Abstract
This paper aims to study transnational diasporic interactions with the internal return of protracted displaces, using two cases from directly war-affected regions of Sri Lanka. This paper contributes to the conceptualization of return by analyzing the complexities arising through diaspora engagement in post-war return and recovery of internally displaced people. Split returns—of near and far diasporas in the form of short-term, temporary family visits—shape protracted returns in post-war situations. Diaspora’s collective memory that results in diaspora transnationalism requires an engagement in rights-based issues such as access to and ownership of land in which the diasporas directly or indirectly intervene.
Introduction
On the fourth of December in 1984, people were displaced. And then in 2010 or 2011 period, people resettled. Nearly after 30 years, and in those years, they had no connections here. In general, if we are not in a house for a week, imagine its status, then imagine in weeks, a month, a year and 10 years? In 10 years, a tree would have fully grown. It was like that, that was the situation when people resettled in 2011. It was all forests, when we came from the main road we cut through the forests and came. That was the situation they came in then only basic facilities came. The roads, and development organizations came in. From 2011 to 2016, only temporary houses were given. (Government officer, 49 years old, male)
Return, following protracted displacement, can be understood through the “permanent temporariness” of people in displacement (Hyndman, 2011: 361) where the hope of returning sustains those in displacement (Brun, 2015). Aspirations for return, whether real or imagined (Cohen, 2008; Safran, 1991; Sheffer, 2003), shape the hopes for community restoration in their places of origin of communities dispersed overseas. These diasporas imagine a form of return in the context where their physical return is constrained due to complex socio-economic and political roots in places of settlement (Agesa and Kim, 2001). Such forms of imagined return remain relatively less studied within diaspora engagement literature globally.
Men and women who left Sri Lanka during the war since the early 1980s have permanently settled mostly in the Global North but continue to maintain strong transnational ties with Sri Lanka (Van Hear, 2013). This transnational engagement is linked to a shared past with those who moved far across nation borders, such as diaspora, and those who are near in Sri Lanka who got displaced within the country internally (Van Hear, 2006). This latter group is now in the process of returning, as the civil war ended in 2009. Enduring social, familial, emotional and financial ties in countries of settlement often constrain diaspora from returning permanently; however, their hopes for rebuilding their areas of origin—claiming back social, economic, political and cultural spaces—are kept alive and supported by their ambitions of supporting local populations that were “left behind” (Faist et al., 2013).
Sri Lanka has had a complex trajectory of inflow and outflow of human mobility throughout history. The outflows are noted during the pre-colonial and colonial periods as well (Munas, 2023). However, the post-colonial era shows a significant outflow of people due to emerging temporary contract work opportunities in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (Sriskandarajah, 2002; Ukwatta, 2000; Wickramasekara, 2015). Further, the movement of people due to discriminatory policies (e.g., Sinhala Language Only Act in 1956), violence and the war (Spencer, 1990) that followed these policies since the 1970s contributed to the formation of “far” diasporas who are distantly tied with the places of origin through financial and non-financial means.
At the local level, studies focusing on Sri Lankan migration and diasporas are mainly about the importance of economic remittances, its flows, outcomes and impacts. These studies focus primarily on individual remittance transfers and do not study flows arising out of collective incentives (Karunaratne, 2008; Shaw, 2010; Sriskandarajah, 2002). The few studies that do focus on the collective engagement of diasporas, study the Tamil diaspora—predominantly the political diaspora institutions, organizations and networks during the war. Thereby, the focus has especially been on diaspora engagement during the war, with special regard given to the frictional and long-distance nationalist nature of these influences, including the support given to the LTTE’s cause to establish a separate nation-state for the Tamils in Sri Lanka (Brun and Van Hear, 2012; Gerharz, 2010; Vimalarajah and Cheran, 2010). However, with the ending of the war, further analysis is required to understand how these diasporas engage collectively in a post-war context.
This paper analyses differences and interactions in displacement and return experiences, expectations and imaginations of those that are displaced “near” and “far.” For diaspora, or those who got displaced “far,” simultaneous attachment(s) to the host country and the country of origin have resulted in a multi-sited permanent temporariness, of wanting to be “there” and “here.” At the same time, nostalgia and memories of these diasporas shape their imaginaries and the future of spaces and people at “home.” These imaginaries have triggered collective and individual support to those at “home” by creating enabling conditions for the return of those who are internally displaced or are “near.” Through this support to “return,” diasporas seek a sense of emotional satisfaction as restoration of the land and people. However, these diasporic interactions post-war are shaped by existing socio-political dynamics and by the interplay between various actors in context.
Conceptual approach
Diaspora, return and imagination
Building on seminal work by Anderson (2006), diaspora scholars have argued that “Diasporic identities are ‘imagined’, and diasporas constitute ‘imagined communities’ in which the sense of belonging is socially constructed on the basis of an imagined and symbolic common origin and mythic past” (Van Gorp and Smets, 2015: 72). However, “imagined communities are not only related to the past but also to the present, and the future, to ‘where we are going’” (Van Gorp and Smets, 2015: 72) including ideas of community building and renewal of communities in relation to their past, but also as aspirations for the future (Georgiou, 2006). An important question here is who is included in the “we” in this equation: In certain instances, diaspora imaginations turn into tangible action, such as the construction of houses or intangible action such as political lobbying, “back home.” Therefore the “we” would include not only the diasporas themselves, but those who are back home as well. A question that can then be posed is “whose collective future” is being renewed, reconstructed and regenerated here?
Diaspora imagination relating to returning home emerges due to sustained transnational ties (Vertovec, 2004). This links to the concept of transnationalism as diaspora belongingness to multiple sites where the immigrants build social fields and sustain ties between the places of origin and places of settlement. Transnationalism is an outcome of simultaneous embeddedness, nostalgic feelings about home and the challenges faced by the immigrants in relation to integration or assimilation into a new society which leads to a form of in-betweenness (Ghorashi, 2004; Levitt and Nadya Jaworsky, 2007; Schiller et al., 1992). Hence the diaspora communities develop a return aspiration, to return in split form, physically or imagined. The imagined forms of return are relevant here as a way of maintaining transnational ties in contexts where a permanent return is not possible.
Return, as an aspiration, is never far from diaspora collective and individual imaginations, and creates hope for communal restoration and a communal consciousness that connects the members of diasporas with each other (Safran, 1991). Further, diasporas see their ancestral home as their “pure, authentic” home and as a place of eventual “return” (Safran, 1991: 83-84), shaped by a sense of alienation and inability to integrate fully into the host country. Although the notion of physical return fades over time, diasporas may maintain an idealized return home or aspirations to return, for the first-generation diaspora or their descendants when conditions at home are appropriate for return (Ammassari and Black, 2001).
Bolognani (2017) challenges the idea of calling the return as myth, put forward by Safran (1991) as patronizing since it obscures the reasons for maintaining the idea of return across generations. In turn, Bolognani (2017) suggests replacing the term “myth” with “fantasy” which brings the elements of imagination. Fantasy also provides return imaginary a degree of legitimacy without any underlying judgment of its outcome (Bolognani (2017). Moreover, even in an eventuality where a physical return is unlikely given the transnationality of diasporas, the possibility or “hope of return” becomes an important part of their cognitive being that orients much of their everyday thinking (Safran, 1991). This everyday thinking provides the platform for moral, collective diaspora action and engagement with those back “home.”
Protracted displacement, return and resettlement
Scholars have conceptualized long-term, protracted displacement as interlinked concepts of waiting and hope. The temporality of protracted displacement, interwoven with peoples’ agency, factors in the fluid and changing nature of protracted displacement. This temporality of protracted displacement can be framed as protracted uncertainty (Brun, 2015) based on the present conditions of the living and changing nature of the future. In other words, the “permanent temporariness” of people in displacement affects their ideas about returning to their places of origin (Hyndman, 2011: 361). The hope of returning in protracted displacement keeps people afloat and shapes lives during displacement. The key question here is how this hope is created, maintained and used (Brun, 2015). In some instances, the return of people in protracted displacement is seen as a solution for conflicts and, in some cases, the return can lead to new conflicts or exacerbate latent grievance. As such, return is an issue that concerns the entire nation (Kabachnik, 2012). The concept of “split return” is used in discussing return in the context of protracted displacement where some members of the family return to the places of origin for a short period of time to test the conditions while others remain in the host location(s). This split return is used as a strategy in response to dealing with insecurities and economic issues emerging from the return in the new environment. In addition, the concept of split return addresses the conceptual binaries attached to return and reintegration (Agesa and Kim, 2001).
Far and near diasporas, coined by Van Hear (2006), are concepts relevant to this discussion. In his conception, the far diasporas are the ones who had the capacity to travel as far as they can, for better living conditions and opportunities to places such as the Global North. This diaspora, later developed to become more advanced, financially capable, politically vocal and influential over the issues in places of origin. Alternatively, near diasporas are the ones who stayed near due to financial and social capital constraints. This particular segment is relatively less capable of remitting, vulnerable and less influential.
Displacement, return, resettlement and relocation in Sri Lanka
In recent history, Sri Lanka had several population relocation projects tracing back to the people from South India, relocated to the central province as part of the British colonial project (Wickramasinghe and Cameron, 2005). Other state-driven resettlement projects have strong political and ethno-nationalist agendas of changing demographic patterns, advanced under the guise of development such as mega irrigation projects (Muggah, 2008), and responses to natural disasters, especially the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami. Further, since 1983, mass internal displacement has been observed during the periods of heavy fighting between the LTTE and GoSL military, throughout the war, which came to an end, as declared by the GoSL in May 2009 (Munas, 2023). The mass eviction of 75,000 Muslims who lived in the Northern Province by the LTTE in 1990 (Imtiyaz and Hoole, 2011) and the mass displacement of about 300,000 people in the Northern Province alone in 2009, at the final stages of the war, are two notable waves of internal displacement (Saparamadu and Lall, 2014).
The case of Sri Lanka and its Tamil Diaspora can be cited as a classic case of the diaspora participation in the homeland conflict and, to some extent, conflict resolution and post-war recovery. Along with this, the contribution of the Tamil diaspora in the development and reconstruction effort has definitely been significant but is less talked about and is yet to be mapped. The need for their future engagement in the developmental and reconstruction process is the call of the hour (Pande, 2017: 4) which this paper seeks to engage with.
In the absence of a functioning state, resources from the diasporas were often the only mechanism for relief, reconstruction and development. Some studies (Brun and Van Hear, 2012: 65-66) point out that towns and villages that were closely linked with diasporic networks witnessed greater developmental and reconstruction activities than those that were not.
Methodology
This paper is part of the lead author’s doctoral research which analyzed the interactions of diasporas in post-war development in Sri Lanka. A multi-sited approach was adopted to collect qualitative data from interviews conducted in 2018–2019. The lead author obtained verbal consent for the interviews from the participants prior to the interviews and discussions. During initial conversations with the study participants, the lead author explained the purpose of the study, informed participation as voluntary and assured confidentiality of the data and anonymity of the findings. Throughout this article, identifiable markers of identities and places are removed from the data and pseudonyms are used instead.
Initially, a mapping exercise was carried out in 2017 to identify the diaspora-initiated development projects in the directly war-affected Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka, through field visits to these areas. The mapping was useful for evaluating the rebuilding initiatives that varied in terms of conceptualization, nature, scale, stage of implementation and impact. This was complemented by an overseas visit in late 2017 by the lead author to identify and interact with diaspora organizations of Sri Lankan origin based in countries such as the United Kingdom (UK), Australia, Canada and the Netherlands. Following a detailed analysis of the mapped rebuilding projects, selected initiatives were followed up for further exploration.
For this paper, empirical material from two villages: “Panaimarathadi” in Trincomalee district and “Semman Kiramam” in Mullaitivu district. 1 These villages were selected due to the presence of numerous diaspora organizations acting in a delicate situation of internal return, where contentious issues of land ownership and access remain critical. The lead author spent two weeks in each village to carry out discussions with villagers and key actors in each area, including local stakeholders in government and non-government organizations (NGOs). More specifically, (a) five interviews with key persons in the two villages: A government administrative officer, a local politician, a diaspora organization local coordinator and two community-based organization (CBO) representatives; (b) three group discussions with returnees; and (c) a series of observations including temple rituals, a rebuilding project launch event, beneficiary selection meeting and a visit to a contested archeological site was conducted in 2018. Additionally, five individual interviews were conducted with representatives of diaspora organizations living in the United Kingdom (four in-person) and Australia (one virtual) in 2019 to understand their intentions, motivations and justification behind the developmental interventions carried out by diasporas.
Findings
Conflict, displacements and returns
As revealed in an interview with a government officer, most original settlements in the two relatively sparsely populated districts of Trincomalee in the East and Mullaitivu in the North happened from 1950s to 1990s in stages, mostly through government-sponsored settlement programs and LTTE-led settlement schemes (Government officer, 49 years old, male). Other government officers further stated that these settlements happened on both state land—often through land permits—and on private land owned by absentee landlords who had fled at the onset of the war. As a result, the lack of undisputed title deeds to support their land ownership was a persisting issue for communities in these areas, prior to their war-related displacements. This lack of title deeds complicated their post-war returns, as discussed below.
Panaimarathadi is a mono-ethnic and mono-religious village where only Tamil Hindus live, a borderland, fencing the contested Northern and Eastern Provinces, located in an area that has been historically framed as a confronted space of the LTTE claim to a Tamil homeland and the GoSL’s violent effort to safeguard the unity of the island (Lokuge and Hilhorst, 2017). In 1983, as the quote below illustrates, the entire village of 155 families was violently displaced to neighboring towns due to the communal riots that erupted across the island. Until the end of the war in 2009, the village remained largely uninhabited, except for periods of temporary return by paddy farmers during the cultivation season. They murdered and raped. Then we escaped from all of that. By the time we left the village (in 1983), the whole village was burning. They (the mob) had burnt everything. Nothing was there. Later we went to Kokkuthuduwai. When we came back, there was nothing. Everything was taken or broken. Even cooking utensils, plates were broken. When people resettled, the government didn’t help us, we had no way of eating. (CBO representative 1, Panaimarathadi, 65 years old, male)
Similarly, according to a diaspora organization representative with links to the village (Diaspora organization representative 1, Semman Kiramam, 61 years old, male), people in Semman Krimam, Mullaitivu district faced many waves of displacements between 1983 and 2009. In contrast to Panaimarathadi, each of these waves were relatively short in duration. However, a mass displacement of the entire village happened during the final stages of the war in early 2009. The communities were displaced until the reconstruction was completed in 2011, as the houses and common property were completely destroyed during the war. Loss of documentation to prove land ownership further complicated their return.
Similar to most areas that directly experienced war and displacement in Sri Lanka, the two cases in this paper experienced property losses, casualties, deaths (Diaspora organization representative 2, Semman Kiramam, 60 years old, male) and violence against women, such as assault and rape (CBO representative 1, Panaimarathadi, 65 years old, male). People had to be constantly on the move. These had negative implications on their socio-economic situations. Many were pushed into poverty due to a lack of stable income and livelihood opportunities. Inconsistent and inadequate access to quality education and health services affected both the first and second generations (Government officer, 49 years old, male). Displacement also caused a breakdown of social cohesion and a sense of collectivity within the communities as they were dispersed to different locations. Experiences of displacement, indeed, made many from the village opt for overseas migration as refugees. As waves of many mass displacements took place elsewhere in the country, many fled overseas. As networks expanded, people from these villages also moved to other countries, and became part of the diaspora and diaspora organizations.
Split returns of near and far displaced people
As in most other parts of the country directly affected by the war, return in Panaimarathadi happened in stages, which is conceptually termed as split return. The key person interview with the government officer revealed, that with the ending of the war in 2009, villagers—mainly older men—have started to come back by 2010, mainly for agricultural purposes. However, not everyone who was displaced in the 80s has returned. Prior to displacement in 1984, the village had approximately 155 families and only about 50 to 60 families had returned to the village in 2011 or 2012, and by 2016, only about 90 families had fully returned (Government officer, 49 years old, male).
In most cases in Panaimarathadi, the decision to return and the return itself is marked by generational differences. Those who returned at first, temporally, as revealed by the interviews with CBO representatives, were mostly adult men who originally used to engage in cultivation. They started arriving first in 2010, clearing agricultural land and engaging in rain-fed cultivation, amidst many hardships, as the whole village at this point was taken over by vegetation and wild animals. Over a few seasons, they started putting up temporary shelters and spending the night in Panaimarathadi, slowly being joined by their wives and elderly women from the community. As per information shared by the government officer and the CBO representatives, at the point of the data collection in 2017 to 2018, almost all the families that had returned and were living permanently in Panaimarathadi were these elders. The younger generation was yet to return at the time of data collection, and in fact, their return remained uncertain due to a variety of reasons discussed below.
Return, in Panaimarathadi, is a complex issue that involves many socio-economic, political and emotional struggles for the villagers. Almost 30 years of absence means the villagers had difficulties in locating their houses, land plots, agriculture lands, fishing gear and other livelihood-related resources upon their return. Land encroachment and occupation by the neighboring villagers was also a serious issue that the villagers faced, especially during the early stages of their return. As a result of forestation, human–elephant conflict has become an everyday reality for the villagers, and the issue was persistent up to the time of the interview, as the man below from Panaimarathadi explains. You can’t leave the village after 2 PM, as the elephants will come in. We will be scared to go out. We don’t know if the elephant is standing there. We can’t light firecrackers also (to scare the elephants away), then the elephants get very angry. (CBO representative 1, Panaimarathadi, 65 years old, male) We need to sort out the land issue. What we now have is to sort out the land problem. We don’t have the deeds. What we have now is just a permit to use the land (Focus Group Discussion 2, Semman Kiramam) We have been talking to the authorities on this matter. Land issues can be sorted. We need to speak to the District Secretary about this. The District Secretary has agreed to help us with this. (Diaspora organization representative 1, Semman Kiramam, 61 years old, male)
Diaspora imagined returns
According to the diaspora groups representatives, diaspora groups linked to these two communities have a strong sense of home, inked to the broader idea and imagination of their place of origin, which is not necessarily always linked to a specific physical location. They also feel the moral responsibility to support people who were not able to cross borders but had to stay “near” by moving within the country, sometimes multiple times. These emotional connections with this place give meaning to their actions by engaging in multiple ways with the local, as the excerpt below from a diaspora organization representative working in Semam Kiramam illustrates. I’m at the tail end of my professional career. I learnt so many things over many years going from the least developed country to one of the most developed countries and working there. Thank God, it’s been successful. But after a while, money is not everything, designation is not everything. After a while you go to field and think what the hell have I been trying to do, more money, more money and it’s a never-ending story. This job (which is working with a diaspora organization operating in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka) brings the best in me from a professional output point of view. It’s not structured. We set the agenda, we go after it, we think afresh, it is very interesting. [It’s] very satisfying. (Diaspora organization representative 1, Semman Kiramam, 61 years old, male) My children do not like me traveling and coming here (Sri Lanka). They asked me why. Why are you going? Why should you go? But I am seeing whether I can settle down here and help people. (Diaspora organization representative 2, Semman Kiramam, 60 years old, male)
In Panaimarathadi, a diaspora organization from Australia initially led the construction of community facilities, as per the government officer, where separate sections of the building were allocated for the health center, community center and the local post office. In addition to providing support for infrastructure, they also started paying salaries for the doctor who visited the village once a week. They have also provided support to purchase a vehicle to take the patients to the nearest hospital in case of emergency as stated by the government officer of the village. Those who are from Panaimarathadi and currently living abroad collected money and got a vehicle that can be used as an ambulance. This vehicle is essential since there is no hospital closer to this village. (Government officer, Panaimarathadi, 49 years old, male)
Moreover, in Panaimarathadi, by choosing to work through the Rural Development Society which comes directly under the purview of the local government administration, diaspora organizations have made an attempt to recognize the presence of the state and, to a certain extent, work with the state structures. It was not uncommon for diaspora organizations to come into direct tension with state structures when engaging in rebuilding efforts in the directly war-affected areas, as discussed in the case of Semman Kiramam below. Further, in Panaimarathadi, diaspora organizations provide loans to an existing community-based organization without creating a new structure, which is often the case in development activities. This approach means that attention is paid to the long-term sustainability of the assistance. In Semman Kiramam, according to a diaspora organization representative, one of the main strategies used by the diaspora organizations in rebuilding the communities was strengthening the economic empowerment of war-affected and displaced communities returning to their places of origin. We need to discuss how to increase the profit. We need to purchase machinery to clear the land. Irrigation infrastructure should be improved. The tank needs rehabilitation. If we do all these, you will generate an enormous profit. This will be the biggest peanut farm in Sri Lanka. Your company will be soon in the news. (Diaspora organization representative 2, Semman Kiramam, 60 years old, male) There’s a new OIC (Office in Charge, Police), and we went to him and told him the problem (land dispute). We gave a letter to the District Secretariat. When you give that letter to them and they said fine and they will come to survey the land. Then they came next day, but the other party, current occupier of our land did not come that day. The issue is still unresolved. (CBO representative 1, Panaimarathadi, 65 years old, male) The provincial land commissioner in Trincomalee, surveyed all the land, to give them to the Sinhalese. After surveying, he wants us to give the Sinhalese two acres each. We only have four acres. We refused it and then he left. So that year, no one cultivated the land. (Focus Group Discussion 1, Panaimaraththadi) We used to cultivate two seasons. The water came from the river or canal. Since our displacement, our lands have been taken by the neighbors. Some of them own 15 to 30 acres. They got together and diverted the water flow, and now at the end, we don’t have water. We can’t confront them openly also since they have all the support. (CBO representative 2, Panaimarathadi, 68 years old, male) We thought we had to file a case, we need some solution, but we need to solve this amicably. That’s what we want. But they are not letting us do that. They are not letting us come to a solution. Some people are okay, but not all of them. (CBO representative 1, Panaimarathadi, 65 years old, male)
Conceptualization of return by actors in context
Diaspora engagement in rebuilding former war-affected areas requires interactions with the state and state administrative structures at different levels of governance. This engagement is often colored by state perceptions about diaspora, which in turn are strongly colored by the politicization of diaspora engagement with Sri Lanka during the war. The suspension of dual citizenship in 2013 and re-introducing the same in 2015 showed the government’s ad-hoc policy measures that sent mixed messages on the state’s interest and motives with regard to the return of diasporas (Diaspora organization representative 2, Semman Kiramam, 60, male).
Further, frustrations on the part of diasporas stem from significant project delays, linked to government red tape, cumbersome red tape and, sometimes, allegations of corruption. This frustration also stems from the comparative experience of engaging with state actors in their countries of origin, as the interview with a diaspora organization representative shows. For the diaspora this is frustrating, because we are used to press of a button and things happen […] worst part of it is we are all volunteers. We have left our family and children and paying our own money to do most of the work and come here. (Diaspora organization representative 3, Semman Kiramam, 64 years old, male) OfERR and UNDP provided livelihood support here (in this village). They asked what we need in the office, I told them we need a photocopy machine. We have to spend LKR 100 on transport to get a photocopy [machine] that’s worth LKR 10. (Government officer, Panaimarathadi, 49 years old, male) Many NGOs here are working only for their benefits. For them, it’s a job with a salary. However, we are all volunteers working towards the betterment of the people. We aim for a change. We have seen many projects implemented by the NGOs in the war-affected areas. When these NGOs leave the projects end and the buildings remain without their intended function. (Diaspora organization representative 1, Semman Kiramam, 61 years old, male)
Discussion
The two cases discussed in this paper embody the complex, emotionally wrought, materially devastating and repeated displacement experiences of war-affected communities. While some people move far from where they used to live, others move “near” and stay near, seeking protection (Van Hear, 2006). Shared histories, memories, kinship and networks among those who moved far and near, result in interdependencies and interactions between these multiple groups, within a complex context.
The general expectation of those who get displaced to a geographically “near” area is for them to return. As argued in this article, their return is encouraged and supported by the state, development actors and diaspora organizations, as opposed to those who moved “far.” However, delays in releasing state- or military-occupied land in the directly war-affected areas in the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka continue to hinder return (Fonseka, 2011). This encouragement of return resonates with the discussion on restoration of homeland by diasporas who live far from their places of origin and who, from a distance, provide material and non-material support to facilitate this process of physical return, with the expectation that the return of those who live “near” will claim land and restore socio-economic and cultural life.
The life of those in protracted displacement, temporally resettled in another location, is entangled with many socio-economic ties to this current place of residence (Lindley and Haslie, 2011). Thus, the physical return with the immediate and extended families in a protracted condition also means uprooting and severing the socio-economic and other ties in the current places of residence.
Physical return means either severing these ties or being simultaneously in multiple localities which creates a situation of neither here nor there. Further, the perspectives of the second generation add further complications to the decision-making process of return because the new environment may put their education and employment prospects at risk. Emotional attachments of the second generation to the current places of residences, where they grew up, if not where they were born, also confront the motivations of their parents’ desire to return to the places of origin. The community who moved to near areas have also experienced and witnessed prolonged violence over the war period, and these experiences create a fear of recurrence of violence which may cause disruptions to normal life again and therefore, create uncertainties of return.
Those who moved far from their places of origin, crossed national borders and settled in other countries, mostly in the Global North, form diasporas with little or no intention of permanent physical return. Their physical return to Sri Lanka has been short visits to relatives, tourism or to check the status of the properties left behind (Gerharz, 2014). Further, split returns in the form of short-term visits of those engage in developmental activities in Sri Lanka are also noteworthy. Their socio-economic, political and sometimes emotional ties with the current places of residence precede the urge to return physically to the place of origin. Relatively weaker attachments to the places of origin exhibited by second-generation diasporas are also hindering factors for the physical return, especially of the first-generation diasporas (King and Christou, 2010). These constraints confront diasporas’ desire to return to reclaim and restore lost homeland. Therefore, a split return takes place when diasporas physically return temporarily for short-term.
Diaspora’s direct or indirect ties with Sri Lanka remain in multiple forms, which could be termed as a form of “permanent temporariness,” similar to those who are in long-term displacement internally (Hyndman, 2011: 361). Unlike, those who are “near,” the legal status of diaspora in their countries of settlement provides a permanent status in those countries. However, the strong ties with Sri Lanka may also be permanent for some, resulting in a duality in “permanence” for diasporas. However, for many diasporas, achieving “permanence” in Sri Lanka, in the form of permanent return, is constrained by the socio-economic, political and legal dimensions attached to their current country of residence. Hence, their alternative form of return is “imagined.” More specifically, “where we are going” (Van Gorp and Smets, 2015: 72), is conceptualized in the form of community renewal and aspirations for a future that is expected to be shared not only within the diaspora (Georgiou, 2006), but with those back home as well.
However, this conceptualization of return is not shared with those who were internally displaced. A parallel “permanent temporariness” (Hyndman, 2011: 361) is being experienced by those who were internally displaced and could not or did not move overseas for various mobility-related constraints and, therefore, the shared notions of “where we are going” (Van Gorp and Smets, 2015: 72) both literally and figuratively, may not be completely mutually agreed upon. This particular group, who faced protracted displacement within Sri Lanka are temporarily settled elsewhere in Sri Lanka. This temporariness, however, is mediated by the opportunities available to them and the choices they have made in order to ensure their overall well-being, and especially that of the younger generation, such as in education and employment.
These incompatibilities in the conceptualization of return are further complicated when implemented. Diaspora’s return imagination, pegged on those who are internally displaced, may not be always compatible with the capacity, interests and willingness of the latter groups’ return expectations. These incompatibilities result in unexpected development and rebuilding pathways and trajectories, which in turn might dilute or even undermine diaspora support for return. “Thus, despite the common identity that binds the diaspora and the homeland actors, such a situation could lead to a disconnection or even a contestation between the two” (Demmers, 2007: 13; Shain and Bristman, 2002: 136).
The case of Panaimarathadi illustrates the contradictions in return resulting from contextual realities and tensions post-war. In Panaimarathadi, many diaspora organizations intervened to resolve land-related issues of the returning communities after protracted displacement, as land is one of the main symbols producing the imagined locality of those who got displaced near and far alike. Regaining control over the lost land symbolizes success. Being diasporas, their experience of displacement, dispersal and deterritorialization colors the way they see land. It is evident in the interviews, that for them, the meaning of land is creating the past into the present, giving heritage and gaining pride, power, socio-economic and political status. This, as noted in the interview with the government official although from the perspective of those returning is considered desirable, the communities in the neighborhood, especially the Sinhalese communities feel threatened by, creating further tensions and mistrust constraining return. These agrarian communities share natural resources such as water for farming activities, the brewing tensions created by external interventions contribute to the deterioration of existing relationships between local communities. Therefore, while acknowledging that diasporas are capable actors in the recovery of their war-affected communities, the unintended consequences of their transnational interactions should be noted, especially as actors from “afar” operating in still fragile post-war contexts with the possibility of escalation of violence.
Diasporas often function in multi-actor spaces (Portes et al., 1999), legitimizing their activities in rebuilding efforts through various strategies. The state is one such important actor, with whom diasporas have a dynamic, sometimes politically charged, relationship. The state undoubtedly plays a central role in the conversations on the return of diasporas or protracted displaced people. While some policies of the state act as enablers of return, certain policies can be constraining, especially when policy decisions are taken on the basis of ethno-nationalistic or political agendas (Castles and Davidson, 2000). The power play between the state is a key node of tension (Gamlen, 2008). The cases we have discussed here illustrate that certain state policies, such as the reconstruction of houses, rural infrastructure, health facilities, roads, and constructing of electric fences to prevent human–elephant conflict, create enabling conditions for those in protracted displacement to return to their original village. However, when it comes to contentious land issues, related state authorities play a passive role in increasing the uncertainty among those expecting to return which inhibits the return process.
Further, the views of diasporas about local systems are colored by their lived experiences with the systems in the countries in the Global North. Frustrations created by perceptions of the local state systems being bureaucratic; the presence of red tape; the complex, incomprehensible administrative structures; issues of transparency; and the lack of responsibility. These views in the end affect the motivations of diaspora organizations to sustain their engagement with the state. Creating and maintaining this legitimacy is important for diaspora organizations to continuously mobilize the diasporas in the countries of residence and convince the donor communities to be financially sustainable. These slow processes affect the progress in achieving the objectives and target the diaspora organizations’ fear of losing legitimacy as capable actors in providing meaningful solutions to war-affected peers in Sri Lanka.
Conclusion
Multiple and complex displacement experiences resulting from prolonged armed violence created multiple and complex forms of diasporas, for instance, the formation of near and far diasporas we have discussed in this paper. This complexity produces multifaceted return and resettlement experiences in war-affected areas of Sri Lanka. Therefore, irrespective of whether one returns from far or near, after decades of displacement, return is faced with numerous challenges, such as land encroachment, re-forestation, and access to user rights and ownership of resources and properties, such as irrigation water and land. Providing and facilitating material support is necessary but not always a sufficient condition where many contextual and demographic factors intersect with such decisions to physically relocate from one place to another. Therefore, diaspora-facilitated return projects aiming for “restoration of their original homeland” (Safran, 1991: 84) will be mediated and shaped by these temporal and spatial complexities.
Collective memories about place of origin provide a bonding effect for diasporas which creates aspiration for “return” to the places of origin. However, nostalgia and collective memories shape imaginaries of near and far diasporas for the future of spaces and people at “home” and provide impetus for community rebuilding. In this paper, we analyzed diasporic reimagining of return, where transnational ties and engagement of diasporas are facilitating the return of protracted, internally displaced people due to war, to their original territories.
This transnational diasporic interaction in a post-war setting shapes existing socio-political dynamics and the interplay between various local actors in context and their interactions in turn are impacted by the existing power dynamics in contexts of return from protracted displacement. Diasporas use their imaginaries of fertile farming, subsistence living and proud cultural micro-histories to support communities who are returning through financial, knowledge, skills, and moral support. This notion of imagined return broadens the discourses of diasporic return, especially in contexts where return is constrained. Return in this context is not necessarily a physical return of diasporas, rather, an inner satisfaction achieved by ensuring the return of their peers.
Most Tamil diasporas from the study areas shared exile or refugee characteristics in their formation, moving “far.” However, over decades, they made decisions to “permanently” settle overseas while being tied to the place of origin through collective memories of trauma and collective hopes for a future. This resulted in a multi-sited permanent temporariness, of wanting to be “there” and “here.” A similar case can be seen among those who resettled “near” within national borders. As noted earlier, this has contributed to a form of split return where the older generation experiments the return prior to taking the risk of taking the second and third generations.
Their attachment to land in their places of origin is centrally featured. With the end of the war, reclaiming land after protracted displacement has become contentious and uncertain. The process of reclaiming is also complex with the involvement of numerous actors with varying levels of interests and motivations. However, the cases illustrated a different form of return and restoration of homeland (to what is stated in the classical definition) by diasporas without their actual physical return to their places of origin. In the absence of the physical return of diasporas, the return of those internally displaced from the same communities was encouraged by the diasporas by creating enabling conditions for return. The return, thus, provides a sense of emotional satisfaction to the diasporas as restoration of the land.
Return in post-war context, therefore, is not a simple, clear-cut phenomenon. As noted, the complexity arises as a result of the nature of returnees, the spatiality near and far, and the temporality of return regarding the transnational ways of being shaped by the diaspora experiences in the places of settlement. Further, the presence of multiple actors in the return context has contributed to the complexities attached to the concept of return, especially the notion of split return. Split return is (re)conceptualized with how the split return of far diasporas in the form of short-term, temporary visits mediated the split return of the “near” diaspora.
Footnotes
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article: This paper is based on a research project funded by Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (DVB/CU-BPZ-374/15).
