Functions of collective victimhood

The Troubles

Despite the complex and violent nature of the Troubles, after almost 30 years of violence, in 1998 the Good Friday Agreement (GFA)/Belfast Agreement was ratified by the populations of the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, leading to the establishment of a governing executive based on power sharing in the region. This agreement, the culmination of a protracted peace process undertaken by the parties to the conflict, is now considered an exemplar of conflict resolution throughout the world (Brewer and Hayes, 2015).

Despite the success of the peace process and the political achievements that emerged from the GFA, the legacy of the conflict remains a divisive issue. The victims of the violence have experienced relative neglect in the aftermath of the GFA and more generally, due to the failure to develop a formal truth recovery mechanism as part of the political settlement, and competing narratives of victimhood have emerged in line with the existing divisions in Northern Ireland’s society (Brewer and Hayes, 2015). The potential boundaries of any definition of victimhood is an ongoing debate, as is the place of perpetrator-victims in these definitions. In addition, definitions of victimhood that are dependent on who the perpetrator was (e.g. victims of state violence versus victims of paramilitary violence) remain problematic. The issues are closely aligned with the dominant identity groups that exist (Catholic/Republican and Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist), with each community prioritising the attribution of blame to the out-group as a means of justifying the violence carried out in their name. In addition, the attribution of blame to the relevant out-group is an important element in the construction of a sense of collective victimhood, given that the relevant narratives rely on the in-group’s ability to deny culpability for their actions and to construct all action as a defensive necessity.

Collective victimhood: Classifications and consequences

Much has been written about collective victimhood in terms of its classifications and the definition of the concept as an identity category (e.g. Goldenberg et al., 2014). The functionality of collective victimhood at an individual and societal level has also been addressed in the literature (e.g. Bar-Tal, 2007). Collective victimhood is a belief that somebody’s in-group has been harmed by an out-group; there are many individual and group-based emotions that underpin collective victimhood (or are enhanced by a salient collective victimhood identity). These emotions include anger, fear, collective shame and guilt, and apathy and indifference, as well as the sense of shouldering an emotional burden or feeling responsible for carrying emotions on behalf of the group (Goldenberg et al., 2014). In addition, collective victimhood can enhance these emotions; for example, in a study of Japanese attitudes towards the Chinese in the context of Japan–China relations, which pointed out that a sense of collective victimhood served to enhance feelings of anger and fear towards the out-group (Nawata and Yamaguchi, 2012). In addition, the motivation to act collectively was enhanced when the emotional reaction of anger was shared with fellow in-group members (Livingstone et al., 2011). That is not to say that all collective action motivated out of a sense of collective victimhood is violent; collective action can take both violent and non-violent forms. However, in the case of political violence it is especially important to note that when collective victimhood is evoked and the emotional reaction of anger is salient, this is likely to inspire collective action towards out-groups, particularly if anger is shared with fellow in-group members.

Researchers have identified three levels of classification for collective victimhood: (a) general collective victimhood related to the group’s distant history; (b) conflict-related collective victimhood rooted in the contemporary conflict but not a discrete event; and (c) event-related collective victimhood associated with a specific event within the contemporary conflict (Bar-Tal et al., 2009). All classifications of collective victimhood are thought to serve a number of functions at both the individual and societal level. For example, conflict-related collective victimhood can function to contextualise victimhood experiences by providing information needed to make sense of the conflict and a person’s position within it (i.e. ‘my side’, ‘your side’, ‘perpetrators’, ‘victims’). Collective victimhood and the identities formed around these experiences can act as a psychological buffer, consolidating social identities (i.e. us vs them), thus making it easier to give and receive social support to and from fellow group members (Muldoon et al., 2009). Collective victimhood can also provide a moral justification for harm inflicted by in-group members towards ‘the enemy’ and can be used to attribute responsibility for the conflict externally. The following section will provide more detail on the functions of collective victimhood, as well as contextualising these functions in the context of the conflict in Northern Ireland.

Functions of collective victimhood

Collective victimhood can serve a variety of functions at a societal level. Collective victimhood can be used to fortify a group’s positive self-image and to differentiate it from other comparison groups. According to the theory of ‘positive distinctiveness’ (Tajfel and Turner, 1986), social groups strive to view themselves in a positive light and to do so, in-group members compare themselves to other social groups along valued dimensions of comparison. For example, group members can achieve positive distinctiveness by demonstrating that they are kinder and more generous than people in other groups. Therefore, positively valued groups will identify and act in the terms of the group in order to achieve and maintain positive distinctiveness. Collective victimhood is also associated with notions of morality and justness, which by default can be attributed to those who legitimately claim to be included within the boundaries of a given collective victimhood. In contrast, their adversaries or those whom in-group members believe are not legitimately entitled to claim collective victimhood, are by default unjust, immoral or somehow culpable in their own perceived victimhood. However, it is not a simple matter of self-assignment into the category of collective victimhood. In fact, and particularly in societies experiencing conflict transition, many social groups have to compete for legitimate inclusion into the category of victim, as well as resisting the exclusion of their group from the perimeters of inclusion.

In the aftermath of prolonged conflict, particularly when social resources are scarce, in-group members will assert that their own victimising experiences were greater than those of other groups claiming and ultimately competing for victim status (Brewer and Brown, 1998; Noor et al., 2008). This process, known as ‘competitive victimhood’, can act as a barrier to peaceful co-existence in societies experiencing conflict transition (Nadler and Saguy, 2003). Social psychologists have suggested expanding the boundaries of collective victimhood to include subgroups in order to accommodate diverse forms of victimhood narratives. However, in reality, all definitions of victimhood are contested and rhetorical distinctions are made within the victimhood category at the local, national and international level (Cairns et al., 2003). Indeed, in the context of Northern Ireland, there are many axes of difference (i.e. geographical area, socio-economic status, ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’ exposure), which can be used by in-groups to justify their entitlement (over and above other social groups) to inclusion within the victim category (e.g. Muldoon and Downes, 2007). In order to enhance the effectiveness of inclusive boundaries of victimhood, researchers have suggested promoting initiatives that foster intergroup trust and cooperation; one such initiative involves the promotion of direct contact between groups (Crisp et al., 2008). However, in deeply divided societies such as Northern Ireland, where structural and psychological barriers separate groups, direct contact is not always possible. In such instances, the authors of this article have previously emphasised the role of imagined interaction whereby key stakeholders in divided societies are seen to work collaboratively within and outside their communities and ultimately serve to model positive interactions with the out-group for their own identity group (Joyce and Lynch, 2017).

Collective victimhood may also function to legitimise immoral actions towards out-group members if the in-group behaviour is framed as being in response to a legitimate threat, particularly a threat to the physical security of in-group members. In such a way, collective victimhood can become a precursor to involvement in violent conflict, or indeed a moral justification after the event (e.g. Wohl and Branscrombe, 2008). In such cases, violence is constructed as retaliatory, a last resort or essential for the defence of the in-group. As individuals are fundamentally motivated to believe that their perception of the social world is accurate (Heine et al., 2006), they must construct their actions and/or those of their in-group as a legitimate response and in direct proportion to any perceived or actual threat. This is relevant in all social situations but particularly so in the case of violent conflict because perceiving one’s own group as the ‘true victim’ can help to allay feelings of collective guilt for wrongdoings committed by the in-group against ‘the enemy’ (Smyth, 2001). Research has shown that social groups who are reminded of historical injustices committed against their in-group in the past (i.e. Jewish-Canadians reminded of the Holocaust), show less collective guilt for the violent actions of their in-group (i.e. towards Palestinians) in present-day conflicts (Wohl and Branscrombe, 2008). This would suggest that group members who are reminded of their collective victimhood might be more willing to legitimise violence towards out-group members. As such, collective victimhood can function as a moral justification for the actions of in-group members in response to perceived or actual threats and, in this case, historical injustices. In a study by Joyce and Lynch (2017) perpetrators of political violence in Northern Ireland were seen to repeatedly invoke narratives of both individual and collective victimhood in their efforts to construct a justification for their involvement in violence. In this study, perpetrators on both sides of the community divide, the defence of their community and provocation by the out-group were key themes drawn upon by participants in accounts of their choice to engage in political violence.

Collective victimhood narratives, including historical injustices, can be used to mobilise the support or action of in-group members (Demant et al., 2008; Venhaus, 2010). Mobilisation is a persuasion process that aims to compel group members to enter into conflict against rival out-groups (Bar-Tal, 2007). The rival out-group is seen as threatening in the competition for resources (i.e. territory, identity, equality) that the in-group believe are legitimately theirs. The preconditions for mobilisation are: individuals identify strongly with the group; they perceive the in-group/out-group division to be real; they perceive and/or internalise any out-group threats; and they legitimise the actions of the collective against the rival out-group (Bar-Tal, 2007). The mobilisation message, often communicated via group leaders or those believed to be prototypical of the group (Reicher and Hopkins, 2001), appeals to these notions of threatened identity and competition for resources. Importantly, this message dehumanises the rival by attributing hostile motives to the out-group. In order for the mobilisation process to be successful, a critical mass of individuals who identify with the in-group must be willing to legitimise their actions, even if participation in conflict involves the sacrifice of their lives and those of others in the pursuit of collective goals.

One strategy for the mobilisation of collective victimhood identity is the internalisation of cultural narratives that can be evoked and called upon to justify participation in conflict (Hammack, 2008). Individuals internalise past injustices and transform them into cultural narratives that shape and inform current social identities (Bar-Tal, 2007). Collective victimhood narratives are often evoked and reproduced by the two communities in Northern Ireland who dispute Northern Ireland’s constitutional status within the UK. The Nationalist community broadly self-identify as Irish and desire a union with the Republic of Ireland, whereas the Unionist community (predominantly) self-identify as British and wish to remain within the UK. As mentioned earlier, perceived discrimination and structural inequalities also contributed to the outbreak of the Troubles in Northern Ireland as well as the divergent social identities. As mentioned, historically, the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland had unequal access to housing, employment and voting rights and this limited their ability to enact social and political change (Hewitt, 1981). As a result, historically, a collective ‘victim of injustice’ narrative has been internalised and evoked to mobilise support from within the Nationalist community in the pursuit of collective goals (Joyce and Lynch, 2017). The content of mobilisation messages was often predicated on the communities’ experience of competition for resources, and for the Nationalist community in Northern Ireland in particular, those resources included territory, identity options and equality (McKittrick, 2002).

Researchers have discussed the ways in which collective victimhood has been evoked and mobilised in the context of the conflict in Northern Ireland. According to O’Sullivan (2009), one of the key variables for successfully sustaining a violent campaign is the mobilisation of support within communities in favour of violent action towards an out-group. O’Sullivan focuses particularly on the ability of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) to mobilise support and/or tolerance for violence on behalf of the Nationalist community. In instances of political violence, radicalised communities are necessary to legitimise violence as an appropriate strategy for the resolution of grievances, and at the core of the radicalising rhetoric used by the PIRA and their political wing, Sinn Fein, were notions of historical injustice, discrimination and the political repression experienced by Nationalist communities towards what was perceived as an illegitimate ‘occupying’ force – the British state (O’Sullivan, 2009). The day-to-day experiences of abuse, oppression, discrimination and exploitation contributed in a significant way to the power of the collective victimhood narrative espoused by large sections of the Nationalist community that emerged as a ‘victim of injustice’ account (Lynch and Joyce, 2017). The Nationalist community lived the collective narrative of injustice and a space emerged into which paramilitaries stepped to, as they saw it, protect their vulnerable community from an outside threat. In such a way, collective victimhood narratives were used to justify violence as a legitimate strategy for ensuring physical security. Importantly, outright support for violence is not the only outcome in cases where a collective victimhood identity is salient; oftentimes a tolerance for or an understanding of the political violence falling short of support for the violent actors emerges. Regardless, once a critical mass of support for violence is achieved, the in-group investment in action is reinforced by the retaliatory actions of the out-group, creating cycles of violence.

A particularly powerful strategy for the mobilisation of support within the Nationalist community was the framing of their sense of victimhood within a historical context (O’Sullivan, 2009). The PIRA were particularly successful at cultivating historical narratives of Irish Catholic subjugation. Importantly, these collective ‘victim of injustice’ narratives were characterised by a sense of continuity and ‘the Troubles’ was depicted as merely the latest conflict in a long historical struggle. Harnessing emotive historical memories in order to create collective victimhood narratives was used by the PIRA to cultivate support for violence within their community; this violence was portrayed as a means to end the aforementioned historical injustices. However, according to Qumsiyeh (2011), the more pervasive and enduring the conflict is, the more likely individuals will legitimise the use of violence even in the absence of historically successful forms of popular resistance. The events of Bloody Sunday, when 14 unarmed civilians participating in a peaceful protest were killed on the streets of Derry by a regiment of the British army, is an example of how peaceful resistance was framed as an unsuccessful strategy for resolving grievances. This event became a key exemplar used to demonstrate the victimisation of the Catholic community, but also served as a means to justify the violence advocated by groups such as the PIRA. Such events can serve to radicalise a population towards more extreme action as they reinforce the applicability of collective ‘victim of injustice’ frames.

The hunger strikes in Northern Ireland can also be viewed as a significant contributor to the emergence and harnessing of a sense of collective victimhood that ultimately served to mobilise in-group support for Republicanism. In Northern Ireland, prior to 1976, political prisoners were granted special category status in that they were not required to wear prisoner uniforms or participate in prison work and they were also housed separately to other detainees. After 1976, their political status was revoked and they were treated as ‘ordinary criminals’ subject to the same prison rules as other detainees. The hunger strike involved protests by Republican prisoners in which they refused to eat or drink in retaliation for being stripped of their political status. Ultimately, 10 Republican prisoners died on hunger strike, including the elected member of the UK Parliament, Bobby Sands. Riots broke out in the Nationalist community in response to his death and there was a spike in recruitment to Republican paramilitary organisations. In this case, the ‘victim of injustice’ narrative was reinforced and served to radicalise the population into supporting action against the oppressors. Such was the impact of the death of the hunger strikers that their memory is routinely evoked and still reproduced in accounts of the collective victimhood of the Nationalist community today.

Collective victimhood and conflict transformation

Researchers have discussed the role of inclusive and exclusive boundaries of collective victimhood in violent conflicts (Bar-Tal and Cehajic-Clancy, 2014; Wilke, 2007; Yildiz and Verkuyten, 2011). Inclusive identity boundaries are permeable in that individuals can easily enter and exit the group. Exclusive identity boundaries, on the other hand, emphasise intergroup differences and restrict entry into and exit from groups. Exclusive identities are also associated with in-group narratives that delegitimise the out-group and accentuate any perceived out-group threat. In general, inclusive boundaries of victimhood are considered conducive to peace (Bar-Tal and Cehajic-Clancy, 2014). The ability and willingness to absorb other groups into collective victimhood identities is desirable for post-conflict recognition and for the reshaping of collective identities in conflict transition (Yildiz and Verkuyten, 2011). However, conflict identities formed in opposition to ‘the other’ are particularly resistant to change (Templer et al., 2009). Furthermore, researchers suggest that conflict identities fulfil an important psychological function, buffering against the ill-effects of protracted intergroup conflict. Researchers have noted that post-conflict societies in transition, such as Northern Ireland, have experienced an elevated incidence of suicide in the aftermath of conflict, attributed, in part, to the dissolution or dilution of conflict identities and the collective narratives of victimhood that sustain them (Gallagher et al., 2012).

Indeed, in the social–psychological literature, researchers have debated whether inclusive superordinate identities, such as inclusive collective victimhood, reduce or inflame intergroup tension (i.e. Dovidio et al., 2009a, 2009b). Some research suggests that perceived inclusiveness of a superordinate identity (collective victimhood in this case), can act as a catalyst that activates elements of subgroup membership by creating a threat to group distinctiveness (Hornsey and Hogg, 2000). According to social identity theory, people are motivated to differentiate their in-group from similar out-groups along related dimensions of comparison in order to maintain positive distinctiveness (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). When an overarching superordinate identity blurs group boundaries, a threat to group distinctiveness occurs. The optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer, 1991) includes the proposition that very large social groups (such as highly inclusive victim groups), can appear over-inclusive, therefore failing to meet the group’s need for distinctiveness. Consistent with this, an experimental study investigating the effects of superordinate group membership on group distinctiveness found that membership of very large groups prompted individuals to identify more strongly with subgroups, perhaps providing a more viable avenue through which to meet their need for distinctiveness (Brewer and Shaw, 1993). Applied to the notion of collective victimhood, subgroups may resist inclusion into a superordinate ‘victim category’ if it appears over-inclusive and fails to meet their needs for distinctiveness. An inclusive collective victimhood identity has long been the subject of controversy in Northern Ireland. Ongoing issues are whether or not former perpetrators of political violence can be given access to this identity category, or how victims of state violence might be incorporated. Efforts to create a (partially) inclusive definition of victimhood have been made but with little success. For example, in a report commissioned by the government in 1998 known as the Bloomfield Report, it was suggested that every citizen could potentially be considered a victim of the Troubles. However, given the potential for inclusion of former perpetrators of political violence, this angered Unionist groups, and given its failure to address the issue of state violence, it incensed Republican groups (Brewer and Hayes, 2015).

A number of theories have been developed to account for the consequences when subgroup members are included in a superordinate category and these can be applied to this discussion of collective victimhood (e.g. Gaertner and Dovidio, 1986; Hewstone and Brown, 1986; Wenzel et al., 2007). These approaches have focused on changing the manner in which the individual categorises information about the in-group and out-group. Categorisation processes are seen to be quite malleable and flexible in that group boundaries can be deconstructed and individuals either de-categorised or re-categorised with resultant reductions in intergroup bias (e.g. Gaertner and Dovidio, 1986). These two strategies are thought to work in different ways. De-categorisation weakens boundaries so that the psychological distance between self and former in-group members is increased. Re-categorisation decreases the psychological distance between the self and former out-group members (Gaertner et al., 1990). Furthermore, the Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM) (Gaertner and Dovidio, 1986) involves re-categorising the group so that previous out-group members can be induced to think of themselves in terms of one superordinate identity. These theories emphasise the malleability of superordinate categories, such as collective victimhood, and how they might potentially be used to reduce intergroup tension in the aftermath of conflict.

These principles have been applied to societies in conflict transition in order to explore the possibility that identification with the superordinate category of ‘common humanity’ can, potentially, dilute collective victimhood identities (i.e. Greenaway et al., 2011; Wohl and Branscrombe, 2005). Indeed, researchers have reported encouraging findings to this effect across a number of conflict contexts, including sites of historical atrocities such as Germany and Australia. During the experiment, participants were asked to recall historical atrocities perpetrated towards their own identity group. In the human categorisation, perpetrators are described as ‘humans’ who behaved cruelly towards other humans, while in the intergroup categorisation, subgroup membership is made salient (i.e. white Australians behaving cruelly towards indigenous Australians). These studies are based on the principle, outlined above, that by appealing to a superordinate identity, there is a reduction in the salience of subgroup identification within the victim category. Weaker identification with subgroup victim identity also reduced collective guilt assignment, increasing forgiveness towards the perpetrator (Greenaway et al., 2011; Wohl and Branscrombe, 2005), as well as lowering collective action intention (Greenaway et al., 2011). These studies suggest ways in which superordinate categorisation can reduce the salience of subgroup victimhood identity, which is often seen to feed conflict and inhibit peace (Bar-Tal and Cehajic-Clancy, 2014).

Based on the same principles, researchers have also considered the possibility that identification with a superordinate national group can reduce the distinction between in-group victims ¹ and out-group perpetrators in intractable conflicts (Gaunt, 2009; Lowe and Muldoon, 2014; Noor et al., 2010). Unlike research that appeals to human categorisation, evoking superordinate national identification has produced mixed results, particularly in the context of Northern Ireland. As part of a three-part study, Protestant (Unionist) and Catholic (Republican) participants in Northern Ireland were asked to complete a set of questionnaires that included subgroup and superordinate identification scales. The scales were identical except that for the in-group scale ‘my community’ was used, which was substituted for ‘Northern Ireland’ in the superordinate identity scale. Participants also completed an intergroup forgiveness questionnaire that assessed participants’ willingness to forgive the out-group. The results suggest that Protestant participants considered themselves to be more prototypical of the ‘Northern Irish’ superordinate category than their counterparts (who also perceived this to be true). Additionally, Catholic participants who identified with the superordinate category indicated greater out-group forgiveness than their Protestant counterparts (Noor et al., 2010). These findings offer a mixed message with regard to the utility of superordinate categorisation for addressing intergroup difference and promoting intergroup forgiveness in Northern Ireland.

In order for the re-categorisation of collective victimhood identity to be successful, intergroup trust must be present. However, in order to build intergroup trust, there must be prolonged and positive intergroup contact. In Northern Ireland, there are a number of structural barriers that inhibit direct contact between the two communities. The peace walls in Northern Ireland, for example, were intended as ‘temporary’ structures erected by the state to physically separate communities in an effort to stem sectarian violence; to this day over 80 barriers remain in working-class Nationalist and Unionist communities (Jarman and Bell, 2012). These structures limit the opportunity for prolonged intergroup contact and are a visual reminder of intergroup differences. In addition, there are separate Catholic and Protestant schools, parks and bus stops in certain areas in Northern Ireland. Opportunities to interact with the other community are minimal and ‘shared space’ is often artificially created (i.e. through recreational sports) in an effort to promote intergroup contact and, ultimately, to foster intergroup trust. It is hoped that as intergroup trust builds and as structural divisions are dismantled, subgroups can be absorbed into a collective identity based on ‘shared suffering’ rather than competitive victimhood (Hewstone et al., 2006).

Further complicating this process are the territorial markers of identity in Northern Ireland that separate ‘us’ from ‘them’. The Union Jack, kerbstones and street lamps painted red, white and blue, and Loyalist murals denote Protestant areas. Similarly, in the Nationalist community, the Irish tri-colour flag and murals commemorating Republican political prisoners denote Catholic areas. There is also evidence of a collective victimhood solidarity movement across conflict divides in Northern Ireland, where Israeli flags are seen in Protestant areas and Palestinian flags in Catholic areas. The Nationalist community draws on the Israeli/Palestinian context and, in particular, notions of Israeli occupation and oppression to reinforce and externalise their own perceived collective ‘victim of injustice’ narratives as a result of ‘British occupation’ (Hill and White, 2008). Similarly, members of the Loyalist/Unionist community view Israeli citizens as the victims of unprovoked attacks by terrorist organisations, legitimising and externalising their own experiences of perceived collective victimhood at the hands of Republican paramilitaries (Hill and White, 2008). This research demonstrates how collective victimhood in similar conflict societies can function as an ‘externalising device’ to consolidate in-group victimisation experiences (Hill and White, 2008). Furthermore, it demonstrates how superordinate re-categorisation can be inherently complex in (post-) conflict societies characterised by structural and psychological barriers that consolidate subgroup identities.

As an alternative to re-categorising subgroups in terms of a common humanity or some other superordinate national identification, researchers have considered re-categorising groups in terms of a common victimhood identity (Shnabel et al., 2013). Re-categorising subgroups so that they conceive of themselves in terms of their common regional identities (i.e. Israeli Jews and Palestinians as ‘Middle Easterners’) fails to account for the psychological need to be recognised as a victim of the conflict. As an alternative, a common victim identity can be induced (‘we are all victims of the Middle East conflict’) that simultaneously encourages superordinate identification, as well as satisfying individuals’ needs for acknowledgement of victimhood. Interestingly, a common perpetrator identity is also included (‘we are both perpetrators of the Middle East conflict’), which is thought to encourage an inclusive construal of the perpetrator role that shares the burden of responsibility for blame and guilt (Shnabel et al., 2013). In this research, the outcome measures included competitive victimhood and forgiveness, and results suggest that inducing common victim or common perpetrator identities can lead to a decrease in competitive victimhood and an increase in forgiveness among Israeli Jews and Palestinians. Therefore, the authors would suggest that common victim and common perpetrator identities can be used as a strategy for conflict transformation that serves to decrease competitiveness and increase forgiveness between subgroups (Shnabel et al., 2013).

Real-life examples of the implementation of superordinate victim and perpetrator identities exist in (post-) conflict societies, such as in Northern Ireland and in the Israeli/Palestinian context (Shanbel et al., 2013). The ‘Bereaved Families for Peace’ and ‘Combatants for Peace’ organisations consist of victims and perpetrators from both the Israeli and Palestinian areas, acknowledging commonalities and engaging collaboratively for peace. In Northern Ireland, following the GFA, there was a proliferation of groups ostensibly designed to support self-identified victims and former political prisoners on both sides of the conflict divide (Dillenburger et al., 2005; Ferguson et al., 2010; Gilligan, 2003). Although certain victims’ groups in Northern Ireland have been criticised for personalising victimhood in an exclusionary manner (Gilligan, 2003), many engage in cross-group interaction (with victims and former political prisoners from the other community) during conflict transformation initiatives. These initiatives are based on the notion that victims (and perpetrators) were created on all sides of the conflict and by all sides. Such an idea is in line with the advancements in the CIIM that encourage superordinate victim and perpetrator identities, which, theoretically, reduce competitive victimhood and increase intergroup forgiveness.

Discussion and future directions

There has been considerable discussion around the role of collective victimhood in conflict maintenance and conflict transformation. However, much less is known about the way victimhood and other social categories (‘survivor’, ‘ex-combatant’, ‘perpetrator’) are used by self-identified victims and former perpetrators of political violence in Northern Ireland. In the years following the GFA, there was a proliferation of services set up to support self-identified victims and, separately, former perpetrators of political conflict in Northern Ireland. Initially, victim and ex-prisoner organisations operated as advocacy services aiming to meet the unique needs of their members. Although victim and ex-prisoner organisations continue to advocate on behalf of their members, their role has expanded to include post-conflict initiatives designed to interrupt cyclical patterns of violence in Northern Ireland. We argue that it is important to consider how victims and former political prisoners working in post-conflict initiatives are actively using their identities as a conflict transformation resource. Further research in this area, and in particular with self-identified victims and former political prisoners, can bring into relief the functional aspect of these identities and how identity processes impact on the transition from violence to peace.

Within the social psychology literature described here, researchers have focused on changing the ways in which individuals categorise information about in-groups and out-groups. In this research tradition, categorisation processes are seen to be quite malleable, in that the boundaries of social categories can be reconstructed in order to increase intergroup cooperation following conflict (Bar-Tal and Cehajic-Clancy, 2014; Wilke, 2007; Yildiz and Verkuyten, 2011). However, in the case of Northern Ireland, social identities were consolidated during a period of intense conflict and have become particularly resistant to change. Furthermore, as noted in this review, social identities formed during the conflict fulfil an important psychological function and have been found to create a buffer against psychological stress. Individuals may be protective of victimhood identities and, particularly, the narratives of loss that constitute these identities. To alter the boundaries of these identities and include others such as ‘perpetrators’ can be seen to contaminate the victim category and those who claim to be ‘legitimate’ members. Indeed, self-identified victims closely police the boundaries of victimhood in Northern Ireland (Joyce and Lynch, 2017). Rather than focus on victimhood, and in an attempt to expand the boundaries of this contested social category, future research could potentially identify (in interviews) alternative forms of superordinate categorisation used by self-identified victims and political prisoners themselves that can be applied to the context of conflict transformation in Northern Ireland.

Furthermore, researchers have suggested the use of a number of superordinate classifications to reduce intergroup tension and to promote forgiveness. Researchers have not yet considered, however, the use of the superordinate ‘working class’ identity, which is evoked by both communities in everyday interaction, as well as by political elites to mobilise support across the two communities in Northern Ireland. In certain areas of Northern Ireland, as many as 80% of the residents knew someone who had been killed or injured in the conflict and three-quarters of all young people have experienced violence in their communities (McAloney et al., 2009). There is a general consensus in working-class areas across both communities (and in the broader society of Northern Ireland) that ‘working-class people’ have had greater exposure to political violence compared to the rest of Northern Ireland society. There is a possibility that ‘social class’ and, in particular, ‘working class’ could be mobilised as a superordinate identity, in conjunction with common victimhood, to reduce intergroup difference and promote cross-group interaction in Northern Ireland.

In effect, future research in this area should consider how victimhood as a social and individual identity resource is constructed and internalised by parties to the violence (and parties to the peace) and how this process can be understood and harnessed to encourage meaningful progression towards a non-violent future. A key part of this process will be a multilevel analysis of identity construction and transition in the context of competing narratives of victimhood that will include a recognition of the potential identity categories beyond fixed conflict identities.