Sanctions on Local Government Officials: Evidence from China

Abstract

Sanctions play a pivotal role in ensuring accountability among local government officials. The existing literature, however, falls short in characterizing sanction measures and examining how sanction decisions are made in practice. We address this critical research gap by leveraging an innovative data set encompassing all sanction announcements against local officials during the most recent public health crisis in China. Beyond a rich descriptive analysis of sanction measures, our empirical analysis consistently indicates that, at the city level, the application of sanctions follows the principle of “the nail that sticks out gets hammered down first”. At the individual level, we find that poor managerial performance and central government on-site inspections escalate the punitive degree of sanctions on senior local leaders, while political patronage appears to mitigate the severity of sanctions and potentially influence their political career.

Keywords

sanction measures public accountability local government political selection

Get full access to this article

View all access options for this article.

References

Aleksovska

Schillemans

Grimmelikhuijsen

(2021). Management of multiple accountabilities through setting priorities: Evidence from a cross-national conjoint experiment. Public Administration Review, 82(1), 132–146. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13357

Attorney-General's Chambers of Singapore. (1996). Singapore public service regulations. Accessed December 21, 2025, from https://sso.agc.gov.sg/SL-Rev/CONS1963-RG1/Published/19990701?DocDate=19960515.

Behn

R. D.

(2001). Rethinking Democratic Accountability. Brookings Institution Press.

Bevan

Hood

(2006). What’s measured is what matters: Targets and gaming in the English public health care system. Public Administration, 84(3), 517–538. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.2006.00600.x

Bovens

(2007). Analysing and assessing accountability: A conceptual framework. European Law Journal, 13(4), 447–468.

Bovens

Schillemans

Goodin

(2014). Public accountability. In Bovens

Goodin

Schillemans

(Eds.), The Oxford handbook of public accountability (pp. 1–20). Oxford University Press.

Brandsma

G. J.

(2010). Backstage Europe: Comitology, accountability and democracy in the European Union. In Dissertation (pp. 1–279). Utrecht University.

Dittmer

Y.-S.

(1995). The modernization of factionalism in Chinese politics. World Politics, 47(4), 467–494. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887100015185

Dubnick

Yang

(2011). The pursuit of accountability: Promise, problems, and prospects. In & H. White

D. Menzel

(Ed.), The state of public administration: Issue, challenges, opportunities (pp. 171–186). M.E. Sharpe.

10.

Gao

(2015). Pernicious manipulations of performance measures in China’s cadre evaluation system. The China Quarterly, 223(September), 618–637. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741015000806

11.

Gao

(2021). Mitigating pernicious gaming in performance management in China: Dilemmas, strategies and challenges. Public Performance & Management Review, 44(2), 321–351. https://doi.org/10.1080/15309576.2020.1775662

12.

Gong

(2009). Audit for accountability in China: An incomplete mission. The Australian Journal of Public Administration, 68(1), 5–16. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8500.2009.00617.x

13.

Grant

Keohane

(2005). Accountability and abuses of power in world politics. American Political Science Review, 99(1), 29–43. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055405051476

14.

A. J.

Shi

Liu

(2020). Crisis governance, Chinese style: Distinctive features of China’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Policy Design and Practice, 3(3), 242–258. https://doi.org/10.1080/25741292.2020.1799911

15.

Hong

Kim

(2019). Loyalty or competence: Political use of performance information and negativity bias. Public Administration Review, 79(6), 829–840. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13108

16.

Hood

James

Scott

Jones

G. W.

Travers

(1999). Regulation inside Government: Waste Watchers, Quality Police, and Sleaze-Busters. Oxford University Press.

17.

(2017). Accountability of public servants under dominant political settlements of China: Effects, challenges, and issues. International Journal of Public Administration, 40(3), 240–255. https://doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2015.1107735

18.

Information Office of the State Council. (2020). China's Novel Coronavirus Pneumonia Outbreak: White Paper. http://www.scio.gov.cn/ztk/dtzt/42313/43142/index.htm.

19.

Jia

Kudamatsu

Seim

(2015). Political selection in China: The complementary roles of connections and performance. Journal of the European Economic Association, 13(4), 631–668. https://doi.org/10.1111/jeea.12124

20.

Jiang

(2018). Making bureaucracy work: Patronage networks, performance incentives, and economic development in China. American Journal of Political Science, 62(4), 982–999. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199641253.001.0001

21.

Kuipers

Hart

(2014). Accounting for crisis. In Bovens

Goodin

Schillemans

(Eds.), Oxford handbook of public accountability (pp. 589–602). Oxford University Press.

22.

Landry

P. F.

(2008). Decentralized authoritarianism in China: The communist party’s control of local elites in the post-Mao era. Cambridge University Press.

23.

Landry

P. F.

Lü

Duan

(2018). Does performance matter? Evaluating political selection along the Chinese administrative ladder. Comparative Political Studies, 51(8), 1074–1105. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414017730078

24.

Zhou

L.-A.

(2005). Political turnover and economic performance: The incentive role of personnel control in China. Journal of Public Economics, 89(9-10), 1743–1762. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.06.009

25.

Lindberg

S. I.

(2013). Mapping accountability: Core concept and subtypes. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 79(2), 202–226. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020852313477761

26.

Liston-Heyes

Juillet

(2022). What has become of the audit explosion? Analyzing trends in oversight activities in the Canadian government. Public Administration, 100(4), 1073–1090. https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12793

27.

Manion Melanie. (2023). Political Selection in China: Rethinking Foundations and Findings. Cambridge University Press.

28.

Martinez-Bravo

Padró i Miquel

Qian

Yao

(2022). The rise and fall of local elections in China. American Economic Review, 112(9), 2921–2958. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20181249

29.

Mulgan

(2003). Holding Power to Account: Accountability in Modern Democracies. Palgrave Macmillan UK.

30.

National Audit Office. (2008). The Use of Sanctions and Rewards in The Public Sector. https://www.nao.org.uk/reports/the-use-of-sanctions-and-rewards-in-the-public-sector-4/#downloads.

31.

Wang

(2018). The separation of powers and responsibilities and avoidance of responsibility at the grass-roots level: A theoretical explanation. Social Sciences in China (5), 116–135. (in Chinese).

32.

People’s Daily. (2008). Yearender - China Focus: ‘Accountability’ Downfall of Many Officials in 2008. (http://en.people.cn/90001/90776/90785/6565017.html.).

33.

Philip

(2009). Delimiting democratic accountability. Political Studies, 57(1), 28–53. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2008.00720.x

34.

Power

(1999). The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification. Oxford University Press.

35.

Przeworski

Stokes

S. C.

Manin

(1999). Democracy, Accountability and Representation. Cambridge University Press.

36.

Research Office of Legislative Council of the Hong Kong. (2021). Monitoring of civil service performance in Singapore and South Korea. Accessed December 21, 2025, from https://www.legco.gov.hk/research-publications/english/2021in11-monitoring-of-civil-service-performance-in-singapore-and-south-korea-20210526-e.pdf.

37.

Romzek

B. S.

Dubnick

M. J.

(1987). Accountability in the public sector: Lessons from the challenger tragedy. Public Administration Review, 47(3), 227–238.

38.

Rosenthal

‘t Hart

Charles

M. T.

(1989). The world of crises and crisis management. In Rosenthal

Charles

M. T.

Hart

P. T.

(Eds.), Coping with crises: The management of disasters, riots and terrorism (pp. 3–33). Springfield.

39.

Schedler

(1999). Conceptualizing accountability. In Schedler

Diamond

Plattner

M. F.

(Eds.), The self-restraining state: Power and accountability in new democracies (pp. 13–28). Lynne Rienner.

40.

Shi

(2018). Race to safety: Political competition, neighborhood effects, and coal mine deaths in China. Journal of Development Economics, 131, 79–95. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2017.10.008

41.

Shih

Adolph

Liu

(2012). Getting ahead in the communist party: Explaining the advancement of central committee members in China. American Political Science Review, 106(1), 166–187. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055411000566

42.

Tian

, et al. (2020). An investigation of transmission control measures during the first 50 days of the COVID-19 epidemic in China. Science, 368(6491), 638–642. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abb6105

43.

Gong

(2021). Accountability intensity and Bureaucrats’ response to conflicting expectations: A survey experiment in China. Public Management Review, 24(7), 1779–1801. https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2021.1930123

44.

Wang

Xiao

Yan

(2021). New development: Administrative accountability and early responses during public health crises—lessons from COVID-19 in China. Public Money & Management, 41(1), 73–76. https://doi.org/10.1080/09540962.2020.1819012

45.

Warren

(2014). Accountability and democracy. In Bovens

Goodin

Schillemans

(Eds.), Oxford handbook of public accountability (pp. 39–53). Oxford University Press.

46.

Wooldridge

J. M.

(2010). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. The MIT press.

47.

(2011). The fundamental institutions of China’s reforms and development. Journal of Economic Literature, 49(4), 1076–1151. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.49.4.1076

48.

(2023). Wrestling with multiple accountabilities in times of crisis: Findings from the experiences of Chinese local governments in responding to COVID-19. Review of Policy Research, 43(1). https://doi.org/10.1111/ropr.12573

49.

Chen

(2025). Does negative feedback on financial performance affect managerial turnover? Public Management Review, 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2025.2456665

50.

Zang

(2017). How cohesive is the Chinese bureaucracy? A case study of street-level bureaucrats in China: Street-level bureaucrats in China. Public Administration and Development, 37(3), 217–226. https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.1790

51.

Zhou

(2004). The incentive and cooperation of government officials in the political tournaments: An interpretation of the prolonged local protectionism and duplicative investments in China. Economic Research Journal, 6, 33–40. (in Chinese).

52.

Zhou

(2007). Governing China's local officials: An analysis of promotion tournament model. Economic Research Journal, 7, 36–50. (in Chinese).

53.

Zhou

(2008). Collusion among local governments: The institutional logic of a government behavior. Sociological Studies, 6, 1–21. (in Chinese).

54.

Zhou

(2017). The institutional logic of governance in China: An organizational approach. SDX Joint Publishing Company. (in Chinese).