Fear Goliath or David? Inferring Competence From Demeanor Across Cultures

Abstract

We examined cultural differences in people’s lay theories of demeanor—how demeanor may be perceived as a straightforward and reliable reflection of reality (convergence theory) or as a deviating reflection of reality (divergence theory). Across different domains of competition, Euro-Canadians perceived greater competence in an opponent with a competent demeanor, whereas Chinese paradoxically perceived greater competence in an opponent with no signs of competence (Studies 1–4b). The results, unexplained by attributional styles (Study 1), likability (Study 3), or modesty (Study 3), suggest that Euro-Canadians endorse a stronger convergence theory than Chinese in their inferences of competence. Corroborated with qualitative data (Study 4a), such cultural differences were explained by the beliefs that demeanor can be a misleading reflection of reality, verified in college and community (Study 4b) samples. We discuss the implications for social perception, intergroup dynamics, and self-presentation in competitions.

Keywords

culture inferences of competence demeanor appearance and reality convergence theory divergence theory competition

In late September 1950, the United States faced a tough dilemma following their victory in South Korea: Should they end the campaign at the 38th parallel or push north for a complete unification of Korea? Their main concern in surging across the border was whether China would intervene. Unsure, they watched for signs from the Chinese forces, and days of observation eventually convinced them that no serious threat was in their way. From the absence of aircrafts and ammunitions to ill-equipped soldiers, the Chinese forces appeared far too weak to stand a chance against 450,000 troops of vastly superior firepower (Appleman, 1961). Concluding that China was not a threat, the Americans crossed the border in early October, only to be met by the Chinese forces who fought back with thorough preparation (Whiting, 1960). What happened next is history.

The historical account above indicates that people often make inferences about the reality of others and the world based on their demeanor. In this research, demeanor refers to the public displays of behaviors or expressions (DePaulo, 1992), from gestures, voices, images, verbal and body languages to postures, manners, and so on. Inferring reality based on demeanor involves the use of lay theories about how demeanor and reality are related (Flavell et al., 1983; Gopnik & Astington, 1988). The psychological basis of these processes, however, is relatively underdeveloped in cultural psychology (with a few exceptions, e.g., Leung et al., 2012). Recognizing this gap, the present research examines people’s beliefs about demeanor and reality as culturally shaped lay theories. Specifically, the convergence theory of demeanor describes the view that demeanor is a direct and straightforward reflection of reality, with the construals of reality and demeanor converging in the same direction. In contrast, the divergence theory of demeanor describes the view that demeanor is a misleading reflection of reality, with reality being construed as paradoxically deviating from its demeanor. We conceptualize the convergence versus divergence theories as two extremes on a single continuum. Based on cultural differences in intellectual traditions and thinking styles, we propose that Euro-North-Americans would hold the convergence theory more strongly than Chinese, whereas Chinese would hold the divergence theory more strongly than Euro-North-Americans. We discuss how these views of demeanor may differ across cultures, and present evidence for how these views may influence demeanor-based inferences of competence in competitive contexts.

Convergence Theory in North American Cultures

For centuries, scholars in the West have taken great interest in the confluence between the outward demeanor of a person and the reality that is presumed to be underneath that demeanor. For example, Aristotle and Hume (1739/1896) were among the first to recognize the self as a singular entity in which external representations of the self (e.g., speech, actions, personas) are thought to be direct reflections of the psyche that defines a person (Höffe, 2010). For other theorists (e.g., Jung, 1954), demeanor and the self are considered different facets of the same unit, which explains why a separation between them can be a threat to personal growth. We propose that underlying these philosophical perspectives is a mental framework of convergence: Demeanor and the reality beneath it are assumed to converge in the same direction. In other words, demeanor is expected to be a direct reflection of reality without substantial discrepancy. Applying this assumption of demeanor to person perception, one should expect a high degree of convergence between the way people present themselves and who they are within. Indeed, from thinking to talking (e.g., Bruner, 1996), attitudes to behaviors (e.g., Kraus, 1995), and values to choices (e.g., Prentice, 1987), a fundamental assumption in Western intellectual traditions is that the defining aspects of the self should be unified and coherent, from the inside to the outside.

Two bodies of literature provide empirical support for the prevalence of convergence theory in North American cultures. First, standing in the heart of North American values is the pursuit of self-expression of inner thoughts, preferences, and desires through outward behaviors (Guignon, 2004; Heine, 2010), accomplished through practices such as direct communication styles (Gudykunst et al., 1988), candid displays of emotions (Matsumoto et al., 1998), and choices motivated by intrinsic preferences (Deci & Ryan, 1985). We propose that these practices, along with many other, are traceable to a convergence view of social life in which outward demeanor and the inner self are brought together in the same direction. Accordingly, motivational quotes in common speech such as “be who you are” and “speak your mind” suggest not only the right to express oneself but also a cultural spirit that demands a straightforward mapping of one’s demeanor (e.g., how one advertises oneself to the world) on one’s core identity (e.g., who one really is). Given the fundamental role of self-expression in North American cultures, it would make little sense to express oneself through demeanor in a way that is misleading, paradoxical, or counterintuitive to the world of observers, which would likely be interpreted as a signal of insincerity or even deception.

Research has suggested a convergence view among Euro-North-Americans in various domains of social perception. For instance, competent-looking candidates are perceived as more competent, and are more likely to win in an actual election (Todorov et al., 2005). Similar results were shown across athletic (Greenlees et al., 2005), academic (Paulhus & Morgan, 1997), hiring (Zebrowitz et al., 1991), and business (Lukaszewski et al., 2015) settings. These observations suggest a pattern of convergence thinking in person perception among Euro-North-Americans: What you see on the outside should directly reflect what is on the inside.

Divergence Theory in East Asian Cultures

In contrast to the convergence theory, the divergence theory describes the view that reality is expected to deviate from demeanor and, in some cases, the two may even diverge into opposite directions. Consistent with the themes of dialecticism (Nisbett, 2003; Peng & Nisbett, 1999), we propose that East Asians would endorse the convergence theory less strongly (or the divergence theory more strongly) than do Euro-North-Americans. In dialectical thinking, everything in the world is considered a manifestation of the coexistence of yin and yang. These two elements, as a result of the complicated nature of the world, may deviate from their original propensity over time (Ji et al., 2001), possess conceptually incongruent qualities (Choi & Choi, 2002; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2010), or, as we propose, appear one way on the outside and turn out to be misleadingly different or even paradoxically opposite on the inside.

A divergent view of social life is a recurring theme in East Asian philosophical traditions. For centuries, Buddhist and Taoist beliefs have emphasized that demeanor is nothing but a distorted window to the understanding of reality, a metaphysical stance passed down from one generation to the next through maxims such as “the greatest skill seems clumsy; the greatest eloquence stutters” (Tao Te Ching, Chapter 45). The paradoxical view of demeanor is also apparent in the contexts of competitions in the East. For example, the “Art of War” (Chapter 6) posits that displaying one’s strengths to an opponent has an ironic effect of revealing one’s weaknesses and vulnerabilities.

Beyond the scope of philosophy, the view that demeanor can be a misleading reflection of reality is observed in other domains of life. For example, stock options that revealed no signs of strengths were more desirable to Chinese than to Euro-North-American participants (Ji et al., 2008). Likewise, behind what seems to be trivial can be an event of disproportionate magnitude (Spina et al., 2010). Doing things one way may suggest thinking the other way (Masuda & Kitayama, 2004); putting forth a happy smile may not be an indication of happiness (Masuda et al., 2008). Whereas demeanor points to one direction, the underlying reality may deviate from that direction or even diverge in the opposite direction. Together, these cultural observations and empirical findings suggest that, relative to North American cultures, Asian cultures tend to embrace a stronger tendency for the divergence theory of demeanor: Things are not always the way they look; what appears to be can be misleading, in the sense that a demeanor observed by the world can be different from, or even the opposite of, what it really is.

The Present Research

We proposed that people across cultures may hold different lay theories in terms of how demeanor and reality are related to each other, which may shape judgments in a host of situations, such as inferences of others’ competence in competitive settings. We predicted that Euro-North-American participants (vs. Chinese) would be more likely to infer competence in an opponent with a strong demeanor that reveals signs of strengths, whereas Chinese participants (vs. Euro-North-Americans) would be more likely to infer competence in an opponent with an ordinary demeanor that reveals no signs of strengths. Studies 1 to 3 focused on demonstrating cultural differences and addressing alternative explanations, and Studies 3, 4a, and 4b focused on unpacking the underlying mechanisms of the observed cultural effects. As the convergence versus divergence theories are conceptualized as two ends of a continuum, it would be inaccurate to say that convergence thinking is exclusive to Euro-North-Americans or divergence thinking is exclusive to Chinese. Instead, we proposed that Euro-North-Americans would be more likely than Chinese to engage in convergence thinking or, alternatively, Chinese would be more likely than Euro-North-Americans to engage in divergence thinking.

Across the present studies, demeanor was operationalized as the public images or self-relevant information that the targets presented in a competition; perceived reality was operationalized by how strong or competent the targets were perceived to be. To help distinguish between targets with different forms of demeanor, we borrowed two figures from the Bible. No story paints a sharper contrast of demeanor than the biblical account of Goliath, the powerful-looking warrior who revealed clear signs of strengths and might, and David, the ordinary-looking shepherd who revealed no signs of advantages on the surface. For brevity, we labeled the targets with a strong demeanor as “Goliath” (e.g., company Goliath) and the targets with an ordinary demeanor as “David” (e.g., company David). These labels were not shown to participants and are used in this article only for ease of understanding.

Study 1: Job Hiring

To examine cultural differences, we recruited participants from Canada and China and had them rate the competence of a job candidate on the basis of demeanor.

Method

Participants

We tested 102 Euro-Canadian students (86 women and 16 men; M_age = 19.6 years, SD_age = 1.85 years) from a Canadian university and 110 Chinese students (52 women and 58 men; M_age = 21.4 years, SD_age = 2.19 years) from a Chinese university.¹ Participants were tested in their native language in all studies (except in Study 2). Test materials of all studies, when applicable, were translated independently into Chinese by two bilingual researchers, and checked by other bilingual researchers to ensure cross-language equivalence.

Procedure

Participants first imagined that they were a hiring manager of a company who had a brief opportunity to evaluate the competence of a job candidate based on the candidate’s demeanor.² They were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the Goliath condition (n = 112), the candidate “projects a competitive image, appears assertive and competent, and resembles people who would appear in the spotlight.” In the David condition (n = 100), the candidate “projects an indistinctive image, appears silent and reserved, and resembles the kind of people who do not stand out in a group” (see Supplemental Material). Descriptions were carefully designed such that they only depicted the candidates’ outward demeanor without any depiction of their actual competence. Then, participants rated the candidate’s competence: “How competent do you think this candidate is?” and “how much of a threat do you think this candidate is to the other candidates’ success of getting this job?” (1 = not competent at all/not a threat at all, 7 = completely competent/a very big threat).

Research has shown that compared with East Asians, Euro-North-Americans tend to focus more on internal dispositions and less on situational factors in causal attributions (e.g., Choi et al., 1999; M. W. Morris & Peng, 1994). To examine the possible influence of dispositional versus situational thinking, we included a vignette (adapted from Kitayama et al., 2006) about a professional basketball player devoting his vacation time to run free basketball camps in poor neighborhoods. Participants rated the extent to which the basketball player’s behavior was caused by dispositional and situational factors, respectively (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Finally, participants reported their gender, age, and ethnicity.

Results and Discussion

Inferences of competence

Because the ratings of competence and threat were highly correlated (r_Canadian = .73, r_Chinese = .74), the two measures were averaged into a composite labeled as inferred competence.

A 2 (culture: Euro-Canadian vs. Chinese) × 2 (demeanor: Goliath vs. David) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on inferred competence revealed a significant effect of demeanor, F(1, 208) = 46.18, p < .001, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .18, qualified by a culture by demeanor interaction, F(1, 208) = 13.11, p < .001, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .06.³ Consistent with predictions, Euro-Canadians (M = 5.26, SD = 1.04) rated candidate Goliath as more competent than did Chinese (M = 4.74, SD = 1.04), F(1, 110) = 7.20, p = .008, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .06, whereas Chinese (M = 4.33, SD = 0.83) rated candidate David as more competent than did Euro-Canadians (M = 3.94, SD = 0.71), F(1, 98) = 6.45, p = .013, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .06 (Figure 1). Thus, Euro-Canadians and Chinese participants inferred competence from demeanor differently.

Figure 1.

Competence of rival candidates inferred by Euro-Canadian and Chinese participants (Study 1).

Dispositional thinking

A 2 (culture: Euro-Canadian vs. Chinese) × 2 (thinking styles: dispositionism vs. situationism) mixed ANOVA revealed a significant two-way interaction, F(1, 209) = 15.15, p < .001, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .07. Consistent with prior research (Choi et al., 1999; Kitayama et al., 2006), dispositional thinking was stronger among Euro-Canadians (M = 5.88, SD = 0.90) than among Chinese (M = 5.35, SD = 1.20), t(209) = 3.59, p < .001, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .06, whereas situational thinking was stronger among Chinese (M = 4.70, SD = 1.20) than among Euro-Canadians (M = 4.33, SD = 1.49), t(209) = 2.01, p = .045, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .02. Dispositional and situational thinking, however, did not mediate the observed effects of culture on inferences of competence, t = 0.43, p > .25. When these two measures were included as covariates, the main pattern of results remained the same for the culture × demeanor interaction, p < .001, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .06.

Thus, Euro-Canadian (vs. Chinese) participants showed a stronger tendency to infer competence in a way that was congruent with demeanor, indicative of stronger convergence thinking (or weaker divergence thinking). Such cultural differences in inferences could not be explained by dispositional thinking.

Study 1 relied on a between-participant design, but subjective and abstract attributes (e.g., competence) are best evaluated with an explicit reference or comparison point (i.e., a joint evaluation; Hsee, 2000). Therefore, we used a within-participant design in subsequent studies so that participants could evaluate targets of Goliath and David comparatively. A joint evaluation approach also provides higher ecological validity as judgments in real-world settings are rarely made in isolation of comparisons (Brunswik, 1956).

Study 2: Business Rivals

Study 2 examined inferences of competence across cultures in the business domain where public images of companies, such as the way they advertise their goals, ambitions, and financial backgrounds, are commonly taken as a manifestation of underlying competence (Gray & Balmer, 1998). Operationalizing demeanor as public images, we predicted that the rival company that advertised its strengths in its image (company Goliath) would be perceived as more competent by Euro-Canadians than by Chinese, whereas the rival company that revealed no signs of strengths in its image (company David) would be perceived as more competent by Chinese than by Euro-Canadians.

Method

Participants

Participants were 54 Euro-Canadian (37 women and 17 men; M_age = 18.7 years, SD_age = 0.96 years) and 45 Chinese (27 women and 18 men; M_age = 19.6 years, SD_age = 1.80 years) students at a Canadian university. Euro-Canadian participants were either born in Canada or raised in the country for the most part of their life. Chinese participants were immigrants who had lived in Canada for an average of 8.3 years. The study was conducted in English.

Procedure

Participants imagined being the CEO of a new company in anticipation of two rival companies. One rival company had maintained a highly ambitious image in the market and appeared to be financially resourceful (company Goliath); the other company had maintained an ordinary image and appeared to be very low profile without advertising its financial background (company David). As a measure of inferred competence, participants rated (1 = very unlikely, 7 = very likely) how likely they thought each rival company was a threat to their own company (see Supplemental Material). Finally, they reported demographic information.

Results and Discussion

A 2 (culture: Euro-Canadian vs. Chinese) × 2 (demeanor: Goliath vs. David) repeated ANOVA on inferred competence revealed no effect of culture, F(1, 97) = 1.48, p = .227, a significant effect of demeanor, F(1, 97) = 7.03, p = .009, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .07, and a culture by demeanor interaction, F(1, 97) = 34.47, p < .001, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .25 (Figure 2). Replicating results of Study 1, Euro-Canadians (M = 6.07, SD = 1.11) perceived company Goliath as more competent than did Chinese (M = 4.89, SD = 1.80), F(1, 97) = 16.07, p < .001, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .14, whereas Chinese (M = 5.64, SD = 1.26) perceived company David as more competent than did Euro-Canadians (M = 4.00, SD = 1.85), F(1, 97) = 25.45, p < .001, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .21.

Figure 2.

Competence of rival companies inferred by Euro-Canadian and Chinese participants (Study 2).

The within-subject nature of this study provided finer evidence for the prevalence of convergence versus divergence theories across cultures. Euro-Canadians inferred greater competence in company Goliath than company David, F(1, 97) = 38.35, p < .001, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .28, reflecting a convergent view that demeanor and reality are pointing to the same direction. In contrast, Chinese participants perceived company David to be more competent than company Goliath, F(1, 97) = 4.25, p = .042, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .04, reflecting a divergent view that demeanor and reality deviate from each other. Thus, cultural differences in inferences of competence based on demeanor go beyond the realms of interpersonal perception to domains of organization assessments.

One limitation of Study 2 is the use of a single item as the dependent measure. Acknowledging the multifaceted nature of competence as a psychological construct, we measured the inference of competence with multiple items in Study 3.

Study 3: Debate Tournament

One may argue that the results of Studies 1 and 2 were driven by modesty concerns, which are emphasized more strongly in Chinese than in North American cultures (S. X. Chen et al., 2009). It is possible that, between Goliath, who may seem to be flaunting his competence, and David, who does not, Chinese participants might have found the former to be less modest and, therefore, less likable, which may have somehow affected their judgments of competence. This alternative explanation, however, goes against the findings that judgments of warmth and competence are independent from each other in Western (e.g., Fiske et al., 2007) and Eastern cultures (e.g., F. F. Chen & Jing, 2012). Still, we aimed to rule out this alternative explanation empirically in Study 3.

In addition, following the logic of dialectical reasoning (Peng & Nisbett, 1999), the quality that confers strengths can turn out to be a source of weakness, whereas the quality that seems to be a weakness may paradoxically be the foundation of strengths. If so, one should predict that Chinese (vs. Euro-Canadian) participants would perceive opponent Goliath as more predictable (as both strengths and weaknesses were revealed) and opponent David as more unpredictable (as neither strengths nor weaknesses were revealed). Perception of unpredictability, in turn, may explain cultural differences in the demeanor-based inferences of competence. Study 3 tested this hypothesis.

Method

Participants

Participants were 126 Euro-Canadian (103 women and 23 men; M_age = 21.1 years, SD_age = 4.76 years) university students in Canada and 119 Chinese (98 women and 21 men; M_age = 20.3 years, SD_age = 0.78 years) university students in China.

Procedure

Participants imagined being on the university debate team in anticipation of two rival debaters. As a manipulation of demeanor, one debater (debater Goliath) was described as someone who adopted a competitive image and had no problem disclosing his debating techniques and skills to the public; the other debater (debater David) was described as one who adopted a low-profile image and did not reveal any sign of strengths to the public (see Supplemental Material). Then, participants rated (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) each rival debater on four measures of competence (how competent, how confident, how much of a threat, how much pressure they were to others) to capture the various aspects of perceived competence more broadly. Next, participants rated (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) each rival debater on modesty (how modest), likability (how likable), and unpredictability (how unpredictable). Finally, they reported demographic information.

Results and Discussion

Inferences of competence

We averaged the four competence ratings (Cronbach’s α: debater Goliath = .77, debater David = .84) into a composite labeled as inferred competence. A 2 (culture: Euro-Canadian vs. Chinese) × 2 (demeanor: Goliath vs. David) repeated ANOVA on inferred competence revealed a marginally significant effect of culture, F(1, 243) = 3.25, p = .073, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .01, and no effect of demeanor, F(1, 243) = 2.10, p = .149. There was a significant culture by demeanor interaction (Figure 3), F(1, 243) = 41.32, p < .001, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .15. Consistent with the results in Studies 1 and 2, Euro-Canadians (M = 5.01, SD = 1.01) rated debater Goliath as more competent than did Chinese (M = 4.50, SD = 1.08), F(1, 243) = 14.50, p < .001, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .06, whereas Chinese (M = 5.31, SD = 0.98) rated debater David as more competent than Euro-Canadians (M = 4.50, SD = 1.06), F(1, 243) = 38.27, p < .001, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .14. Furthermore, Euro-Canadians rated debater Goliath as significantly more competent than debater David, F(1, 243) = 12.76, p < .001, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .05, whereas Chinese showed the opposite pattern, F(1, 243) = 30.16, p < .001, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .11.

Figure 3.

Competence of rival debaters inferred by Euro-Canadian and Chinese participants (Study 3).

Modesty

A 2 (culture: Euro-Canadian vs. Chinese) × 2 (demeanor: Goliath vs. David) repeated ANOVA on perceived modesty revealed no effect of culture, F(1, 243) = 1.12, p = .291, an effect of demeanor, F(1, 243) = 927.45, p < .001, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .79, and a significant culture by demeanor interaction effect, F(1, 243) = 8.36, p = .004, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .03. Whereas debater Goliath was perceived to be equally immodest by Euro-Canadians (M = 1.90, SD = 1.12) and Chinese (M = 2.11, SD = 1.12), F(1, 243) = 2.21, p = .138, debater David was perceived to be less modest by Chinese (M = 5.16, SD = 1.31) than by Euro-Canadians (M = 5.59, SD = 1.15), F(1, 243) = 7.38, p = .007, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .03. When modesty measures were included as covariates, cultural differences in inferred competence remained in the same pattern for the culture by demeanor interaction, F(1, 241) = 42.40, p < .001, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .15. Modesty did not predict inferred competence or mediate the observed cultural effects (see Supplemental Material). Thus, modesty could not explain the observed cultural differences in judgments of competence.

Likability

A 2 (culture: Euro-Canadian vs. Chinese) × 2 (demeanor: Goliath vs. David) repeated ANOVA on likability revealed no effect of culture, F(1, 243) = 1.76, p = .186, an effect of demeanor, F(1, 243) = 173.93, p < .001, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .42, and a significant culture by demeanor interaction, F(1, 243) = 11.69, p = .001, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .05. Debater Goliath was perceived as marginally less likable by Euro-Canadians (M = 2.52, SD = 1.22) than by Chinese (M = 2.82, SD = 1.40), F(1, 243) = 3.19, p = .075, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .01, whereas debater David was perceived as more likable by Euro-Canadians (M = 4.66, SD = 1.20) than by Chinese (M = 4.08, SD = 1.42), F(1, 243) = 12.08, p = .001, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .05. When likability measures were entered as covariates, the culture by demeanor interaction effect on inferred competence remained significant in the predicted pattern, F(1, 241) = 41.65, p < .001, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .15. Likability did not predict inferred competence or mediate the observed cultural effects (see Supplemental Material). These results suggest that although advertising one’s strengths may make one less likable, likability seemed to have little to do with the perception of competence (Fiske et al., 2007) and could not explain the observed results.

Unpredictability

A 2 (culture: Euro-Canadian vs. Chinese) × 2 (demeanor: Goliath vs. David) repeated ANOVA on perceived unpredictability revealed a marginal effect of culture, F(1, 243) = 3.23, p = .073, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .01, an effect of demeanor, F(1, 243) = 284.24, p < .001, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .54, and a culture by demeanor interaction, F(1, 243) = 20.17, p < .001, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .08. Consistent with predictions, Euro-Canadians (M = 3.71, SD = 1.81) perceived debater Goliath as more unpredictable than did Chinese (M = 2.82, SD = 1.21), F(1, 243) = 19.93, p < .001, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .08, whereas Chinese (M = 6.08, SD = 0.94) perceived debater David as more unpredictable than did Euro-Canadians (M = 5.60, SD = 1.71), F(1, 243) = 7.57, p = .006, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .03.

Did perceived unpredictability contribute to cultural differences in demeanor-based inferences of competence? An indirect effect analysis suggested so. First, we created a composite score of convergence judgments of competence by subtracting competence ratings of debater David from competence ratings of debater Goliath. A high score would represent the tendency to associate a strong demeanor with competence. Then, we created a composite score of relative unpredictability by subtracting unpredictability scores of debater David from unpredictability scores of debater Goliath. A high score would represent the tendency to perceive a strong demeanor (vs. an ordinary demeanor) as more unpredictable. To examine the mediating role of unpredictability in the effects of culture on convergence judgments, we entered culture (0 = Chinese, 1 = Euro-Canadian) as the predictor, convergence judgments as dependent variable, and unpredictability as mediator into the Process macro (Hayes, 2013) based on 5,000 bootstrap samples. Culture predicted convergence judgments (b = 1.32, SE = 0.21, p < .001) and perceived unpredictability (b = 1.37, SE = 0.31, p < .001), indicating that compared with Euro-Canadians, Chinese were more likely to perceive an ordinary demeanor (vs. a strong demeanor) as more unpredictable. Both culture (b = 1.02, SE = 0.20, p < .001) and unpredictability (b = 0.22, SE = 0.04, p < .001) predicted convergence judgments when they were entered into the model simultaneously. The 95% confidence interval (CI) = [0.15, 0.51] for the indirect effect did not include zero. These results, indicating a partial mediation, suggest that perceived unpredictability contributed, in part, to cultural differences in convergence judgments of competence (Figure 4).

Figure 4.

Indirect effect of culture on convergence judgments of competence, partially mediated by perceived unpredictability (Study 3).

Study 4a: Beliefs About the Misleading Nature of Demeanor

Study 4 aimed to unpack the observed cultural differences in inferences by identifying the underlying mechanism. We specifically examined the misleading nature of demeanor as lay beliefs and their mediating role in the links between culture and demeanor-based inferences of competence.

Pilot Study

We used proverbs to measure people’s lay beliefs that demeanor is a misleading reflection of reality, an approach employed in previous research investigating cultural ideas and beliefs (e.g., Peng & Nisbett, 1999). We selected two proverbs from the Oxford Dictionary of Proverbs (4th ed., Duckett, 2004), “beware of a silent dog and still water” (a Latin proverb) and “a wise falcon hides his talons” (an Italian proverb). They were selected for two reasons: (a) Both proverbs shared the notion that the underlying nature of things can deviate from how they appear, which is a core feature distinguishing the divergence and convergence views of demeanor; and (b) the proverbs originated neither from Chinese nor North American cultures as a safeguard against the possible confounding effects of familiarity on agreement (e.g., Cialdini, 1993). A separate group of Euro-Canadian (n = 35) and Chinese (n = 21) participants rated (1 = not at all agree, 7 = completely agree) how much they agreed with each of the proverbs (along with fillers), and with the statement “appearances are often misleading.” Results showed that endorsements of the two target proverbs significantly correlated with each other (r_Canadian = .54, p = .001, vs. r_Chinese = .76, p < .001). Furthermore, endorsements of these proverbs (see descriptive statistics in Supplemental Material) were correlated with endorsement of the conceptually relevant statement “appearances are often misleading” (Euro-Canadians: r = .79, p < .001, and r = .57, p < .001, for the two proverbs, respectively; Chinese: r = .52, p = .016, and r = .68, p = .001, for the two proverbs, respectively).

Main Study

Participants

Participants were 84 Euro-Canadians (46 women and 38 men; M_age = 18.9 years, SD_age = 1.10 years) at a Canadian university and 71 Chinese (32 women and 39 men; M_age = 22.7 years, SD_age = 4.56 years) at a Chinese university.

Procedure

Participants read the debating scenario used in Study 3. They rated (1 = very unlikely, 7 = very likely) the extent to which each debater would be a threat to their own victory, as a measure of perceived competence (see Supplemental Material). Then, they explained their assessments in an open-ended question. Next, participants rated (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) the extent to which they agreed with each of the following proverbs, “beware of a silent dog and still water,” “a wise falcon hides his talons,” along with two conceptually unrelated filler proverbs. Finally, they provided demographic information.

Results and Discussion

Perceived competence

A 2 (culture: Euro-Canadian vs. Chinese) × 2 (demeanor: Goliath vs. David) repeated ANOVA on perceived competence revealed no significant effects of culture, F(1, 153) < 1, p = .833, or of demeanor, F(1, 153) < 1, p = .964. As expected, the culture by demeanor interaction was significant, F(1, 153) = 5.79, p = .017, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .04. Euro-Canadians (M = 4.92, SD = 1.39) inferred debater Goliath as more competent than did Chinese (M = 4.39, SD = 1.52), F(1, 153) = 5.00, p = .027, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .03, whereas Chinese (M = 4.90, SD = 1.50) inferred debater David as more competent than did Euro-Canadians (M = 4.43, SD = 1.49), F(1, 153) = 3.84, p = .052, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .02 (Figure 5). Within-culture analyses revealed that debater Goliath was marginally more competent than debater David to Euro-Canadians, F(1, 153) = 3.04, p = .083, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .02, whereas debater David was marginally more competent than debater Goliath to Chinese, F(1, 153) = 2.77, p = .098, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .02. In sum, Chinese and Euro-Canadians inferred competence from demeanor differently.

Figure 5.

Competence of rival debaters inferred by Euro-Canadian and Chinese participants (Study 4a).

Can these cultural patterns be explained by the convergence or divergence theory of demeanor as we proposed? We addressed this question qualitatively by examining participants’ open-ended explanations. We then examined demeanor–reality beliefs, as measured by the proverbs, and how such beliefs may mediate cultural differences in demeanor-based inferences of competence.

Open-ended explanations

Participants’ open-ended accounts were translated into English where appropriate, and independently coded by two coders blind to hypotheses (preconsensus agreement: 85%). Coders coded whether the explanations (see Supplemental Material for sample responses by both cultural samples) highlighted convergence thinking between demeanor and reality (e.g., debater Goliath “was competent because he looks strong”) or divergence thinking between demeanor and reality (e.g., debater David “was competent because he looks weak”).

Supporting our predictions, convergence explanations were significantly more common among Euro-Canadians (42.9%) than among Chinese (25.7%), χ²(1, N = 155) = 4.93, p = .026, whereas divergence explanations were significantly more common among Chinese (30.0%) than among Euro-Canadians (14.3%), χ²(1, N = 155) = 5.60, p = .018. Unrestricted by methodological issues such as response biases in rating scales, these qualitative data provided further support to the proposed cultural differences, with Chinese (vs. Euro-Canadians) holding a stronger divergence view about demeanor and reality.

Mediating process: Belief in the misleading nature of demeanor

Measuring the beliefs in the misleading nature of demeanor with proverbs, we found that Chinese participants endorsed both proverbs to a greater degree than did Euro-Canadian participants (M_CH = 5.00, SD_CH = 1.80, and M_CAN = 3.10, SD_CAN = 1.84, for the silent dog proverb; M_CH = 5.21, SD_CH = 1.67, and M_CAN = 4.61, SD_CAN = 1.86, for the falcon proverb), Fs > 4.32, ps < .039.

For the indirect effect analysis, we created an index of convergence judgments of competence by subtracting the competence ratings of debater David from that of debater Goliath; a positive score would represent the perception that debater Goliath was more competent than debater David, reflecting stronger convergence thinking. Ratings of the two proverbs were averaged into a composite; a high score would represent strong beliefs in the misleading nature of demeanor.

In our mediation analysis, we entered culture (0 = Chinese, 1 = Euro-Canadian) as the independent variable, convergence judgments as dependent variable, and beliefs in the misleading nature of demeanor as mediator into the Process macro (Hayes, 2013) based on 5,000 bootstrap samples. Culture predicted convergence judgments (b = 0.95, SE = 0.41, p = .023) and beliefs about demeanor (b = −1.23, SE = 0.24, p < .001), indicating that compared with Chinese, Euro-Canadians were more likely to associate a strong demeanor (vs. an ordinary demeanor) with competence, and they were less likely to endorse the beliefs that demeanor is misleading. When culture and the beliefs about demeanor were entered into the model simultaneously, beliefs predicted convergence judgments (b = −0.40, SE = 0.14, p = .003), whereas culture’s effect was no longer significant (b = 0.46, SE = 0.44, p = .295). The 95% CI = [0.15, 0.97] for the indirect effect did not include zero. These results indicated that believing in the misleading nature of demeanor accounted for cultural differences in convergence judgments (Figure 6).

Figure 6.

Unstandardized regression coefficients for links between culture and convergence judgments of competence, fully mediated by the beliefs about demeanor (Study 4a).

Study 4b: A Test of Generalizability

In the interest of generalizability, Study 4b sought to replicate the observed cultural effects with community samples recruited in the United States and China. In addition, we measured perceived competence with multiple items.

Method

Participants

We recruited 130 Euro-Americans (50 women and 80 men; M_age = 38.5 years, SD_age = 11.70 years) in the United States via Amazon Mechanical Turk (an online data collection platform in North America), and 130 Chinese (73 women and 57 men; M_age = 30.5 years, SD_age = 7.64 years) in China via So Jump (an online data collection platform in China). Participants in both cultures were diverse in their education level, ranging from high school to college to professional degrees.

Procedure

To measure perceived competence, we had participants read the debating scenario used in Study 4a and rate (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) each debater on seven items of competence (competent, capable, knowledgeable, experienced, proficient, skillful, intelligent). Next, as a measure of the beliefs about the misleading nature of demeanor, participants rated the extent to which they understood (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) and agreed (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) with each of four proverbs (see Supplemental Material). Of these proverbs, two were target proverbs from Study 4b that described the misleading nature of demeanor, and the other two were fillers (see Supplemental Material). Finally, participants provided demographic information.

Results and Discussion

Inferred competence

Ratings of competence were averaged into a composite for debater Goliath (α = .90) and debater David (α = .92), respectively. A 2 (culture: Euro-American vs. Chinese) × 2 (demeanor: Goliath vs. David) repeated ANOVA on inferred competence showed no effect of culture, F(1, 258) < 1, p = .759, or of demeanor, F(1, 258) < 1, p = .958, but the predicted culture by demeanor interaction was found, F(1, 258) = 13.57, p < .001, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .05. Consistent with Studies 1 through 4a, Euro-Americans (M = 5.30, SD = 1.12) perceived debater Goliath as more competent than did Chinese (M = 4.99, SD = 0.90), F(1, 258) = 6.03, p = .015, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .02, whereas Chinese (M = 5.27, SD = 0.95) perceived debater David as marginally more competent than did Euro-Americans (M = 5.03, SD = 1.18), F(1, 258) = 3.36, p = .068, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .01 (Figure 7). Within-culture analyses further showed that debater Goliath was rated as more competent than debater David by Euro-Americans, F(1, 258) = 6.59, p = .011, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .03, whereas the opposite was observed for Chinese, F(1, 258) = 96.98, p = .009, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .03.

Figure 7.

Competence of rival debaters inferred by Euro-American and Chinese participants (Study 4b).

Proverbs

We averaged the agreement ratings (Euro-Americans: r = .26, p = .002; Chinese: r = .45, p < .001) of target proverbs into a composite score of beliefs in the misleading nature of demeanor. Both groups of participants understood the proverbs well, M_AM = 4.98, SD_AM = 1.33, significantly above the scale midpoint, t(129) = 8.40, p < .001; M_CH = 5.44, SD_CH = .98, significantly above the scale midpoint, t(129) = 16.75, p < .001. As expected, Chinese participants endorsed the proverbs (M = 5.54, SD = 1.04) more strongly than did Euro-American participants (M = 4.88, SD = 1.23), F(1, 258) = 22.16, p < .001, $η_{ρ}^{2}$ = .08.

Then, we conducted a mediation analysis using the same procedure and parameters as in Study 4a. Culture (0 = Chinese, 1 = Euro-American) predicted convergence judgments of competence (b = 0.55, SE = 0.15, p < .001) and the beliefs about demeanor (b = −0.67, SE = 0.14, p < .001). When both culture and the beliefs about demeanor were entered into the model simultaneously, the beliefs predicted convergence judgments (b = −0.20, SE = 0.07, p = .003), and the effect of culture remained significant (b = 0.42, SE = 0.15, p = .007). The 95% CI = [0.04, 0.28] for the indirect effect did not include zero. These results, indicating a partial mediation, suggest that believing in the misleading nature of demeanor partly accounted for cultural differences in convergence judgments of competence (Figure 8).

Figure 8.

Unstandardized regression coefficients for links between culture and convergence judgments of competence, partially mediated by the beliefs about demeanor (Study 4b).

Meta-Analysis

We performed a meta-analysis on the five studies reported above and three additional studies we have conducted (see Supplemental Material for the methods and results), involving 1,407 participants (712 Euro-North-Americans and 695 Chinese). Each study was weighted according to the sample size of the study and the variance of their respective effect sizes. In each study, participants inferred competence of two targets with different forms of demeanor, on a 7-point scale. Within each cultural group, we created an index by subtracting the competence ratings of target David from that of target Goliath. A positive score would represent a higher competence rating for Goliath than for David. Then, we used the mean difference between Euro-North-Americans and Chinese to index the effect size in each study. A positive value would indicate that Euro-North-Americans inferred corresponding competence from demeanor to a greater extent than did Chinese.

The sample effect estimates (with difference between the means of two cultural groups), their respective CI, and the average effect size are presented in the forest plot (Figure 9). Homogeneity Q(7) = 27.83, p < .001, indicated that the distribution of the effect sizes was not homogeneous overall. Assuming a random-effects model, the estimated cultural difference was 1.09, 95% CI = [0.74, 1.44], d = 0.65, z = 6.05, p < .001.⁴ These results further supported our predictions: The tendency to infer greater competence in target Goliath than in target David was stronger for Euro-North-Americans than for Chinese, which highlighted systematic differences in demeanor-based inferences of competence across cultures.

Figure 9.

Forest plot for a meta-analysis based on eight studies.

General Discussion

Across five studies and a meta-analysis, we have shown consistent cultural differences in how people infer competence based on demeanor in various competitive settings. Specifically, Euro-North-Americans (vs. Chinese) inferred greater competence from an opponent who appeared competent, whereas Chinese (vs. Euro-North-Americans) paradoxically inferred greater competence from an opponent who showed no signs of strengths. These cultural patterns, observed in college (Studies 1–4a) and community samples (Study 4b), were explained by the extent to which demeanor is believed to be a misleading reflection of reality, a finding supported by qualitative (Study 4a) and mediational evidence (Studies 4a and 4b). In particular, mediation analyses have strengthened the conceptual ground of the present research by pinpointing the roles of perceived unpredictability (Study 3) and beliefs in the misleading nature of demeanor (Studies 4a and 4b) as the underlying processes of observed cultural effects. Both processes are facets of the cultural assumption that whatever on the outside (demeanor) can deviate from what is on the inside (reality), which is a core feature distinguishing the divergence theory from convergence theory. Taken together, these results highlight the relevance of cultures in the theories of demeanor that people hold, and their roles in demeanor-based inferences of competence in competition domains.

The present findings cannot be explained by perceived modesty or likability of the targets (Study 3). One possible reason, we believe, is the competitive contexts in which inferences were made. Competitions motivate people to contemplate the goals and motives behind the displays of their opponents (e.g., Fein et al., 1990). Motivated to win in a competition, people may do whatever it takes to maximize their chance of success, which may include choosing a particular demeanor to present to the world. Armed with this mind-set, a modest demeanor in a competition might be perceived as a cue of strategic presentation instead of a reflection of true modesty. Accordingly, our findings on beliefs in the misleading nature of demeanor across cultures (Studies 4a and 4b) may explain why Chinese participants tended to infer a demeanor of modesty as a sign of underlying competence, whereas Euro-Canadian participants tended to infer the same demeanor of modesty as a true signal of underlying modesty.

How is the present research on demeanor different from prior work on faces? Some research on inferences of the face has shown cross-cultural consensus (e.g., Buss, 1989; Ekman & Friesen, 1971; McArthur & Berry, 1987; Zebrowitz et al., 1993), whereas other research has revealed cultural differences in the perception of facial emotions (e.g., Masuda et al., 2008; Matsumoto, 1992). The present research differs from face research in three ways. First, our studies have embedded demeanor in a specific context (e.g., job interview, company rivalry, debate tournament) along with situation-specific goals (e.g., getting a job or winning a debate). The abundance of contextual features in our study designs stands in sharp contrast to some of the previous studies, in which a person’s face is often presented for judgments with little or no context. Second, the present research focused on competitive settings in which stakes are high, decisions are expected to be strategic, and reasoning about others is likely to be clouded with suspicion of ulterior motives (e.g., Fein et al., 1990). Thus, cultural differences in inferences might be more evident when people are put in the mind-set of competitions than when they are not. Third, demeanor is known to be distinct from faces: Unlike faces, which have a strong biological component, demeanor of all forms (e.g., Kudoh & Matsumoto, 1985; D. Morris, 1994) is more strongly influenced by cultural knowledge and norms, likely imbued with all kinds of cultural grammars. All these aspects might have contributed to the different results observed in the present research than those reported in prior work on faces. Future work can directly investigate how contexts may affect face perception.

Can the present results be explained by the possibility that competence is expressed differently across cultures? In other words, one may argue that our Euro-North-American and Chinese participants reacted to Goliath and David differently simply because competence is expressed as showcasing one’s strengths in North American culture, whereas it is expressed as being reserved in Chinese culture. This account is plausible, but unlikely, for several reasons. First, if the two cultures differed in how competence is expressed and if both Chinese and Euro-Canadians endorsed the convergence view to a similar extent, then one may expect Chinese and Euro- Canadians to perceive a similar link between demeanor and reality. If so, their beliefs about the misleading nature of demeanor (as measured by the proverbs) would not have differed, and the endorsement of such beliefs should not have mediated cultural differences in appearance-based competence inference. But our data (Studies 4a and 4b) speak against these claims. Second, the distinct views on demeanor across cultures were captured not only by quantitative and mediational evidence (Studies 4a and 4b) but also by open-ended explanations (Study 4a), in which divergence explanations were more prevalent among Chinese than among Euro-Canadians (Study 4a). These findings cannot be explained by the cultural expression account. Furthermore, if the present findings were due to cultural expressions of competence across cultures, then David would not have been more unpredictable to Chinese than to Euro-Canadians (or Goliath would not have been more predictable to Chinese than to Euro-Canadians). Our data on perceived unpredictability, however, showed just that (Study 3). Thus, although cultures may vary in their expressions of competence, this account cannot explain the present results.

Theoretical Implications

The present findings have important implications. First, understanding people’s assumptions about demeanor and reality are ecologically important as these assumptions are guiding compasses for a host of social phenomena, from judgments and misunderstanding to surprises, trust, and prejudice. Because demeanor is a key source of information, it is often taken as a justification for stereotypes and associations (e.g., Jussim et al., 1987) that people have for social groups. We hope that the present research can contribute to the theoretical links between the cultural literature and decades of work on intergroup processes.

Moreover, the observed cultural differences have implications for self-presentation. For example, physical height, which is typically associated with dominance (Zinsser et al., 1998) or social status (Lukaszewski et al., 2015) in Western cultures, may confer tall people with advantages that indirectly increase their chances of success in a competition. These findings, obtained mainly from North American samples, may not be applicable to people with the beliefs that demeanor and reality do not converge into the same direction or to the same degree.

To what extent are the present findings related to the research on social complexity? Known as one of the social axioms (Leung et al., 2002) of cultures, social complexity refers to the general beliefs that social problems may have multiple solutions and that people can behave inconsistently due to situational demands (e.g., Leung et al., 2002; Singelis et al., 2003). As social complexity does not seem to differ between China (M = 3.79) and the United States (M = 3.87; Leung et al., 2012), it is an unlikely explanation for the present findings. Nonetheless, social complexity has been shown to predict flexible thinking (Singelis et al., 2003) and the tendency to compromise in interpersonal tasks (Bond et al., 2004). These findings suggest that a complex view of the social world may encourage people to consider multiple possibilities for social problems as opposed to using rigid rules. When applied to the present findings, social complexity may not necessarily promote convergence or divergence thinking; rather, it may promote a more fluid switching between the two ways of thinking in demeanor-based inferences, to the extent that social complexity is associated with flexible thinking. We leave this interesting possibility to future research.

Limitations and Future Directions

Although the present research has demonstrated the roles of cultures in demeanor-based inferences, a limitation of this work is the reliance of scenarios. In the pursuit of ecological validity, future researchers should bring their investigations to real-world behaviors in naturalistic contexts. With regard to generalizability, we expect the present results to have some level of applicability to different populations as our investigations revealed consistent findings from college and community samples from three countries. The extent to which this speculation holds true can be addressed by future research with other cultural samples.

Theoretically, there are reasons to expect similar cultural patterns in inferences of positive (e.g., competence and strengths) and negative (e.g., clumsiness and ineffectiveness) qualities, although the present research only tested the former. Future research can examine the latter empirically to address the issues on generalizability, especially in populations beyond North American and Chinese cultures. Another interesting question is whether our results may emerge in social domains beyond competitions. To the extent that culture-specific theories of demeanor are basic mental compasses that guide social perception, their impacts on inferences should appear not only in competitions but also in noncompetitive domains, although one may reasonably expect the effects to be somewhat weaker in noncompetitive contexts due to the absence of competition-specific mind-sets and behaviors (e.g., Fein et al., 1990). We encourage future research to systematically address this possibility. Furthermore, future studies may examine other core dimensions of social perception such as warmth (Fiske et al., 2007). Is the new colleague who greeted you with a warm demeanor really a friendly person? Does the sweet-looking couple at the dinner party indeed share a happy relationship? These situations are familiar, important, and relevant to everyday life, and future research may benefit from taking a deeper look at people’s perception in these situations through the lens of cultures and theories of demeanor.

Conclusion

The present research underscores the links between demeanor and reality in different cultural minds and their effects on demeanor-based inferences of competence. Whereas a strong demeanor in competitive situations is usually taken as a sign of actual competence and threat among Euro-North-Americans, such a tendency is weaker or even reversed among Chinese due to their strong beliefs in the misleading nature of demeanor. This research also suggests a bold interpretation for the opening story: Maybe the Chinese army was signaling its competence by not revealing any sign of strengths, which, ironically, was mistakenly deciphered by the United States as a sign of weakness. Perhaps history—as well as the clashes between the West and East today—would have been a little different if it were not for a cross-cultural misunderstanding?

Supplemental Material

Lee_OnlineAppendix – Supplemental material for Fear Goliath or David? Inferring Competence From Demeanor Across Cultures

Supplemental material, Lee_OnlineAppendix for Fear Goliath or David? Inferring Competence From Demeanor Across Cultures by Albert Lee, Li-Jun Ji, Ye Li and Zhiyong Zhang in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

We thank Huajian Cai, Ioana Petrar-Silca, Janxin Leu, Kristen Wadowski, Mark Khei, Melissa Kang, Ning Zhang, Suhui Yap, and Thomas Vaughan-Johnston for their help with early versions of the article.

Authors’ Note

This article is based, in part, on a PhD dissertation completed by Albert Lee at Queen’s University under the supervision of Li-Jun Ji.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The research was supported by grants from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRCC Grants 410-2009-0904, 435-2012-1279, and 435-2018-0061) to Ji, and a Nanyang Technological University Start Up Grant (HSS 4080-M4081361) to Lee.

ORCID iD

Albert Lee

Notes

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material is available online with this article.

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