Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin

Systematic observation of social interaction, noting the presence or absence of predefined behaviors in an ongoing stream of behavior, can result in an overwhelming mass of data. The central thesis of this report is that a few simple conceptual and analytic tools greatly facilitate the handling of such data. Various ways of representing observational data are discussed, and implications are included showing analyses of mother-infant, monkey- monkey, and human adult-adult interaction.

This paper comments on Altman's description of environ mental psychology and its relation to social psychology. It sug gests that a distinction be made between environmental psychology and the field of environment and behavior. It argues that Altman's description of the distinguishing features of environmental psy chology represent the orientation of non-social psychologists in volved in the field while social psychologists in the field gen erally adhere to a more traditional orientation. In accord with Altman's position this paper suggests that social psychology and environmental psychology can mutually benefit one another and dis cusses ways in which they can do so.

The present discussion examines some of the theoretical assumptions implicit in Altman's (1976) concept of social-unit analysis. These assumptions are considered in relation to Miller, Galanter, and Pribram's (1960) "TOTE" model of human behavior and the concept of human-environment optimization (Stokols, in press). An attempt is made to specify certain core concerns of the environ ment and behavior field, and to examine the potential contribution of social psychology to an analysis of these concerns.

Altman (1976) presented an excellent descriptive exposition of the history and present status of environmental psychology. However, I disagree with Altman about the potential relationships between envir onmental psychology and social psychology. Altman is optimistic that the two disciplines have much to offer each other. For reasons elabo rated in this response, I am pessimistic as to whether social psychology can make any serious contributions to environmental psychology. If the concepts and methods that social psychologists presently employ to study environmental problems are the best they have to offer, I conclude that social psychologists would be well advised to leave the study of environ mental psychology to environmental psychologists.

This paper is a reply to comments made by Epstein, Proshansky and Stokols on my earlier article, "Environmental Psychology and Social Psychology." My remarks are directed to the historical professional generations they and I represent, their extensions and modifications of my ideas, our agreements and disagreements on "diagnosis" and "prognosis" of social psychology in relation to environmental issues.

Further exploration into the historical dependency of social knowledge is undertaken, with special attention given to various objections to the earlier thesis. Initial concern is with general theory as a means of transcending historical period. It is found that while such theory may be of continuous utility as an explanatory device, its contribution to the task of pre diction is highly limited. The related issue of "underlying regularity" is then considered, and the conclusion reached that regularity must continuously be negotiated post hoc. Further, social life is sufficiently complex that virtually all hypo thetical regularities may be supported. The "if then..." solution is then considered, and it is found that the process of continued qualification over time renders theories untestable. Numerous instances of eroding knowledge are then considered, along with the issue of enlightenment effects in social psy chology. It is concluded that the important question is not if present knowledge is passing into obscurity so much as whether its passing is inevitable.

The social-psychology-as-history thesis is reexamined in light of recent arguments. No valid arguments have been ad vanced which would fundamentally distinguish the social and natural sciences. At best, the history thesis has more bearing on the utility of universal generalizations than it does on their exis tence ; prematurely judging this issue by fiat could lead to such :onsequences as abandoning theory construction and the search for any type of explanation.

Durable laws of social behavior are possible in principle even if they are very difficult to arrive at in practice.

Gergen (1973) presented the thesis that social psychology is primarily an historical inquiry. The implications of his paper are very significant for the status of social psychology as a scien tific discipline. In defense of traditional science Schlenker (1974) presented a strong rebuttal, focussing on five major issues; the nature of theoretical abstractness, the search for regularity, open systems, the conditional nature of scientific propositions, and the uniqueness of events. The present paper considers the Gergen- Schlenker debate within the context of these five issues. The analyses indicate that Schlenker's rebuttal arguments are not de finitive, and that Gergen's thesis still awaits a decisive answer.

This is the Cybernetics and Stuff That covered Chaotic Confusion and Bluff That hung on the Turn of a Plausible Phrase And Thickened the Erudite Verbal Haze Cloaking Constant K That saved the Summary Based on the Mummery Hiding the Flaw That lay in the theory Jack built. (Winsor & Parry, 1958, Poem 30)

The main reason for suspecting that transhistorical validity may be more difficult to achieve for social than for physical theories is that incorporating enlightenment effects into social theories may lead to an infinite regress. Such infinite regresses are not an uncommon problem in science, however, and effective strategies for dealing with them have been developed. Unfamiliarity with such strategies is but one manifestation of our field's failure to model two crucial lessons from several centuries' experience with the physical sciences: the need for formally stated theories and the need to distinguish between the success of a theory in highly com plex applied settings and the validity of that theory as established in more tightly controlled situations.

The issues in the controversy over "social psychology as history" are seen as resolvable through interdisciplinary work resulting in the development of comprehensive social theory. Such theory must interweave person, situation, social context, and sub cultures into a matrix of interacting structures and processes that cut across time periods.

In a brief discussion of some of the issues concerning the nature of social psychology which have been raised in recent articles by Gergen, Schlenker, Manis, and Thorngate, it is argued that there is a view about the nature of social psychology which takes advantage of and to some extent reconciles both Gergen's arguments for social psychology as history and Schlenker's argu ments for social psychology as science.

Gergen (1976), outlines a number of problems that make it difficult to apply general social psychological the ories, or to assess their validity unequivocally. These dif ficulties are not unique to social psychology, however. The application of general scientific principles has never been a simple matter, not even in the well-established physical sci ences. Moreover, there are formidable difficulties in asses sing general theoretical propositions in every field of in quiry, since empirical procedures will inevitably depend on assumptions about local field conditions, the adequacy of meas urement techniques, and the like. As a consequence, if re sults are inconsistent with theoretical expectations, there will always be some uncertainty as to where the problem lies. Social psychologists should not assume that their difficulties are totally unlike those encountered in other fields of sci entific inquiry. The problems raised by Gergen do not, con sequently, rule out the possible development and application of general social psychological theories.

Reacting to papers in a symposium stimulated by an exchange between Gergen (1973), who argued that social psychology is primarily an historical inquiry, and Schlenker (1974), who defended the traditional scientific view of the discipline, the present paper seeks to refocus attention on pragmatic issues facing the discipline. The pursuit of traditional physical science models in social psychology has not worked well, but social psychology has been much more successful in demonstration studies that result in sensitization to variables and relationships. Social psychology has taken a narrow view of science, and neglected significant opportunities that bring it closer to history. The conception of social psychology as history is developed as liberating, not prescriptive, for research in social psychology.

Current principles and regulations concerning the ethics of research on human participants draw on two unrelated frames of reference: informed consent and harm/benefit. Problems involved in informed consent include the inability of some classes of potential participants to give such consent, the incompatibility of some research designs with fully informed consent, and ambiguities about the meaning of "informed." Problems involved in the harm/benefit frame include the impossibility of balancing benefit to science and society against harm to an individual and the question of who is to assess harms and benefits. Two currently proposed extensions of commonly accepted principles are discussed: the possible harm of deceptive procedures to the normative order of society, and the rights of categories of individuals, and of institutions, with respect to consent and harm/benefit. The former is favored, the latter oppossed.

The difficulties in performing a crucial experiment in social psychology are addressed taking philosophical and epistemo logical issues into account. While previous discussions have pro posed that present social psychological theories and methods pre vent such tests, closer analysis indicates that this inability is not unique to social psychology, but is an aspect of any scienti fic inquiry.

Current uncertainties among social psychologists concerning the present status and future directions of their field are examined in terms of recent developments in the history and philosophy of science. Examination of the perspective social psychologists share toward the history of their field, as illustrated through a brief case study from social psychology's past, suggests that we have not come to grips with the complexity of our current crisis. Critical historical analysis provides a seldom-used perspective for examining our present dilemmas.

Subjects' role expectations were experimentally manipu lated in order to go beyond ex post facto inferences concerning the operation of subject roles in the laboratory. Students were given role conceptions defining the role of subject as active or passive and then placed in an experimental situation where they could cooperate or not cooperate with the experimenter. Results indicate that subjects' role conceptions influence their experim ental behavior and that role conceptions are easily altered.

Well fed subjects role-played either food-deprived or food-satiated participation in a classical conditioning of atti tudes study. Subjects who role-played deprivation and indicated awareness of the hypothesis that deprivation would lead to in creased liking for nonsense syllables paired with food words liked the syllables more than satiation-aware, unaware, and con trol subjects, who did not differ in their liking. The results were interpreted as supporting a demand characteristics explana tion of the deprivation-satiation effect found by Staats, Minke, Martin, and Higa (1972).

Previous research (Dawes & Corrigan, 1974) has indicated that simple linear models may be highly predictive--of such cri teria as academic success and psychiatric diagnosis. This note sum marizes two studies concerning the prediction of another (socially important) criterion: self-ratings of marital happiness. Two samples of married subjects monitored sexual intercourse and argu ments on a daily basis. Rate of sexual intercourse minus rate of arguments was highly predictive of self-ratings of marital happiness.