The Roots of Conflicts between Muslims and Christians in Indonesia in 1995–1997

The Struggle of Islamic Politics during the Suharto Era

Until Suharto ruled Indonesia up to 1990, the political role of Islam in the country was marginalized. This is thought to be caused by the strong influence of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on Suharto government’s policies toward Islam. CSIS was founded in 1971 by Ali Murtopo along together with the Chinese Catholic elite such as Harry Tjan Silalahi, Sofyan Wanandi, and Jusuf Wanandi. ² According to Islamic leaders, CSIS had a great influence on the Suharto government for more than 15 years and was able to create an atmosphere that the government’s biggest enemy was Islam (Suhadi, 2002).

Islam in Indonesia began to experience revival both at the urban level and also in areas that were once a pouch kejawen at the end of the 1970s. ³ People who experiencing conversion to Hinduism and Christianity in the early 1970s started to embrace Islam again in the 1990s (Hefner, 2000: 122). The results of Habib’s research (2004: 106–107) in East Java in a village called Sumberwedi showed that the village’s population that had a majority of Christians in 1970 changed, with Christians occupying the second place in 1980 and the Christian population continued to decline until 1998. The same trend was reported by the researchers from PERCIK Salatiga that in the Karangjoso area during the Sadrach period the percentage of Christians was 90% and of Muslims was 10%, but in 2002 this percentage was reversed (Renai, 2002: 192–196).

At the middle-class level, Islam was also developing very significantly. Dawam Rahardjo said that in the 1980s, Muslim scholars were popping up with PhDs, such as Amien Rais, Kuntowijoyo, and Yahya Muhaimin, whose commitment to Islam was very strong (Nasution, 1990: 35). The modern education they got enabled them develop their intellectual and professional skills. This gave birth to a process called embourgeisement or priyayisasi santri (Anwar, 1994: 33). In the 1980s these graduates occupied middle positions in the bureaucracy, making changes from within, thus encouraging the Islamization of the bureaucracy (Anwar, 1994: 33).

The Islamic revival in the late 1970s and 1980s strengthened the identity and purification of Islam in Indonesia. Their Islamic awareness was stronger, and this awareness certainly affected the way they saw other religions. The tendency to see the world as “we” and “them” grew stronger.

Furthermore, since the 1970s, radical Islam also had developed in the form of the Komando Jihad (holy war). This organization is known to use violence to achieve its goals and harbors the ideals of establishing an Islamic state (Ricklefs, 2001: 369; TAPOL Bulletin No. 35 August 1979, 13). Several radical Islamic acts of violence took place, such as the one in March 1981, in which the Jemaah Imran group attacked the police station in Cicendo, West Java. On March 28, they hijacked a Garuda DC-9 aircraft. Bombings at two BCA banks owned by Liem Sioe Liong in Jakarta and the Glodok shopping complex, Jakarta, also took place. In 1984 the Tanjung Priok incident occurred. Another bombing took place at the Southeast Asian Bible Seminary Building (SAAT) Malang, East Java. Additionally, the bombing of Borobudur occurred on 21 January 1985. In 1987 several figures of Islam anti-liberal Indonesian Islamic Da’wah Council (DDII) sponsored the establishment of the Indonesian Committee for Islamic World Solidarity (KISDI) (Bruinessen, 2002: 137; Hefner, 2000: 109).

Both in the view of radical Islam and anti-liberal Islam, Christianity and Chinese were considered as enemies and threats. In his speech at the Tanjung Priok, Biki criticized the construction of a church in an area dominated by the Islamic community (Bourchier and Hadiz, 2003: 152). The Chinese were considered enemies because of the eviction of the land of Muslim people officially by the government, which was then sold to the Chinese (Bourchier and Hadiz, 2003: 153). DDII raised two issues about the threats to Islam namely, internal threats (Shi’a, Liberal Islam) and those from outside, namely Christianity and Judaism. They believed there was a Christian conspiracy to destroy the political influence of Muslims in Indonesia, especially from descendants of Chinese Catholics (Bruinessen, 2002: 127). This referred to the Chinese Catholic elite within the CSIS institution. After 1965, many Chinese became Christians, which caused Christianity to be identified with the Chinese. This is an additional stigma given to Christianity. During the colonial era, Christians were considered as Londo ireng (black Dutch), and then in the 1970s and 1980s, Christians were considered close to the Chinese.

Conflict of Interest in the Making of Government Regulations

From the 1970s to the 1980s there were many government regulations causing conflicts of interest between Islam and Christians. In 1973 the government proposed a draft marriage law, which was considered by some Islamic groups to conflict with the Shari’ah (Islamic Law). For example, in article 11 paragraph 2, it says, “Differences due to nationality, ethnicity, country of origin, place of origin, religion/creed and descent, do not constitute an obstacle to marriage.” This means that the government allowed marriages between couples of different religions, whereas in Islamic law such marriages are prohibited (Amak, 1976: 32). The draft marriage law received a strong opposition from various Islamic circles. Jusuf Hasyim felt that the draft marriage law only protects minority groups such as Chinese and Christians but harmed the majority group, namely Muslims (Amak, 1976: 14).

The draft marriage law “was believed by Muslims to be a direct fruit of the involvement of Christian forces” (Effendy, 1999: 139). They suspected that the drafting of the marriage law was influenced by a study institute of which most administrators were Christian intellectuals (Sudarto, 2001: 84). Rasjidi considered the draft law as a form of covert christianization (Shihab, 1998: 263).

In 1978 two religious ministerial decrees were issued regulating the spread of religion directed at those who were already religious and foreign aid was channeled through the government. This decision was enthusiastically welcomed by Muslims (Harun, 1995: 85; Pranowo, 1990: 93), but on the contrary, Christians protested the policy and requested that the decision be revoked (Sukamto et al., 2019: 203–205).

Muslims considered that Christian schools were an arena for the process of christianization. Therefore in 1989 through intensive lobbying from the MUI and Muhammadiyah, the Education Law, which came into force in March 1989, in the explanation of Article 28 paragraph 2, clearly stated that religious teachers must adhere to the religion taught and adopted by students who took the lessons (Effendi, 1998: 281). Of course, the Christians protested it. Meanwhile, the Islamic side also took to protest, as Lukman Harun as Deputy Chairman of Muhammadiyah stated, “every effort to eliminate or amend Article 28 of the National Education Law and its explanation could give rise to a disturbance of national security” (Shihab, 1998: 185).

At the end of 1989, precisely on December 29, the Parliament passed a Law on Religious Courts (UUPA). The enactment of this legislation, of course, satisfied the Muslims. But on the other hand, it gave rise to anxiety among non-Muslims. The Council of Churches in Indonesia (PGI) responded to the bill. PGI concluded that the UUPA was not quite right. PGI then proposed changes to the UUPA. PGI’s objections to the UUPA evoked a response from Islamic groups. Lukman Harun who, at the time, was the Deputy Chair of Muhammadiyah said, “While Muslims were constantly urged to practice religious tolerance, why,” Harun asked, “in this particular case our non-Muslim brothers and sisters did not want to show tolerance towards religious justice?” (Shihab, 1998: 185).

Islamic Negative Perceptions against Christianity

The Muslim perceptions of Christianity are colored by negative images. Christianity was considered as the religion of the Dutch. After independence, the Muslim apathy toward Christians increased. The deletion of the seven words in the Jakarta Charter and the massive conversion to Christianity in 1965 added to the long list of Muslim disappointments toward Christians (Sukamto, 2013). This bitterness certainly exacerbated the prejudice of Muslims toward Christians and gave birth to a hatred that was very fertile among Muslims, especially the radical groups.

Christianization was also a crucial issue in the era before the mid-1990s. The formation of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals’ Association (ICMI) on 6 December 1990 had a major impact on political and ideological discourse in the 1990s (Ramage, 1995: 75). Although Emil Salim rejected that the presence of ICMI as a test-case measure to deal with the issue of christianization (Tempo, 1990b: 30), according to some Western researchers, the issue of Christians who controlled various fields of life in Indonesia was their main concern. Feillard, for example, saw that ICMI’s core members who were neo-Masyumi ⁴ regretted (1) the great role of CSIS; (2) the important role given by Suharto to the Chinese minority in the economic field; and (3) the fears of a massive conversion to Christianity in the 1970s (1999: 402). Likewise, Hefner said that ICMI’s concern was twofold: First, it was Christianity. Even though Christians were less than 10% of the Indonesian population, they had long been disproportionately represented among Indonesian professions and the middle class. Second, the Chinese dominated the Indonesian economy (2000: 140–141). Feillard concluded that these modernist Muslim groups tended to be anti-American, anti-Jewish, anti-Chinese, and anti-Christian (1999: 403; Schwarz, 1999: 10).

Muslim–Christian Tension at the Grassroots Level

The distinction between we (Islam) and they (Christians) gained its legitimacy when the MUI issued fatwas restraining Muslims from participating in Christmas celebrations. This fatwa was very influential in sharpening of differences in identity between Muslims and Christians. On 7 March 1981, the Indonesian Ulema Council again issued a fatwa banning Muslims from participating in Christmas celebrations. This fatwa was issued because, first, as an effort to stem the possibility of more and more Muslims converting to Christianity (Sudarto, 2001: 14–15). Second, because Christians began to enliven religious holidays, especially Christmas, since 1980 in which they invited government officials and the general public who were non-Christians. This is considered an attempt to obscure the aqidah element and spread Christian worship into the body of Muslims (Depag, 1983/1984: 46; Djatiwijono, 1995: 285).

Although the fatwa had been revoked, its impact was very strong for the relationship between Islam and Christianity, including at the grassroot level. Sharpening these differences in identity did not only occur in cities but also in rural areas. As reported by Kim (1998a,b), in his research in a village in the Yogyakarta region, fearing violation of the decision No. 70 and 77 of 1978, the contact between Muslims and Christians became more limited. The habit of sharing food and visits on Islamic or Christian holidays had disappeared since 1993–1994. This change had something to do with the two MUI fatwas. This was corroborated by Claudius’s (2004) study in the village of Jambudipa near the city of Bandung that since 1990, based on the information from the local priest, the Muslim community around the church was not willing to go to the Christmas event organized by the church because of the fatwa.

On October 15, 1990 (two months before ICMI was established), a tabloid called The Monitor managed by Arswendo Atmowiloto, belonging to the Kompas Gramedia Group, which at that time was considered close to Catholicism, published the results of a questionnaire that placed the Prophet Muhammad at the 11th position behind several artists, officials, and politicians (Nasution and Indrayati, 1990: 26). The questionnaire caused strong resentment among the Muslims. The Monitor is known to influence the interfaith relations, especially between Islam and Christianity. This was seen as a real picture of religious and political tensions in Indonesian society (Ramage, 1995: 56). Amin Rais, a Muhammadiyah figure, commented that “What Monitor was doing was a crushing blow to Muslims, as well as destroying all government efforts so far to build harmony among religious believers” (Sopiann, 2002).

The Monitor opened the mask of real religious harmony in Indonesia. As the Western observer Ricklefs stated, the tension and conflict in 1967 turned into an increasing intolerance in the 1970s and 1980s. However, the understanding of conflict would not be limited only to the form of violence, especially in Javanese culture. A conflict could also mean differences of opinion. Thus, those years were marked by a cold war between Islam and Christianity. This is evident from the way religious leaders in Indonesia responded to The Monitor cases. Fachruddin, the General Chairperson of Muhammadiyah’s leadership, for example, said that “the conditions of religious life in Indonesia if it was said to be good, was good. But that did not mean there was no competition. However, there was still competition ”(Tempo, 1990a: 29). Zainuddin Mz., a famous preacher, said that, “. . . religious harmony was maintained well, mainly due to the high tolerance of Muslims. Even though they had felt that there was an unfair game” (Tempo, 1990a: 31).

The Monitor’s questionnaire results was only a trigger for the opening of the Islamic–Christian tensions in the late 1990s. What was said by Situmorang, the secretary-general of the Indonesian Bishops’ Conference (KWI), is very true: “Outwardly, on the surface, religious harmony looked good. However, . . . on several occasions, it was as though it was forced” (Tempo, 1990a: 30).

The Weakening of Suharto’s Power in the Late 1980s

In the early 1990s, an issue arose about the division within the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) body, namely hijau (green) ABRI and merah putih ⁵ (red-white) ABRI (Rabasa and Haseman, 2002: 63; Zen, 2004: 76). Green ABRI was a nickname given to military groups who came from Islamic subcultures and were close to Islamic figures (Zen, 2004: 76), for example, General Feisal Tanjung and General Hartono. Red-White ABRI were military groups that were considered nationalists and did not carry religious flags, for example, General Edi Sudrajat (Rabasa and Haseman, 2002: 63; Zen, 2004: 76).

On the other hand, Prabowo Subianto’s fear syndrome of Benny Moerdani (a Catholic) as Suharto’s rival continued (Zen, 2004: 79). Even after Benny Moerdani stepped down from his position, there was a continuing effort to eliminate his people (Moerdani men) from influential positions in the Army (Rabasa and Haseman, 2002: 62). This effort was known as “de-Bennyisasi,” which began in the 1990s.

Although TNI leaders dismissed the notion that promotion for positions in the ranks of the TNI was based on ethnic and religious interests, the situation in the 1990s was more justified on the allegations as revealed by Rabasa and Haseman:

Since 1990, no non-Moslem (Sic!) has risen to a four-star (Sic!) rank in any of the services, nor has a non-Moslem held any of the most significant three-star posts, except for Johny Lumintang’s famous 17-hour tenure as Kostrad commander. An extremely capable and politically neutral officer, Lumintang was made commander of Kostrad immediately after Suharto’s resignation and the new president Habibie’s sacking of Suharto son-inlaw (Sic!) Prabowo Subianto from that key command. Lumintang was quickly promoted to lieutenant general and assigned to the position, but Muslim generals close to Habibie, led by Feisal Tanjung, and the influential ICMI protested the assignment of a Christian to such an important job. General Lumintang was moved out, to be replaced by an observant Muslim officer, Lieutenant General Djamari Chaniago (2002: 63).

In 1991 ICMI was formed with the support of Brawijaya Regional Military Commander Major General R. Hartono and President Suharto’s approval (Zen, 2004: 78). At that time Suharto needed ICMI and Islamic support (Zen, 2004: 79). On 21 May 1993, Lieutenant General Feisal Tanjung was appointed by Suharto as the ABRI Commander and in 1995 General R. Hartono was appointed as KASAD. This was the first time in the history of the Indonesian Army to have two high-ranking officers close to the Muslims. This duo of two generals was nicknamed the santri general duet (Zen, 2004: 81). So, the general topic of discussion at this time was about the greening (penghijauan) of ABRI (Ricklefs, 2001: 400–401). Along with the rise of General Feisal Tanjung and General R. Hartono, a think tank organization, Center for Policy and Development Studies (CPDS), was formed at the initiative of several officers including Lt. Col. Kivlan Zen, Lt. Col. Prabowo Subianto, Lt. Col. Syamsul Maarif, Lt. Col. Adityawarman Thaha and civil intellectuals such as Din Syamsuddin, Amir Santoso, Jimly Asshidiqie, and several other young intellectuals to provide input to the ABRI/TNI-AD Headquarters and the government (Zen, 2004: 81). This institution was also expected to be another alternative to CSIS, which had been a think tank of the New Order since 1971 (Zen, 2004: 81). Islamic sentiments vis-à-vis Christian toward the mid-1990s flourished not only among civilians, politicians, and government bureaucrats but also entered into the military world in Indonesia.

The Conflict between Catholics vis-à-vis Islam and Protestant Christians in East Timor (September 1995)

When East Timor was still part of the Indonesian province, in September 1995, there was a conflict between Catholics vis-à-vis Islam and Protestant Christianity. According to General Feisal Tanjung (serving as the Commander of the Armed Forces), the riots were triggered by three events.

First, on 2 September 1995, the results of the civil service recruitment test were announced. Out of the 12,000 applicants, only 1,872 were accepted, of which only two East Timorese figured in the list. This caused dissatisfaction among the people of East Timor so that the next day the level II Liquisa Regional Government (Pemda) office was besieged by protestors (Basri et al., 1995).

Second, on 4 September 1995, in Aflacai Village, Uatolari District, Viqueque Regency, interfaith marriages took place. The bride and groom candidates were Protestant Christians while the women were Catholics. The blessing of marriage was done in the Assemblies of God Church. This marriage sparked violence as angry Catholics damaged and burned the church. A Protestant church, a Hosana Orphanage, and a small mosque were not spared from the simmering tensions. This riot continued on 12 September 1995, when a Protestant Church of the Assemblies of God and the Hosana Orphanage in Matadiki Village were also torched and completely subsumed by the fire (Basri et al., 1995; Cohen, 1995: 22).

Third, on September 2 in Maliana, Sanusi Abubakar, the Head of the Maliana Regency Penitentiary Security Unit, issued an insult to Catholicism. This angered the Catholics and on September 4, they vented out their anger by destroying and burning mosques, prayer rooms, Protestant churches, markets, and people’s homes (Basri et al., 1995; Cohen, 1995: 22). Riots spread to Viqueque, which led to burning of a mosque and a small mosque as well as two Protestant Churches (Cohen, 1995: 22).

This riot angered some Muslim leaders. For example, Amin Rais spoke of the need to defend Muslims in East Timor (Ricklefs, 2001: 401). Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, the Catholic bishop of East Timor, became the target of Islamic leaders’ outrage. This was because Belo, in his interview to Gatra, had stated that he wanted to make East Timor a special area for Catholics (Basri et al., 1995; Harjono, 1995). The day after the September disturbances in Dili, Republika reported a demonstration by students of the Islamic College, IAIN (now UIN) Bandung, protesting at the plight of the Muslims in East Timor. The demonstration, organized by the Student Forum for Solidarity with the Muslim Minority in East Timor, called on the government to stop “spoiling” East Timor (Republika, 10 September 1995; TAPOL Bulletin No. 132, December 1995).

The Destruction of Several Churches in Cikampek (April 12, 1996), Bogor (April 14, 1996), and Surabaya (June 9, 1996)

Before the Situbondo riot broke out, several churches had been damaged in other places, for example in Cikampek, West Java on 12–13 April 1996. Four churches and the Kindergarten School belonging to the GBI Bukit Hermon church were targeted by the violent mob (Nazaruddin, 2016: 57–58). In Bogor, on 14 April 1996, there was vandalism and ill-treatment of members of the GBI Koinonia congregation in the Griya Alam Sentosa housing complex, and two churches were subjected to mass outrage.

The riots that occurred in West Java on 9 June 1996, spread to East Java in Surabaya, precisely in the Sidotopo area. A total of 10 churches in this area were destroyed and robberies and persecution took place (Supriatma ed., 1997: 76–79). This series of events then continued with the outbreak of the next riot in Situbondo, East Java.

Islam–Christian Conflict in Situbondo, East Java

The cause of the riots in Situbondo had nothing to do with Christians. They were triggered by the internal problems of Muslims. In April 1996, Saleh, a Muslim resident of Gebangan Village, Kapongan District, Situbondo Regency, visited Kyai Haji Zaini, his uncle, the leader of the Naqsabandiyah order and owner of the Nurul Hikam Islamic Boarding School in Kesambirampak Village, Kapongan District, Situbondo Regency (Interfidei, 1996: 22; Sudiono, 1996: 203). In his discussion, Saleh asked his uncle’s opinion related to the beliefs that he held, namely (1) The Prophet Muhammad was not a messenger of God; (2) the prayer had its place and if one already knew the place, and even if one did not pray it was okay; (3) the process of the death of the ulema leader Kyai Haji Raden As’ad Syamsul Arifin was considered imperfect because he died in the hospital; (4) The Qur’an was not a revelation but ordinary human writing; and (5) for those who would follow his teachings, one had to disbelieve first and had to cut the red- and white-feathered chickens (Interfidei, 1996: 22; Sudiono, 1996: 203). Saleh was considered to have insulted the religion of Islam so he was put on trial. Saleh was then proven to have violated article 156 of the Criminal Code, which was committing a crime of blasphemy against Islam and was required to be sentenced to five years in prison.

This demand caused mass dissatisfaction. Crowds went on a rampage, fighting officers, damaging and burning cars, and courthouses (Santoso, 2002: 176). Amidst such a chaotic situation, someone shouted that Saleh was hiding in the GBI Bukit Sion church on Jl. P. B. Sudirman, located 200 meters to the west of the District Court building and the judge who tried Saleh was a Christian (Interfidei, 1996: 36; Santoso, 2002: 176). The riots continued even reaching areas outside Situbondo Subdistrict, namely Asembagus Subdistrict, Panarukan Subdistrict, Besuki Subdistrict, and Banyuputih Subdistrict. In the riots, 30 churches were burned and destroyed (Supriatma, 1997: 63–64).

Islam–Christian Conflict in Tasikmalaya, West Java, 1996

At the end of 1996, there was an Islam–Christian conflict in Tasikmalaya, West Java. Tasikmalaya was an area that has similar characteristics to the Situbondo area. Both were often nicknamed the city of Santri. This was reflected in the number of religious education institutions, especially pesantren. The number of pesantren in this city was recorded at around 925, spread around various urban and rural areas (Trihusodo, 1997).

Some of these pesantren had quite extensive influence in West Java, such as Cipasung Pesantren, Musthafa Sukamanah Pesantren, Manonjaya Pesantren, Bahrul Ulum Awipari Islamic Boarding School, and Suryalaya Islamic Boarding School. The number of students in 1997 reached 64,000 (Trihusodo, 1997).

The cause of the riots in Tasikmalaya on 26 December 1996—Christians called it the 1996 Gray Christmas—was similar to the Situbondo incident. There was no connection with Christianity or Chinese ethnicity, but they were the target of Muslim fury.

The riots in Tasikmalaya extended to Ciawi, which borders Garut Regency, about 50 kilometers from the Tasikmalaya Great Mosque. A similar incident also occurred in the Sawalu region, which borders Garut Regency. In addition to shops and vehicles, several police stations and police posts were damaged by the crowd. Destruction and arson outside the city of Tasikmalaya lasted until Friday, 27 December 1996 (Jawa Pos, 1996: 1). These riots caused 12 churches to be burned and destroyed (Hadad, 1998: 29).

Islam–Christian Conflict in Rengasdengklok, West Java

On 30 January 1997, the destruction of the church occurred in Rengasdengklok, West Java. This riot started with a warning from a Chinese citizen called Mrs. Kho Cong Hwa or Mrs. Jade to several young men who were waking up Muslims for dawn. The reprimand, according to the story, was accompanied by dirty words that provoked the youth’s anger, which finally erupted in riots in Rengasdengklok (Sudarsono, 1997: 12). Just like in Situbondo and Tasikmalaya these riots had nothing to do with the church, but eventually the targets of the angry youth were symbols related to Christianity and Chinese. In the riots, four churches and two temples were burned and destroyed.

The Karawang community, which was predominantly Muslim and was very obedient to practicing religion, especially in Rengasdengklok, felt that a lot of changes had taken place in their religious life. During this time, many houses in Rengasdengklok had turned into non-Muslim places of worship. “We were not against other religions, but the houses could one day become a time bomb,” said Sobana, secretary of MUI Rengasdengklok, as quoted by Republika (Any, 1997).

Islam–Christian Conflict in Banjarmasin, South Kalimantan

The destruction of the church also occurred in Banjarmasin on 23 May 1997, which was called the “Gray Friday Tragedy.” The Banjarmasin incident initially had nothing to do with Christianity. This event began with the Golkar campaign, but then expanded to the symbols of Christianity and the Chinese. As for the church buildings that were damaged in as many as 11 places, one of which was burned to the ground, namely the Church of the Protestant Batak Christian Huria (HKBP) (Salim and Achdian, 1997: 65).

As had happened in Situbondo, amid chaotic situations there were screams that those who interrupt Friday prayers were Christians (Salim and Achdian, 1997: 65). Then the church became the target of mass anger. This shows that the relationship between religious communities in the 1990s was still porous. Christians still could not be fully accepted among Muslims.

Feelings of Dissatisfaction among Muslims

Gurr (1970), in his book titled Why Men Rebel, said that the main factor causing people to rebel is plunder. This sense of deprivation causes discontent. Furthermore, according to Gurr (1970), that dissatisfaction is then developed into politics. This politicization serves to give social meaning to personal dissatisfaction and also to spread a sense of solidarity and the belief that anger is felt not only to shake up personal interests, but it has to do with the interests of many people, making it easier for people to move.

The dissatisfaction of Muslims in the political arena in Indonesia began when seven words in the Jakarta Charter were crossed out. Several rebellions arose to establish an Islamic state as a form of expressing dissatisfaction. When the New Order came to power, the dissatisfaction of the Muslims became more profound because the new regime that ruled was so shrouded in Islamophobia that Islamic politics was truly marginalized. The exclusion of Islamic politics from the arena of power was allegedly due to the influence of political abangan and Christianity in the early Suharto government. Gurr (1970) mentions that acts of violence will be more directed at the target if people realize who or what causes dissatisfaction. At least from the language of the speech expressed in the Tanjung Priok incident and the scripturalist Islamic Group (DDII and KISDI), three groups had cornered Muslims in the political and economic constellation in Indonesia, namely the New Order, Christians, and the Chinese government. So it can be understood why in the various riots that had occurred since the mid-1990s violence was directed at government symbols such as the District Court Office in Situbondo, the Police Station in Tasikmalaya, the Golkar Office in Banjarmasin, Christian symbols namely church buildings, and ethnic Chinese symbols namely shops, bank buildings, and temples.

Christianization

Christianization is the issue that has dominated the perceptions of Islamic figures since colonialism. The formation of Muhammadiyah as a modern Islamic organization was driven by the progress of Christian missionary institutions in Indonesia. After Indonesian independence, this issue did not disappear. Even before 1965 a pamphlet was circulated containing the christianization program in Java and Indonesia. The religious conversion among PKI abangan supporters to Christianity in 1965 further confirmed the accusations of Muslims about the christianization program, leading to the onset of physical conflict. Deliberations between religious leaders initiated by the government in 1967 was unable to solve the problem, which only added to the tensions among the followers of Islam and Christianity. The deliberations also increasingly convinced Islamic groups that the task of Christianity was to christianize Indonesia. The way the church carried out its mission was disliked by Muslims who frequently complained about such activities. For example, “sending Muslim children to Christian schools free of charge plus various assistance” didn’t sit well with Muslims. The use of housing as a means of worship later changed its function to become a church. These methods of Christian propaganda offended the Muslims (Tim Pencari Fakta GP Ansor Jatim, 1996: 20–21).

During the New Order, the issue of christianization was not only related to the issue of conversion but extended to other areas of social life. For example, L. B. Murdani was accused of having a reputation for christianizing the intelligence services and hampering the promotion of santri officers compared to abangan or Christian officers. Among the scripturalist Muslims, this issue was increasingly emphasized and Christianity was considered to habor a conspiracy to destroy Islamic politics in Indonesia. This issue first planted prejudice and then becomes the framework for Islamic groups in perceiving Christians. The prejudice then led to the stereotype that Christians were enemies and threats.

Public Policies that Exacerbate Problems

New Order policies further exacerbated the problem of the relationship between Islam and Christianity. For example, the draft Marriage Act 1973, Decree of the Minister of Religion No. 70 of 1978 concerning the guidelines for spreading religion, No. 77 of 1978 concerning Foreign Aid, the National Education System, and the Religious Courts Act. These policies were perceived by Christian groups to be more beneficial to Islamic groups, whereas Islamic groups considered the policy reasonable because the government had to protect the interests of the majority. The tug-of-war and the debate around these policies added to the hatred between the two religious groups.

MUI’s policy of issuing a fatwa banning Muslims from attending the Christmas events further increased the distance between the two communities. Even textbooks that taught followers of Islam to give Christmas greetings to their Christian friends had drawn protests because it was seen as a violation of the MUI fatwa. Of course, conditions like this increased the tensions between the two religious groups.

Economic Gap

Economic power in Indonesia in the 1990s was held by mainly Chinese ethnic groups. Hadiwinata stated that in 1993 Chinese descendants were the highest taxpayers, and they counted 247 of the 300 highest taxpayers in Indonesia (2003: 75). Christians in big cities were mostly ethnic Chinese, so there was a perception that Christianity was close to the Chinese. Coupled with this perception was magnificent church buildings. For example in Situbondo, the Indonesian Bethel Church (GBI) Bukit Sion building with a cross measuring 2.5 × 5 meters is located right at the western entrance of the city of Situbondo (Interfidei, 1996: 17–20; Santoso, 2002: 241; Tim Pencari Fakta GP Ansor Jatim, 1996: 20). The grandeur of the construction of the Bukit Sion GBI was once questioned by the Chairman of the MUI Pusat K.H. Hasan Basri, “As a city of santri, how come when entering the city of Situbondo it appears a magnificent church building, not a magnificent mosque?” (Interfidei, 1996: 17). So the perception grew stronger that Christian minorities disproportionately had taken on the national economy, resulting in social jealousy among Muslims as voiced by Amin Rais, there was a need for proportional distribution of power and economic benefits in Indonesia.

These preconditions will determine the occurrence of conflict. When conditions are ripe and trigger factors appear, they will explode easily. The sentiments, bitterness, and disappointment of Islamic groups toward Christian groups could be said to have to grown very persistent by the mid-1990s. On the other hand, the position of power of both the government and the military was weakening, so that when there were triggering factors, the sentiment appeared in a frightening brutal act that destroyed all symbols and attributes related to the group being hated. Even though if we look at the initial problems well in Situbondo, Tasikmalaya, and Rengasdengklok, there was no connection at all with Christianity and the Chinese, but in the end, these two groups were the targets of mob anger of the times.

Why did it only explode in the mid-1990s? According to Gurr (1970), the feelings of dissatisfaction that had become political could expand and last for a long time without progressing to acts of violence. The most dominant barrier was the military or police authorities. By the mid-1990s this barrier, namely the authorities and the military, began to weaken. Although the seeds of enmity within the ABRI between the green and red-white groups had begun to sprout since the conflict between Lt. Gen. Benny Moerdani with Prabowo Subianto. But the issue of ABRI’s division between two groups was very widely discussed since the early 1990s. Changes in ABRI’s handling of rioters were also not as repressive before the mid-1990s. The incident of shooting of civilians in Dili on November 12, 1992 and the 1993 Sampang incident, which ended in a military court, traumatized ABRI so that the way to deal with riots had begun to change since 1995 (Pracoyo, 1997: 16). On the other hand, Suharto’s unshakable power after so many years in power began to weaken by the 1990s. This was because ABRI’s support began to slide for Suharto. When the inhibiting factors of dissatisfaction had weakened, the forms of aggressiveness using violence easily took place. The purpose of the aggressiveness was to hurt the target parties both physically and non-physically. Incidentally, the target was the Christian and Chinese groups and then the symbols of the two groups, which often happened in the months when they were venting their anger over various dissatisfactions that befell them.