The Democratic Horizon

In The Democratic Horizon we are offered the project of renewing political liberalism via responding to hyperpluralism which is seen in the context of a worldwide democratic ethos now emerging. The book in ringing terms endorses John Rawls’ Political Liberalism but significantly extends beyond that project. While the Rawlsian project was based on a specific reading of the process of modernization that departs from the old Weberian model which links modernization with secularization, Rawls did envision a form of modernization that would account for the ‘fact of reasonable pluralism’. In Rawls’ view, pluralism could accommodate the multitude of comprehensive doctrines (religious, philosophical and secular) by making a distinction between the comprehensive and the political. This would mean that reasonable comprehensive doctrines could be conceived of as legitimate in at least two ways: first, internally with reference to those who would sustain them for good reasons; and second, in reference to the public (political) which each could accommodate in its own manner. Ferrara introduces the term hyperpluralism, by means of which he points to a pluralism that was envisaged in the Law of Peoples but goes beyond the Rawlsian framework. The Rawlsian narrative is characterized as a narrative of the transition to liberal democracy shaped by Protestant polities emerging from the wars of 17th-century Europe that form the historical background for the distinction between the comprehensive and the political that grounds the framework of Political Liberalism. Here the trace of old Europe remains, i.e. westernization. If we look at the transition to modernity from the perspective of the model of Multiple Modernities we will see that democratic cultures are actually anchored in different civilizational contexts that will correspondingly produce alternative versions of the ‘just and stable society of free and equal citizens’. The upshot is not that we should abandon Political Liberalism, rather we should expand it, modify it, reshape it, to meet the demands of a world society half of which can be classified as democratic (there are 90 countries that embrace democracy as counted by Freedom House in 2013) while the other half may be aspiring to be part of a democratic movement but hindered by various forms of repression.

The fundamental question to be asked following the argument of the book is: ‘What did Political Liberalism accomplish?’ The answer is that if we look at the current democratic horizon, democracy can be characterized as being challenged by ‘inhospitable conditions’ among which we can list: extensions of electorates, institutional complexity, cultural pluralism, anonymous quality of will-formation, stratification of citizens, financial markets with absolute power, acceleration of time and virtualization of organizations, the tendency towards supranational governance, the transformation of the public sphere through media, and the influence of opinion polls on the process of legitimacy. The sub-thesis of the book is that political liberalism provides the best possibility for the neutralization of these toxic conditions through the process of democratization without resorting to a 1960s model that perceives democratization within the framework of westernization. Ferrara contends that Political Liberalism does this by integrating a dualist interpretation (Ackerman) of constitutionalism – higher law governs ordinary law, as summed up in the liberal principle of legitimacy which conceives consent of the governed in the framework of the constitution. The book deduces from this framing of political liberalism that it is enough for the citizen to follow constitutional essentials without getting into the details of legislative, executive and judicial forms of government.

And now we come to the fundamental claim of The Democratic Horizon, namely, that this anti-perfectionist conception of normativity has extraordinary potential, not only for what one might label the domestic interpretation of western democracies but, and perhaps more importantly, for the larger world-society which may be characterized by hyperpluralism. In certain ways this approach will transform public reason with its standard of reasonability which rests on voluntary affirmation on the one hand and the necessity to endorse certain principles on the other. The idea here is to take seriously political liberalism’s claim to bridge the gap between the ancients and the moderns, meaning that, contrary to the claims of some who would limit true democratic justification to liberals alone thus enforcing a standard that amounts to liberal oppression, the very notion of reasonability must be expanded to include the partially reasonable. To put it in other words, the task of The Democratic Horizon will be to make partially reasonable justifications fully reasonable. The assumption is that only some of the citizens can endorse constitutional essentials in light of principles acceptable to their common human reason, but others may endorse them out of prudential reasons without thereby necessarily undermining the legitimacy of the polity.

So at its heart The Democratic Horizon offers a series of conjectural arguments which will enable citizens with partially reasonable comprehensive conceptions of democracy to find internal reasons for endorsing liberal constitutional essentials. This is something of a departure from Rawls; however, the claim is that it is in the spirit of Rawls’ Law of Peoples which made distinctions between liberal and decent peoples, benevolent absolutisms, burdened societies and outlaw states and which offers ample evidence for the recognition of the multivariate character of world society. The point is that one can make a distinction between the various ways in which constitutional essentials can be endorsed. Some can endorse constitutional essentials on the basis of principles rooted in their comprehensive moral doctrines, while others can endorse on a mix of principles-based and prudential-based reasons, and others can endorse on the basis of prudential reasons alone.

The larger context in which this process is taking place is through focusing on the notion of the democratic ethos, a tradition established by Rousseau and Montesquieu and developed by a number of contemporary authors. In that tradition one can mention the passion for the common good, respect for equality and the affirmation of individuality. The later Rawls adds to that list of virtues by emphasizing toleration, civility and reasonableness. The Democratic Horizon reconstructs contemporary contributions to the discussion, citing the virtues of agape (Taylor), hospitality (Derrida) and presumptive generosity (White), and with the multiple modernities model in mind suggests that another virtue be added to the roster, namely, openness, which takes into account the contributions of the other authors and characterizes the emergence of a public culture open to the possibilities of new social configurations. Further, it is in that spirit of openness that it is possible to see that one of the limitations of the western democratic heritage is its concentration on a rights-based orientation which is contrary to the duty-based orientations found in Confucianism, Buddhism and Islam. No doubt, in the spirit of openness it should be possible, given this anti-perfectionist orientation to democracy, to find ways to incorporate these orientations within the framework of democratic legitimacy.

Frank I. Michelman in his article ‘A constitutional horizon?’ argues that the presupposition for a democratic horizon is a constitutional horizon. At issue are the legitimacy and the central location of ‘constitutional essentials’ particularly as they pertain to the Lockean distinction between higher and ordinary law, which was taken up by Ackerman and endorsed by Rawls. From Michelman’s perspective the constitutional question is whether Ferrara’s interpretation of constitutional essentials amounts to an historical ‘originalist’ orientation which can be differentiated from Rawls’ ‘moral-philosophical’ perspective. What is at stake is Ferrara’s attempt to accommodate hyperpluralism.

Seyla Benhabib in her ‘The multivariate polity or democratic fragmentation’ places The Democratic Horizon in the context of ‘high liberalism’ with its orientation to ‘ideal theory’ and its rejection of ‘realism’. She focuses on the phenomenon of multivariate democratic polities in relationship to the renewal of political liberalism. Citing Ferrara’s reformulation of the liberal principle of legitimacy as well as his reformulation of Rawls’ frequent reference to absolute conflict resulting from the fact of pluralism, Benhabib voices a healthy skepticism regarding how easily fundamental democratic issues can be compromised. In her terms: ‘throwing out the baby with the bathwater’. ‘Not all constitutional essentials can be open to revision and questioning at all times without distorting the essentials of liberal democracies beyond recognition’ (this issue: p. 653). Indeed, according to Benhabib some constitutional essentials should be ‘duly entrenched’.

Stephen K. White in his ‘Idea of a democratic ethos’ critiques Ferrara’s ‘passion for openness’ on the one hand as not determinate enough to be used to articulate the fundamental thrust of a democratic ethos and on the other hand his ideas of identity and exemplarity as not sufficiently integrated into the concept of a democratic ethos. White will suggest a possible ‘reconfiguration’. The virtue of openness needs to be more effectively integrated in a ‘comprehensive ethical-ontological source’ rather than having a function ‘as something like a cheerleader passion’. On the second point White argues that the concepts of identity and exemplarity would be enhanced by a reflection on individual identity, which would ‘consider how individual self-formation might actively confront identity/difference dynamics, becoming thereby more proto-political’ (this issue: p. 663).

William E. Scheuerman focuses his response to The Democratic Horizon on two questions. What contribution does the book make to democratic theory and is Ferrara’s account of democracy beyond the state successful? At issue in the first question is the juxtaposition between ethos and procedure, and Ferrara’s tendency to favor ethos over procedure. In Scheuerman’s view, that strategy undermines the importance of democratic procedure which more or less defines deliberative democracy. Ferrara’s concentration on the ethos and the democratic virtue of openness leads Scheuerman to reflect on the embrace of Montesquieu by conservatives and nationalists who defended the idea of a democratic ethos ‘as ideological apologies for political systems’, lacking commitment to fundamental liberal values. On Ferrara’s contribution to the ongoing debate over democracy beyond the nation-state, Scheuerman finds more or less the same problem but this time in an overemphasis on governance with not enough attention given to democratic procedure.

Anthony S. Laden responds to The Democratic Horizon by raising the problem of justification as it relates to conjectural reasoning and the virtue of openness. On conjectural reasoning Laden wonders whether or not Ferrara’s approach ‘runs the very real danger of not convincing the very person it is meant to convince’. This issue is best articulated as Rawls’ own intention when he introduced the term conjecture, as aimed at enhancing ‘mutual trust’ (Rawls) between subjects. Laden’s interpretation of conjecture is influenced by Stanley Cavell who stresses the equalitarian significance of one’s encounter with the other. The claim is that Ferrara assumes the more abstract role of ‘teacher’ as opposed to that of equal participant. On the democratic openness Laden regards this virtue as one that comes from a ‘place of humility’. Again, for Laden it is the context that is important for the process of justification.

This extraordinary group of commentators, although they are unanimous in their praise of The Democratic Horizon, raise their respective criticisms on constitutionalism (Michelman), on the multivariate democratic polity (Benhabib), on the democratic ethos (White), on democratic proceduralism (Scheuerman) and on democratic justification (Laden). In my view The Democratic Horizon represents something of a tour de force; a truly original contribution for those who recognize the imperative significance of our worldwide confrontation with the fact of pluralism.