In a brief discussion of some of the issues concerning the nature of social psychology which have been raised in recent articles by Gergen, Schlenker, Manis, and Thorngate, it is argued that there is a view about the nature of social psychology which takes advantage of and to some extent reconciles both Gergen's arguments for social psychology as history and Schlenker's argu ments for social psychology as science.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
Gergen, K.J.Social psychology as history. Journal of Personality and Psychology , 1973, 26, 309-320.
2.
Gergen, K.J.Social psychology, science and history. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1976, 2, 373-383.
3.
Kuhn, T.The structure of scientific revolutions (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press , 1970.
4.
Manis, M.Comment on Gergen's "Social psychology as history." Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1975, 1, 450-455.
5.
Schlenker, B.R.Social psychology and science. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1974, 29, 1-15.
6.
Thorngate, W.Process invariance: Another red herring. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1975, 1, 485-488.
