Neoliberal Global Remedies: From Speculative-Led Growth to IMF-Led Crisis in Turkey

Turkey experienced a severe economic and political crisis in November 2000, and again in February 2001. The IMF has been involved with the macro management of the Turkish economy both prior to and after the crisis, and provided financial assistance of $20.4 billion, net, between 1999 and 2003. The official stance is that the crisis was the result of the failure of the public sector to maintain the austerity targets and the failure to fully implement the free market rationale of globalization. I argue in this article, however, that contrary to the official wisdom, the current economic and political crisis is not the end result of a set of technical errors or administrative mismanagement unique to Turkey, but is the result of a series of pressures emanating from the process of integration with the global capital markets. I document the fragility indicators of the Turkish financial and fiscal system, and show that the IMF program led to an increase in vulnerability of the financial system throughout 2000-2001. I further argue that the recent wave of structural reforms destined for stability and credibility serve, in fact, mainly the interests of foreign finance capital, and primarily aim at securing the debt obligations of the Turkish arbiters.