Abstract
The analysis of economic crises is an integral part of the conception of how an economic system reproduces itself over time, and thus reflects the diversity of economic thought. This article systematically examines various interpretations of the Great Recession in the Spanish economy through the methodological lens of crisis theory. It argues that neoclassical, Austrian, Keynesian, and post-Keynesian approaches (among others) ultimately converge in their treatment of crises, attributing them to some form of exogenous intervention. Despite certain divergences, they share a common feature: the crisis is understood as a contingent possibility rather than as an inherent and inevitable necessity, as posited by the materialist conception of crisis. In the Spanish case, these analyses have primarily emphasized (1) state intervention—both regulatory frameworks and economic policies—interlinked with (2) income distribution, particularly nominal and real wages, and (3) the financial sphere, especially interest rates and debt levels.
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