Unemployment disciplines workers and reduces the wage that firms must pay to prevent shirking. Equilibrium unemployment is too low from the perspective of the profit-maximizing firm because each firm fails to account for the reduction in unemployment imposed by its own hiring. An executive committee for macroeconomic policy can provide discipline as a public good by maintaining higher unemployment to increase collective profits.
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