Refining domestic politics theories of IPE: A societal approach to governmental preferences

Introduction

Current international economic disruptions such as the trade war between the United States and China, the frequent disputes in the G20, the Brexit, and the Eurozone crisis shed a bright light on the crucial role of domestic politics in shaping preferences towards the governance of international economic relations. Political science theories that focus on domestic politics to explain the foreign economic preferences of governments belong to the core of international political economy (IPE) for decades. Widely cited seminal works have been published, for instance, on domestic forces of foreign economic policy (Katzenstein, 1977), internationalisation and domestic politics (Frieden and Rogowski, 1996; Keohane and Milner, 1996), ideas and foreign policy (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993), interests, institutions, and information (Milner, 1997), the liberal theory of international politics (Moravcsik, 1997), and on domestic institutional sources for multilateral preferences (Fioretos, 2001). Recently, this theoretical school was further developed, for example, by the open economy politics theory (Lake, 2009), by foreign policy analysis (Kaarbo, 2015; Krotz, 2015), and historical institutionalism (Farrell and Newman, 2010; Fioretos, 2011).

While some publications concentrated on diplomacy or on the interaction between the international and domestic levels, others specifically focussed on how domestic forces influence the government’s preferences. The latter, however, left considerable space to further conceptualise domestic variables and thereby complement the theories with what I named the ‘societal approach’. The literature especially shows a conceptual gap regarding the conditions for the bearing of the different domestic politics variables. Theories of domestic politics have conceived three dimensions of domestic forces that influence governmental preference formation: material interests/lobby groups, ideas/belief systems, and political/socio-economic institutions. The theories, however, left room for a systematic exploration of the conditions under which each of the three individual domestic forces matters more than the other(s) in shaping governmental preferences. The societal approach addresses this gap by conceptualising the conditions for the prevalence of either domestic ideas, or institutions, or interests in governmental preference formation and by further exploring the interaction among and plurality within the variables.

In complementing and building upon domestic politics theories, I developed and applied the societal approach over the last decade to analyse specific empirical puzzles (Schirm, 2009, 2013, 2016, 2018). The present theoretical article brings together the previously conceived and empirically tested parts, and considerably expands the approach. The article proceeds in four steps. The next section discusses several core works of domestic politics theorising, focussing on the conceptual gaps left by these theories. In a second step, I present the societal approach with definitions of the variables, the hypotheses, and their operationalisation. Furthermore, the analytical strategy, the changeability of the variables, their inter-relationship, and plurality will be elaborated. The conclusion highlights the novelties and limitations of the societal approach and proposes areas for further research.

Domestic politics theories of IPE

The seminal works which constitute much of domestic politics theorising in IPE until today share the argument that the explanation of governmental preferences has to start with investigating domestic societal influences in form of interests, ideas, or institutions. While many works focus on only one or two domestic variables, most agree that:

[. . .] states do not automatically maximize fixed, homogeneous conceptions of security, sovereignty, or wealth per se, as realists and institutionalists tend to assume. Instead, [. . .] they pursue particular interpretations and combinations of security, welfare, and sovereignty preferred by powerful domestic groups. (Moravcsik, 1997: 519)

Katzenstein (1977: 601–602) argues that societal influences may consist of ‘mass preferences [. . .] translated via elections into government policy’ or reflect the efforts of ‘interest groups’: ‘In sum, in both the interest group model and the democratic model, foreign economic policy is seen primarily to reflect societal pressures’. In developing a ‘theory of domestic politics’, Milner writes on domestic interests:

[. . .] cooperation among nations is affected less by fears of other countries’ relative gains or cheating than it is by the domestic distributional consequences of cooperative endeavours. Cooperative agreements create winners and losers domestically; therefore, they generate supporters and opponents. (Milner, 1997: 9)

The open economy politics (OEP) theory focusses on trade and finance and analyses how the power of interest groups is aggregated by domestic institutions in the process of influencing intergovernmental bargains about international institutions that, in turn, shape domestic interests (Lake, 2009; Rogowski, 1989). More recent publications emphasise the influence of interest groups and domestic ideational interpretations on governmental preferences for the realm of both political economy and foreign policy analysis alike (Kaarbo, 2015; Krotz, 2015). Cross-country comparisons have frequently validated the crucial relevancy of both ideational and material domestic level factors. It holds true even regarding governmental preference formation under the deep international institutionalisation of common rules in the European Union. Regarding the IPE of EU’s two core drivers, Krotz and Schild (2013: 181) conclude, ‘The structures of their economies, the relative sectoral competitiveness, and the differences in economic thought more often than not placed France and Germany in opposite camps’.

Domestic politics theories, however, do not negate the possible impact of the international distribution of power, of international institutions, and transnational interdependence for governments, societies, and private actors. Rather, these theories maintain that domestic politics and societal influences must be considered analytically prior to other variables when explaining governmental preferences.

Moravcsik (1997, 2008, 2010) offers a comprehensive version of the domestic ‘liberal theory’ relevant for international relations (IR) and/IPE by developing three variants: commercial, ideational, and republican liberalism. Commercial liberalism shares its core argument with authors concentrating on international economic competition and interest groups, such as Milner (1997), Frieden and Rogowski (1996), and much of the OEP literature. It argues, that ‘changes in the structure of the domestic and global economy alter the costs and benefits of transnational economic exchange, creating pressure on domestic governments to facilitate or block such exchanges’ (Moravcsik, 1997: 528). Ideational liberalism in turn argues that societal actors support the government when the latter provides positions and institutions that are in accordance with their identity-based preferences and are therefore perceived as legitimate by individuals. Finally, republican liberalism focusses on the ‘mode of domestic political representation’ and emphasises the way in which domestic institutions privilege certain societal identities and economic interests in influencing ‘state policy’ (Moravcsik, 1997: 530). These three variants of liberalism offer an important theory, but leave several opportunities to further develop it. These include providing more elaborate definitions of the variables, exploring interactions between them, and especially conceptualising the conditions under which each variable affects governmental positions.

A widely cited influential work on domestic ideas and foreign policy was edited by Goldstein and Keohane (1993). In a causality-oriented, and thus non-reflectivist approach, the authors in this volume conceptualise and empirically analyse the role of ideas as world views, as principled beliefs, and as causal beliefs in influencing governmental preference formation towards international politics. While concentrating on ideas, the authors suggest that ideas as well as interests and institutions have causal weight in ‘explanations of human action’ (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 4; see also Garrett and Weingast, 1993). This focus on ideas offers a basis for the societal approach through the definition of ideas as analytically distinct from material interests and institutions as well as by conceiving the possible pathways ideas can take in shaping governmental preferences. However, the volume does not provide equal attention to all three variables, nor does it attempt to explain under which conditions either ideas, or institutions, or interests inform governmental positions.

Other important works on ideas have concentrated on the inter-relationship between ideas, interests, and institutions (for instance, Blyth, 2003; Campbell, 2001; Schmidt, 2011). Their focus, however, was not on conceptualising the conditions for the bearing of each of the three variables on governmental preferences. For the latter purpose of this article, individual conceptions of the variables are analytically necessary (without omitting their interplay, see below). In other words, this article maintains that material interests, value-based ideas, and regulatory institutions in principle represent different logics, motivations, and conditions for social interaction, and can also overlap and mutually influence each other. This dual character of the variables as individual and interactive becomes visible, for instance, in the multifaceted perspective that, while ‘variations of interests are not accounted for by variations in the character of the ideas that people have’ (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 27), ideas can have an effect on the content of what actors want and not just on the order of what they want, this is to say, ‘ideas can in fact change an agent’s interests’ (Blyth, 2003: 697).

The ideational dimension of domestic politics theories also includes post-positivist approaches and constructivism as a meta-theory of IR. Post-positivist and constructivist perspectives, however, will not be considered since the domestic politics theories assessed here and their refinement through the societal approach aim at causality-oriented analysis, this is, causal inference regarding specific puzzles of IPE (see below). Lake (2013: 572) characterises the latter approaches as ‘mid-level theories that focus on parts of the political process, rather than the whole, and study the effects of one or more variables on policy choice’.

Domestic politics theories emphasising institutions as an independent variable for governmental preference formation contribute an additional dimension to the domestic school. In this regard, the varieties of capitalism theory and its further development (Hall and Soskice, 2001 and recently, for instance, Hay, 2019; Schmidt, 2011) offer important conceptualisations for analyses puzzles in comparative political economy and IPE. In particular, the focus on the variation of socio-economic institutions in cross-country comparison provides insights into different regulations of market economies (such as ‘coordinated’ and ‘liberal’ market economies, questioned as ‘ideal types’ by Hay, 2019) and sheds light on the role of domestic institutional complementarities for private firms and governmental preferences.

The varieties of capitalism’s approach to multilateral preferences (Fioretos, 2001) as well as historical institutionalism’s (Farrell and Newman, 2010: 610; Fioretos, 2011) focus on path dependency and domestic regulation’s influence on governmental preferences, constitute core elements of the institutional perspective of domestic politics theorising. Fioretos (2010: 701) explains:

An institutionalist theory of state preferences suggests that governments’ positions in intergovernmental negotiations are informed by their calculations of how international rules will affect their ability to sustain designs that are the foundation of economic groups’ competitive advantages and that national traditions of policy-making determine which groups are given more weight in deliberations.

The following societal approach is inspired by these theories regarding institutions as an independent variable in arguing that governments will try to secure institutional patterns of their domestic economic systems in pursuing foreign economic policies. This argument seems plausible, since the comparative institutional advantages of different variants of capitalism not only structure the preferences of firms, but also of governments and of societal actors. Following Sil and Katzenstein’s (2010) concept of ‘analytic eclecticism’, institutionalism is considered here in a stylised form focussing solely on core claims and institutions’ sui generis characteristics. The institutionalist debate is, of course, much broader and has dealt with ideational and interest-related dimensions of institutions (see, for instance, Hall and Taylor, 1996; Schmidt, 2011).

Coming back to the OEP literature, OEP’s main empirical area is trade and finance and it essentially argues that material interests’ (lobby groups’) influence is mediated by domestic institutions vis-à-vis governmental positions regarding intergovernmental bargains on international institutions (rules) which, in turn, structure domestic interests (Lake, 2009: 225, 2013: 574). While the ‘fundamental building block of OEP is interests’, ‘much research in OEP focusses on how international institutions, like their domestic counterparts, structure bargaining and affect outcomes’ (Lake, 2009: 226, 229). Therefore, OEP goes beyond domestic politics theories in focussing on international institutions and their impact on domestic actors while contributing to domestic politics theories regarding the role of domestic interests and institutions as conceived, for instance, by Milner (1997), Moravcsik (1997), Fioretos (2001), and Lake (2009). OEP, however, does not consider societal ideas as an independent variable on equal terms with interests and does not ask for the conditions under which domestic ideas, institutions, or interests prevail in shaping governmental preferences. In addition, OEP deduces interests and the competitive position of sectors (or individuals) following economics theory and neglects the perception (interpretation) of costs and benefits by the actors (firms, associations, unions) themselves. Thus, it also leaves space for further theorising.

Refining domestic politics theories: The societal approach

The societal approach was developed as a complementary approach to analyse empirical puzzles of IPE (Schirm, 2009, 2013, 2016, 2018). Especially, the societal approach aims at explaining the reasons for diverging governmental preferences in cross-country comparison and the reasons for the prevalence of domestic ideas and institutions in some cases and of interests in other cases of governmental preferences towards international economic governance. The latter puzzle raised the question about the conditions for the prevalence of either value-based ideas, or institutions, or material interests. Before presenting the approach in detail, the results of two research projects shall be briefly sketched as examples for the empirical application of the approach’s core hypotheses and for the usefulness of conceptualising the conditions for the prevalence of a specific domestic variable (for the complete analysis and evidence, see Schirm, 2013, 2016)

In one research project, the societal approach was able to explain the puzzle about the variation between the interest-driven controversies among the United States, Germany, and Brazil on global trade imbalances in the G20 on one hand, and the apparently ideas-driven controversies among the same countries over public debt and stimulus programmes in the G20 on the other hand. The evidence supported the societal approach’s core hypotheses (see next section). First, governmental positions on trade imbalances corresponded to domestic material interests, since the cost–benefit calculations of the export sectors in Brazil and Germany and of the sectors threatened by imports in the United States were directly affected by the initiative to limit trade surpluses. The sectors strongly lobbied their governments. Second, regarding public debt and stimulus programmes, evidence demonstrated that governmental positions correlated with the ideational expectations of voters, since the contentious issue referred to fundamental and salient attitudes on the role of the government in steering the economy through deficit spending or fiscal restraint, while lobbying did not play a prominent role because economic sectors were only affected diffusely.

In another project, I employed the societal approach’s suppositions to explain the divergences between German and US preferences regarding the reform of the governance rules of the International Monetary Fund (IMF; Schirm, 2016). The analysis showed that governmental positions corresponded to different domestic ideational and institutional settings in both countries. US defence of its de facto veto power in the IMF reflected ideational public expectations on US leadership in world politics as well as the hierarchical decision-making institutions in its ‘liberal market economy’ (LME). In contrast, German demands for a more integrative governance in the IMF were consistent with ideational societal expectations favouring inclusive governance and with the consensual institutional character of the country’s ‘coordinated market economy’ (CME).

These illustrations of completed empirical–analytical projects serve as examples for both the necessity to complement the domestic politics theories and the fruitful application of the societal approach, which will be elaborated in the following section.

As a preliminary remark, it must be emphasised that the societal approach does not negate the possible impact of international institutions and power as well as transnational networks. These factors may strengthen, undermine, or transform the ideas and interests of domestic groups and by extension influence governmental preferences. Hence, international influences enter the analysis indirectly via the domestic politics level of analysis. They might also impact directly on governments as theories employing international or transnational variables aptly argue. The focus of the societal approach, however, is the analysis of the conditions for the bearing of the domestic variables on governmental preferences.

In naming the approach, I chose ‘societal’ for two reasons. First, ‘societal’ appears to be the most adequate term to indicate domestic ideational, material, and institutional forces emanating from and anchored in the society. In other words, while ‘domestic’ is the level of analysis of the societal approach, ‘societal’ is the character of the approach’s independent variables. The term ‘societal’ was partly also used by other authors (such as Milner, Lake) when referring to domestic societal groups. The term ‘societal approach’ as designation for the following theoretical conceptualisation, however, constitutes a novelty regarding the innovative elaboration of a coherent set of hypotheses, definitions, and interactions between all three societal variables which complements previous domestic politics theories.

Second, the term ‘societal’ avoids any confusion arising from the multiplicity of meanings attached to the term ‘liberal’ in the literature (such as in liberal IR theory and liberal economics). Many people think of an economic policy strategy when reading the word ‘liberal’. IR scholars attach diverse meanings to this term, ranging from explanatory analysis over positivist empiricism to normative connotations and moral dimensions (for a critique of liberal IR theory, see Humphreys, 2012: 28; Jahn, 2009; Reus-Smit, 2001: 582ff; Sterling-Folker, 2015). Since the societal approach does not intend to engage in debates on normative theory building or economic policy strategies, ‘societal’ appears a better reflection of its goals, namely, theorising a complementary approach to explain the domestic foundations of governmental preferences and analyse the conditions for the relevance of societal ideas, institutions, or interests.

In defining the three independent variables individually, the societal approach does not suggest that the variables are completely autonomous from one another. For instance, ideas can influence the interpretation of what constitutes a cost–benefit calculation and material circumstances can shape ideational expectations. Rather, it maintains that – in addition to their interactions – the variables possess sui generis characteristics, which make them theoretically and empirically distinguishable from each other and thus individually identifiable regarding the specific features outlined below. Furthermore, drawing a distinction between the variables is necessary to develop hypotheses on the conditions of their individual bearing on governmental preferences. Thus, the conceptual separation of the variables through definitions is purely for analytical purposes. Interactions will be discussed in the following as well.

Interests are defined here as material considerations of domestic sectors or groups that can react rapidly to changing circumstances, that is, according to the benefits and costs induced by national, regional, or global economic developments and politics. This definition rests upon the literature addressing the connection between internationalisation, domestic economic sectors, and government, specially focussing on changes in the international economy that lead interest groups to pressure the government into protecting or establishing competitive conditions (see, for instance, Frieden and Rogowski, 1996: 35; Lake, 2009; Milner, 1997: 9; Moravcsik, 1997: 528). International cooperation and economic developments change the domestic distribution of wealth, producing winners and losers domestically, which will subsequently lobby the government to defend their interests. Methodologically, interests can be assessed by measuring competitive positions of economic sectors and how they change in response to factors such as trade liberalisation, technological innovation, and the rise of new global competitors or governmental subsidies. In the societal approach, the structural assessment of these material circumstances, however, is treated as a secondary method of evidencing interests. To advance actor-centred analysis and consider actors’ perceptions, the societal approach primarily focusses on statements by associations and lobby groups to ensure that interest groups’ interpretations of cost–benefit calculations and circumstances are included in assessing interests.

Ideas are defined as fundamental, path-dependent, and value-based individual and collective expectations about appropriate governmental positions. Thus, ideas do not encompass, for example, whether voters support a specific free trade agreement, but instead whether voters see competition as a force for good or rather as a danger and whether governmental regulation is seen more positively than the workings of free markets. The societal approach draws on definitions of ideas as expectations about appropriate positions, which are both theoretically grounded and accessible to empirical analysis (see, for instance, Campbell, 2001: 159–166; Goldstein and Keohane, 1993; Hall, 1997: 184). Goldstein and Keohane (1993: 16) exemplarily provide this dual (theoretically grounded and empirically accessible) character of ideas vis-à-vis different ideational dimensions:

Ideas serve the purpose of guiding behaviour under conditions of uncertainty by stipulating causal patterns or by providing compelling ethical or moral motivations for action. Ideas can be broad or narrow [. . .], or merely suggest what economic policy will steer a nation toward increased wealth.

Empirically, the societal approach maintains that value-based ideas express themselves in public opinion polls on desirable governmental positions and in behavioural patterns of societal groups, which are defined here as observable practices of ideational predispositions (for instance, of savers, consumers, environmentalists). Practices, however, reach beyond value-based ideas and may express general material interests, which are not sectoral and short-term in nature, but may either cause or follow path-dependent ideas. Thus, conceptually and empirically, practices may be material and ideational. For example, private saving in times of high interest rates seems to constitute a material interest because of high material gains, while saving in times of very low interest rates such as currently in the Eurozone seems to follow ideational beliefs (cultural traditions) because of very low material gains. Hence, practices may conceptually and empirically connect ideas with general societal interests and may be codified in institutions or derive from existing institutions. Therefore, interactions between interests, ideas, and institutions may be strong in addition to each variable’s sui generis characteristics.

Regarding ‘ideas’ as conceived above, the societal approach differentiates between process ideas and content ideas. Process ideas are defined here as expectations about the consensual or hierarchical way governance decision-making should be conducted. Opposing process ideas as societal expectations can emphasise, for example, ‘leadership’, ‘winner takes it all’, and ‘hierarchical’ decision-making versus ‘inclusive’, ‘consensual’, ‘corporatist’ decision-making. In contrast, content ideas express what a society sees as the primary role or task of the government in a given policy area. Regarding economic policy, diverging content ideas can be, for instance, ‘trust in market forces’ versus ‘trust in governmental regulation’, or ‘fiscal prudence’ versus ‘deficit spending’.

Institutions are defined here as formal regulations which structure domestic political and socio-economic coordination. With the variable institutions, the societal approach includes institutional complementarities resulting from domestic regulations that might shape governmental positions. This argument draws on the varieties of capitalism literature (Fioretos, 2001; Hall and Soskice, 2001) and partly on historical institutionalism (Fioretos, 2011) in suggesting that governments’ preferences towards international negotiations are informed by the consideration of how international rules will affect domestic regulations that shape domestic sectors’ competitive situations. In addition to these material efficiency-calculations, governmental preferences also tend to be consistent with long-term domestic institutional settings because of their path-dependent ideational legitimacy. After all, institutions represent the codification of previously existing sets of ideas and interests, and may influence current societal ideas and interests. For example, in CMEs, the ideational expectation favouring inclusive decision-making is codified in rules on the collaborative interaction between employers, labour, and government, while, in liberal market economies, coordination occurs via competing market forces and hierarchical decision-making (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 33). This institutionalisation reinforces corresponding process ideas.

In sum, societal ideas, interests, and institutions possess sui generis characteristics, but may interact. As mentioned above, institutions, for example, have reasons and these reasons may be found in ideas and interests. Equally plausible, however, is the historical institutionalist argument that institutions, once created, subsequently influence societal ideas and interests (Schmidt, 2011: 52–53), thus shaping governmental preference formation indirectly through societal ideas and material interests.

Hypotheses

The societal approach shares with other domestic politics theories the basic argument that, if domestic ideas, institutions, or interests differ (converge) in cross-country comparison, then diverging (converging) governmental preferences on international economic issues are to be expected. Building on this argument, I suggest four hypotheses with the societal approach on the conditions for the bearing of the variables on governmental preference formation. These four hypotheses do not argue that one variable matters instead of another, but rather propose conditions under which each variable becomes more important and prevails in shaping governmental preferences. The fifth hypothesis refers to the impact of ideas and interests on the government’s ability to compromise internationally.

Conclusion

The societal approach is a mid-level theory developed to explain specific puzzles in IPE, that is, the reasons for governmental preferences in cross-country comparison. It especially aims at investigating the question on the prevalence of domestic ideas and/or institutions in some cases and of interests in other cases of governmental preference formation. To explain these puzzles, the societal approach proposes hypotheses on the conditions for the influence of domestic value-based ideas, regulatory institutions, and material interests on governmental preferences and conceptualises the interaction between the three variables.

In doing so, the societal approach complements domestic politics theories of IPE in three respects. First, it includes all three domestic variables which are potentially relevant for endogenous preference formation, while other theories often use only one or two variables. Second, the variables are defined and operationalised in a more comprehensive way than is the case in much of the domestic politics literature. Third, the societal approach fills a gap in research by conceptualising the conditions under which each of the independent variables influences governmental preferences. It proposes hypotheses on the prevalence of ideas, institutions, or interests and on how the variables affect a government’s ability to compromise internationally. In addition, changes in character and direction of the variables as well as their plurality and interaction are conceptualised.

Thus, the societal approach’s claim vis-à-vis domestic politics, institutionalist, and liberal theories is that all three domestic variables ideas, interests, and institutions matter and that each matters most under certain conditions. The societal approach reaches its highest explanatory power for democratic political systems, since it argues that government politicians are responsive to societal demands due to their wish to remain in office through elections. Admittedly, in democracies, governments influence the electorate and have a certain degree of autonomy, and elites can capture the political process. In democracies, however, societal ideas and interests articulate themselves with more autonomy than in authoritarian regimes and voter’s discontent can remove ruling parties from office through elections with more ease.

The societal approach contributes to the theoretical debate, but has clear limitations. With the focus on the bearing of domestic societal forces on governmental preferences, it conceptually deepens a crucial but limited part of the political process. Other potentially important factors, such as international influences on governmental decisions, the increasing transnationalisation of societies, and the role of transnational elites are not considered explicitly. Rather, following the argument that governments will be responsive to domestic demands prior to international circumstances, international forces are seen as analytically secondary. The impact of international institutions, negotiations, and power shifts is not negated, but enters the analysis of governmental preference formation indirectly via the reception (or non-reception) of the international level by domestic interest groups, ideas, and institutions. Thus, through the examination of the three variables with the societal approach, the transnational and international influences on voters, domestic regulations, and lobbies are included in the analysis as soon as they become relevant for the domestic factors. Also, party programmes are not examined explicitly since the societal ideas and interests that shape the party programmes are considered via, for instance, public opinion polls or interest group statements. This does not preclude that political parties possess a certain degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the society and function as a transmission belt between societal demands and the government.

Future research might clarify further the interplay and boundaries between ideas, interests, and institutions. Conceptualising general societal interests (for instance of consumers, savers) seems to be especially challenging, because they are usually not as clearly identifiable as are sectoral interests and can best be evidenced through behavioural patterns, which the societal approach also uses to identify ideas (besides public opinion polls). Thus, research could focus on the conditions under which behavioural patterns refer to value-based ideas or to material interests. Research may also elaborate more on the link between the independent and dependent variables, that is, on the conditions for governmental responsiveness to societal demands.

Currently, further research seems especially important on the sources and consequences of domestic anti-establishment and populist movements for international politics. The societal approach is well equipped for an analysis of the implications of the dissatisfaction of large parts of Western societies with the material-distributive (economic interests) and cultural-participatory (value-based ideas) effects of neoliberal globalisation and multilateralism. This growing domestic discontent seems to trigger a turn to more nation-centred foreign economic policy preferences of governments as evidenced by recent US and UK policies.

Additional research is also promising on the influence of domestic forces on governmental preferences regarding international negotiations. While governments compromise internationally with more ease when domestic interests dominate their position than when ideas prevail according to H4, international leadership might gain strength if a potential leader country includes the ideas and interests prevalent in the domestic politics of potential follower countries in its leadership project (Schirm, 2010). Since governmental preferences are presumably informed by domestic variables, such an ‘inclusive leadership’ would enhance the legitimacy of any leadership attempt from the perspective of potential follower countries’ societies, enabling followers’ governments to align their international commitments with their domestic politics.