Abstract
The author explains ideological change using a theory justifying an individual’s grounds for action. If an individual prefers ideology A to ideology B, it is because the costs of justifying A are less than the costs of justifying B. On this basis, the dynamic behind ideologies is explained partly by their justification context and partly by rises in justification costs. The context for their rationale plays a not insignificant role, as it qualifies the type of event capable of generating a change. An event generates a change because it makes an ideology problematic and places the individual in a situation of cognitive dissonance. This event is an experiment in an empiricist justification context, a logical factor in a rationalist context and an interpretative inconsistency in a religious context. The event that generates change is qualified thus; it might be argued that an event makes an ideology problematic when it increases its justification costs. Logically, its rationale costs should increase with the quality of alternative ideologies, the position of scientific or religious authorities – depending on the rationale context – the number of people who decide to revise their ideology or to abandon it, and the entire body of knowledge deemed to be non-problematic by individuals.
Introduction
This article is designed as a contribution to building a positive theory of ideology (North, 1981: 55). It seeks to explain the reasons that drive individuals to change their ideology. Such an explanation is important because the neo-institutionalist, D.C. North, and the sociology of institutions consider that it is impossible to contemplate institutional change or the status quo without examining the legitimacy of institutions. In such conditions, it is vital to explain the conditions in which an institutional regime either remains legitimate, in order to acknowledge the status quo, or becomes illegitimate, in order to explain the change.
Ideology is a system for justifying the way the world is and/or should be (Jost et al., 2009: 326). This article does not set out to justify the importance we attach to justification when defining ideology. We should remember, however, that in his critique addressing the Marxist ideology theory, Joseph Schumpeter (1968[1954], 1983: 66 n1) distinguishes the rationalization of ideology. Rationalization is a habit of the mind. “This habit consists in comforting ourselves and impressing others by drawing a picture of ourselves, our motives, our friends, our enemies, our vocation, our church, our country, which may have more to do with what we like them to be than with what they are” (Schumpeter, 1968[1954]: 35). This process is a self-defence mechanism. Rationalization, ex post, justifies a decision. It tends to provide reassurance regarding choices made. It should be differentiated from ex ante rationalization. Ideology justifies an ex ante choice. This is the argument individuals have created to justify the choice they have made and the alternatives they have given themselves. Joseph Schumpeter therefore suggests we use the word ‘rationalization’ for belief and value systems that serve to justify ideas we know are false and values we know are unsustainable, but that let us legitimize the social order we live in. Such an ex post rationalization process of the social order justifies the use of rhetoric and propaganda. Conversely, the word ‘ideology’ is reserved for all representations that have been created in order to have the most faithful and accurate representation in the world.
This distinction makes clear the subject of the present article. It is not a case of explaining how ways of rationalizing reality have evolved, but instead of deciphering the evolution of ideology. Ex post justification has no effect on behaviour, as the reasons the subjects use to explain their actions are designed to conceal the real reasons for their behaviour (Boudon, 1995: 162, 2003, 2010). These genuine reasons are – depending on the approach – class interests (Marx), individual interests (perfect rationality) or emotions (Aronson, 1968; Braker, 2005). This explains the significance given to persuasion (Coyne & Leeson, 2009; Jaeck, 2011; Olper & Swinnen, 2013; Stromberg, 2001) and/or indoctrination (Lott, 1987, 1990, 1999; Saint-Paul, 2007, 2010) models in contemporary social sciences.
The subject of the present article is different. It addresses the evolution of ideology; in other words, the reasons people use ex ante to justify their actions. Without always being properly understood, literature on ideological changes does not use persuasion models with a central rhetorical argument. Instead, in this literature, ideology acts as a catalyst for learning models. The easiest model is a feedback model. Such a model is based on the following premise: a person thinks that A will enable them to obtain B. Information invalidates this belief. There is a cognitive dissonance and, ultimately, a crisis. The response to this crisis is a shift in ideology (Aoki, 2001). The crisis is considered to be a window of opportunity for reform (Williamson, 2000) because it nullifies the reasons people use to justify their actions. The cause of action for change in this model is information that contradicts a causal belief constituting an ideology. This learning model is widely used to understand the waves of liberalization and privatization during the 1980s and 1990s (Meseguer, 2005: 68), as well as the British Labour Party’s termination of its nationalization programme (Parker, 2008). It is also used to explain the inability of Keynesian policies to tackle stagflation (Hall, 1993). Stagflation, unemployment and the economic crisis are considered to be causes of action that triggered change (Hall, 1993: 284) because they discredit all political ideologies that used the Keynesian doctrine to justify their economic policies. Stagflation constituted an anomaly in the sense described by Kuhn (Hall, 1993: 285). It was not expected (Hall, 1993: 283), which weakens it.
This learning model has the advantage of being operational (Meseguer, 2005, 2006). However, it does not tell the full story. First, it does not explain why individuals revise their ideologies. It is indeed possible to imagine that individuals opt for the status quo while denying reality. Faced with a situation of cognitive dissonance, individuals can basically adopt a strategy of denying reality (Cowen, 2005). This scenario refers to an ideology as a source of the institutional status quo and the inability of a certain number of countries to adapt to their environment (Benabou, 2008). After that, it says nothing about the speed of learning. If individuals revise their beliefs, do they do this slowly, or as soon as a piece of information generates a cognitive dissonance? Such a model fails to explain why a particular solution has been chosen; why Keynesianism gave way to monetarism as opposed to a regime of competition between the currencies or the establishment of Islamic finance.
Several reasons surface to answer the question of why individuals refuse to deny reality. First, it is difficult to deny that in the years from 1960 to 1970 the dominant growth model was based on State intervention (Meseguer, 2003, 2006) and the Keynesian model (Hall, 1993: 284); that the 1980s and 1990s were characterized by a liberal and monetarist model (Hall, 1993: 284). Political parties and voters who followed them obviously shifted their ideologies to more right-wing positions. Furthermore the strategy of denying reality is neither without consequences nor without moral prerequisites. It is not without consequences because if the reasons that lead me to do A are false, I will never have B. Individuals therefore revise their ideologies because they fear the cost of denying reality (Hirschman, 1982: 36). Denying reality then has consequences for my credibility. I must not simply justify my choices to myself. I must also justify them to others, as my political ideology – by definition – involves others. It justifies a political programme that will impact all individuals belonging to the national community. My strategy of denying reality must be justified. I must have good reasons for defending the status quo. The reality-denying strategy assumes that intellectual honesty is not a value integral to my ideology. Honesty prohibits me from denying reality, regardless of the consequences for my well-being. It is a moral principle that can constitute part of my ideology; values that I uphold.
It is from this cognitive perspective that the theory developed in this article explains ideological shift. Its central idea is as follows. An event generates a cognitive dissonance, which in turn triggers rising costs for justifying certain ideologies. It is the level of these costs that explains the status quo or the revision. The article is structured as follows. Its starting point is the widely accepted theory that political, economic and social crises generate ideological changes (second section) because they create a cognitive dissonance (third section). This theory is nonetheless modified initially by introducing the justification context for each ideology. What generates change differs from one ideology to another. This would be a significant factor within the context of an empiricist ideology, an intellectual factor within the context of a rationalist ideology and a hermeneutic factor for religious ideologies (fourth section). The cause of action for dissonance is always an event, but this event is not always of a significant nature. It then modifies it, by introducing the concept of justification cost. Individuals change their ideology when justification costs become prohibitive. These costs are prohibitive first if there is an ideology whose rationalization cost is less than that of the initial ideology (‘Choice and opportunity cost’ in the fifth section). They are also prohibitive (1) if there is a large number of individuals opposing them, (2) if scientific or religious authorities – depending on the context – condemn them and (3) if it fails to acknowledge all of the assertions deemed non-problematic by the majority. These costs create objective conditions for revising and/or abandoning the ideology. Depending on the ability of an ideology to be absorbed, these costs can also explain the appearance or adaptation of each ideology (sixth section). The article therefore ends with a few key predictions that could be illustrated by econometric tests.
Events and changes of ideology
Ideology is the justification system for our representations. Its initial source is an act of perception. Through their senses, people learn about their environment and accumulate knowledge, which they memorize and which, through inference, enables them to predict a certain number of events. Language adds to this cognitive pattern the possibility of transmitting what the person has seen and organizing it all into a coherent representation system. In this sense, an ideology is more than just a belief. It is a collection of beliefs and values organized in a coherent way and that justifies our choices. These choices are governed by intentions. My political ideology justifies my conception of what a good society should be and the means required to achieve this.
What makes this sense of right and this idea of good politics change to achieve this? The standard answer to this question is as follows. The cause of action for ideological change is an event. An event is something that creates discontinuity in an individual’s life (illness, birth, death, failure, marriage, etc.) or in community life (war, revolution, natural disaster, economic crisis, etc.). War, revolution, economic crises, inflation, insecurity and disorder all create new threats and tend to discredit established ideologies. They create opportunities for change and for experimenting with new ways to view the world and to behave (Higgs, 1987, 2007: 75; Williamson, 2000: 598).
We therefore expect these economic, political and social crises to generate ideological changes and a shift in the balance of power.
Events, cognitive dissonance and change
Such an explanation does not, however, tell us why such events cause change. Developing the concept of cognitive dissonance, social psychology goes some way towards giving an answer (Festinger, 1957). An event provides information that places the individual in a situation of cognitive dissonance. This event creates a dissonance for an individual or for society. An individual can think they are protected from illness because they follow the precepts of their religion. They fall ill. They are appalled by their illness. God should not punish his own. The illness distances them from God and changes their behaviour. Like the collapse of one lone business, illness provokes individual dissonance. The collapse of a very large number of businesses during a crisis period, however, involves virtually everyone. It dictates collective concern, as the crisis creates a social dissonance. It forces a debate to discuss the underlying reasons and ways by which to solve the issue. A major event is therefore an event that creates a social dissonance, forcing a debate and a re-assessment of justification systems for ideologies in operation. It creates the conditions for a shift in current ideologies and their balance of power. A few examples can be used to illustrate this sequence.
A terrorist attack lends credibility to security-based ideologies. For a number of observers (Higgs, 1987: 58, 2007: 75; Shiller, 1991; Turner & Killian, 1972: 147), the 1929 crisis was the impulse behind the founding of an anti-capitalist party (Higgs, 2007: 76; North, 1981: 4951). The fall of the Berlin Wall played the opposite role. It cast doubt on the argument that socialism was effective. In this sense, economic history is not a series of events that always discredit the same ideology. It either strengthens or weakens the ideologies of those involved in politics. History plays on perceptions could explain the existence of ideological cycles (Ikeda, 1997: 134): times when liberalism convinces the majority of the population, and times when it fades.
Justification context and the nature of events underpinning a problem
Such a sequence, however, ignores an important aspect of ideology. Ideology is what justifies our judgements of values and facts, as well as our justification context. The justification context is the epistemology at the root of all moral and factual knowledge found in all ideologies. The epistemology of an ideology is the internal logical structure of knowledge that is mobilized to justify its representation of reality and a fair world order.
A political ideology can be founded on rationalism or empiricism. Empiricism is the basis of scientific ideology. It has a twofold premise. The first is that my knowledge is derived from my experiments. The second is that it is a generalization of particular situations. Empiricism is of the view that the justification question can be considered only in terms of observations and experiments. The justification context of an empiricist ideology forces a debate about the nature of inferences that must be made in the case of an event like the 1929 crisis. What should I infer from 1929? 1929 could potentially falsify liberalism if it describes an event the likelihood of which was logically prohibited by the theory. An ideology here becomes problematic only because its anticipatory role has become problematic.
Rationalism does not pose a problem in this way, as it bases human knowledge solely on discursive reason. This reason is further supported by the revelation of God’s words to the prophets in religious rationalism. It is the only reason able to understand the world and morally assess it within secular rationalism. In these justification contexts, 1929 assumes a completely different significance. The capitalist crisis instead conceals an identity crisis. It is proof that when people speculate against the law of God they are helping to destroy the social order. These debates are not about the origin of the crisis, but about the word of God. Did God really prohibit speculation and usury? For its part, secular rationalism will examine whether the discursive reasoning that led to the supporting of market self-regulation is deductively accurate. The solution to the problem is logical and non-experimental.
The justification context therefore determines the nature of the event that will make an ideology problematic: a significant factor in an empiricist justification context, a logical inconsistency in a rationalist justification context and an interpretative inconsistency in a theological justification context.
Political ideologies founded on the rationality of the revelation are essentially composed of theological knowledge. What is important for justifying the way in which the world is and should be is my knowledge of the words of God. The world is God’s creation. A person alone is solely responsible for their failings. My judgements of facts and values are based on this faith and the word of God. Political ideologies based on an empiricist justification context, however, allow much more room for experience. A person can even ultimately deny basic ethics (Hume’s guillotine) and prioritize solely judgements of fact. The justification context for each ideology thus determines its ideal reasoning model and the nature of the knowledge accepted as being true.
This means that there are two types of ideological shift: the learning itself and the way in which the learning method changes.
What is problematic in an empiricist justification context is not problematic in a theological or rationalist justification context. Ideological inertia at the root of institutional inertia cannot, in these conditions, be explained by reasons of self-interest, but by the justification context for current ideologies. A purely religious ideology is based on faith in the revelation. A better world is a world where people act according to the law of God. An event such as the 1929 crisis cannot make such a representation of the world problematic.
The cause of action for change is always an event, but this event is not always a significant factor. It is only so in an empiricist justification context. This is a logical inconsistency in a rationalist context; a hermeneutic inconsistency in a theological context. As a result, major economic, social and political crises will logically generate even more ideological change if the ideologies justify the idea that significant experience is the only source of knowledge. We should therefore not expect facts or economic crises to modify political ideologies that share a rationalist or theological justification context. If there is inertia, it is not – in these conditions – because agents refuse to learn in order to protect their interests but because they do not appreciate the problem. By the same token the economic success of liberalism only boosts its popularity in an empiricist justification context.
Change and justification cost 1
With ideology characterized in this way by its justification context and its content, judgement of fact and judgement of value, we can try to explain the reasons why it has changed. We are now coming to the heart of this article. What leads an agent to revise the justification context for their ideology and its content?
The answer is as follows. An individual changes their grounds for action according to the justification costs of their choices. They have the choice between defending their ideology (option A) or changing it (option B). There is an advantage to each solution. If the individual chooses option B, it is because the advantages associated with it are deemed superior to option A. B is chosen because it has lower opportunity costs. The individual only waives the advantages of option A if they are inferior to the advantages of option B. Weighing up the advantages requires the individual to substantiate their justifications. The advantages of option B are superior to the advantages of option A for several reasons. The costs of forming their grounds for action are the justification costs. I choose B over A because it is less costly to defend option B than option A. The choice of ideological change therefore depends on the world of ideological possibles and the level of opportunity costs for each option.
Choice and worlds of ideological possibles
The concept of opportunity cost implies that choosing involves giving something up. If I choose to stay liberal, I waive the benefits of all alternative ideologies. This is why the solution a particular individual chooses depends on imagined solutions, i.e. solutions from my world of ideological possibles. In this case, the ideological status quo is explained by the limited nature of my world of ideological possibles or by the way in which I assess the advantages of its alternatives. I remain liberal despite 1929 because I do not understand socialism (ignorance) or because I consider the advantages of socialism to be inferior to those of liberalism, despite the crisis. A world of limited ideological possibles can thus explain the absence of change.
This simple principle has several consequences. First, major events in an empiricist justification context only generate a review of ideologies if the individuals concerned possess a less costly alternative representation, i.e. more in line with the knowledge held by the individual. The same major event, then, does not have the same effects if individual A does not share the same world of ideological possibles as individual B. If Islamic finance is in one individual’s world of ideological possibles and not in that of another individual, the solution chosen will not be the same. Individuals will not necessarily have the same opportunity costs or make the same choices. This can explain why, when faced with a major crisis, nations respond differently. Some countries opt for liberalism (UK in 1978) and others Islamism (Egypt in 2014).
Choice and opportunity cost
The ideological status quo can also be explained by the fact that available solutions are more costly to justify than the initial ideology. The solution chosen by the individual is one of their imagined ideologies. If it is chosen, it’s because it is deemed to be the best. It is deemed to be the best because it is the less costly solution to justify. I prefer A to B because it is less costly for me to believe that A is preferable to B. I prefer to revise my ideology, in these circumstances, either because I feel ex ante that my revision costs are prohibitive or because I consider ex post, having assessed the current justifications, that I cannot maintain the status quo. Why would the person decide that the justification costs of a revision are prohibitive ex ante? Three factors influence the total of these costs: the number of people who have chosen to revise their ideology, the opinion of experts and the amount of knowledge possessed by those defending an ideology revision.
Justification cost and group size
The justification costs for a particular ideology are lower the greater the number of individuals adopting them. The argument here is as follows. An ideology is never founded on a clear understanding. It is founded on an act of faith, i.e. an act whose basis for belief is not sufficient to determine my approval. My ideology is, in this sense, a good of confidence as opposed to a good of experience. The fact that a large number of individuals make the same choice lends it credibility. The opposite is also true. The justification costs for a particular ideology are, in these conditions, the greater the fewer people subscribing to them.
Two reasons emerge to explain this. On the one hand it is because the investment made to restore the credibility of the ideology tends to decrease the fewer supporters it has. The fewer liberal individuals, the less they invest in defending liberalism, the fewer arguments put forward in favour of liberalism the greater the cost for each individual – taken separately – to justify liberalism. On the other hand it is because the costs of justifying my ideology tend to rise the more times I am faced with a cognitive dissonance. The greater the number of socialists, the more liberals will be faced with views they disagree with. Such disagreements cost them dearly, as they are increasingly obliged to justify why they are not socialists. The less an ideology is shared, the more an individual is placed in a situation of cognitive dissonance and the greater the number of times they will be forced to justify themselves.
Justification costs and authoritative argument
The justification costs of a particular ideology also depend on the opinion of experts. The argument here is as follows. If a mathematician contradicts the way in which I have solved a mathematical problem, it will be difficult for me not to accept my mistake, partly because no one will have faith in me, as I am not a mathematician, but also because I have faith in the ability of institutions to encourage researchers to focus on searching for the truth regarding their interests. I also accept the expert’s solution because it enables me to possess credible knowledge at a low cost.
The risk in so many people having this relationship of dependence on the honesty of a small group of experts is, obviously, that the latter will become aware of their power and abuse it. It should also be noted that the expertise depends on the various justification contexts for each ideology. A religious justification context, for example, makes the theologian the expert. The argument in such a context remains the same: arguing that usury is not prohibited by God in the Koran is all the more costly if virtually all Koran specialists say the opposite.
Justification costs and knowledge
Justification costs also depend on the knowledge available. Knowledge is the sum of all assertions deemed to be non-problematic. An assertion is non-problematic if the costs of making it problematic are prohibitive. The consequence is that justification costs for interpreting the word of God or an event such as the 1929 crisis diminish when they do not contradict what we think we already know.
Let us take two examples to define this principle. When crisis theorists announce an unemployment rate of 25% of the active population in the USA following the 1929 crisis and negative production growth rates, they build their views on conventions: the definition of unemployment and national accounting. These conventions are deemed non-problematic because a large part of the population thinks that, if it had to define unemployment or calculate production, it would do it in the same way. Denying the extent of the 1929 crisis would amount to rejecting the entire theory of national accounting and a large part of labour economics, as well as numerous personal accounts from workers and entrepreneurs from the era. The cost of such a rejection is objectively extremely important, as it assumes that the individual is suggesting a new form of national accounting and a new way of calculating unemployment. We can take another example with even more obvious consequences. The justification costs for revisionist ideologies are extremely high, if not infinite, as Holocaust denial goes against thousands of testimonies, archives and documents. The return on investment for the resources used in denying the Holocaust is more than likely to be virtually nil. The historian only uncovers details that do not question the existence of the Holocaust.
In this sense, the justification costs have an objective dimension. They depend on the knowledge deemed to be true at a given point in history by the individuals comprising a group. Science, theology and/or philosophy therefore reduce the justification costs of an ideology in two different ways: by enabling the use of the authoritative argument (see ‘Justification costs and authoritative argument’ above) and by helping to form the assertions that no one considers necessary to question. In discussions about economic problems, it is rare, for example, for national accounting figures to be questioned. These figures, as we have been reminded, are conventions, however, and are not without their issues. The other consequence of this reality objectivity is that the justification costs of a particular ideology do not depend solely on the amount of resources invested. They are also dependent on what can be termed the intrinsic quality of an ideology.
The intrinsic quality of an ideology is its ability to make a coherent whole from all non-problematic assertions upheld by a group of individuals. In these conditions the dominant ideology is the ideology that best respects the group’s shared knowledge. It makes way for other ideologies partly because there is always a degree of uncertainty and partly because an ideology is always threatened by a potential falsifier, i.e. an event that challenges the validity of an assertion and in fine the coherence of the dominant ideology. This event reduces the justification costs for ideologies that announced the event. The justification costs for security-based ideologies are diminished by attacks. The anticipatory role of its ideologies gains credibility thanks to the attacks. The other ideologies can retain their position or integrate this anticipatory role in their representation system.
Absorption capacity and justification context
Integrating new information into the representation system reflects its absorption capacity. An ideology’s absorption capacity measures the ease with which the individual will assimilate, transform and exploit the knowledge generated by an event. What is important for understanding the ease with which an ideology will absorb something new is really its relationship with whatever is new, and its ability to use it as an argument that reinforces its credibility. As shown by John Stuart Mill, numerous societies put to death those who introduced new opinions (Mill,1889: II.18 2 ). These societies were built on ideologies that gave good reasons to be hostile to anything new. By prohibiting anything new, the ideology is protected from any change and reduces its costs. It also deprives individuals of two types of information: ‘a more vivid perception of the truth by virtue of its confrontation with error’(Mill, 1889: II.2) or ‘the means to exchange error for truth’ (Mill, 1869: II.2 3 ). Political ideologies that are the least conducive to freedom of expression are the most hostile to new ideas and in fine the most stable. Once the taste for new ideas and confrontation of world interpretations has been justified, the absorption capacity for ideologies will depend on their ability to combine this new knowledge with all of the assertions it comprises. Depending on the circumstances, an intellectual or significant factor can render an entire ideology obsolete. Once assimilated and transformed, the new information can be used to reduce the justification costs of the initial ideology.
The stability of an ideology thus depends on its relationship with new ideas and freedom of expression. Some ideologies are, in this sense, more flexible than others. An ideology is therefore even more stable when it emphasizes the past over the present, and can minimize ideological confrontations. It would thus reduce the emergence of social dissonance situations; there would be ideologies designed to change and ideologies designed to remain static. This shows that ideological change depends on the value each ideology attributes to the adaptability of its representation system. An ideology that has a traditional view of the singular, unchanging truth will be less malleable than an ideology based on a post-Darwinian, evolutionist philosophy of the truth.
Conclusion
The theory developed in this article paves the way for two types of research. Introducing the justification context makes it possible to show that ideological inertia during a period of economic and social crisis cannot always be explained by a strategy of manipulation and/or conscious cognitive bias. It is only because significant factors have no effect on the problematic or non-problematic nature of an assertion. People see the world through the revealed word of God to man or through their reason. We therefore expect the effect of economic and social crises on ideological change to be conditioned by the justification context and the absorption capacity of each ideology. Political ideologies in the most secularized countries should be more volatile than those in countries with solid, deep-rooted religious practices, partly because in a political culture dominated by religion a significant factor does not make a dogma problematic, and partly because of the relationship that the major religions have with truth. God has revealed the truth to them. This certainty makes these ideologies less malleable, and less conducive to new ideas than scientific ideology, which is based on the concept of progress. Political ideologies with a religious basis should – in these conditions – be less changeable. This allows an ideological explanation of the generally flexible nature of institutions. The law in a particular country is all the more malleable when scientific culture defines the justification context for all political ideologies that make up the world of ideological possibles. This means that political ideologies should be categorized according to their justification context and not solely according to the content of their judgements of fact or of value. This also means that we cannot ignore the two levels of learning: changing one’s way of learning, i.e. from a religious context to a scientific context, and changing the content of one’s judgements of fact or of value.
Introducing the concept of justification costs is also a good way of understanding the dynamic of ideologies and the conditions underpinning their change. According to the theory of justification costs, it is even more costly for someone to justify the choice of ideology A when everything they and others know about the world disproves the latter. Thus we should expect an ideology to be less costly to defend when it enjoys support from a significant doctrinal and scientific body. This body is the result of a successive series of investments on the part of all agents. An ideology is therefore more inert when it agrees with all assertions deemed to be non-problematic by science in secularized societies, and by religious authorities in non-secularized societies. The context of discovery and ideology of scientific research policies can therefore have an effect on the justification costs for the various ideological alternatives.
If a state uses taxation to finance the scientific justification of its ideology, e.g. liberalism, it will build a body of knowledge that will make it extremely costly to criticize liberalism, partly because scientific research will have proved the benefits of liberalism and minimized its costs, and partly because the scientific authorities will be liberal. As it is even more difficult to argue against an ideology supported by a scientific or religious authority, the effect of accumulated knowledge is reinforced by the effect of the authoritative argument on justification cost levels. This means that ideological change is dependent on information possessed by a group at the moment when it is confronted with a cognitive dissonance. The content of its options depends on the way in which research programmes have been funded. A doctrine can only help to revise political parties’ economic ideologies if it has all the attributes of science: symbols, university titles, academic awards, Nobel prizes, etc., and if it puts forward a credible alternative, in other words, an alternative that is less costly to defend than the status quo. Politicians can then externalize the costs of justifying their ideology through taxation. Instead of investing their own resources to justify their choice, they invest the resources of others. In this way, they completely alter the balance of power between the various ideologies. They can reduce the justification costs for certain ideologies and increase them for others.
Lastly, we expect the most inert political ideologies to be the dominant ideologies, as the individuals subscribing to these ideologies are those who will be the least confronted with social dissonance and contradiction. There is a network effect at play. The ideology is credible because a large number of individuals deem it credible. This means that majority ideologies should tend to self-reinforce and be more stable than minority ideologies. This economy of scale should, however, be conditioned by the relative popularity of each ideology. The more widely an ideology is shared by a large number of people, the more it is exposed to the chance of its facts and/or logic being disputed. Conversely the less well-known an ideology is, the less its anticipatory roles will be challenged or confirmed by individuals.1929 makes liberalism problematic because the principle of self-regulation is shared and understood by a large number of individuals.
The work presented in this article should now be pursued and extended with a history of political ideologies that integrate the justification context, focusing on illustrating the major democracies in political life.
Footnotes
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.