Beyond the Colonial Lens: An Investigation into the Chequered History of Assam Tea

Introduction

Throughout the colonial period and beyond, there has been a prevailing consensus in Assam that tea symbolised the British Empire’s initiation of a modern enterprise in the region, signifying societal progress and economic development. Various factors contributed to this prevailing belief. In the early nineteenth century, the British began tea enterprises in Upper Assam, intending to use the local Assamese, particularly the Cachari (Kachari) tribe, as labourers. ¹ Employing local labour would have been cost-effective and would have shielded the East India Company (EIC) from criticisms linked to the slave trade. However, the British deemed the natives as ‘laziest race under the Sun’, for their habit of opium consumption. ² These natives practised shifting cultivation, which challenged the EIC’s revenue extraction. Their sustenance-based cultivation contribution little to the treasury, and the lack of a monetary economy led to taxation challenges. ³ The EIC’s solution was to make the natives cultivate tea in the ‘wastelands’ and pay wages in currency, ⁴ which could again be extracted back to the treasury in the form of revenue. ⁵ The EIC also pushed for opium prohibition for speedy economic growth, ⁶ and leaders like John Alliston and Francis Fox hoped that promoting Christian missionaries who spread ‘modern’ education and Christian values would curtail opium use, turning the tribes into a compliant workers’ group. ⁷

This article challenges this notion that the British aimed to civilize Assam through the tea industry, asserting instead that it disrupted the nature-based local economy, marginalising natives and their kingdoms. This viewpoint contradicts the widespread glorification of the British tea venture by the colonial Assamese elites and the mainstream industrialists, who were influenced by missionary training. ⁸ The article delves into the British tea industry’s impact on the native population, examining its connection to massacres and military interventions. It also investigates the native’s responses to these threats, the EIC’s monopoly intentions, British military officers’ quest for new tea sources and the intricate role of the Calcutta Botanical Garden (CBG).

The Lost Rainforest of Upper Assam

Until the last decades of the twentieth century, the people of Assam were unaware that a contiguous rainforest existed in eastern part of the state or ‘Upper Assam’. ¹⁰ No administrative term like ‘rainforest’ ever existed in the official parlance of the British administration. Dutta argues that the forests in Upper Assam were indeed rainforests, particularly those existing on the southern bank of Brahmaputra that covered present-day Dibrugarh, Tinsukia and Sivsagar districts. ¹¹ These three districts of Upper Assam are situated along the foothills of the Patkai mountain ranges, which also constitute the Indo–Myanmar border and one of the twenty-five biodiversity hotspots on earth, a part of the Eastern Himalaya. Initially, the Upper Assam rainforest was a part of the Thailand Rainforest Network, which got separated afterwards owing to the northward shifting of the Indian sub–continent. ¹² Rainforests across the world are categorised under two broader spectrums, that is, ‘temperate’ and ‘tropical’. Although the term rainforest is not found in the colonial forest history of Assam, frequent use of the term ‘tropical’ implies that a rainforest indeed existed in Upper Assam. ¹³

It is further corroborated by descriptions provided by British tea planters and foresters. Forest Inspector General Dietrich Brandis, Berthold Ribbentrop and Gustav Mann frequently described the local forests as exceptionally dense and impenetrable, characterised by dense undergrowth. This undergrowth, a hallmark of rainforests, comprises the herb layer, known for its lush herbal vegetation. ¹⁴ The undergrowth bushes created massive tension for the tea planters as they did not provide them direct access to the soil; hence, ‘the first thing (to establish tea garden) is to clear the undergrowth of which there is a remarkable quantity in the jungles of (Upper) Assam’. ¹⁵ Lower Assam forests were praised by British administrators for their simplicity and homogeneity, which ensured commercial viability. In contrast, Upper Assam forests showcased a rich diversity of trees, ferns and undergrowth, forming a complex foliage landscape. ¹⁶

Tea Consumption Among Natives Prior to British Colonialism

The hot and humid environment in Upper Assam was ideal for the growth of wild tea plant. Local communities’, namely the Singphos, Khamptis, Namsang Nagas, Morans, Muttocks and Ahoms did not cultivate tea but gathered its leaves in their raw state. For instance, the Singphos collected leaves from 30- to 35-feet-tall tea trees, often using elephants. A common method among these tribes was to sun-dry the leaves for up to three days, removed moisture, then fire-fry them before sealing in bamboo tubes (Chunga) for preservation on kitchen fireplaces (Chang). Whenever they wanted to drink it, they remove the bamboo layer and cut a portion of the preserved tea to mix it with boiled water. This preserved tea, was Phanap for Singphos, Khelap or Phalap for Namsang Nagas and Phalap Khah for Tangsas. ¹⁷ There existed another practise of drinking tea as a vegetable oil and garlic, which closely resembled the neighbouring Burmese people’s style of drinking tea known as the Letpet tea. ¹⁸ Baruah states that the tribes had expertise in growing tea but had a unique cultivation approach. They engaged in farming within the forest and, being nomadic, would often abandon their plots after cultivation. ¹⁹ Bhuyan opines that the first generation of Ahoms brought tea plants while migrating from Mung Khang or the Mougang kingdom of Northern Burma. Almost all these tribes entered Upper Assam from Northern Burma by crossing the Patkai after several centuries of migrating from Yunan. Even after migration, they had good relationships with the Chinese and Burmese people. In fact, according to Kar, Maan raja (Burmese king) and Ahom Shan Phookan collectively traded with the Chinese, who used to buy tea cultivated in Assam. ²⁰ The close proximity of various indigenous groups in the region, both culturally and geographically, suggests that each one was familiar with tea. This proves that tea was not solely under British authority in Assam, and that the native people did not view it as a mere commodity like the colonisers did. Rather, tea held a sacred significance for them as a revered beverage, believed to possess qualities of immortality and often used as a sacrificial element. ²¹

Lost Opportunities: The Economic Rationality behind the Rejected Tea Discoveries in Upper Assam

Discussions regarding tea in Assam were significantly influenced by a number of factors, namely scientific developments, political objectives of the Company and so on, but in the end, the Company’s commercial interests outweighed all other considerations. The British administration continued to deny discoveries of tea in Assam although at the close of the eighteenth century, tea had become the quintessential beverage of the British Empire. ²³ For instance, in 1598, a Dutch traveller named Jan Huyaghen Van Linchton pointed out that Indians of the remote hilly frontiers drank tea. ²⁴ In 1815, Colonel Latter, and in 1818, Mr Gardnar, pointed out the same. In 1815, Mr Govan, a correspondent of Sir Joseph Banks, recommended its cultivation on the hills of Assam. ²⁵ However, the Company turned a deaf ear to all those appeals. In these backdrops, it becomes necessary to inquire why the Company exhibited such apathy towards these revelations. A reassessment of the economy in Upper Assam can shed light on the matter.

When the British set foot for the first time in Upper Assam, it was engulfed in the thirty years of prolonged Moamaria Rebellion (1769–1801), followed by the three successive horrific Burmese invasions (1817, 1819 and 1824) that led to widespread depopulation, total collapse of industry, trade and agriculture, turning the region into nothing more than a ‘profitless primaeval jungle’. ²⁶ The population of Lakhimpur was reduced to a meagre 30,000. ²⁷ Even forty years after that, in 1874, it remained one of the most sparsely populated districts in Assam. ²⁸ Taking advantage of the crumpling strength of the Ahoms, the surrounding hill tribes’, namely Daflas, Abors, Khamptis, Singphos and so on, started demonstrating their supremacy by engaging in frequent head hunting raids, looting, murder, kidnapping and selling Assamese people as slaves. When Purnananda Buragohain, the Ahom Prime Minister, was busy fighting against the Moamarias, the Khamptis and the Singphos who entered Upper Assam from the Barkhampti and Kachin regions of Upper Burma occupied the erstwhile Ahom regions of Sadiya and Mishimi Hills (presently in Arunachal Pradesh). ²⁹ In such a devastating political environment, not a single commodity of Upper Assam was listed in Welch’s report on the prospect of economic profitability of Assam to Cornwallis.

Considering these political and economic circumstances of the area, perhaps the British administration considered that running a military or civil administration would have incurred a more significant expense than the profits that could have been derived from cultivating tea in Upper Assam. Moreover, efforts to establish tea businesses in uncharted territories were deemed futile, as the Company held the world’s largest legal monopoly over the Chinese tea commerce during that period. Utilising superior military strategies and efficient tactics, the EIC dominated the tea trade, even with sixteen European competitors vying for Chinese tea. By 1700, the Company had imported 20,000 pounds of tea. This grew exponentially, with duties paid on five million pounds by 1715 and six million by 1766, bolstering the British treasury. ³⁰ Its monopolistic control was so substantial that it became a rival to the empires. ³¹ Thus, the Company prioritised protecting its monopoly, and introducing tea cultivation in Assam could have resulted in otherwise.

Uncovering the Truth About British Scientific Zeal and its Impact on Upper Assam’s Wild Tea

The Legacy of Nathaniel Wallich: Examining the Dark Side of Colonial Science

In a letter dated 2 June 1825, Scott wrote dispatching the Assam tea specimens, ‘I have the pleasure to forward some leaves and seeds of a plant which the Burmese and Chinese at this place concur in stating to be wild tea’. ⁴³ The first person to receive it was Nathaniel Wallich. He was the Superintendent of the CBG, obsessed with improving the tropics and belonged to the ‘Linnaean School’. ⁴⁴ This school maintained a strong contrasting line between ‘tea’ and ‘camellia’ to ‘pooh-pooh’, every possibility of proving tea found in the North Eastern frontiers of Bengal as authentic. ⁴⁵ Continuing the ‘Banksian ideology’ that authentic tea was found only in China, it held those found in other Southeast Asian countries as wild camellias, ⁴⁶ which might be some moss or leaves of other trees. ⁴⁷ On the other hand, Captain Francis Jenkins, the second receiver, was an ardent campaigner for colonising Assam by turning it into an agricultural estate. ⁴⁸ He belonged to the ‘Anglo-India school’, which emphasised direct annexation if it was to yield profit. ⁴⁹ However, true to the nature of the CBG and its perceptions of unscientific sources, Wallich, after three years of repeated scrutiny, discarded the plant as the wild distant cousin of the pure Chinese variety. ⁵⁰

The fact that the Assam tea was unique should not have been a surprising revelation, as numerous surveyors, military personnel and others had already discovered it. But the way Wallich had doubted the purity or authenticity of the plant with a sense of disgust was perhaps the revelation of the discrimination inherent in colonial science. ‘Europe’s naturalists not only collected the stuff of nature but (also) laid their peculiar grid of reason over nature…’ ⁵¹ The Chinese were praised as ‘adventurous, superior in energy and industry; quite equal to any of the European nation’, ⁵² while the tribes of Upper Assam appeared to be savages and the Assamese were ‘more effeminate than women’. ⁵³ Therefore, the CBG’s decision to choose the cultured Chinese variety over the junglee one was understandable. Such downgrading of all indigenous Camellias except Chinese, however, had its precedents in the outlook of Banks. He noted:

Tonquin and Siam have been said by various writers to produce tea, but…the rich are the only people who can afford to drink imported Chinese tea. The poor substitute the leaves of the ‘other plants’ found in their countries; still, however, calling the infusion by the name of tea…, (the manufacturer) commences with articles of inferior quality, being less difficult in preparation and more specific (as they fall into the hands of the lower order of people) of being admitted to immediate use than higher prized commodities intended for the consumption of those who have more distinguishing palates…, ⁵⁴

Studies in the post-colonial era have shown that a significant portion of Southeast Asia, including Laos, Cambodia, Burma, Northeast India and Yunnan, can be considered the primary homeland of tea, but not just one variety. Instead, all three major varieties, namely Assamica, Sinensis and Cambodia, are present in these regions. It is interesting to note that several botanists, traders and military personnel associated with the Company were aware of this fact. For example, Leonard’s use of the term ‘teas’ in reference to Assam suggests that he knew that Chinese tea was not the only type of Camellia. In fact, there were five different varieties of Camellia found in Assam: the Assam indigenous, the Manipur or Burma indigenous, the Luchai or Cachar indigenous and the Naga indigenous. ⁵⁵ The British scientific community’s fixation on the Sinensis variety caused them to overlook that different varieties could produce distinct flavours. Rather than acknowledging these differences, the scientific community attributed them to racial prejudice, likely due to tea’s association with the British aristocracy. ⁵⁶

Military Adventurism of Alexander Bruce and Charlton

Despite facing outright rejection, Alexander Bruce’s passion for the indigenous tea variety remained unwavering, and he tirelessly searched for it throughout the rainforests of Upper Assam from 1825 to 1837. During this time, he identified a total of 120 thriving tea plantations in various locations, including Phakial, Tippom (Tipam), Tingri, Buri-Dehing, Hukanpukhuri, Chabua, Jaipur (Jeypore), Mishimi Hills (Tirap, Changlang and Deomali of Arunachal Pradesh), ⁵⁷ Gabruparbat (Mariyani in Jorhat) and others. These tea plantations formed a continuous line that extended from Irrawaddy in Burma to the borders of Yunnan in China, intersecting Upper Assam. ⁵⁸ He travelled to China, where he hired Chinese tea experts and brought them to Upper Assam to teach him the techniques of tea cultivation. ⁵⁹ With an unwavering belief in the native plant’s potential, he was determined to produce a genuine tea beverage. Despite facing prejudice and envy from the native chiefs, he persevered tirelessly to win them over. ⁶⁰ He combined his European enthusiasm with Chinese expertise, and the resilience of the native people (in felling forests and planting saplings). Additionally, he set up experimental gardens in various tea areas of Upper Assam to produce the first drinkable tea. Despite these noteworthy achievements, Bruce refrained from disclosing them until 1833 due to the strict scientific standards of the Calcutta authority. ⁶¹ Meanwhile, another military officer with a keen interest in botany named Lieutenant Andrew Charlton of the Assam Light Infantry, stationed at Sudeeyah (Sadiya), showed a sincere interest in tea. He obtained samples of the local plant from his gardener, which he then forwarded to Dr John Tytler of the Agricultural and Horticultural Society of India in May 1830. Charlton also observed that the most knowledgeable natives of the area were already well-versed in tea cultivation. ⁶² Similar to Bruce, Wallich also rejected Charlton’s proposal right away.

End of British Tea Monopoly: Strategies and Realities

The Opium War and its Impacts

As scientific inconsistencies plagued the tea industry in Assam, the arrival of Commissioner Lin Zexu in Guangzhou (known as Canton in the western world) in 1839 to enforce a ban on opium added fuel to the turmoil. Lin destroyed over 20,000 chests, or about 2.6 million pounds, of opium, arrested 1,600 Chinese dealers and seized and destroyed tens of thousands of opium pipes. He demanded British merchants surrender their opium supplies, but they refused to comply. As a result, Lin convinced Portuguese merchants in a colony near Macau to expel the uncooperative British and push them back to Hong Kong, which angered the British. ⁷⁸ But interestingly, this ban was not new. It was imposed in 1813, twenty-six years before this action, indicating that the British were running the opium trade illegally in China. This trade, during its initial stage, was a compulsion for them, as the Chinese did not accept anything else except silver and cotton in exchange for tea. From 1810 to 1840, the British imported tea using silver and Indian cotton as exchange commodities. With the decrease in the flow of silver after the American Revolution and the Chinese beginning to grow their indigenous variety of cotton, the British needed to find an alternative to trade for tea. They found a solution in opium, which coincidentally aligned with the Company’s acquisition of Bengal, Bihar, Orissa and Malwa—regions in India known for producing high-quality opium. Additionally, the British utilised abusive labour practices and easily accessible raw materials to produce opium at a significantly lower cost, yielding a large profit margin. To illustrate, a chest of poppies was sold at auction for ₹1,362, but its production cost was only ₹370. ⁷⁹ The Company exported 60 tonnes of Indian opium in 1776, and this quantity grew to 120 tonnes in 1790 and 1,500 tonnes in 1830. The value of this opium amounted to $11.5 million, but the cost of importing tea during this timeframe was $9 million, similar to the opium trade. ⁸⁰ The resulting financial gain caused opium to develop into a self-sufficient trading industry, separate from its previous role as a commodity used in exchange. Between the years 1810 and 1838, the export of opium rose from 4,500 chests to 40,000 chests, triggering a social and economic upheaval in China. ⁸¹ There were no students to study, teachers to teach, farmers to cultivate and ministers to advise the king. Everyone was immersed in opium. Zexu wrote to Queen Victoria against these illegal activities of her traders, ‘…of the products which China exports to your country, there is not a one which is not beneficial to mankind…by what principle should these foreigners send in return a poisonous drug’? But the queen did not take any initiative to stop the opium trade. Instead, she sent the British naval troops to fight the Chinese at Canton, and there began the first opium war. The immediate impact of the war was that ‘tea cultivation in Assam became an ‘urgent national need’ if the British had to take revenge on China’, quoted in the Friend of India. ⁸² This ended the ideological battle within the scientific commission, and Assam emerged as the undisputed choice for tea cultivation.

Inclusion of Upper Assam into the Empire

After a decade of persistent demands for recognition, the indigenous plant finally got it. To accelerate plantations, the British prioritised removing barriers to land acquisition. While no official British record explicitly confirms this, a thorough examination of local history supports this claim.

The Upper Assam Rainforest: Understanding the Destruction of a Sustainable Livelihood Source

To establish tea gardens, the British cleared rainforests, aiming for landscapes dominated by straight rows of tea bushes. ⁹⁵ This process involved deep hoeing, exposing jungle roots to sunlight, damaging the soil’s micronutrients and harming the rainforest’s herb layer. ⁹⁶ The British’s aversion to ‘unnecessary trees’ in Upper Assam led to large-scale deforestation, highlighting their ecological indifference. Labelling forests as ‘wastelands’ justified their appropriation of over half the land. ⁹⁷

There is ample evidence to indicate that the rainforest offers superior-quality soil for cultivation. William Roberts, a planter at the Jorehaut Tea Company, recommended that forested areas be prioritised for establishing tea gardens due to the presence of high-quality, decomposed plant matter on the surface. This organic matter stimulates the growth of young tea plants more effectively than any other type of fertiliser. ⁹⁸ As a result, regulations were created for the allocation of wastelands, such as the 99 Years’ Lease Rules of 1838, the Fee Simple Rules, the Revised Fee Simple Rules of 1874 and the New Lease Rules of 1876. These rules did not encourage applicants to limit the amount of land they applied for. For example, the 1838 wasteland grant rules allowed one-fourth of the total granted lands to be exempted from revenue, and no revenue had to be paid on the remaining land for 20 years if it was covered in forests. These provisions made planters more interested in forested lands. Furthermore, these plots were granted at very low prices. As a result of these favourable rules, planters frequently applied for large tracts of land, ranging from 1,000 to 1,500 acres or more, even though they lacked the resources or intention to cultivate the entire plot. ⁹⁹ The jungles underwent severe deforestation, leading to the loss of numerous valuable trees. These trees were utilised for producing charcoal, the primary fuel source for tea processing, and crafting wooden tea boxes for packaging. In addition, the cleared forest areas were repurposed to accommodate tea garden labourers. ¹⁰⁰ In 1861–1862, 115 grants were made, which increased to 182 in 1862–1863 and further rose to 418 during 1867–1868. ¹⁰¹ According to the Annual Tea Report of 1878, planters were granted 147,071 acres of land in the Sivasagar district, out of which only 34,194 acres were utilised for planting, leaving the remaining 112,877 acres unplanted. In Lakhimpur, 117,308 acres of land were granted, of which only 23,781 were planted and 93,527 remained unplanted. ¹⁰² As a result, tea planters became the most significant private land and forest owners in Upper Assam. ¹⁰³

Exploring the Vital Connections Between Natives and the Rainforest

The rainforest offered the indigenous people a variety of resources for building houses, making boats for transportation and the armed forces and creating various household items such as utensils, furniture, clothing, baskets and mats. Additionally, temporary settlements called Pam Basti were built in forests to enable farmers to grow crops like vegetables, pulses, paddy and so on. ¹⁰⁴ In view of this, B. C. Allen observed that the Assamese people had a sustainable source of livelihood readily available to them, right at their doorstep. ¹⁰⁵

Hunter provides a list of valuable herbs and trees procured from these forests that are deemed useless and unknown to the civilised world. However, the locals frequently used them. Some of the herbs and trees include Jamalgota (Croton tiglium), Madar (Calotropis gigantea), Bag Bharendra (Jatropha), Hara (Terminalia chebula), Chaulmugra (Gynocardia odorata), Sunaru (Cassia fistula), Mishmi Teeta (Coptis teeta), Afim (Papaver somniferum), Bel (Eagle marshmelos), Kat Bis (Aconitum napellus), Kathal (Artocarpus integrifolia), Kala Jam (Syzygium jambolana), Asu, Udal and so on. Additionally, various species of trees, such as Adakur (Tetranthera quadrifolia), Sum (Lancifolia) and Pila Champa (Michelia pulneyesis), were suitable for silkworm rearing, and this was one of the largest indigenous industries in the tropical forests. Despite their importance, they were abolished due to their insignificance compared to tea, and no records of their properties, utilities or significance were ever recorded. ¹⁰⁶

Collaboration Between Planters and Missionaries in Colonial India: A Manifestation of British Colonialism

The British tea enterprise had such evident repercussions on the local population that it led the tribes to engage in violent confrontations, raids and rebellions. The raids on the gardens played a significant role in establishing the Assam Light Infantry. Nonetheless, the British realised that employing military force alone might not decrease tribal hostility towards them. Thus, the British endeavoured to change the tribes’ mindset and ideology through psychological and ideological methods such as religious teachings and education to achieve their desired outcome. For this purpose, the Company invited American Baptist missionaries to baptise the tribes and utilise them for tea garden management and jungle cleaning tasks. ¹⁰⁷ The presence of tea in the Jeypore rainforest played a significant role in attracting the first generation of American Baptist missionaries to the region under the ‘Shan Mission’ (as most of the communities residing here belonged to the Shan ethnicity from Southeast Asia). ¹⁰⁸ The EIC instructed the mission to carry out civilisational activities, which proved successful. The missionaries established schools and introduced modern education in the vernacular Naga language. Miles Bronson composed grammar books such as ‘Phrases in English and Naga’ (1840) and ‘Vocabulary in English, Assamese, Singpho and Naga’ (1838). However, despite their efforts, the missionaries could not attract any major Shan tribe, who were portrayed as ‘ignorant’ and ‘barbaric.’ In reality, it can be assumed that their alliance with the planters was the main reason for their lack of interest in religion. Nonetheless, the missionaries had a magnetic pull on the aristocratic class of the native Assamese society, if not the lower stratum. This aristocracy consisted of the high-caste Hindu Assamese, who previously served in the administration of the Ahom monarchy and were eager to exploit the new opportunities brought about by the tea industry. ¹⁰⁹ The missionaries initiated an educational revolution in Upper Assam, which led to the revitalisation of the Assamese language that had previously been suppressed by the political manoeuvring of the Bengali Bhadraloks. ¹¹⁰ The achievement had a lasting influence on the Assamese upper class, and they became the most devoted local supporters of the British tea industry and the missionaries. With such a favourable response from the local intellectuals, the missionaries found it easier to establish tea as the harbinger of progress in Assam. Gunabhiram Baruah, for example, expressed enthusiasm when vast tracts of forests were transformed into thriving tea plantations. There was a sincere plea by the missionaries that the day would come soon when gardens would replace jungles. ¹¹¹ Padmanath Gohain Baruah celebrated the tea industry as a remarkable discovery post-Ahom dynasty’s era, while Someswar Sharma highlighted the aesthetic appeal of tea gardens as ‘sources of beauty’. Missionaries successfully educated local intellectuals in what Drayton termed ‘Economics of Eden,’ shaping tea historiography that overlooked adverse effects on tribes, common people and ecology. Company officials, including Commissioner Jenkins, Alexander Bruce and Captain Hannay, supported the missionaries. This alliance led to locals perceiving missionaries akin to the planters, causing both of them to flee Upper Assam during the 1857 revolt, a localised outbreak of India’s First War of Independence. ¹¹²

Conclusion

The story of the tea industry in Assam is more complex and multi-faceted than it may seem to be. The current historical literature asserts that the discovery of indigenous tea plants led to the Company’s annexation of Upper Assam. But this article raises the intriguing question of whether Upper Assam was annexed solely for the purpose of tea. If the British Government had not abolished the tea monopoly of the EIC, trade relations with China had not deteriorated, and the opium war had not occurred, would Upper Assam still have been annexed? It is possible that it would have been, but not just for tea. The annexation of Upper Assam might have been driven more by some strategic and security concerns, given its access to Tibet, Burma and China. This is further supported by the fact that the British were not particularly fascinated by the discovery of ‘indigenous tea’, as evidenced by the decision of the Company to cultivate the Chinese variety rather than the Assamica. Ultimately, this decision turned all the efforts, adventures and conflicts surrounding tea cultivation in Upper Assam entirely irrelevant. ¹¹³ Furthermore, the Company’s stance contradicts Brockway’s belief that introducing the Chinese tea plant into Upper Assam was a ground-breaking endeavour that set a precedent for transferring plants to all the Royal Botanical Gardens throughout the tropics. ¹¹⁴ Instead, the Company actually prevented all such attempts, whether by patriotic Englishmen or botanists. ¹¹⁵ The above discussion reveals that tea has been growing in Assam for thousands of years and was not introduced by the British. The locals of Upper Assam used to sell it to the Chinese, who later sold it to the British. However, a distorted and biased history has been perpetuated to glorify the British as the first to bring tea to Assam. This article highlights that owing to the psychological schooling of the Baptist missionaries, the educated local intelligentsia furthered for long a prejudiced, biased and colonial interpretation of history, not recognising the fact that the British tea industry was built at the expense of a rainforest.