Abstract
Digital media is ascribed significant potential for democratizing political communication and processes. There is still, however, a lack of empirical evidence and adequate understanding concerning the question of whether digital media can contribute to an improvement in democratic quality. In response to this question, the present article proposes a concept of e-democracy and an analytical framework for measuring it. The added value of such an e-democracy index is, firstly, that it provides a basis for assessing online-enhanced democratic processes (something which has previously been lacking) and, secondly, that it enables a finer-grained perspective on digital processes in democracies, something which is essential for scholars and practitioners.
Introduction
In the existing literature on the relationship between media and democracy, there is a strong consensus that a free media and independent journalism are vital to democracies. The media perform several fundamental functions in democracies, such as informing citizens and enabling them to form opinions, providing a forum for public discussion, and serving as a conduit between government and the governed. Finally, the media exercise scrutiny over the government, political parties, interest groups, etc. A term often used in this context is ‘fourth branch’: 1 without doubt, the technical characteristics (interactivity, ubiquity, multimodality, etc.) of digital media go far beyond those of classical media. The Internet and social media have multiplied the channels of political communication and created the new role of the citizen as content provider or ‘citizen journalist’, thereby changing communication patterns in a significant way. At the same time, digital media have opened up new opportunities for interaction between representatives and represented, between political and societal actors. Some scholars have claimed that power constellations have been changed by digitalization (Castells, 2009: 42–50; Meraz, 2009). Others emphasize the potential for changing citizens’ political behaviour by, for example, increasing interest in politics and likelihood of voting (Mossberger et al., 2008) or creating the potential for increasing the capacity for political engagement (Rheingold, 1993).
In addition to these considerations at a macro (power) and micro (empowerment) level, the emergence of the Internet has generated an extensive debate about its potential effects on democratic processes and fuelled a range of expectations, some involving utopian hopes (Buchstein, 1997; Coleman and Blumler, 2009; Dahlgren, 2009; Diamond and Plattner, 2012; Hague and Loader, 1999; Hindman, 2009; Wilhelm, 2000). Against the background of increasing political disenchantment among citizens, the perceived disconnection between citizens and politicians, and the loss of trust in political institutions that can be observed in established democracies in recent decades, e-democracy has been regarded (and often overstated) as a panacea capable of curing democratic fatigue and revitalizing or modernizing democratic processes (Coleman and Blumler, 2009; Kneuer, 2013). The main strands of this literature involve theoretically driven expectations about how the new social media can strengthen democratic principles. It is held that online-enhanced interaction will increase transparency, making it possible to retrieve and provide more information; promote inclusion by giving social actors (especially marginalized ones) better opportunities to contribute to the formation of public opinion outside institutionalized channels and without the filtering function of the traditional media; open up alternative opportunities for participation, allowing people to be more involved in political decision-making processes over the Internet; and strengthen the responsiveness of political actors, since represented and representatives can easily enter into dialogue on social media. Moreover, advocates for alternative forms of democracy, such as deliberative or direct democracy, see digital media as facilitating new opportunities for citizen deliberation and direct decision-making (Barber, 1998b; see also Buchstein, 1997; Dahlgren, 2013). Even the vision of citizens’ self-government – evoking the Athenian ideal of a virtual agora or ekklesia – seems to have renewed relevance as a possible model for future democracy. Finally, digital media are credited with creating new opportunities for civil society, social movements or even new actors (grassroots movements) to make their voices heard and influence the public agenda (McCaughey and Ayers, 2003; van de Donk et al., 2004).
The study of the democratizing potential of digital media often follows a normative or prescriptive approach – either net-optimistic or net-pessimistic overall – that hypothesizes an improvement (or not) in the quality of democracy. By contrast, the premise here is that technology is not a democratizing force per se (Dahl, 1989: 339). Technology is ex-ante neutral, and its effect on political structures, processes, actors, behaviour and norms depends on the motives of use, the content that is transmitted, the way that the technology is used (quantitatively and qualitatively speaking), and, finally, on the political context in which the digital media are used. Quite a few scholars apply such a techno-realistic approach to information and communication technology (ICT) (Barber, 1998b; Buchstein, 1997; Kneuer, 2013; Leggewie, 1998; Wilhelm, 2000). They assume that the impact of the Internet on the development or quality of democracy is ambivalent: it can enrich and enhance democratic values and processes, but at the same time it can constitute a stress factor for democratic processes and harm the quality of democracy.
Although a large number of empirical studies on digital media have been produced, there is no consistent picture of the impact on political processes. Most of the empirical analyses have a limited scope: they focus on specific actors (government, parliament, parties, protest movements, etc.) or specific processes, such as electoral campaigning or protest, while often concentrating on one country or case. Hence, there is considerable need for comparative studies and for a broader perspective in order to overcome the proliferation of isolated and eclectic findings. Consequently, we still have little understanding of whether and how digital media influence democratic processes and, in particular, whether it has produced any perceptible improvement in the quality of democracy. This is especially true because there is no index for measuring the democratizing influence of digital media. ‘Traditional’ democracy indices do not include digital media at all or only consider very basic aspects (such as Internet freedom), as will be shown in the second section.
The aim of this article, therefore, is to propose an analytical framework for measuring e-democracy. Such an ‘e-democracy index’ would establish a basis for better understanding the usage of digital tools in democracies, illuminating the generally fuzzy picture we currently have of this area. Like indices in general, such an e-democracy index is intended as a descriptive tool for measurement. The index is not supposed to answer other still-open issues like the development or realization of different forms of democracy, for example, direct democracy, or engender the complete self-determination of citizens, deliberative democracy, or new forms like liquid democracy. The notion of e-democracy is not understood in a prescriptive way here; rather, it is intended to describe electronic processes in existing democracies.
In the next section, definitions of the main concepts – democratic quality and e-democracy – are provided. Existing indices and their consideration of social media are then discussed, followed by conceptual considerations, the analytical framework, and proposed operationalization for measuring e-democracy. The last section comprises conclusions and a consideration of possible challenges regarding the index.
Defining basic concepts
Just as democracy is a contested concept, so there is no consensus regarding the concept of the quality of democracy; the main points of reference on this topic are the studies of Altman and Pérez-Liñán (2001), Beetham et al. (2002), Beetham (2004), Diamond and Morlino (2005) and O’Donnell (2004). In terms of definitions of democracy, these approaches differ in the extent of parsimony of their concepts. Altman and Pérez-Liñán mainly follow Dahl’s (1989) concept of polyarchy and identify three dimensions of the quality of democracy (effective civil rights, effective participation and effective competition). They thus represent a quite parsimonious approach (Altman and Pérez-Liñán, 2001: 88), while other concepts are considerably more complex, for example, Beetham’s framework, which is included in the democratic audit in the IDEA Handbook on Democracy Assessment (Beetham et al. 2002). Diamond and Morlino (2005) pursue a quite broad, comprehensive approach that goes considerably beyond the minimalist approach of Altman and Pérez-Liñán but still does not reach the level of substantial definitions of democracy that include social and economic criteria. O’Donnell’s (2004) concept of ‘human development’ is the most comprehensive and ambitious.
In an attempt to crystallize the common features of the different concepts, Kneuer identifies three dimensions of democratic quality that are essential to all these approaches (Kneuer, 2011: 135–136): (1) the dimension of civic and political rights and rule of law, which could be considered the constitutional and control dimension; (2) the procedural dimension, consisting of basic democratic principles relevant to the input level and decision-making level; and (3) the output dimension, which refers to the effectiveness of government performance. Synthesizing the different strands of the quality of democracy is a meaningful way to reduce complexity and provide a parsimonious concept which is at the same time sufficiently comprehensive to contain the convergent components (participation, competition, etc.). Therefore, this is the concept that will be used here.
A variety of different terms for e-democracy can be found in the literature (e-democracy, e-government, e-participation, cyberpolitics, etc.) and their use is inconsistent. Indeed, the definition of e-democracy itself is inconsistent. Some authors conceive e-democracy as a more general concept (see Hague and Loader, 1999), others follow a narrower understanding, equating e-democracy with citizen participation (Manoharan and Holzer, 2012: ix). Here, e-democracy is not understood as a possible future model for a different kind of democracy but, similar to Clift (2004: 38), as an overarching concept, namely the use of ICT by political actors (government, elected officials, media, political/societal organizations, and citizens) within political and governance processes in today’s representative democracy. Two pillars are commonly identified as pillars of e-democracy: e-government; and e-participation (see inter alia OECD, 2003; UN, 2003).
There is consensus that e-government relates to ‘the use of ICT (…) as a tool to achieve better government’ (OECD, 2003: 11), in relation to the efficiency of public administration processes, public services for consumers/citizens, to contribute to specific policy outcomes (for example in health policy, environmental policy, and educational policy) or economic policy outcomes like reducing corruption, and to public management modernization. Moreover, e-government can enhance trust between government and citizens by enabling citizens’ engagement in public policy processes and promoting open and accountable government.
The OECD and UN regard the concept of e-participation in terms of a three-level approach. The UN distinguishes between e-information, e-consultation and e-decision-making. Although the OECD also uses a three-level approach, e-government is subsumed under ‘e-engagement’ and includes e-information, e-consultation and e-participation (OECD, 2003: 28–58). Thus, the categories are slightly different. Moreover, the OECD, in contrast to the UN, defines e-engagement as a two-directional mechanism (top-down and bottom-up).
I basically follow this multidimensional approach towards e-democracy, based on the two pillars of e-government and e-participation. Given the heterogeneous and often inconsistent definitions and conceptual considerations, however, it is important to clarify my understanding of these basic terms and to relate them in a consistent way. Moreover, I believe that it is necessary to expand the concept of e-democracy in several respects. This conceptual elaboration will be presented after discussing the existing indices.
Taking stock: what can existing indices tell us about the Internet and democracy?
The lack of interest in theorizing and analysing the relationship between media and political systems in democracy studies has led to considerable lacunae when it comes to explaining the effects of media performance on democratic outcomes and identifying the mutual influence and interaction between media logic and political logic (Esser and Matthes, 2013; Kriesi, 2013). A further problem is that theory formation in the different disciplines – political science, communication studies and sociology – is rarely integrated. Political communication theory elaborates in depth on media logic and especially how it influences political logic. It is often based on the argument that political communication is a precondition of democracy and that democracy depends heavily on the infrastructure of the media system (Esser and Matthes, 2013: 155). In democracy studies a dominant interpretation is the liberal strand, which holds that media freedom and public empowerment contribute to the democratization of the political system. This is reflected in most democracy indices, which measure media freedom and media independence as necessary prerequisites for democracy. Such scores, however, do not reveal much about the strategies and mechanisms of governments and about the tools they offer for communicating and interacting with citizens; and conversely they do not tell us which channels are used by citizens in order to influence opinion formation and decision-making. 2
It may have been the limited knowledge that these indices provide about the role of the media in democracies that led to the development of new indices exclusively concerned with the media, such as Freedom of the Press by Freedom House, the Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders, the Media Sustainability Index by IREX, and Media Freedom Indicators by UNESCO. I cannot discuss the approaches and methods of these indices in detail here, but they all view criteria such as media freedom as the result of democratic development or as an element of the political environment correlated with the state of democracy.
There are very few indices that focus exclusively on digital media. Freedom House, which created the widely known and used Freedom of the World Index, has published the Freedom on the Net Index annually since 2011. This project only encompasses 65 countries and thus gives only a partial view. The index gauges the degree of digital freedom by examining three main aspects: obstacles to access; limits on content; and violations of user rights. The added value of this index undoubtedly lies in revealing the legal, practical and technical measures that countries take in order to limit free online communication. The concept, however, is based on an ex negativo approach which only measures aspects that restrict digital freedom. The measurement only indicates the degree of interference in online interaction. It does not tell us much about the implications for democratic quality and does not give any insights into the possible effects of online communication on political processes (indeed, it does not seek to do so). Interestingly, in the group of countries that the Freedom of the World Index assesses as ‘free’, there is significant variation in levels of Internet freedom. Not every free country allows free Internet access or communication (e.g. India). This is just one indication of the need for a finer-grained perspective on the digital sphere in democracies.
The second index is the UN E-Government Survey (EGovS), published irregularly since 2003 (2003, 2004, 2005, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014). Unlike Freedom on the Net, it comprises all UN states. Based on a two-level approach, the UN survey assesses e-government and e-participation separately. The E-Government Development Index (EGDI) provides a score based on three indices: online services; telecommunication connectivity; and human capacity. The first index assesses the country’s national website along with the websites of five ministries, the second index comprises five indicators for telecommunication infrastructure, and the last index is a composite of the adult literacy rate and tertiary gross enrolment ratio. The first two indices provide especially important information. The online services index is particularly useful for quantitative work, as it both assesses the technical sophistication of the online tools and also measures the stages of e-government development: simple service of information (emerging); enhanced one-way or simple two-way communication between government and citizens (enhanced); two-way communication, including the possibility of requests and input into government policies, etc., and also including the processing of transactions (transactional); and a fourth level addresses proactive communication, with citizens able to request information and provide opinions using interactive Web 2.0 tools in order to give them a voice in decision-making and involve them in government activities (connected). The aggregated EGDI score, however, involves distortions due to the aggregation of these indicators. For example, the score for online services, which is relevant for assessing the state of e-government activities, can be ‘neutralized’ by low scores in telecommunication infrastructure or human literacy. Countries like Colombia (EGDI rank 50) and the United Arab Emirates (EGDI rank 32) receive a significantly lower overall rank even though they are among the best performers in terms of online services (Colombia ranks 13, United Arab Emirates ranks 8; data for 2014).
The e-participation score is broken down into e-information, e-consultation and e-decision-making (UN, 2010: 16). Each level is assessed separately and then aggregated into the e-participation index (EPI). This index also assesses the four different stages (see above). The EPI is without doubt a useful basis for assessing government activity in empowering and including citizens. But just like the EGDI, the EPI is limited to the top-down perspective, which therefore only provides a partial view of online-enhanced interaction. Hence, the authors of the UN survey state that there is a lack of information on the demand side (UN, 2010: 94). Moreover, the EGDI and EPI do not include basic conditions for Internet use, access and Internet freedom. In sum: existing indices only provide partial insights into digital processes and their possible influence on democratic quality. What remains needed, therefore, is an ‘e-democracy index’ with a comprehensive measurement framework based on a rigorous, homogeneous concept.
Measuring digital democracy: presenting a concept of e-democracy and an analytical framework
According to Munck and Verkuilen (2002: 13), transparent conceptualization is best achieved by developing a ‘concept tree’. In the concept I present, e-democracy, which was discussed in the previous section, is located at the highest level as the point of reference and defined as the ‘use of ICT by democratic actors (government, elected officials, media, political/societal organizations, citizens) in political and governance processes in today’s representative democracy’. The next level of abstraction includes the components – here: the basic conditions for ICT, e-participation and e-government. The third level identifies the subcomponents and corresponding indicators.
The dimensions of e-democracy
E-democracy is here conceived as a three-dimensional concept, expanding on the two-dimensional approach of the UN. The first dimension relates to the basic conditions 3 for ICT use in democracies and draws upon two central prerequisites for the existence and durability of e-democracy: (1) the technical infrastructure (access to digital media); and (2) Internet freedom. The latter are legal provisions concerning the free use of the Internet or content regulation. Just as important as legally guaranteed Internet freedom is free access to the Internet on the basis of technical infrastructure and the question of whether there is any filtering or blocking by independent offices or regulatory bodies. Creating a specific dimension for Internet freedom and equal access provides a clearer picture of the legal and technical situation in countries than would including these factors in aggregated scores.
The second dimension is e-participation. Here, three elements are identified. First, as emphasized by various scholars, there is a basic distinction between two dimensions in e-participation: a top-down direction – or in the words of Coleman and Blumler: e-democracy from above – and a bottom-up direction – or democracy from below (Coleman and Blumler, 2009: 90–139; see also OECD, 2003: 30). Second, I separate e-voting from engagement in decision-making processes, since −as in the offline world − these are functionally speaking different actions (OECD, 2003: 32). And third, I add e-monitoring, based on the assumption that through digital media citizens can not only gain better knowledge of grievances or undesirable developments but also have a stronger voice to express ‘alarm’ (Hindman, 2009: 136–138). There are already numerous online parliamentary monitoring organizations, like the Parliament Watch model in Germany, which fulfil a monitoring function by holding members of parliament (MPs) accountable.
Concept of e-democracy.
Thus, two different directions of e-participation are distinguished – top-down and bottom-up – and four levels: e-information; e-consultation; e-monitoring; and e-decision-making. These levels reflect different degrees of engagement in terms of time, input and commitment. Citizens choose whether to use digital media purely for information, whether they want to contact politicians (via email or social media like Twitter or Facebook) and thus enter into dialogue with them, whether they choose to engage in monitoring politicians on specific platforms or whether they will take the further and more demanding step of becoming involved in decision-making (e.g. via e-petitions, signing up to campaigns, and collaborative governance). The same applies to top-down tools as for online-enhanced channels offered by governments: according to the model used by the UN (2014: 195), government online services are graded into four increasingly demanding stages: emerging; enhanced; transactional; and connected.
The third dimension corresponds to e-government. Unlike e-participation, e-government is limited to a top-down mechanism that offers online tools to citizens as a government service with a focus on public service delivery, efficiency and policy outcomes. In this dimension, the role of the citizen tends to be conceived as that of a consumer or client. The goals of e-governmental tools focus on cost reduction and efficiency in administrative transactions. At the same time, increased transparency can lead to the reduction of corruption. Moreover, scholars point to the fact that transparency in policymaking procedures and improved satisfaction of citizens/consumers can increase trust towards government, which is also supposed to have an impact on legitimacy (Clift, 2004: 8–14; OECD, 2003: 45). Therefore, although e-government seems to be purely a matter of service or efficiency, it has implications for a possible increase in democratic quality: it can enhance the output dimension as well as support a positive attitude towards the government, the regime and democracy in general.
Developing indicators and measurement
The first dimension measures Internet freedom and free and equal access to the Internet. Internet freedom is broken down into: (a) the absence of legal provisions limiting content, and the existence of privacy legislation and data collection legislation; and (b) the existence of a strategy (‘digital agenda’) and an independent body monitoring the implementation of objectives such as introducing and controlling Internet freedom. Similarly, a third indicator focuses on (c) the absence of de facto limitations such as violations of users’ rights. Access to the Internet includes: (a) technical infrastructure, such as a high-bandwidth network with equal distribution; and (b) the absence of technical filtering or blocking. These indicators can mostly be operationalized based on the Freedom on the Net Index.
The second dimension is the most comprehensive one. Both top-down and bottom-up mechanisms need to be represented by indicators in order to get a balanced picture. The assessment of e-information as part of the participatory dimension determines whether state institutions are ‘providing the kind of information that encourages and empowers citizen participation’ (UN, 2010: 86), for example, calendars of discussion forums, electronic notification tools, etc. On the bottom-up side, blogs and Twitter hashtags are the most important ways to disseminate information about political issues while also reaching broader audiences. Both tools – blogs and hashtags – should be taken into consideration under two conditions: they have to attain broader (i.e. national) attention in the public sphere; and they have to be initiated and implemented by ‘ordinary’ citizens (and not by journalists or politicians, as is quite common). Prominent blogs of this kind (like Kottke.org in the USA, Guido Fawkes in the UK, microsiervos.com in Spain or basicthinking.de in Germany) can constitute a relevant and alternative voice in the public sphere that can also influence public debates. The same applies to Twitter hashtags, since Twitter is a microblogging service that enables multimodal dissemination of information. Hashtags like #StopTTIP, for example, provide additional information to citizens who have been frustrated by the collusive procedures and actions of their governments during the TTIP negotiations. With regard to the subcomponent of information, both political and information scholars (Todoran et al., 2015: 10–11) underline the importance of analysing not only the existence of information (quantity of government websites, documents that are available, data, links, etc.) but also the quality (correctness, reliability, objectivity, relevancy, timeliness, completeness, and integrity). This is an additional and important aspect that can, however, only be examined in a randomized way.
The next level of participation is termed dialogue, as it comprises on the one hand governments’ consultation tools, which help them to understand their citizens’ needs and demands in relation to specific topics, and on the other hand citizens addressing political actors in order to enter into dialogue or provide input into a specific debate. Common top-down tools include online consultation (of the general public or targeting specific stakeholder groups), chatrooms or online citizens’ juries. Citizens can address members of government or parliament via emails or posts on the websites of ministries or MPs, as well as follow officials on Facebook (a social platform that allows broader dialogue than Twitter, due to the latter’s space limitation). The frequently asked questions function can also be a way to get in touch with ministries, agencies, political parties, etc. While the last indicator can be measured rather easily on the basis of the websites’ own figures, establishing the number of emails or volume of Facebook communication is more demanding and necessarily relies on qualitative work.
Monitoring can be understood primarily as a bottom-up tool for citizens to hold their officials accountable. A good indicator is the presence of online parliamentary monitoring where citizens address politicians personally. On the other side, a government may have an interest in self-monitoring or monitoring specific procedures and policy-making processes, and thus can install online polls or surveys.
Finally, decision-making can be measured by means of top-down tools like participatory budgeting, collaborative governance and e-referenda. I also include online voting tools here (which are not the same as e-voting, since they relate to limited issues/questions that are subject to decision). These tools may primarily be used at a local or regional level, and so – and this applies as well for other indicators – these subnational levels also have to be considered. Citizens have an array of tools at their disposal for providing input into policy-making processes in order to initiate, impede or amend laws. The most common are e-petitions, e-referendum initiatives and signing up to campaigns. Official government data can be used for the examination of decision-making tools.
The third dimension, e-government, can be broken down into two main subcomponents: information; and transaction. The subcomponent ‘information’ may appear somewhat redundant. But while for the participatory dimension information is regarded as encouraging and empowering people to participate, the function of information for e-government is aimed at a more general objective that focuses on the existence of websites that provide information from state institutions (government, parliament, high courts, audit agencies, etc.). Thus, the indicators are the existence of the websites themselves, the archiving function of information so that citizens can access not only recent but also older documents and the comprehensiveness of the information so that citizens can to a great extent get an overview of a policy or receive additional support via links, podcasts, etc. Transaction entails three indicators: e-procurement processes by governments (at a national, regional or local level); e-transactions, which include all tools that enable citizens to carry out administrative tasks (e.g. tax declarations, applications for a driver’s licence or similar), either excluding or including financial transactions; and finally service portals that can also be collaborative and involve multiple stakeholders (e.g. healthcare, which can include national and subnational levels of administration as well as health insurance companies, civil society, etc.).
As explained above, the central question that this article addresses is how digital interaction influences the quality of democracy. How can the two concepts of quality of democracy and e-democracy be related? While Internet freedom and equal access to the technical infrastructure constitute prerequisites for Internet use, the procedural dimension of democratic quality (see Table 1) relates to digital interaction, especially to the dimension of e-participation. The third dimension of the concept of democratic quality, namely government effectiveness (see Table 2), corresponds to e-government. In accordance with the concept of e-democracy, the principal online interactions are broken down into information and transaction (e-government) and information, dialogue, monitoring and decision-making (e-participation). These interactions relate to different democratic principles: information → transparency; transaction → efficiency; dialogue/consultation → deliberation; and inclusion, decision-making → participation and inclusion.
Three dimensions of democratic quality.
Source: Kneuer (2011: 136) on the basis of Altman and Pérez-Liñán (2001), Beetham et al. (2002), Beetham (2004) and Diamond and Morlino (2005).
Indicators for e-participation.
Online voting tools are not the same as e-voting; they relate to opportunities to submit a specific issue for citizens to judge.
All indicators will be assessed on the basis of a simple ordinal scale: completely fulfilled (3); partially fulfilled (2); marginally fulfilled (1); or not fulfilled at all (0). Measurements on the first dimension assess the extent to which there is Internet freedom and equal access. Measurements on the second dimension, e-participation, establish the extent of participatory tools in general. Furthermore, such measurement will reveal which subdimension prevails in a particular country: whether the government’s activity focuses on basic and less sophisticated forms like information or on more interactive and more demanding tools like consultation or decision-making. The same point applies to the bottom-up direction: results will reveal how much demanding activity is actually undertaken in order to voice and participate in decision-making. Taken together, these results indicate whether any improvement of democratic quality can be expected as a result of online-enhanced processes. A high score on the three dimensions would support such a finding. The results also make it possible to see which ‘online culture’ prevails in state–citizen interaction: Is there a trend toward more deliberative or more participatory interaction, or toward monitoring; or, simply towards the provision and retrieval of information? Moreover, the results of e-participation can also indicate another tendency, namely whether the online culture is shaped more by top-down or by bottom-up activity.
Since assessment is carried out for every dimension, there is a score for each subcomponent: 4 doing so provides information on free and equal access as well as on e-participation and e-government. Measurement has to be carried out at regular intervals (maximum every year, minimum every two years) in order to observe the dynamics. This is especially important in the rapidly developing field of ICT.
Space does not permit providing an example of an in-depth analysis. In order to give a tentative overview, I shall provide a survey of five countries that are quite similar in terms of the first dimension of Internet freedom and access to the Internet, namely France, the UK, Germany, Canada and the USA (see Table 3). Interesting differences appear regarding the second dimension of e-participation. There is a significant gap between France, the UK and the USA, on the one hand, and Germany and Canada, on the other, because the latter two countries offer very few of the decision-making tools that the other countries provide in abundance. Germany also has a clearly lower performance in terms of e-consultation than all other countries.
E-participation top-down scores for selected examples.
Source: Data from UN (2014).
This finding now needs to be complemented by a thorough analysis of bottom-up e-participation tools. Different expectations or explanations could be formulated with respect to the case of Germany. One could be that, at a strategic level, the German government has not formulated the aim of offering such tools. Another reason could lie at the operative level: the German government does aim to increase e-consultation and e-decision-making but has not achieved this aim to date. It might be the case that the lack of provision of such top-down tools has induced more bottom-up online activity. Thus, it is useful to assess what effects the presence or absence of top-down tools can have for the ‘online culture’ of a country and for its democratic quality. For example, if a country offers many top-down tools and only a few people use them, an increase in democratic quality cannot be expected, while a low level of top-down participation tools does not necessarily mean that there is low online engagement by citizens. Therefore – to repeat – an assessment of both directions is needed in order to achieve a better understanding of the effects of e-democracy.
Conclusion
After predominantly theoretical and normative debates on the democratizing potential of digital media, empirical evidence is needed in order assess whether digital media can contribute to improving the quality of democracy. Responding to this challenge, this article has presented a concept of e-democracy and an analytical framework to assess it. Due to limited space, this article cannot provide more than a basic outline of a measurement of digital processes in democracies. The added value of such an e-democracy index is, firstly, that it provides a basis for assessing digital interaction (something which has previously been lacking) and, secondly, that it enables a finer-grained perspective on the development of digital processes in democracies, something which is essential to scholars (and not just those working on ICT), politicians, and practitioners.
The e-democracy index I have proposed is a first step – and to my knowledge the only one – that aims to record and evaluate possible improvements to democratic processes through digitalization. The fine-grained but parsimonious concept makes it possible to assess the locus (grassroots or state level) and level of engagement (from information to decision-making), and to relate these types of engagement to central democratic principles. The aggregated score shows the extent of online-enhanced democratic processes (from completely fulfilled to not at all fulfilled). In countries without e-democracy, no improvement of democratic quality can be expected, while countries which receive a score of ‘completely fulfilled’ are expected to display an improvement in democratic quality. The index offers not only a cross-country comparison but also a comparison over time. This could reveal whether governments are reducing or increasing their activities in specific types of engagement or whether citizens are becoming more active or not.
The e-democracy index provides a basic framework which can be expanded. Some challenges remain. For example, the framework I have presented does not record the deterioration of democratic quality. The problem is that this involves factors that relate to dimensions other than those outlined here, such as the atomization of the public sphere (Buchstein, 1997; Dahlgren, 2013) which are difficult to assess. A further negative effect for democratic quality could be that online-based tools are not working successfully. This assessment can be incorporated at least for e-dialogue and e-participation as well as e-government. Other challenges for constructing an e-democracy index include the scope of governmental bodies to be assessed and how to obtain comparable data for national and especially subnational levels. The dynamics of ICT development, without doubt, are a central factor that must be taken into consideration by regularly updating the framework.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
I thank the anonymous reviewers and the editor, Mark Kesselman, for their very helpful comments.
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.