My Iranian Road Trip – Comments and Reflections on Videographic Interpretations of Iran’s Political Economy and Marketing System

Peterson Comments: Exchange with Iran – The Western Academy Is Very Important Now

In 2006 and 2008, I made week-long visits to Damascus, Syria. The scenes of commercial life in Nicholas Kristof’s 2012 video tour of Iran struck me as similar to those I saw in Syria. Unlike Chinese cities where global brands are evident in signage and in products in stores, Syrians move about their commercial spaces without these global brands. Local ones are abundant, though. I remember thinking while being driven around Damascus by new friends that the entire commercial landscape could be a control condition for an experiment in globalization because global marketing as done in the West really had not arrived in Damascus. There were plenty of Lada cars from Russia and Chery cars from China, though.

The most frequently visible local brand was the one for the government represented by oversized statues and wall-murals of Hafez al-Assad who ruled as a dictator of the country from 1971–2000. Occasionally, al-Assad’s son, Bashar – the current ruler of Syria – was depicted. While stopped in traffic at a major intersection near the wall of the old city of Damascus, I asked my cab driver to translate the words on one of these wall-murals of Bashar, with an enormous Syrian flag unfurled in the wind behind him. The cab driver slowly translated, “God Fights Against Our Enemies.”

In Iran, the Ayotollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who ruled Iran with an iron hand from 1979 until his death in 1989, still can be seen in oversized murals. One image from the 2013 Academy Award-winning movie Argo captures this branding, evident in Tehran during the time of the Iranian Revolution (see Figure 1). The movie retells a story of a non-violent CIA mission to rescue six U.S. State Department workers caught in Iran during the early days of the Khomeini regime, in 1979 and 1980. Similar wall-art can be seen in Kristof’s tour of Iran, as shown in Figure 2. Syria and Iran are thus similar in having few global brands of the West, but one dominant brand – the icon of the government.

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Figure 1.

Actor Ben Affleck, portraying CIA operative Tony Mendez, walks through Tehran airport in the movie Argo, in front of a wall-art image of an icon – Ayatollah Khomeini – of the Iranian government (Warner Brothers 2012).

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Figure 2.

Wall-mural of the Ayatollah Khomeini, from Nicholas Kristof’s My Iranian Road Trip (Kristof 2012).

The Iranian government established by Khomeini has proved to be a durable brand, despite its antagonizing stance toward regional neighbors and Western powers. Through its pursuit of nuclear weapons, through its projection of power into Lebanon (via its ally, Hezbollah), through its alliance with al-Assad’s government in Syria, and through its fomenting of unrest in Bahrain, Iran is more of a destabilizing influence in the Middle East today than in the time of Khomeini.

In October 2012, the US CENTCOM commander, Marine General James Mattis, visited the University of Wyoming and gave a public address to the university community. CENTCOM’s geographical area of responsibility extends from Egypt eastward to Pakistan and includes Iran. The first question from an audience member during the question-and-answer time following Mattis’s talk was the following: “What keeps you (Mattis) up late at night, worrying?” Mattis’s immediate response was simple: “Iran, Iran, Iran.” This answer is noteworthy when considering that, at the time, Afghanistan and Iraq were two countries in CENTCOM’s area of responsibility, in which thousands of U.S. troops lived and worked each day. Mattis did not mention either of these countries.

Countries concerned about Iran’s potential threat have placed embargoes on trade with firms from Iran. Leaders of American firms caught trading goods and services with Iranian firms are subject to a $1 million fine and up to a 20-year jail term (U.S. Department of the Treasury 2012). This is not a hand slap. It is a harsh penalty to be served in a federal prison system with no parole possible. The sanctions even snare U.S. businesses helping opposition leaders in Iran. Just Host, a U.S. web-hosting service had to shut down the web page of Mehdi Karoubi, a reformist cleric, in August 2013 (Torbati 2013). When Karoubi disputed the re-election vote for Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2009, protests broke out across Iran. At the time of this writing, both Karoubi and Mirhossein Mousavi have been held under house arrest since February 2011.

Non-US firms can be subject to sanctions by the U.S., as well. The U.S. Treasury Department blacklisted a United Arab Emirates company in May 2013 because of its trade with Iran (Constance 2013). This signals that firms from any country should watch their own dealings with Iran or face exclusion from the U.S.

Other countries have responded similarly to Iran since Iran’s drive for acquiring nuclear weapons accelerated in 2010. Canada actually imposed a total ban on trade with Iran in 2013 that is more restrictive than the U.S.’s ban (Vieira 2013). The EU has tightened its embargo against Iran, but has stopped short of a total ban on trade with Iran.

Although Iran exports petroleum, chemical and petrochemical products, fruits and nuts as well as carpets, most of these exports in 2012 went to its leading trade partners, China, India, Turkey, South Korea and Japan (CIA 2013). In the same year, Iran imported industrial supplies, capital goods, foodstuffs and other consumer goods, and technical services from these same trade partners, as well as from the United Arab Emirates. Looking to the future, former enemy Iraq agreed to buy $3.7 billion of natural gas per year from Iran (EuroInvestor 2013).

During the era of embargoès imposed by Western countries on trade with Iran, two of Iran’s few exports that have made it to the West are movies and college students. These cultural exports come under the category of education and humanitarian aid. Director Asghar Farhadi’s A Separation won the Academy Award in the Foreign Film category in 2012, the first Iranian film to do so (Grover 2012). Other acclaimed works by Iranian filmmakers in recent years include Children of Heaven, Colour of Paradise, Taste of Cherry, and About Elly. Posters for these movies can be seen in Figure 3. Unlike high-budget films infused with computer-generated special effects, Iranian films that have become popular in the West tend to be artistic works, with low budgets and a focus on character development and dramatic movement accomplished through dialogue and cinematography. For those Westerners desiring artistic accomplishment in movies without an R-rating, a night viewing an Iranian movie could very well provide what Hollywood only occasionally attempts these days.

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Figure 3.

A montage of highly regarded artistic movies from Iran, produced and released in recent years.

College students from Iran provide a particularly accessible export for those in the academy. Iranian students attend universities of the West by the thousands (Torbati 2010). If Iranians are not in your classroom, a Persian students’ club is probably on your campus. When considering the sanctions against doing trade with Iran, college teachers have more direct access to Iranians than do most business people. In fact, teachers and staff at universities in the West now have one of the only ways left for Iranians to interact with people of the West.

Friendship and hospitality should be extended to these Iranians who have overcome all bureaucratic hurdles to be with us in the West. These students will likely not return to Iran until they complete their degree or degrees. This is because of the precariousness of obtaining a visa for re-entry to a Western country. These Iranians will have lots of time around campus during holidays because of their limited budgets and inability to travel abroad.

I now call on Nicholas Kristof to do a 15-minute video focused on Iranian students’ perspectives of life in Western countries in which they study. He could even ask these Iranian young people what they miss about their home country. I think capturing these expatriate-perspectives would be valuable for enabling Westerners to understand that there still is a lifeline between the West and Iran. Although this line is thin, the academy is where Iranians can now actually touch the West and its people. In a time of intensifying political tensions with Iran, this story needs to be told to give all of us hope for better days with Iranians in the future, when full trade has been restored.

Zwick Comments: Missing the 30-year old link – Kristof and the hopes of the West for Iran

Kristof’s (2012) short video of a road trip through Iran makes two important political points, one of which is contentious while the other is not. The first message Kristof wants to convey is that (now former) Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who liked to position himself as hero of the Islamist poor, is (was) in fact a corrupt and oppressive dictator willing to curtail personal freedoms as part of his own populist brand of Islamo-Fascism and who tries to deflect attention away from his repressive and failing political and economic agenda by fighting symbolic and largely pointless battles with the United States. All of this is on the backs of the Iranian people while holding back economic development. Kristof makes however a second and, among the hawks in the U.S., much more controversial point about Ahmadinejad’s Iran, namely that despite all of the crazed president’s shortcomings, the worst thing the U.S. could do now is to attack Iran because all that would do is actually strengthen Ahmadinejad’s position in the country. I think both of these observations are absolutely correct, even though they come from the false position of a journalist who detected in the 2009 protests a pro-western reform movement along the lines of the “color revolutions” in Eastern Europe. In a short but revealing reference to the 2009 protests, Kristof detects in them a clear expression of a reaction to the Khomeini revolution and a desire for a liberal, democratic, and secular Iran liberated from the Islamic fundamentalism of the ayatollahs and Ahmadinejad. Three years later, at the time of his road trip, Kristof is clearly disappointed to find these desires either repressed or expressed in roundabout ways. He still finds them everywhere he looks (Calvin Klein belts, the frustrated capitalist, exasperated women on the beach). But here it might be useful to question whether this sort of reduction of the protests to a quest for personal freedom and a market economy misses the true nature of the 2009 protests.

We should keep in mind that Ahmadinejad’s blend of absurd self-importance and coldblooded power politics worries the ayatollahs in his own country at least as much as western and regional leaders (Zizek 2009a). His distribution of crumbs to the poor is little more than a cynical gesture compared to his main tools of ruling the country, an oppressive police force, a PR machine, and the corrupt Revolutionary Guard that has amassed large parts of the nation’s wealth (Zizek 2009a).

Leftist supporters of the president often cite his determination to defend independence against foreign imperialists, fight elite corruption, or redistribute oil wealth to the poor and that he is in fact loved by the majority (while Mir-Hossein Mousavi, in contrast, would be the person backed by the middle class, the minority). This view of the Ahmadinejad supporters ignores factual reality. Consider, for example, the high electoral participation (up from the usual 55 percent to 85 percent), which can only be explained as a protest vote against Ahmadinejad, or the inability of the president's supporters to understand the mass demonstrations as a genuine expression of popular will against Ahmadinejad (Zizek 2009b).

As the crushed 2009 uprising has shown, many Iranians desire something different, but what exactly that is and how and where to look for it Kristof does not quite understand in my view. He looks for signs of the liberal, secular Iran, an Iran that makes sense to him, that fits into a world where sleeveless bathing suits and Calvin Klein are the only universal language left.

But in his quest for the secular and liberal, Kristof asks questions on the level of a 9^th grader, curious but rather naïve: do you envy American women or not? Are real Nike shoes better to impress women than fake ones? Have you lost hope? He essentially asks questions that probe at anything except the real messiness of social economic and political life in Iran. And he starts out with a question that we already know the answer to: how popular is the regime, really? (Well, his first question is the one about the sleeved bathing suits and the woman who responds to it made her feelings about the astuteness of that question quite clear, in my view). We do not need to test a claim made by the government about its popularity; we know it is made-up. But that is hardly the point. The important question is what do Iranians desire? And here Kristof remains firmly tied to his ideological apparatus of desire as expressed through individual freedoms and consumption.

Nevertheless, through his questions we do learn a lot about Kristof’s own hopes (and he might be the one who lost hope). He wants a country that respects human rights and offers the kind of personal freedom of expression common to, say, the United States, a place with the right to make and spend money freely, a fun place with its enviably sleeveless women. He seems to long for the days several decades ago, I suspect, before or right after the revolution, when young people were having wild parties and before the revolution was stifled by the Islamists.

I have generally nothing against wild parties. But in Kristof’s account the struggle for political emancipation and self-determination becomes reduced to questions about Nike shoes and whether beaches should be co-ed. The very real political struggle becomes displaced and reappears in Kristof in a form that hides its origin. Questions – such as what kind of state or country do we want to live in; what form of government do we want; and who should get what? – are thus turned into something else.

One short glimpse is provided of the kind of desires and energy that drove the 2009 protests. A man expresses his frustration with a lack of political representation. It is suffocating. Is not this what the Khomeini revolution was all about at its roots before the Islamists corrupted it? So perhaps the protests are, as Zizek (2009b) maintains, the return of the repressed, the desire for emancipation from the fascistic regime of the shah, soon betrayed by the hardline Islamic takeover. What Kristof should be looking for then is something infinitely deeper than consumer desires. The 1979 revolution was initially full of political vitality, an explosion of political and social creativity, organizational experiments and debates among students and ordinary people. “The fact that this explosion was stifled demonstrates that the Khomeini revolution was (in Badiou’s [2003] terms), an authentic political event, a momentary opening that unleashed new forces of social transformation, a moment in which ‘everything seemed possible’” (Zizek 2009b, p. 19). At least in this sense, Kristof’s account is as far removed from unearthing the link between 2009 and 1979 as Tehran is from Malibu.

Atik Comments: An Analysis of Kristof’s Perspectives on Iran’s Marketing System

Nicholas Kristof’s 13 minute, 53 second videography offers a nice, but brief overview of the marketing system in Iran. Some valuable observations can be made, but many issues still remain unknown. On one hand, it is hard to criticize Kristof from an academic standpoint since he probably did not intend to conduct a scientific research on the market system of Iran, but instead intended to report some of his observations. In that sense, he makes a nice contribution to our knowledge of Iran where it is highly challenging, difficult, or even dangerous to collect any kind of data, due to the authoritarian regime in which exists “fear of speech” instead of “freedom of speech.” Therefore, any kinds of data collected, even partial, can be valuable, at this point.

On the other hand, if this were a scientific study, one could easily question how much bias is involved in the interpretations. For instance, Kristof asks manipulative questions such as: “Do you envy American women?” From such a question, one could assume that all Iranian women are unhappy with their conditions, and all American women are happy and represent the ideal. Both assumptions are debatable. Although, if circumstances allowed, many could desire to stand up for their rights, some Iranian women could be at peace (partially or fully) with their conditions due to cultural differences, while those who would like to stand up may desire a different format from the proposed American ideal, which is often portrayed in pop-culture films. Only in-depth research could allow us to see some of these dynamics, which would enable us to understand the inner desires and feelings of women, about their current conditions.

Kristof further asks: “Every smart young Iranian wants to go abroad, do you?” Given that Iran is a relatively large country with 5000 years of rich history, despite how it looks from the outside due to the authoritarian regime, much can be discovered about Iranian culture (e.g., music, literature, food, art, way-of-life). It is not easy to leave one’s country, and the solution may not always be to leave one’s homeland. If everybody goes abroad, who will remain to end the injustices of the current regime and to protect this rich culture?

Kristof further states: “We give money to Pakistan; they are hostile to us while in Iran, although we have bans, some people are nice to Americans.” One may wonder what criteria incite hostility or sympathy towards another culture. Money is certainly not the only criterion. Considering the interview-style of Kristof in his inquiries, it seems as if he may have an American bias.

To reduce bias and subsequently erroneous conclusions, longitudinal ethnographic research – making observations, collecting systematic field notes, and conducting in-depth interviews with different members of the market system (e.g., consumers, producers, retailers, and policy makers) – would be highly suitable if we are to develop a deeper understanding of this closed, relatively unknown market system. In the case of Iran, such an extended and in-depth study may be challenging to conduct due to the restrictions of the people and many people’s fears of authorities. However, as scholars, we can take initial steps by, for instance, studying Iranians outside Iran, understanding their perspectives, and making connections inside the country for potential interviews and observations.

Videographic research, while useful, has disadvantages and limitations. For example, in democratic societies in which freedom of speech is assured, informants often may not like to be videotaped, even if they are asked “only” to share comments on relatively apolitical topics such as fashion consumption (though in some cases fashion can also have political meanings). They may not like to be exhibited in a videography, despite various assurances. Generally, the more anonymous the research setting, the more forthright people will be in sharing their thoughts and feelings. In a country such as Iran, many participants in Kristof’s video were, not surprisingly, hesitant to share information. In a more anonymous setting where Iranian interviewees could be more confident that their identities would not be revealed, they may be more forthcoming with information, which in turn would shed more light on market and marketing phenomena.

For the above reasons and methodological limitations, drawing final conclusions about Iran based on Kristof’s film is not easy. Conflicting messages are in the video. Some interviewees favor the current regime while others fear it; some are blaming Iran while others are blaming the U.S. We cannot be certain of informant-sincerity, how in-depth the research is, or how much bias is involved. Nonetheless, some general observations can be made, particularly in the context of marketing and consumption dynamics, as affected by a foreign-imposed embargo and domestic policy. The embargo greatly hinders marketing activity. Iranian enterprises do not have unfettered access to certain materials and production and distribution of some goods and services therefore become impossible or cost-ineffective. This then affects consumption in forms of scarcity, high prices, and other challenges. The entire marketing system is stifled. A quick take away from the video is that the current regime is corrupt and repressive, but sanctions imposed by the West cause or exacerbate difficult consumer-conditions.

Further to the matter of consumption, despite bans on the sales of certain products (e.g., Hollywood movies, American branded-products) or restrictions on communication (e.g., social media such as Facebook, Twitter), people – especially young people – are finding ways to circumvent the regime. We can observe consumers using branded products, such as the CK belt or Nike shoes, women with trendy nail polish and hair color, and especially young consumers, listening to American music and watching Hollywood movies through satellite TV or DVDs. Although our intention here is not to comment in great detail about the regime or to draw conclusions about the future of Iran, these observations suggest that fully authoritarian regimes struggle mightily and against human nature and the allure of goods, service, and communities that people believe will enhance their well-being. This reality is evident not only in Iran, but in countries and regions throughout history. Given the slightest opportunity, people will find ways to circumvent policies that oppress them. In the case of Iran, a new era with more freedoms may eventually emerge with the new president Hassan Rouhani. From a consumer research perspective, a central take away from the video is that, despite restrictions, many Iranians are still exposed to global consumer culture, accumulating similar desires and tastes to the West for the idealized images of life and being. Hence, many change their styles and look like Westerners as soon as they get out of the country. My own informal chats with Iranian friends also suggest that they behave differently in their homes than in streets. Many have Westerner life styles at home, which is one of many possible research topics.

Finally, a short list of possible research questions follows. How has the market system changed in Iran throughout history (see, e.g., Minowa and Witkowski 2009) and especially over the last 35 years following the Islamic revolution? What are the current market practices? How does the current regime affect market freedoms both on the production and consumption sides? How are the producers and consumers coping with bans and restrictions? What consumer practices get around these bans? What are their recommendations for future? How (and how much) are Iranian consumers exposed to global consumer culture, under what types of restrictions? What are their feelings and consumption desires, vis-à-vis global consumer culture, despite the restrictions? What are the influences on their consumption desires? How do their consumption practices vary in public versus private domains? These questions may repeat separately for women, who are even more suppressed, and the young generation, although the latter appears to be more dexterous in circumventing various bans and restrictions.

Reflections and Future Directions

So, what to make of My Iranian Road Trip? To be fair, Kristof does not represent the film as a documentary, or any form of scholarship; it literally is represented as an “opinion,” as stated in the first few frames of the video, replete with observations, voiceovers, interviews and, well, opinions. The academic comments and reflections shared here therefore may seem a bit harsh. Furthermore, one can discern some interesting and informative tendencies regarding the interplay among theocracy, policy, markets, marketing and society. We suspect many people were or will be stimulated to learn more about Iran after watching the film and pondering the comments shared here, and of course in the wake of recent elections, which in turn may stimulate more thorough analysis.

What becomes clear in reviewing the film and reflecting on the commentaries are opportunities – imperatives, really – for further, more rigorous research if we hope to have a nuanced and accurate understanding of Iran’s political economy and marketing system, and Iran’s marketing relationship with the rest of the world. Each panelist hints at research opportunities, some of which encourage videography, some of which do not.

Mark Peterson, for example, mentions some interesting commonalities between Iran’s marketing and consumer dynamics and those found in another relatively closed, authoritarian country, Syria. These systems are inherently interesting to macromarketing scholars, as evidenced by previously cited research projects administered and published by macromarketing thought-leaders. Peterson also suggests that by studying and understanding people from enigmatic and relatively closed places (e.g., Syria), we might be able to glean useful information about even more arcane and inaccessible marketing systems such as Iran. The throng of Iranians living and studying in the U.S. is given as an opinion-leading sample to study. Peterson moreover suggests this sample should be the focus of a future Kristof-videography. And if we are committed to film-as-conduit-to-understanding, Peterson intimates that recently produced and distributed Iranian films might be edifying to macromarketers and others.

Detlev Zwick calls for study that more carefully examines socio-political complexities. He adds such study would be especially illuminating if conducted and recorded through eyes other than those largely influenced by the West, and diffusion of brands and western popular culture, if we truly want to understand the macromarketing dynamics of Iran, including its politics and culture.

Deniz Atik, similarly to Zwick, shares concerns about videographer bias, but agrees that some information is better than none, even when that information may be biased. Atik suggests the shortcomings of Kristof’s work present opportunities for longitudinal multi-methodological ethnographic research on, for example, the effects of the embargo and domestic policy, and ways people engage in marketing and consumption. Atik makes a case for studying young consumers and women, and instances in which in-home consumption markedly varies from out-home consumption, and the marketing system that exists to support that duality.

Lastly, the very nature of Iran’s isolation, or ostracism, from the West makes the Kristof videography compelling, even if that short film fails to evince the methodological rigor expected by academics. The recent olive branch offered to the West from President Rouhani, including his “charm offensive” at the UN (Economist 2013, p. 50), his brief exchange with President Obama, and even Rouhani’s tweets all augur well for a thaw between Iran and the West. That thaw presents opportunities for macromarketing scholars, and more robust, systemic research. A first initiative might be expansion of academic exchanges and research collaboration, which could stimulate more thorough and rigorous field research in Iran – videographic or otherwise – and ultimately better understanding of a complex and unique marketing system, as it evolves in response to possible reforms or even a possible reactionary shift toward greater isolation for Iran’s enigmatic theocracy and marketing system. Macromarketers, armed with video cameras and other scholarly tools for data collection, and most importantly imbued with the confidence, knowledge and sense-of purpose that a well-functioning, globally integrated, sustainable marketing system – while imperfect – still offer a most viable model to enhance consumer and societal well-being, from the delivery of goods and services, to the broader outcomes of sustainable peace and prosperity. The alternatives of further diplomatic discord and sabre rattling – or worse – are not in the best interests of Iranians, Americans, Europeans and other stakeholders the world over. Macromarketers, carpe diem.