Philosophy & Social Criticism

The Democratic Horizon offers us the project for the renewal of political liberalism through a response to hyperpluralism in the context of an emerging democratic ethos worldwide. While the book reads as a ringing endorsement of Political Liberalism, authored by John Rawls, it goes beyond that project in significant ways. In my view The Democratic Horizon represents something of a tour de force; a truly original contribution for those who recognize the imperative significance of our worldwide confrontation with the fact of pluralism.

In The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism, Alessandro Ferrara seeks a philosophical breakthrough from what looks like it could be a pending dead-end for democracy. The best hope, Ferrara superbly maintains, lies through an extension or updating – a “renewal,” as he calls it – of lines of thought bequeathed to us, by John Rawls and others, under the name of political liberalism. Somewhere near the crux of Ferrara’s reflection stands a class of institutional fixtures whose name is missing from his title. I mean the class “constitution.” I use that word to name a country’s scriptural basic law, its publicly cognizable corpus of canonically worded sentences ordaining the country’s basic institutional framework. My suggestion will be that it is no less tellingly a “constitutional” than a “democratic” horizon that Ferrara’s work, in conjunction with Rawls’s, shows us to be facing.

Alessandro Ferrara’s The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism poses an important challenge to recent defenders of ‘realism’ in political theory and shows that a renewal of Rawlsian ideal theory is possible. Ferrara focuses on the contemporary condition of ‘hyperpluralism’, in which every comprehensive worldview and religion has to admit the equal validity of at least one other conception, and claims that only a ‘pluralist justification of pluralism’ can lead to a genuine revival of the democratic horizon. Naming such a project of democracy the ‘multivariate’ polity, he uses Rawls’ method of conjecture to show how such a justification strategy is possible. I argue that the multivariate polity may attain pluralism but not stability and may fail in securing democratic respect among equal citizens for each other’s point of view.

In this article I explore the character and importance of a democratic ethos. Ferrara develops such a concept around the idea of ‘openness’ as part of his broader ideal of seeking to foster exemplary expansions of political identity with the goal of better accommodating the ‘hyperpluralism’ polities face today. I argue that ‘openness’ has several drawbacks that hinder its possible functioning in such a role, contending rather that ‘presumptive generosity’ is to be preferred. The latter can contribute more effectively than the former to enhancing Ferrara’s notion of exemplarity.

My discussion here addresses one key question: has Alessandro Ferrara succeeded in outlining a cogent account of democracy ‘beyond the nation state’? Despite the volume’s many strengths, his The Democratic Horizon suffers from some underlying conceptual and programmatic ambiguities. The nexus between democracy’s ethos or spirit and its institutional and procedural components might have been more clearly elucidated. The author’s tendency to privilege democratic ‘ethos’ or ‘spirit’ over so-called ‘proceduralism’ ultimately risks discounting the significance of some democratic institutional and procedural essentials. Like many others with similarly praiseworthy cosmopolitan normative instincts, Ferrara seems overly reluctant to acknowledge how stateness and self-government are likely to remain intermeshed.

This comment on Alessandro Ferrara’s Democratic Horizon raises questions about his development of ‘conjectural reasoning’ and the democratic virtue of openness as responses to what he calls ‘hyperpluralism’. In order to probe these questions, the article offers an alternative reading of these ideas.

In this article by way of reply, the author responds to the challenging comments on The Democratic Horizon provided by Michelman, Benhabib, White, Scheuerman and Laden. In response to Michelman, some reflections are propounded (1) on the function of judicial review, in order to alleviate the tension between two understandings of the mandate of the highest interpreter of the constitution as aimed at remedying either an occlusion of democratic authorship or a shortfall of agreement, and (2) on the need to rethink how the authority of the supreme interpreter relates to the will of the people in a deeply changed historical context. In response to Benhabib, the author discusses the new limits of the accommodation of diversity in Fairburg, a fictional polity that expands the Rawlsian standard of ‘reasonable disagreement’, and defends the normative relevance and democratic credentials of his notion of ‘multivariate polity’. In response to White, after recalling the importance of putting the ‘democratic ethos’ at the center of a reflection on the democratic quality of complex societies where formal procedures often mask elitist substance, the author defends the ‘political, not metaphysical’ credentials of ‘openness’ (as well as of ‘exemplarity’ as the ‘upstream source’ of openness) and accepts a complementarity of ‘openness’ and ‘presumptive generosity’. In response to Scheuerman, the author restates his focus on the democratic ethos as a supplement to, not a replacement of, the reflection on democratic procedures and defends the conceptual diversity of governance from government. In response to Laden, the author highlights the diversity of contexts to which his own and Laden’s versions of ‘democratic justification’ are responding and defends a more moderate version of ‘openness’, which still keeps constitutional essentials and political values shielded from ongoing questioning. Finally, the author interprets the debate aroused by The Democratic Horizon as indicative of the persistent vitality of the Rawlsian legacy in the 21st century.

In this article the claim of normative ethics to be the main philosophical access to the problems raised by climate change is contested and instead it is suggested that these problems be addressed from a different perspective: that of a political philosophy that escapes its own reduction to a theory of justice. Part I shows several incidences of how mainstream climate ethics fails with regard to its intention to shape an effective climate policy. Part II argues that ‘politics for the future’ as required by man-made lethal challenges has to complement the adversarial politics-as-usual. Included here is a redefinition of what the relationship of politics and morality means in the new circumstances – not only with regard to climate change.

Hannah Arendt’s conceptualization of political judgement has been a source of much scholarly investigation and debate in recent decades. Underlying the debate is the assumption that at least in her early writings, Arendt had an actor’s theory of judgement. In this article I challenge this common assumption. As I attempt to demonstrate, it relies on a misunderstanding, not only of Arendt’s conception of judgement, but also of her conception of agents in the public realm. Once we discard the assumption of an actor’s theory of judgement, I argue, some important issues in Arendt’s theory of judgement are resolved, enabling us to perceive it as a unified, rather than self-contradictory, theory of judgement.