uncle's house is there too. You're surrounded by relatives. But in Bangkok you stand alone. Even if you stay in an apartment with a lot people around, you don't know them. I have neighbors that I never talk to. You just feel … on your own. [When asked if he liked Bangkok, Supoj continued:] Sometimes it's hard to do things and make a lot of friends here because it's so expensive. You can't just go wherever you want and if you do, you might feel out of place. I love Surin because when I go back home, it's almost like I'm going back to when I was a kid … I have the same food and my family is around (Supoj, male, 33 years old, single; interview in Bangkok, 2009).

Supoj's excerpt highlights that aside from the loneliness and solitude that can accompany living within dense city centers, lack of discretionary income also restricts one's socio-cultural and spatial movement. As noted elsewhere (see Gullette 2014), though highly skilled migrants might experience exclusionary aspects of urban life (e.g., being aware of linguistic register and feeling the need to drop one's Isaan dialect), migrant workers' lower incomes diminished their abilities to move freely in elite spaces. Such experiences with spatial and symbolic boundaries created anxieties that manifested more commonly in migrant workers' desires to return home and to view Bangkok negatively. While dissatisfaction with Thailand's inegalitarianism and uneven development provided structural foundations for migration decision-making, Bangkok's socio-cultural hierarchies and experiences of alienation offered impetus to return for some, reinforcing the circular nature of internal migration and the spatialities of socio-cultural divisions.

Considerations: Development, migration and broader aspirations

Thailand's development efforts over successive decades have contributed to marked socio-cultural, economic and political inequalities, including material and infrastructural deficiencies in provinces marginal to state-building efforts. Ethnographic data collected among origin households tied to agricultural production and among migrants in Bangkok note that structural issues, such as development's urban bias, limited employment options, lower incomes, reduced governmental support for agrarian subsidies, urbanization's ecological effects or land fragmentation, factored into migration decision-making. Origin households in Nakhon Ratchasima and Samut Prakan noted their experiences of precarity created through development and urbanization. Agrarian families' uncertain futures led many to adjust their livelihood portfolios to include migration and labor diversification, exploring opportunities in regionally expanding industrial economies or sending family members to work in Bangkok. Such patterns of economic diversification reflect a growing condition where families in Thailand and elsewhere do not transition neatly from one livelihood strategy to another. Rather, families continuously rely upon varied activities in diverse places to provision the household (Forsyth and Evans 2013; see also Ellis 2000). Select family members frequently work away from home, and farmers themselves may find work on a semi-permanent basis in non-agricultural sectors.

Of course, families’ engagements with labor diversification and mobilities were framed by socio-cultural motivations. Hopes for obtaining a good life seemed possible through the prospects of working and living elsewhere—in Bangkok or large mueang districts. Migrant workers and highly skilled migrants sought the socially and economically desirable elements of labor mobilities—to increase wealth and status, to mine diverse employment opportunities, to consume luxury goods and to occupy prestigious positions that might allow for upward mobilities. Though some pathways were closed to migrants working in Bangkok, the aspirational element of migration and future-oriented logics proved central. Despite discrimination and prejudice experienced by migrants coming from provinces or economic sectors traditionally viewed as ‘rural,’ migration to Bangkok allowed individuals and families access to urban labor markets and associated economic and cultural capital. This enables them to diversify household economies, distancing some families from devalorized agricultural labor, and offering pathways to raise individual and household status.

As noted above, the material conditions of life cannot fully account for people's ideas of “a good life”—one with dignity, respect, worth, meaning or value. People's aspirations and imaginative desires also influence connections with broader socio-cultural, political and economic institutions. Those interviewed commonly claimed that migration and labor diversification helped mitigate the structural unevenness of Thai development. However, the subjective experiences with and outcomes from migration also inform the non-material qualities of a good life. Unfortunately, Thailand's development trajectory has created profound material and infrastructural differences between rural and urban spaces, which have been used as foundation for relational Thai social orders. Different valuations mapped onto those deemed rural, provincial or other, complicate one's ability to navigate the material deficiencies of state development, as well as handling the symbolic or socio-cultural inequities within Thai society. Thus, various types of exclusion or marginalization become interwoven with development's effects of poverty or deprivation.

Some caution should be taken if attempting to generalize the findings herein. First, while non-probability sampling produced a robust sample for qualitative analysis, one should not make universal inferences regarding the broader Thai population. Second, ethnographic data were collected over the course of several years and at different locations in the northeastern and central regions. Such long-term engagement may introduce some temporal and spatial distortions (e.g., changing socio-political climates in the country). However, the ethnographic data collected in this study demonstrated degrees of consistency among sampled respondents. By presenting ethnographic data collected in two (related) research projects, this article demonstrates the deep-rooted, profound challenges households and individuals face when attempting to navigate socio-economic and cultural life in Thailand.

The spatialities and economies promoted through the Thai state's development policies have failed to erase structural uncertainties and, to an extent, have further entrenched socio-cultural boundaries between regions and people. Ongoing state efforts to reduce poverty, increase socio-economic equity, and facilitate people's capacity to cope with daily life face difficult realities. Simplistic rural–urban, city–countryside dyads rationalize exclusionary practices and disadvantage some migrants in Bangkok. Drawing from Appadurai's (2004, 2013) work on “capacity to aspire,” reframing development must address people's existential needs and consider the ways that structural precarity interrelates with persistent socio-cultural inequities and prejudices. Otherwise, freedom to pursue various life opportunities will remain constrained for segments of Thai society.

Such intolerance or diminished socio-cultural positions become apparent when considering the ways in which ongoing political and class tensions have transformed Thai society. While a thorough treatment of Thailand's political turmoil exists outside the scope of this work, Bangkok's divisive, politicized environment provides context to understand the discrimination migrants face and the challenges for equitable, inclusive development. The 2006 military coup d'état of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra destabilized Thai society, leading to violent and peaceful protests, alternating changes in ruling governments, iterations on constitutional order and profound social cleavages. Since 2014, the National Council for Peace and Order—a military junta under the control of former-General Prayuth Chan-ocha—has maintained strict control over state power. Research in fields such as sociology, anthropology and geography has wrestled to explain this extended instability. Scholars have considered issues that include the formation of two democracies, Bangkok-based royalists struggling to maintain power under expanding populism, renewed political awareness to entrenched forms of cultural and economic exploitation via dispossession and accumulation, and complex schisms within Thai society that binary oppositions fail to grasp (e.g., Chachavalpongpun, 2014; Connors and Hewison, 2008; Ferrara, 2017; Glassman, 2010; Hewison, 2014; Phongpaichit and Baker, 2008; Volk, 2016; Vorng, 2011).

Implicit or explicit in such works are the ways in which societal factions and class divisions have minimized spaces for socio-political critique and participation in governance. The need to police one's self and veil political orientations, particularly those supporting associated actors and institutions aligned with Thaksin's (neo)populist policies, add to the intolerance, antagonism or exclusion faced by some Isaan migrants or those connected to ‘rural histories’ who have relocated to Bangkok.¹² Given that the Thai state's alterations to national political economies and urbanization policies will likely increase the usage of migration in household economic strategies—thereby increasing urban communities’ socio-cultural diversities—ongoing development planning and civil society participation must ensure that diverse peoples have sufficient ‘voice’ when debating, supporting, and contesting the direction of collective social life. State urbanization and development will only proceed in a democratic fashion when a moral cognizance of persons who share worldviews different from others is recognized and equitably included in the body politic (Appadurai, 2004: 62—see also Harvey, 2009; Fainstein, 2010; Lefebvre, 1991; Soja, 2010). Current development trajectories—including stages of formation, deployment and assessment in decentralized governance—have been hampered by the unfolding series of crises and have failed to equitably incorporate broad cross-sections of society into development planning or enabled a freedom of voice and critique among citizens. As individuals and families adjust to development's benefits and harms through labor diversification and internal migration, it is hoped that future efforts in Thailand will place people's aspirations and existential needs for fairness, freedom, dignity and moral well-being at the center of an equitable, inclusive and ethical development framework.

Footnotes

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank everyone in Thailand who participated in and supported this work. I would also like to thank two anonymous reviewers and the editors for their thoughtful and constructive comments that helped improve this article. Of course, any errors of fact remain my own.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this paper.

Funding

Research was funded by Thomas Terry Grants (grant numbers: ETTRY090; ETTRY103; ETTRY0006; and TTRY0019). A Junior Faculty Development Grant at Santa Clara University also provided support (grant number: JFDL0001).

1

Peri-urbanization broadly refers to urban growth in transitional areas between “city” and “countryside” (Inwood and Sharp, 2011; Webster, 2002). Due to lower rates of industrial buildup, peri-urban spaces allow capitalization on previous infrastructural development, including “undeveloped” spaces that support new economic ventures.

2

See also for a discussion on mētis and the value of local practical knowledge in state planning.

3

Socio-economic data have also been obtained from the National Statistical Office of Thailand (NSO). Purposive sampling has been used to locate government officials in the Ministry of Interior and personnel in non-governmental organizations working with development and migration-related issues (n = 17). While those data are not detailed here, those interviews provided insights into the historical and contemporary consequences of Thailand's development and internal migration systems.

4

For more on the complexities and characteristics of Bangkok, see Ferrara (2017), Hamilton (2000), Waugh (1970) and .

5

For more details on the complications experienced under various state subsidy programs for rice production, see Kedmey (2013) and .

6

For more detailed information on household economic strategies in Nakhon Rathchasima, including quantitative data, see .

7

A positive correlation existed between land size and propensities to invest. Families that owned more than 30 rai were more prone to productively investing remittances. Those renting lands showed lower propensities for similar behavior.

8

All names used are pseudonyms. During translation, excerpts have been edited for clarity.

9

Three-sector economic systems position primary sectors as oriented around raw materials, secondary sectors with manufacturing and tertiary sectors with services. Intellectual production and high-level positions in education or government are commonly associated with quaternary and quinary sectors, respectively.

10

This has proven particularly attractive among young women between the ages of 18 to 24 years, who commonly discussed the positive elements of living and working in Bangkok—a global, cosmopolitan city.

11

See also for bivariate statistical analysis on the relationships between income or education and the extent to which one might view themselves as “belonging” in Bangkok or viewing their mobilities as similar to those of international migrants from neighboring Southeast Asian countries.

12

For example, during interviews that veered into highly politicized topics or explicit critiques of the Royal family, one might ask that the recorder be turned off to prevent such conversations from possibly being obtained.

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