Beyond Mimicry: Military Isomorphism and Context-Specific Security Approaches in the Gulf

Coercive Isomorphism: External Pressures and Structural Dependencies

Coercive isomorphism occurs through formal and informal pressures exerted on militaries by actors upon whom they are dependent in the relevant area. In the military sphere, these pressures manifest through international security alliances, defence treaties, and arms supplier relationships (Adamsky, 2010; Alley, 2021; Benson, 2012; Kegley & Raymond, 1982; Kier, 1995; Snyder, 1997). The nature of these relationships creates structural dependencies that shape and influence military development, often guiding it along particular organizational paths.

For GCC states specifically, security arrangements with western powers create significant de facto coercive isomorphic pressure to adopt compatible military structures, doctrines, and equipment (Parker & Bakir, 2024; Saleh, 2020). This dependency relationship began during the colonial era but intensified dramatically following the oil boom and subsequent US security engagement in the region (Gause, 2010; Peterson, 1986; Roberts, 2020; Rossiter, 2014). The 1990–1991 Gulf War represented a watershed moment. The US-led cinematic trouncing of Iraqi forces in 1991, potentially saving the other Gulf monarchies and liberating Kuwait, precipitated a vast expansion of US engagement on the Peninsula. The Gulf monarchies were eager to facilitate such relations. Not only had the US demonstrated a flawless, stunning military victory flaunting its latest eye-catching technologies, such as hyper accurate missiles, but the vulnerabilities of the monarchies had recently been starkly revealed with the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The ensuing decades saw a proliferation of defence cooperation agreements, status of forces agreements, and formal alliances that institutionalized a range of dependencies in the monarchies on the US, its allies, and their equipment (Roberts, 2023). The point is, therefore, that ‘coercive’ elements need not actually be that coercive, but rather often represent mutually beneficial arrangements eagerly embraced by local leaders for their perceived security advantages.

Procurement dimensions of these relationships further create particularly powerful isomorphic pressures. Indeed, it must be remembered that buying, say, an F-18 fast jet is far more than buying the plane itself; rather, it inherently buries the buyer into the logistical, educational, and doctrinal systems and ethos of the seller (Roberts). In this sense, military procurement is a non-negotiable driver of profound isomorphism that extends far beyond the hardware itself. Indeed, the GCC states’ historic reliance on western arms suppliers creates technological dependencies that necessitate adoption of compatible organizational structures and operational concepts. Initial procurement decisions create technological lock-in effects that extend through multiple upgrade cycles and shape future acquisitions (Hughes, 1986, 2004; Winner, 1980). For example, switching from ‘western’ fast-jet platforms to Russian or Chinese ones is constrained by far more than geopolitical and economic elements. Rather, numerous structural impediments constrain such transitions, including educational and training mismatches, language barriers, and the technical challenges inherent in migrating between distinct ecosystems of knowledge, supply chains, and specialized engineering expertise (Roberts, 2025). All of these difficulties can be overcome, as Hungary showed with its pivot from the Soviet to the NATO ecosystem from the 1990s onwards, but it is not a simple switch.

The coercive dimension of military isomorphism extends beyond formal alliance structures into the operational realm. Joseph Soeters expanded this category when he referred to the concept of ‘experiential isomorphism’, whereby militaries with joint expeditionary experience in coalition warfare inevitably drives a convergence in practice (Soeters, 2008; Wachholtz & Soeters, 2022). Joint exercises, combined command arrangements, and multilateral military operations create powerful pressures for organizational compatibility. The participation of GCC forces in operations like the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan or the international coalition against ISIS required adoption of NATO-compatible command structures, communications protocols, and operational procedures. These operational necessities drive organizational adaptation toward western models regardless of their appropriateness for broader domestic or regional security challenges. Certainly, these logistical and other operational systems and modus operandi may be suitably apropos for domestic and regional security challenges, but they may also not be ideal – as explored in the third section when an alternative set of paradigms is presented.

Foreign military presence within GCC states creates additional coercive pressures through direct demonstration effects and advising relationships. The extensive US military footprint in Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE exposes host nation forces to US military organizational models, creating implicit standards for ‘professional’ military organization (Farrell, 2005; Farrell & Terriff, 2002). Military advisory missions, whether formal or informal, further transmit western organizational concepts directly into GCC military structures, often without critical evaluation of their contextual appropriateness.

The coercive dimension extends beyond operational requirements into strategic signalling, where western-style military structures serve deterrence and alliance management functions that transcend internal effectiveness. Gulf states maintain certain capabilities less for operational utility against likely threats than as instruments of international communication, signalling resolve and alliance worthiness to adversaries like Iran while demonstrating credibility within partnership frameworks. This logic helps explain apparent mismatches between threat environments and force structures, where high-end platforms like fast-jets proliferate functioning at least as much as tangible representations of security partnerships as tactical or operational solutions to regional challenges.

Mimetic Isomorphism: Uncertainty and Prestige-Seeking Emulation

The second mechanism, mimetic isomorphism, emerges under conditions of uncertainty where organizations tend to model themselves after entities perceived as legitimate or successful (Haverman, 1993; Mizruchi & Fein, 1999; Öztürk, 2020). Military organizations face inherent uncertainties; the true test of military effectiveness comes only in conflict, which most militaries experience infrequently, if at all. This fundamental uncertainty about organizational effectiveness creates strong incentives to emulate structures and practices of militaries with perceived success or prestige.

For GCC states, this uncertainty is compounded by historically relatively limited warfighting experience and the complex, rapidly evolving security environment of the Gulf region (Cordesman, 2020). When facing such uncertainty, mimetic processes provide seemingly safe and sensible templates for military development. Western military dominance in conventional warfare, particularly US successes in the 1991 Gulf War and initial phases of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, created powerful models for emulation. These often-spectacular demonstrations of conventional military superiority reinforced perceptions that western military organizational forms represented optimal solutions, regardless of their appropriateness for GCC security contexts. Indeed, even though US and allied forces ultimately struggled and failed in Iraq and Afghanistan, the retort that these were political defeats interspersed with military victories reinforces the sentiment of the continued worthiness of emulation.

Ultimately, as Pretorius suggests, cultural ‘imperialism’ manifests when western military models spread implicitly as a form of ‘military common sense’, regardless of their contextual appropriateness (Farrell, 2005; Kier, 1995; Pretorius, 2008). This process operates as much through such informal channels and associated cultural diffusion to shape perceptions of military legitimacy and modernity. Western military doctrines, operational concepts, and organizational structures become internalized as self-evident ‘best practices’ as much as they are also in place thanks to historically contingent factors. For GCC militaries, where modernization has been a central aspect of broader state-building projects (Ardemagni, 2019a; Cronin, 2013; Jones, 2010), the adoption of western military models becomes intertwined with national narratives of development and progress.

Indeed, the prestige dimension of mimetic isomorphism deserves particular attention in the Gulf context. Military modernization in GCC states serves not only practical security functions but important symbolic ones, demonstrating state capacity, international status, and regime legitimacy (Ardemagni, 2020; Marshall, 2016; Roberts, 2023). Western military models arguably carry particular prestige value, as their adoption signals membership in an exclusive club of the most advanced military powers.

Normative Isomorphism: Professional Socialization and Educational Networks

The third mechanism, normative isomorphism, stems from professionalization, including formal military education and the growth of interpersonal professional networks (Kamrava, 2000; Nemeth, 2022; Samaan, 2019). Professional military education creates powerful socialization experiences that shape officers’ understandings of legitimate military organization and practice (Roberts, 2025). Unlike coercive or mimetic mechanisms, which operate through external pressures and uncertainties, normative isomorphism works through internalized professional standards that military elites adopt as their own values and beliefs.

Beyond formal education, professional networks create powerful channels for normative isomorphism. Foreign Military Training (FMT) programs, staff exchanges, liaison positions, and combined exercises create interpersonal relationships through which professional norms diffuse. This increasing professionalization of GCC officer corps through western military education programs has accelerated normative isomorphism through multiple channels, developing shared professional languages, analytical frameworks, and normative understandings that inevitably shape their approach to military development in their home countries (Samaan, 2019, 2023). The exclusive nature of attendance at these prestigious military institutions creates an elite cadre of western-educated officers who often enjoy accelerated promotion and disproportionate influence on organizational development, further amplifying normative isomorphic effects (Barany, 2019).

Linked to this, Mark Suchman and Dana Eyre take forward these ideas to persuasively argue that weapons procurement stems significantly from such normative cultural pressures as much as any ‘rational’ approach (Suchman & Eyre, 1992). These normative pressures create preferences for certain types of (often western) military technology and organization that align with professional identity rather than necessarily addressing specific strategic needs. Indeed, a professional military officer educated in western traditions develops not just skills but tastes preferences for certain weapon systems, organizational forms, and operational concepts that signal professional identity and competence. These professional preferences arguably drive procurement and organizational decisions that may have little relation to objective strategic requirements.

The creation of indigenous professional military education institutions in GCC states has not necessarily reduced normative isomorphism, as these institutions frequently replicate western educational models (Samaan, 2019). Faculty at Gulf military colleges often receive their advanced education from western institutions, curricula closely mirror western models, and educational materials rely heavily on translated western texts.

Theoretical Foundations: Beyond Isomorphism

The proposed framework below draws inspiration from theoretical traditions that challenge the premises of institutional isomorphism. First, contingency theory in organizational studies argues that no single organizational structure is universally optimal; rather, effective structures must align with specific environmental conditions, technologies, and scales of operation (Donaldson, 2001, 2006). Applied to military organizations, this perspective suggests that optimal security architectures should vary systematically based on threat environments, resource constraints, and sociopolitical contexts, so directly contradicting the homogenizing tendencies of isomorphism.

Second, the framework incorporates insights from Fourth Generation Warfare approaches, which emphasizes that technological superiority and conventional force structures often prove ineffective against asymmetric threats and non-state actors (Echevarria, 2005; Junio, 2009). This is particularly relevant for the Gulf states and their local context, which is comprised of a complex threat landscape including both conventional and significant irregular challenges (Cordesman, 2007, 2020).

Third, the framework draws from strategic culture theory, which emphasizes how historical experiences, cultural values, and geopolitical positions shape distinct approaches to security (Gray, 1999; Johnston, 1995; Klein, 1991). Rather than treating western military models as universal templates, this perspective recognizes the potential value of security approaches emerging from indigenous traditions and historical experiences. The successful defence strategies of small states such as Switzerland, Finland, Singapore, and Israel offer particularly relevant alternative models that demonstrate how context-specific innovation can produce superior security outcomes compared to great power emulation. Building on and borrowing from these theoretical foundations, we propose four core principles for developing locally attuned security architectures in the Gulf context.

Asymmetric Small State Deterrence

The cornerstone of this alternative strategy would be a radical departure from extant acquisition-driven approaches. Rather than investing in prestigious and expensive but demographically unsustainable conventional forces, the Porcupine strategy suggests more of a specialized Distributed Defence Force approach focusing on irregular threats and asymmetric responses.

A Cyber Command would stand as a central pillar rather than an auxiliary capability, exemplifying the threat-centric focus principle through its direct response to the most prevalent security challenges facing small Gulf states. This approach begins with rigorous threat assessment, examining actual rather than theoretical dangers, and builds capabilities in response to these specific challenges rather than following conventional force structure templates. Unlike acquisition-driven approaches that prioritize prestigious platforms regardless of strategic context, this threat-centric design would create deterrence specifically calibrated to the asymmetric and digital vulnerabilities that represent the most significant dangers to small Gulf states.

Certainly, it is not easy for any states to deter by cyber means alone (Pedersen, 2023). While some small Gulf monarchies have ample resource to put towards developing deep cyber retaliatory capabilities, thus potentially overcoming one of Pedersen’s critiques, small states, he argues, still struggle to signal putative deterrence-by-punishment (Domingo, 2018, 2022; Fischerkeller & Harknett, 2017; Pedersen, 2023). Indeed, thus far, much of the literature finds that it remains difficult for small states to achieve meaningful deterrence in this way. Such conclusions are not to be ignored. Equally, no states have yet pursued such a strategy doggedly and with considerable resource.

Leveraging Social Structures

Rather than importing organizational structures that conflict with Gulf social realities, the Desert Porcupine strategy would reflect and harness existing social frameworks into its security architecture. Drawing from Cronin et al.'s work on Gulf military institutions, this approach would recognize tribal and family affiliations as potential strengths rather than obstacles to be overcome (Cronin, 2013; Crystal, 2016; Kostiner & Khoury, 1991). This exemplifies cultural aculturation not merely as tactical accommodation but as strategic advantage – building upon rather than attempting to override deeply embedded social structures that carry their own forms of cohesion and legitimacy. Indeed, the Gulf states are in a process of state formation, where they are actively creating and propagating the national myths (Ardemagni, 2019a; Diwan Smith, 2022), and states are already leveraging armed forces towards this end (Ardemagni, 2019b).

Dividing military forces in some way into tribally delineated groupings cuts against the broader prevailing ‘wisdom’ on this issue. The scholarly gist presently argues that Gulf states remain in a form of competition with tribes as important ‘other’ groupings that have a call upon peoples’ loyalties (Al Fahad, 2015b; Al Sarhan, 2015; Jones, 2010; Roberts, 2023). Equally, it is reasonable to muse whether this particular battle, so to speak, is over, or at least not as salient as it once was. The Gulf states are enormous behemoths, most suffused with hydrocarbon revenues, controlling myriad levers across the economic and social spectrum to control and exert influence. Tribal politics still hits the headlines sporadically, but typically this is precipitated by perceived slights or otherwise having an element of enfranchisement or opportunity taken away (Pyne-Jones, 2019; Qatar : Al-Murrah Return, Seeking Mercy, 2019).

Consequently, leveraging tribal loyalties and sentiment, but employing them in the service of the state is a potential answer to this. Indeed, to a degree, this is what Saudi Arabia did with its ‘White Army’ - formerly a bastion of tribal power - which became incorporated into the state structure and became the country's fourth force, the Saudi Arabia National Guard (SANG). Cognisant (and wary) of its tribal origins and potential latent power, Saudi leaders formalized an institution around these tribal groupings, encasing them in state apparatus, giving them a budget, endowing them with prestige as a core part of national defence, all the while making it quite clear where the power (and subsidy) lay within the relations (Cronin, 2013; Des Roches, 2022; Jones, 2010). Ultimately, there are various critiques to be levelled against the SANG, but it could seldom be said that in its century long history it actively challenged state power.

The Saudi Arabia National Guard (SANG) offers a partial historical parallel to this aspect of our counterfactual, demonstrating how tribal structures can be successfully incorporated into formal security architecture. While the SANG emerged by historical contingency rather than deliberate design, it illustrates how tribal affiliations can be leveraged rather than suppressed in military organization. Our counterfactual extends this principle more comprehensively, envisioning security architecture that consistently aligns with rather than works against social realities, embodying cultural aculturation as a foundational rather than incidental aspect of military development.

Ultimately, there may be risk to such an approach. The logic that trained and armed sub-state groupings (like tribes) might use their power to cut against or challenge the state is, as outlined, not an unreasonable concern. But it must also be noted that conventional received wisdom is often wide of the mark in Gulf politics. For example, for decades on end, the importance of the ‘Sudairi seven’ segment of the Al Saud ruling family was overly reified, as was the so-called fundamental power division in Saudi Arabia between the Al Saud and Al Wahhab politio-communities (Henderson, 2009, 2019; Hubbard, 2020; Niblock, 2006). Both were deemed immutable truths in Saudi and Gulf politics, until they were proven to reflect minimal reality when events showed these ideas to be hollow.

Moreover, a tribally rooted military force might enjoy other benefits. While myriad critiques abound of Arab military force, they also often argue that such forces do enjoy elements of important social cohesion (Pollack, 2019). This would not be surprising. Military forces have historically been rooted in and taken from tightknit communities for precisely these kinds of reasons.

Command structures would adapt traditional consultative processes through a Majlis Command Structure, maintaining clear hierarchical authority while incorporating elements of Gulf consultative traditions. This approach recognizes, as (Kamrava, 2000) noted, that effective military institutions in the Gulf must balance modernization with cultural continuity. Decision-making would follow established hierarchical patterns while creating formalized spaces for input from key stakeholders, similar to traditional majlis gatherings but adapted for military contexts.

A Gulf Legion

The Gulf Legion concept exemplifies both the resource-appropriate forces and indigenous innovation principles of our framework. It addresses the fundamental demographic constraints of smaller Gulf states by formalizing and institutionalizing what is currently an ad hoc approach to manpower challenges. Rather than attempting to create manpower-intensive western-style forces despite population limitations, this counterfactual proposes innovative adaptation of historical Gulf and Islamic practices of military organization to contemporary security needs.

The basic fact of Gulf militaries is that several of the smaller Gulf states, notably Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE, have small native populations that are not numerically adequate to populate full-scale, tri-service military forces alone (Barany, 2019, 2021). Though detail on this issue remains a key gap in the literature, it is evident that a range of foreigners already undertake critical roles across these forces, usually in a training and logistical capacity, though exceptions arise. For example, Australian national Mike Hindmarsh played a key role in the formation and direction of the UAE Presidential Guard, and British officers took senior positions in Oman’s forces into the 1990s.

This reliance on foreign expertise is, then, already the reality of Gulf monarchies’ security architecture. The counterfactual proposal herein would be to, in essence, formalize, institutionalize, and transform what is currently an ad hoc approach into a strategic advantage through the creation of a ‘Gulf Legion’. This concept would draw upon both historical precedents in the Islamic world and successful modern examples of foreign military integration.

The historical precedents discussed here, from Mamluk forces to the Abbasid Caliphate’s military structure, represent indigenous innovation in their original contexts, developing military systems responsive to specific political, demographic and strategic realities rather than importing foreign models. Similarly, the Gulf Legion concept demonstrates how selective adaptation can incorporate elements of contemporary models (like the French Foreign Legion) while maintaining alignment with regional historical traditions and current strategic needs. This approach embodies innovation not through technological novelty but through institutional creativity, reimagining military organization based on specific contextual requirements rather than isomorphic templates.

The concept of employing non-native military forces is deeply rooted in Arab political and military history. The Mamluk Sultanate (1250–1517) represents perhaps the most sophisticated example of such integration. Its elite Royal Mamluk forces comprised various foreign groupings including Turks, Circassians, refugees from Ayyubid armies, Kurdish tribal contingents, Turkoman groups, and various displaced military elements who had fled Mongol expansions (Amitai, 2006; Ayalon, 1953, 1994; Levanoni, 1995). Entrusted with the sultan’s personal protection, these forces formed decisive elements in major campaigns and were rewarded handsomely. Beyond this core, auxiliary forces also of foreign origin played critical strategic and operational roles, with the Turcomans considered most significant among these elements (Amitai, 2006; Ayalon, 1953, 1994; Levanoni, 1995).

Even earlier, the Abbasid Caliphate established patterns of foreign military integration, particularly from the reign of Caliph al-Mu’tasim (r. 833-842), when the influence of Arab forces progressively diminished in favour of non-Arab military elements, including Mawālī [موالي] (non-Arab clients), Turkish military units and specialized forces from Central Asia, including the Farāghina [فراغنة] and Ushrūsiyya [أشروسية] (Ayalon, 1994). The significance of these foreign military elements was such that al-Mu’tasim constructed the city of Samarra explicitly to house and separate Turkish forces from both the general population and other ethnic military contingents, an early example of specialized infrastructure developed to accommodate foreign military personnel.

Modern examples provide equally valuable templates, such as the British Gurkhas or the French Foreign Legion. The former employs a cultural accommodation model preserving distinctive (Gurkha) traditions within the wider British command ethos and mission, while the Foreign Legion approach is about assimilation creating a new identity with the principle of Legio Patria Nostra (the Legion is our Homeland) (Cooper, 2006; Porch, 2010; Rand & Wagner, 2012; Ware, 2012). The French example bears striking similarities to the Mamluk system’s transformation of foreign recruits into a distinct military elite with primary allegiance to the institution rather than their places of origin. The Legion’s legal framework, offering pathways to French citizenship after service, provided structural incentives for loyalty comparable to the economic benefits granted to Mamluks.

A Gulf Legion could build upon these historical and contemporary precedents by establishing a formalized system for recruiting, training, and integrating foreign military personnel into Gulf security forces. Such a system would not represent a radical departure from regional traditions, but rather a contemporary adaptation of established historical governance strategies. Some kind of tiered citizenship could be offered in return for long-term military service, fostering a buy-in and esprit de corps. This could range from initial contractual status through extended residency rights to selective pathways for permanent residency or even limited forms of citizenship for exceptional service. This strives to overcome inevitable concerns of whether or not, when conflicts turn hot and dangerous, foreign nationals will, to put it bluntly, put their life on the line for a pay check.

By institutionalizing what is currently an ad hoc approach to foreign military expertise, the Gulf Legion concept would transform a demographic weakness into a strategic asset while drawing upon a rich tradition of foreign military integration in Islamic history. The sophisticated mechanisms developed by historical Arab rulers to manage, incentivize, and control foreign military forces, from separation policies to exploitation of internal rivalries to economic incentive structures, provide valuable lessons for this contemporary adaptation of established governance strategies.

This counterfactual exploration demonstrates how the four principles of our framework, threat-centric focus, local cultural aculturation, resource-appropriate forces, and indigenous innovation, might combine to produce a radically different security architecture when freed from isomorphic pressures. By beginning with specific threats rather than organizational templates, aligning with rather than overriding social structures, acknowledging demographic realities, and selectively adapting historical and contemporary models, the Desert Porcupine strategy represents not a practical proposal per se but a theoretical demonstration of alternative possibilities in security development. Its value lies not in its immediate applicability but in its illustration of how different organizing principles might generate distinctive security approaches tailored to specific Gulf contexts.