The Influence of Legal Mandates on Public Participation

Abstract

Legal mandates are a common mechanism to stimulate government agencies to engage the public. Research shows managerial efforts can also affect civic engagement. We first examine whether local government departments that are legally mandated to engage the public have more public participation than departments that are not mandated to do so. We then explore the relationship between manager perceptions of public participation and the frequency of public participation. Finally, we analyze the interactive effect of legal mandates and managerial perceptions. To investigate our research questions, we use regression models on data from a 2018 nationally representative survey of 527 local government managers in the United States. The results indicate legal mandates are not significantly related to public participation, but managerial perceptions are a key factor. These findings support pursuing a managerial approach to advance public participation in local government.

Keywords

public administration citizen participation‌local and urban public administration/governance e-government

Modern democracies are premised on the belief that the will of the people empowers government and that public organizations have a responsibility to involve citizens in public decision-making. Public participation, defined as the processes by which citizens seek to influence government decision-making (Nabatchi & Leighninger, 2015), aims to democratize bureaucratic institutions. The positive view of public participation suggests that governments can engage the public to develop more lasting, appropriate, and effective public services that embody the will of the people (Moynihan, 2003; Wang, 2001). The negative view of public participation in government posits that involving the general public in bureaucratic processes can slow or hinder important organizational performance considerations such as organizational efficiency and effectiveness (Burke & Clarey, 1989). Some argue governments that engage the public minimize the role of expertise in favor of majority rule and popularity (Cleveland, 1985; Moynihan, 2003; Predmore et al., 2011).

Research has shown that public participation in government—which takes many forms including goal setting, policy making, oversight, and decision making—can lead public organizations to be more democratic (Wang, 2001). A national study of city governments in the United States (US) found that public participation led to a greater consensus among citizens and accountability in local government (Wang & Wart, 2007). Public participation enables governments to identify community needs that were previously unrecognized (Wang, 2001). For example, when there is widespread community dissatisfaction citizens get directly involved in improving public services (Vigoda, 2002). Research, in general, indicates that the public can make government decisions more reflective of the public will and improve government accountability and transparency.

Legal mandates are a common mechanism used to stimulate public participation in government (Brody et al., 2003; Chess, 2000; Duram & Brown, 1999; Mitton et al., 2009). Legal mandates refer to laws passed by federal, state, and local legislatures that require government agencies, departments, and organizations to involve the public in policy and decision-making processes (Brody et al., 2003; Bryson et al., 2013; Godschalk et al., 2003). These mandates require government actors to engage the public through activities such as public hearings (Berner, 2001; Ringholm et al., 2018), citizen interviews (Ghose, 2005), or public notices (Brody et al., 2003). Legal mandates are used in many countries. For example, the European Union has mandated public involvement in natural resource planning (Newig & Koontz, 2014; van der Heijden & ten Heuvelhof, 2013) and, in the 2000s, the Chinese government mandated the development of public participation programs in environmental policymaking (Johnson, 2010). The widespread use of legal mandates for public participation shows that it is a preferred tool used by governments across the world.

Because legal mandates are a common government tool for fostering public participation, scholars have sought to understand their effectiveness. Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of legal mandates for public participation is inconclusive. Mandates can increase community representativeness at public hearings (Chess & Purcell, 1999), lead to greater stakeholder involvement in decision-making (Brody et al., 2003), and improve citizen-government collaboration (Newig & Koontz, 2014). However, research also finds that legal mandates do not lead to meaningful collaboration (Duram & Brown, 1999), do little to influence government decision-making (van der Heijden & ten Heuvelhof, 2013), and are often ignored by public administrators (Moynihan, 2003; Neshkova & Guo, 2012). Furthermore, public administrators’ perceptions of legal mandates vary widely with some viewing mandated participation as a boon to the democratic process and others viewing participation as a deterrent to effective public service delivery (Predmore et al., 2011). Despite the popularity of legal mandates, these conflicting research findings make it difficult to assess whether legal mandates could—or even should—be used to stimulate public participation in government.

Since legal mandates require local governments to engage in public participation efforts, local government managers play a key role in implementing and overseeing mandated public participation programs. Managerial attitudes and values influence participation mechanisms, quality, and outcomes. If a manager strongly values citizen input in agency activities, he or she may go above and beyond legal requirements to involve diverse stakeholders in multiple decision-making activities. Conversely, a manager who perceives public participation in local government as ineffective or unnecessary might do only enough to meet the basic legal requirement. We examine whether managerial valuing of public participation moderates the level of citizen participation in government when legal mandates are present.

In this paper, we draw on Rosenbloom's theory of public administration to examine the relationship between legal mandates, manager attitudes, and public participation. Rosenbloom (2016) contends that public administration theory stems from three disparate approaches to public administration—managerial, political, and legal (Rosenbloom, 2016). We discuss how each of these three approaches informs public participation in local government and empirically examines legal and managerial approaches to advancing public participation in local government. Using 2018 data from a nationally representative survey of 621 local government managers in the US, we further investigate the relationship between legal mandates and managerial perceptions of their effectiveness. We ask: Are legal mandates associated with greater public participation—both in terms of frequency of stakeholder engagement and the type of participation—at the local level of government? We also ask: How are legal mandates related to managerial perceptions of public participation?

Theory

Public Administration Theory: Three Approaches

Rosenbloom (2016) argues that public administration theory consists of three disparate views—managerial, legal, and political. These views of the field stem from the U.S. system of government where three branches of government—legislative, executive, and judicial—check and balance one another's constitutional powers (Rosenbloom, 2016). Rosenbloom (2016) contends that managerial, legal, and political values often conflict in public administration theory and practice. The managerial perspective of public administration posits that managers should use reason and logic to carry out government functions efficiently and effectively (Rosenbloom, 2013). The managerial approach to public participation in local government is exemplified when managers are empowered to design and implement public participation programs. Public managers wield significant discretion in how—and how much—public participation occurs (Moynihan, 2003; Neshkova & Guo, 2012). Thus, local government managers are trusted to incorporate citizen input effectively and efficiently into decisions and policymaking.

The legal approach to public administration focuses on adherence to written laws and ordinances (Rosenbloom, 2013). Laws and regulations can greatly impact how public managers collaborate with citizens and other government officials (Amsler, 2016). Public managers seeking to involve the public must adhere to local, state, and federal laws. Furthermore, laws can require public managers to engage in certain types of public engagement procedures or dictate how often or how much they must engage the public when making decisions (Brody et al., 2003; Chess, 2000; Duram & Brown, 1999; Godschalk et al., 2003; Mitton et al., 2009). The robust legal framework surrounding public participation in local government makes the legal approach to public administration prevalent.

The political approach to public administration is illustrated through political oversight and participation designed to engage or satisfy constituents and voters (Rosenbloom, 2013). Local government managers are influenced by the demands of elected officials and their constituencies. The laws and regulations that guide public participation are instituted by elected officials. Politicians can apply varying pressure to enforce or ignore these requirements. These political factors shape the extent of local government engagement with the citizenry.

We examine the effectiveness of legal, managerial, and combined legal–managerial approaches in local government. First, we examine whether legal mandates are related to public participation. Lawmakers have sought to institute laws that require local governments to institute programs aimed at promoting public participation in local government. Legally mandating public participation programs align with the legal view of public administration. Second, we examine whether managers’ perceptions of public participation are related to participation in local government. Because public managers have discretion in designing and overseeing public participation, their attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs become key factor in the level of citizen involvement in local government decision-making. This approach aligns with the managerial approach. Finally, we investigate how the legal and managerial approaches together are related to participation.

Legal Mandates, Public Participation, and Manager Perceptions

Public participation in government decision-making is essential to democratic governance. Government agencies are tasked with providing public goods to citizens and upholding important public values (Bryson et al., 2014). When individual citizens and other stakeholders partner with government agencies, their input can influence the government to align public services with the will of the public (Bryson et al., 2014; Gustafson & Hertting, 2017; Thomas, 2013). When the government is responsive to input from citizens, citizens become more involved in the governance process—leading to even more democratic governance (Sjoberg et al., 2017). Conversely, if government agencies never seek to understand the will of citizens or disregard citizen input, public services will align with the preferences of bureaucrats irrespective of the public will. Thus, the government will be more/less democratic depending on how much influence citizens have on government decision-making.

To stimulate public participation, lawmakers have mandated that government bodies seek public input on policy decisions. Such legal mandates have a long history in the US. Citizen participation was first mandated by the federal government in the 1950s with the Urban Renewal Program (Brody et al., 2003) and then expanded to other city planning initiatives in the 1960s and environmental planning initiatives in the 1970s (Brody et al., 2003). Public participation is often required in natural resource planning such as water management (Duram & Brown, 1999) and in health care settings (Mitton et al., 2009). Today mandates for public participation are issued at all levels of government (Chess, 2000; Godschalk et al., 2003).

While ubiquitous, all legal mandates are not created equal. Legal mandates for public participation require a wide range of activities. Table 1 lists five examples of legal mandates and their requirements.

Table 1.
Examples of Citizen Participation Legal Mandates.

Mandate Example What is Mandated Source

State growth management legislation Public hearings, public notices, advertising, advisory committees. Brody et al., 2003

Federal Transportation Law (SAFETEA-LU) Requires a written plan on how the public will be involved. Slotterback, 2008

Neighborhood Strategic Planning program (Milwaukee) Interview at least 300 citizens when creating program. Ghose, 2005

Norwegian Planning and Building Act Make planning strategy publicly available. Receive input from the public. Ringholm et al., 2018

Local Government Budget and Fiscal Control Act (North Carolina) Make the proposed budget publicly available. Hold a public hearing before adoption. Berner, 2001

Table 1 demonstrates that participation mandates generally require written plans and citizen feedback. In an in-depth analysis of legal mandates in city planning in 10 U.S. states, Brody et al. (2003) found great variation in the content of the mandates. Some mandates suggested how to involve the public, but most simply required a public hearing with little to no guidance on how to disperse or engage information from the public (Brody et al., 2003). The federal transportation law, SAFETEA-LU, requires a written plan from local transportation agencies on how they plan to involve the public. Others—such as the Norwegian planning mandate and a budgeting mandate in North Carolina listed in Table 1—require making documents publicly available and gathering citizen input. In comparison, the Milwaukee planning mandate requires stronger citizen involvement—interviewing 300 citizens at a minimum.

Although the design and implementation of legal mandates are inconsistent, they can lead to greater citizen involvement in government decision-making (Brody et al., 2003; Newig & Koontz, 2014). These directives ensure citizens are consulted and able to voice their opinions in government decision-making (Brody et al., 2003). Public input can expose government decision-makers to new perspectives on how their decisions will impact the local community (Renn, 1999). Legal mandates for participation can facilitate collaboration among community members by requiring government and citizens to establish a shared goal, create a plan to achieve that goal, and determine how to oversee progress (Newig & Koontz, 2014). Imperatives for public participation also influence local government managers’ efforts to target more stakeholders. In their examination of public involvement in city growth management planning, Brody et al. (2003) found that more-specific mandates (Washington) led to greater involvement from diverse stakeholders including businesses, land developers, and community groups (Brody et al., 2003). Empirical evidence indicates that legally mandated public participation develops more active, more diverse stakeholder participation in government decision-making processes.

In comparison, there is also evidence that legal mandates do little to make government decision-making processes more democratic. Public administrators have substantial discretion over how much public input they allow and how that input influences decisions (Moynihan, 2003; Neshkova & Guo, 2012). Thus, public managers can comply with legal mandates while receiving very little public input (Moynihan, 2003). Legal mandates for participation often only require public hearings, which the public often perceives as a rote exercise that does not influence government (Chess & Purcell, 1999; Renn, 1999). In a qualitative study, citizens participating in a water management project reported that their voices had no impact on government decisions (van der Heijden & ten Heuvelhof, 2013). The same study found that participants also believed that the small group of enthusiastic community members involved in the process were not representative of the general public (van der Heijden & ten Heuvelhof, 2013). Another study using a mail survey of 64 managers of federally funded water initiatives found managers often held public hearings to fulfill legal mandates, but that these hearings did not lead to substantial collaboration (Duram & Brown, 1999). Research shows public managers can dismiss public input and the public input may not be representative of community sentiment.

Though there is mixed empirical evidence on their effectiveness, we hypothesize that legal mandates will generally lead to greater public participation. The empirical evidence relies heavily on case studies to investigate the influence of mandates on participation. These case studies demonstrate that legal mandates can increase participation although this is not always the case. Since legal mandates require a baseline level of a government effort to involve the public, we expect mandates to increase opportunities for the public to engage with the government. Legal mandates should be related to higher levels of public participation in two ways. First, mandates increase opportunities for more diverse stakeholder participation by requiring local governments to create programs and plans aimed at increasing participation.
H1a: Local government departments that are legally mandated to engage the public will have a higher frequency of stakeholder participation than those without mandates.

Second, legal mandates for participation mandate a variety of mechanisms to involve stakeholders in government decision-making. Legal mandates for participation usually require local governments to seek public input and feedback via hearings, notices, advisory committees, or citizen interviews (see Table 1). Mandated participation mechanisms create avenues for citizens to engage in different types of participation activities. These activities can include giving input on government plans and priorities, sharing feedback on service quality and department decisions, and providing oversight. Since legal mandates require public organizations to engage the public through a variety of mechanisms, we expect that local government departments with participation mandates will have citizens involved in more types of participation than departments without a mandate.
H1b: The public will be involved in more types of participation activities in local government departments that are legally mandated to engage the public than those without mandates.

While legal mandates may increase civic engagement, public administrators have a wide range of views of public participation, both good and bad. (Godschalk et al., 2003; Predmore et al., 2011; van der Heijden & ten Heuvelhof, 2013). For example, a qualitative analysis of a survey sent to over 3,000 U.S. federal forest workers found they had both favorable and unfavorable views of public participation (Predmore et al., 2011). Some forest workers reported involving the public was an effective way of reaching consensus (Predmore et al., 2011). Conversely, others indicated involving the public in decision-making led to adopting policies that ran counter to scientific best practices (Predmore et al., 2011). Others voiced concerns that public participation consisted of simply “letting the public speak” and then moving forward with the agency's original plan, rather than fully engaging public input (Predmore et al., 2011). Forest workers reported participation efforts appeased a few concerned, vocal citizens at the expense of providing quality service to all (Predmore et al., 2011). Zhang and Feeney (2018) found local government managers who had a favorable view of public participation were more likely to reach out to citizens using online tools. This research shows managers can have a wide range of views on citizen participation and these views can influence participation outcomes.

Scholars note that negative views of public participation can stem from high transaction costs including time-consuming oversight processes and delays in policy development and implementation (van der Heijden & ten Heuvelhof, 2013). A case study of public participation in natural disaster planning found the process of involving the public led to lengthy delays, goal creep, and underrepresentation of community views (Godschalk et al., 2003). Given the high costs associated with complying with legal mandates and the spectrum of government employee perceptions of legally mandated public participation (Predmore et al., 2011), we hypothesize that manager perceptions of public participation will be related to the amount of public participation that takes place in a local government. We expect more favorable views of public participation by managers will be positively associated with (1) more frequent public participation and (2) more types of participation activities (e.g., input, feedback, oversight).
H2a Manager perceptions of public participation will be positively associated with the frequency of stakeholder participation.

H2b Manager perceptions of public participation will be positively associated with the number of types of public participation.

We also expect that manager perceptions of public participation will moderate the relationship between legal mandates and various types of public participation (e.g., input on planning, feedback and service quality, and oversight). Managers with positive views of participation—who are legally mandated to engage the public—would likely be more vigilant in carrying out mandated public participation requirements than managers with negative views who are also mandated to involve the public. We hypothesize the following:
H3a Manager perceptions of public participation will positively moderate the relationship between legal mandates and frequency of stakeholder participation.

H3b Manager perceptions of public participation will positively moderate the relationship between legal mandates and the number of types of participation.

Figure 1 illustrates the hypothesized relationships tested in this article. We expect that legal mandates will have a positive relationship with public participation. We measure this relationship using two measures of public participation: stakeholder participation (H1a) and participation types (H1b). We also expect that managerial perceptions will be positively associated with both our measures of public participation (H2a, H2b). As manager perceptions may be related to how legal mandates are implemented, we hypothesize that manager perceptions of public participation will positively moderate the relationship between legal mandates and our two forms of public participation (H3a and H3b). The moderation relationship is demonstrated in Figure 1 with managerial perceptions intersecting the relationship between legal mandates and public participation.

Figure 1.
Hypothesized relationships between legal mandates, managerial perceptions, and public participation.

Data and Methodology

Data

We use data from the Center for Science, Technology and Environmental Policy Studies 2018 National Study of Technology Use in Government to test our hypotheses. The population of interest is managers in the city government. The sample consisted of five managers from 500 U.S. municipalities with populations of 25,000 to 250,000, for a total of 2,500 managers. The five managers surveyed from each city were (1) the highest ranked administrator in the mayor's office, (2) the community or economic development director, (3) the finance director, (4) the parks and recreation director, and (5) the deputy police chief. The sample consists of two groups: a random sample of 316 municipalities with populations ranging from 25,000 to 99,999 and a census of all 184 cities with populations of 100,000 to 250,000. The data are weighted to adjust for the sampling approach. Contact information was gathered using websites, direct emails, and phone calls. The web survey was administered April 18, 2018 to August 7, 2018 to a final sample of 2,475 managers, with up to six email reminders and phone calls to encourage participation. Of the 2,475 managers, 297 were ineligible due to administrative leave, retirement, and bad e-mail addresses resulting in a total sample size of 2,178. We received 621 completed surveys from the 2,178 eligible managers resulting in a response rate of 28.5%. Response bias tests show respondents were more likely to be employed under a council-manager form of local government than non-respondents. Lead managers in the mayor's office and finance directors did not respond at the same rate as those in parks and recreation, economic/community development, and police departments. We include controls for a form of government and department type to adjust for potential response bias.

Dependent variables. We have two dependent variables to operationalize public participation: (1) frequency of stakeholder participation and (2) types of participation. Stakeholder Participation is a continuous variable created by averaging responses to a survey question which asked, “Over the last year, how often did the following citizens and stakeholder groups participate in your organization's decision and policy-making?” The Cronbach's alpha for these seven items is .76. [Response categories: very often = 5, often = 4, sometimes = 3, rarely = 2, never = 1, or do not know = 0.] Survey participants answered this question for the following seven groups:
news media

professional associations

interest groups

religious groups

human services nonprofits

neighborhood associations

individual citizens.
To measure the ways that the public participates in government activities, we used responses to a survey question asking, “Over the last year, how often did members of the public contribute the following to your organization?” The Cronbach's alpha for the scale is .83.
Input on long-range plans

Input on service priorities

Feedback on service quality

Formal oversight over your organization

Feedback on department decisions

Input on improving department management and operations

Input on employee conduct.
Respondents indicated how often (very often = 5, often = 4, sometimes = 3, rarely = 2, never = 1) the public participates in each way. We created a binary variable for each participation type sometimes, often, or very often ( = 1) and rarely or never ( = 0). Participation Types is the sum of types of participation (ranges 0 to 7).

Independent Variables

We have two key independent variables. First, Legal Mandate is a binary variable in response to the following question: “Is your organization legally required to include citizen input in policy-making activities?” (yes = 1; no = 0). Respondents who indicated “I Don't Know” were assigned a 0. Manager Perceptions of public participation are the second key independent variable. Manager perceptions are measured by averaging responses to the following three statements. [Response categories: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree]:
People in this organization believe that citizen participation is necessary even if it dramatically slows down government decisions.

People in this organization believe that citizen participation increases government effectiveness.

People in this organization believe it is the government's responsibility to integrate citizens in its deliberation and decision processes.
A higher value indicates a more positive perception of public participation in government decision-making. The Cronbach's alpha for the manager perceptions scale is .81.

Control Variables

Our models control for individual, organizational, and city factors. We control for respondents Job Tenure using a continuous variable for the number of years in their current position, Age with a continuous variable, and self-reported gender with a binary variable, Female ( = 1).

At the organizational level, we control for technology mismatch, centralization, risk-taking, and department type. Access to technology influences public participation by increasing the reach (and lowering the costs) of public managers seeking to engage with the public. When there is no access to a needed technology—or a mismatch between available technology and organizational needs—managers report increased stress and dissatisfaction. We include a variable called Technology Mismatch which is measured as a 5-point agreement scale in response to the statement “there is a mismatch between our department's needs and what technology can provide.”

We control the level of government centralization because centralized governments have more participation than decentralized governments (Jun & Bryer, 2017). Government centralization is the average of responses to three questions that asked participants to indicate their level of agreement (5-point Likert scale) with the following statements: “Top management exerts strong control over this organization”; “There can be little action taken here until a supervisor approves a decision”; and “Even small matters have to be referred to someone higher up for a final answer.” Government departments who engage in more risk-taking have been shown to have higher participation as they are willing to risk a possibility of negative outcomes when engaging with the public (Bovaird, 2007). We measure risk-taking using the average of responses to three survey questions that asked participants how much they agreed or disagreed with the following statements about the level of risk-taking in the respondents’ department: “Most employees in this organization are not afraid to take risks; ‘This organization has a strong commitment to innovation. People who develop innovative solutions to problems are rewarded’; and ‘This organization is a very dynamic and entrepreneurial place. People are willing to stick their necks out and take risks.’” Responses were a 5-point Likert scale. We control for department type with five dummy variables: mayor's office, community development department, parks and recreation, finance department, and police department.

We control for city’s form of government, population, and economic inequality. Research finds that the form of local government is a key factor in public participation. Council-manager governments have more citizen participation than mayor-council governments because professional city managers are more likely to seek citizen input than elected officials (Ebdon & Franklin, 2006). Mayor-council ( = 1) is a binary variable (council-manager ( = 0)). A national survey of local governments demonstrated that governments with more full-time employees had higher citizen participation—likely due to larger governments having more resources (Wang, 2001). We do not have a reliable measure of full-time employee numbers by department. Thus, we use population from the 2017 American Community Survey, which coincides with government size and typically is positively related to citizen input (Yang & Callahan, 2005). The city population is the natural log of the population from the 2017 American Community Survey, a proxy for government size. We use it in our models. Economic inequality in a community is also a predictor of public participation (van Holm, 2019). We control for economic inequality by including county-level Gini coefficients (a common measure for economic inequality). Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for each variable. The correlation matrix is in the Appendix.

Table 2.
Descriptive Statistics.

Variables N Mean SD Min Max

Dependent variables

Stakeholder participation 614 3.282 0.624 1 5

Participation types 621 4.586 1.871 0 7

Independent variable

Legal mandate 553 0.472 0.500 0 1

Manager perceptions 615 3.979 0.748 1 5

Controls

Job tenure, yrs 588 5.821 5.702 0 35

Age 566 51.969 8.234 29 72

Female 621 0.285 0.452 0 1

Technology mismatch 614 2.746 1.140 1 5

Organization centralization 594 2.507 0.696 1 5

Organization risk-taking 594 3.222 0.783 1 5

Mayor's office 621 0.161 0.368 0 1

Community development 621 0.243 0.429 0 1

Parks and recreation 621 0.198 0.399 0 1

Finance 621 0.195 0.396 0 1

Police 621 0.203 0.402 0 1

Mayor-council 621 0.251 0.434 0 1

City population 616 11.314 0.697 10 13

City economic inequality 595 0.464 0.032 0.37 0.55

Methods

We use OLS regression for the models predicting stakeholder participation, a continuous variable. The OLS regression results are presented in Table 3. We ran fit statistics for both models in Table 3 and found we had sufficient fit for Model 1 (R² = 0.25; RMSE = 0.55; F = 12.29 [p < .001]) and Model 2 (R² = 0.25; RMSE = 0.55; F = 11.45 [p < .001]). We use Poisson regression for the models predicting our second dependent variable, participation types, which is a count variable. We use a general Poisson regression model because our count-dependent variable is underdispersed (Harris et al., 2012). The results are presented in Table 4. We find sufficient model fit for Model 1 (Wald Chi² = 89.05 [p < .001]) and Model 2 (Wald Chi² = 89.21 [p < .001]). When assessing the moderating effect of manager perceptions on the relationships between mandates and participation, we include an interaction term for legal mandates and manager perceptions.

Table 3.
OLS Regression on the Relationship Between Legal Mandates and Stakeholder Participation.

(1) (2)

Variables Stakeholder Participation Stakeholder Participation

Legal mandate 0.003 0.309

(0.061) (0.320)

Manager perceptions 0.217 * 0.248 *

(0.040) (0.053)

Legal mandate x manager perceptions −0.075

(0.077)

Job tenure, yrs −0.002 −0.002

(0.004) (0.004)

Age −0.006 −0.006

(0.003) (0.003)

Female 0.192 0.191

(0.061) (0.061)

Technology mismatch 0.049 * 0.049 *

(0.024) (0.024)

Centralization 0.123 0.122

(0.046) (0.045)

Risk-taking 0.071 0.070

(0.043) (0.042)

Mayor's office 0.533 * 0.522 *

(0.093) (0.094)

Community development 0.36 * 0.345 *

(0.099) (0.101)

Parks and recreation 0.217 * 0.202 *

(0.098) (0.100)

Finance 0.151 0.137

(0.092) (0.093)

Mayor-council 0.014 0.016

(0.062) (0.062)

City population 0.085 * 0.086 *

(0.041) (0.041)

Economic inequality 0.148 0.204

(0.936) (0.936)

Constant 0.725 0.587

(0.604) (0.610)

Observations 525 525

R-squared 0.245 0.247

Notes. Robust standard errors are provided within parentheses.

Reference category: police department.

p < .05, p < .01, p < .001.

Table 4.
Poisson Regression Predicting the Number of Ways the Public Participates in Local Government.

(1) (2)

Variables Participation Types Participation Types

Legal mandate −0.003 −0.050

(0.043) (0.261)

Manager perceptions 0.184 * 0.179 *

(0.030) (0.038)

Legal mandate x manager perceptions 0.011

(0.060)

Job tenure, yrs −0.001 −0.001

(0.004) (0.004)

Age −0.004 −0.004

(0.002) (0.002)

Female 0.047 0.047

(0.044) (0.044)

Technology mismatch −0.012 −0.011

(0.018) (0.018)

Centralization 0.059 * 0.059 *

(0.029) (0.029)

Risk-taking 0.024 0.024

(0.027) (0.027)

Mayor's office 0.047 0.048

(0.061) (0.062)

Community development −0.182 −0.180

(0.067) (0.068)

Parks and recreation −0.051 −0.049

(0.060) (0.060)

Finance −0.249 * −0.247 *

(0.073) (0.073)

Mayor-council −0.019 −0.020

(0.046) (0.046)

City population 0.080 0.080

(0.026) (0.026)

Economic inequality 1.149 1.141

(0.599) (0.601)

Constant −0.571 −0.551

(0.432) (0.451)

Observations 527 527

Notes. Robust Standard errors are provided within parentheses.

Reference category: police department.

p < .05, p < .01, p < .001.

Results

The Model 1 results presented in Table 3 indicate that legal mandates are not significantly related to stakeholder participation. We do not find support for H1a; the presence of a legal mandate is not associated with greater stakeholder participation in local government (β = −0.003, p > .05). Table 4, Model 1 presents the results of the Poisson regression for Participation Types. We do not find support for H1b; the presence of a legal mandate is not associated with greater stakeholder participation in local government (β = 0.003, p > .05). The presence of a legal mandate is not significantly related to public participation in local government.

We find support for H2a (Table 3, Model 1) which expected manager perceptions of public participation would be positively associated with greater stakeholder participation (β = 0.217, p < .001). We find support for H2b (see Table 4, Model 1). Manager perceptions of public participation are positively associated with more participation types (β = 0.184, p < .001). Thus, managerial perceptions are positively related to public participation in local government when measured as both frequency of stakeholder participation and participation types.

We do not find support for H3a that manager perceptions will moderate the relationship between legal mandates and frequency of stakeholder participation. The results in Model 2, Table 3 indicate the interaction between legal mandates and manager perceptions does not produce significant results (β = −0.075, p > .05). We do not find support for H3b (Table 4, Model 2). Manager perceptions did not moderate the relationship between legal mandates and participation types (β = 0.011, p > .05). When measuring the frequency of participation, the interaction between legal mandates and manager perceptions (Model 2, Table 3) had a slight impact on the single measures of legal mandates and managerial perceptions. The statistical significance and R² were not considerably altered. Similarly, when predicting participation types, the interaction between legal mandates and manager perceptions (Model 2, Table 4) had little impact on the single measures of legal mandates and manager perceptions.

In all the models, organizational centralization is significantly and positively related to public participation. Population, a proxy for size of government, is also positively related to both frequency of stakeholder participation (population (β = 0.085, p < .05)) and participation types (population (β = 0.08, p < .01)). There are statistically significant differences by department type. Aside from the finance department, all city departments report higher stakeholder participation (Table 3) as compared to police departments. Community development and finance departments had more participation types (Table 4) compared to police departments. The regression results in Table 2 indicate other correlates with participation frequency. Female managers report greater stakeholder participation (β = 0.192, p < .01) and organizational technology mismatch (β = 0.049, p < .05) is significantly associated with greater stakeholder participation.

Discussion

The model’s evidence that the legal approach to advance public participation may not be an effective tactic in local government. Having a legal mandate is not significantly related to the frequency of stakeholder participation or the number of ways the public engages. These findings align with previous research that shows legal mandates require too little of local governments and do not lead to substantial change (Chess & Purcell, 1999; Duram & Brown, 1999; Renn, 1999; van der Heijden & ten Heuvelhof, 2013). These findings suggest that those seeking to stimulate citizen participation in local government need to do more than simply dictate public participation through mandates. For example, lawmakers could do more to provide in-depth guidelines on the types of actions local government managers should take to engage more with constituents. Public managers could do more to fully engage the public using multiple mechanisms. It is also possible that legal mandates are not related to greater public participation because public participation is already happening. Perhaps the norms and values of local governments across the US encourage the same level of public participation regardless of mandates. Whatever the case, legal mandates in city departments are not related to participation intensity, measured as frequency and type.

Conversely, the managerial approach is a more effective strategy for improving public participation. Manager perceptions matter for public participation in local government. This highlights the crucial role managers play in facilitating public participation. To effectuate more participation in government, politicians and other lawmakers may be better advised to empower managers who are committed to and passionate about involving the public in local government decision-making. Manager perceptions of public participation do not moderate the relationship between legal mandates and public participation. The lack of moderation shows that legal mandate ineffectiveness is not significantly related to managerial apathy towards public participation. Rather, legal mandates appear to have little influence on public participation regardless of manager attitudes and beliefs. Thus, policy influencing manager attitudes and behaviors towards public participation can be a much more effective route for those hoping to increase public participation in local government.

Our findings inform previous research on related local government factors that influence public participation. We find that centralization is positively associated with public participation. More centralized government and higher levels of income inequality are both positively associated with higher levels of stakeholder participation. This adds more evidence to previous findings on the relationship between participation and organizational centralization (Jun & Bryer, 2017). We also find that population is positively related to public participation. This gives some credence to the notion that larger governments have more resources to devote towards engaging the public. Some scholars argue that technology can lower the costs of public engagement (Nabatchi & Amsler, 2014), which may be a factor in how managers perceive public engagement. In our analysis, technology mismatch was significantly related to stakeholder participation, but not to participation types. We do not find that organizational risk-taking is positively associated with public participation (Bovaird, 2007). Previous research showed that Council-Manager local governments have higher citizen participation (Ebdon & Franklin, 2006), but we do not find significant differences in public participation by the form of government.

This research has a few limitations. We use manager-reported levels of public participation. While managers are well-positioned to report on the level of public participation in their department, our findings could be enhanced by surveying other members of local government departments and the general public. An objective measure of public participation such as attendance at public forums would also bolster our findings—although access to this information across a nationally-representative sample is difficult to obtain. Our findings are also limited by the cross-sectional nature of our data—we cannot test for causation or change over time. Finally, we do not have data on the content of the legal mandates that guide the local government departments in our study. We cannot account for differences in participation outcomes that result from each mandate specifically, but instead, examine the general trends and relationships between the presence of a legal mandate and public participation.

Conclusion

This study has research and practical implications for public participation in local government. The presence of a legal mandate is not significantly related to public participation frequency or type. Overall, our results indicate the limits of legal mandates in cultivating public participation. Though it is possible that our general measure of mandates misses the nuanced effects of certain types of mandates. Future research should seek to better interrogate specific types of mandates to determine if there are components of legal mandates that increase civic engagement. While mandates are not significantly related to frequency or type of participation, our findings indicate managerial perceptions of participation play a key role in public participation in local government. Increasing positive experiences with public participation and better training public managers to engage the public could be a good investment of resources. Lawmakers could increase positive citizen-government interactions by focusing on managerial training, culture, and norms. Finally, scholars should further assess how managers influence the relationships between legal mandates and participation outcomes. It appears that mandates themselves are less important than the ways in which public managers implement them. Future research should consider the ways cultural and normative aspects of local government departments and management are related to public participation.

These findings are also relevant to public administration theory, which centers around three conflicting approaches: legal, managerial, and political (Rosenbloom, 2016). We find the managerial view, as compared to the legal view, may be the most appropriate for explaining differences in public participation in local government. Our results show the important role public managers play in public participation efforts in local government. Managerial perceptions inevitably drive their behavior. Whether or not departments have legal mandates, managerial perceptions matter for civic engagement. The next steps for practice include increasing managerial training and skill sets to ensure meaningful engagement and providing leaders with the appropriate technological tools to effectively reach more, diverse stakeholders. While we did not collect data from the perspectives of stakeholders, it is important to note the critical role that individuals and groups make in advocating for public participation in government decision-making. Community members can increase participation by attending public hearings, demanding more effective engagement processes, and working with public managers to ensure participation is meaningful and improves public outcomes. The public can have a strong impact on government and policy outcomes by working directly with public managers. While community members could use other legal and political avenues to influence change, working directly with public managers can be a fruitful approach to advancing civic engagement.

Mandate Example	What is Mandated	Source
State growth management legislation	Public hearings, public notices, advertising, advisory committees.	Brody et al., 2003
Federal Transportation Law (SAFETEA-LU)	Requires a written plan on how the public will be involved.	Slotterback, 2008
Neighborhood Strategic Planning program (Milwaukee)	Interview at least 300 citizens when creating program.	Ghose, 2005
Norwegian Planning and Building Act	Make planning strategy publicly available. Receive input from the public.	Ringholm et al., 2018
Local Government Budget and Fiscal Control Act (North Carolina)	Make the proposed budget publicly available. Hold a public hearing before adoption.	Berner, 2001

Variables	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Dependent variables
Stakeholder participation	614	3.282	0.624	1	5
Participation types	621	4.586	1.871	0	7
Independent variable
Legal mandate	553	0.472	0.500	0	1
Manager perceptions	615	3.979	0.748	1	5
Controls
Job tenure, yrs	588	5.821	5.702	0	35
Age	566	51.969	8.234	29	72
Female	621	0.285	0.452	0	1
Technology mismatch	614	2.746	1.140	1	5
Organization centralization	594	2.507	0.696	1	5
Organization risk-taking	594	3.222	0.783	1	5
Mayor's office	621	0.161	0.368	0	1
Community development	621	0.243	0.429	0	1
Parks and recreation	621	0.198	0.399	0	1
Finance	621	0.195	0.396	0	1
Police	621	0.203	0.402	0	1
Mayor-council	621	0.251	0.434	0	1
City population	616	11.314	0.697	10	13
City economic inequality	595	0.464	0.032	0.37	0.55

	(1)		(2)
Legal mandate	0.003		0.309
	(0.061)		(0.320)
Manager perceptions	0.217	***	0.248	***
	(0.040)		(0.053)
Legal mandate x manager perceptions			−0.075
			(0.077)
Job tenure, yrs	−0.002		−0.002
	(0.004)		(0.004)
Age	−0.006		−0.006
	(0.003)		(0.003)
Female	0.192	**	0.191	**
	(0.061)		(0.061)
Technology mismatch	0.049	*	0.049	*
	(0.024)		(0.024)
Centralization	0.123	**	0.122	**
	(0.046)		(0.045)
Risk-taking	0.071		0.070
	(0.043)		(0.042)
Mayor's office	0.533	***	0.522	***
	(0.093)		(0.094)
Community development	0.36	***	0.345	***
	(0.099)		(0.101)
Parks and recreation	0.217	*	0.202	*
	(0.098)		(0.100)
Finance	0.151		0.137
	(0.092)		(0.093)
Mayor-council	0.014		0.016
	(0.062)		(0.062)
City population	0.085	*	0.086	*
	(0.041)		(0.041)
Economic inequality	0.148		0.204
	(0.936)		(0.936)
Constant	0.725		0.587
	(0.604)		(0.610)
Observations	525		525
R-squared	0.245		0.247

	(1)		(2)
Legal mandate	−0.003		−0.050
	(0.043)		(0.261)
Manager perceptions	0.184	***	0.179	***
	(0.030)		(0.038)
Legal mandate x manager perceptions			0.011
			(0.060)
Job tenure, yrs	−0.001		−0.001
	(0.004)		(0.004)
Age	−0.004		−0.004
	(0.002)		(0.002)
Female	0.047		0.047
	(0.044)		(0.044)
Technology mismatch	−0.012		−0.011
	(0.018)		(0.018)
Centralization	0.059	*	0.059	*
	(0.029)		(0.029)
Risk-taking	0.024		0.024
	(0.027)		(0.027)
Mayor's office	0.047		0.048
	(0.061)		(0.062)
Community development	−0.182	**	−0.180	**
	(0.067)		(0.068)
Parks and recreation	−0.051		−0.049
	(0.060)		(0.060)
Finance	−0.249	***	−0.247	***
	(0.073)		(0.073)
Mayor-council	−0.019		−0.020
	(0.046)		(0.046)
City population	0.080	**	0.080	**
	(0.026)		(0.026)
Economic inequality	1.149		1.141
	(0.599)		(0.601)
Constant	−0.571		−0.551
	(0.432)		(0.451)
Observations	527		527

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Jared Olsen

Author Biographies

Jared Olsen is a Public Administration and Policy doctoral candidate at Arizona State University. His research focuses on local government, street-level bureaucracy, and political bias.

Mary K. Feeney is professor and Lincoln Professor of Ethics in Public Affairs. She is the editor of the Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory and a Fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration. Her research focuses on public and nonprofit management and science and technology policy.

Appendix

Correlation Matrix

	1	x	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
1. Stakeholder participation	1
2. Participation types	0.33	1
3. Legal mandate	0.18	0.03	1
4. Manager perceptions	0.30	0.30	0.24	1
5. Job tenure, yrs	−0.03	−0.06	−0.03	0.08	1
6. Age	−0.07	−0.06	−0.01	0.07	0.35	1
7. Female	0.13	0.03	0.06	0.04	−0.03	−0.08	1
8. Technology mismatch	0.06	−0.02	0.07	−0.10	−0.09	−0.10	0.09	1
9. Centralization	0.08	0.02	0.00	−0.12	0.02	−0.06	−0.05	0.14	1
10. Risk-taking	0.02	0.07	0.00	0.16	−0.01	0.07	−0.09	−0.27	−0.44	1
11. Mayor's office	0.21	0.15	0.12	0.07	−0.06	0.02	−0.08	−0.13	0.02	0.10	1
12. Community development	0.11	−0.05	0.34	0.13	0.05	0.02	0.12	0.06	0.01	−0.10	−0.25	1
13. Parks and recreation	0.00	0.11	−0.01	0.15	0.12	−0.01	0.09	0.13	−0.09	0.00	−0.22	−0.28	1
14. Finance	−0.29	0.00	−0.40	−0.32	−0.14	−0.01	−0.23	−0.06	−0.05	0.13	−0.22	−0.29	−0.25	1
15. Police	−0.02	−0.19	−0.07	−0.03	0.02	−0.01	0.09	−0.01	0.12	−0.12	−0.22	−0.28	−0.24	−0.25	1
16. Mayor-council	0.00	−0.09	−0.05	−0.05	0.07	−0.05	0.04	0.01	0.13	−0.14	−0.02	0.03	−0.04	0.01	0.02	1
17. City population	0.13	0.17	0.02	0.14	−0.09	0.01	0.08	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.00	−0.03	0.01	−0.03	0.06	−0.07	1
18. Economic inequality	0.02	0.03	−0.01	−0.02	−0.02	0.04	0.07	0.01	0.10	−0.12	−0.05	0.01	0.02	−0.04	0.05	0.06	0.06

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