Abstract
As states face shrinking budgets, new options for correctional supervision are being sought. One solution has been to shift the responsibility for custody from the state to county level through a process of realignment. The current article uses a case study methodology to examine proposed solutions and opinions of various stakeholders in juvenile justice following a 2010 announcement that the Department of Juvenile Corrections would be closed in Arizona. The findings show that the manner in which the realignment was proposed would have been a difficult model to adopt but that a well-planned and adequately funded reform would benefit juveniles and counties across Arizona.
Many states are experiencing a unique period of correctional reform. Following the prison boom in the 1980s, states have devoted a significant amount of funding to the incapacitation and supervision of millions of individuals (Schmitt, Warner, & Gupta, 2010). Over the past 5 years, as the resources devoted to the criminal justice system have grown dramatically, all states have been faced with reduced budgets during the economic recession. As the cost of corrections has begun to strain state revenues, many states are now being forced to consider alternative options for confining prisoners and juvenile delinquents (Gottschalk, 2010). In 2010, alternative solutions were developed for juvenile corrections when the Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections (ADJC) was slated for closure. The current article examines challenges faced at state and county levels if the agency had closed, opinions of juvenile justice officials across the state regarding the realignment, and proposed solutions for the future of juvenile corrections in Arizona.
Responding to Budgetary Constraints
The response to declining budgets has varied across states. While the solution to reduce operating costs for some states has been to close adult and juvenile facilities (Porter, 2011), others have reinvested funds from prisons into community corrections or changed their mandatory minimum sentencing practices (Subramanian & Tublitz, 2012). A more drastic solution to address budgetary constraints is to realign a state’s correctional system. In other words, some states have resorted to releasing offenders back into their communities and shifting the burden of confinement from state to local governments (Butts & Evans, 2011; Porter, 2011). Multiple states facing budget constraints have either begun making steps to drastically reform their correctional systems or begun to consider such moves.
One of the most notable correctional realignments has been the reform of California’s adult correctional system following Assembly Bill 109 (AB109). In an effort to reduce prison overcrowding and respond to the budget crisis, AB109 shifted responsibility of certain drug and property offenders from the state to county level (Owen & Mobley, 2012). The realignment has garnered criticism because of the difficulties that counties have faced including devoting increased resources to housing offenders in jails, challenges in implementing adequate community alternatives, and maintaining community safety (American Civil Liberties Union, 2012). Initial research suggests that the realignment has been effective in attaining some of its goals—at least at the state level. Petersilia (2014), for example, recently reported in her study of the California prison realignment that in 2005, about 20% of prisoners were confined on drug charges compared to 8.7% today. She noted, however, that the success of the realignment was largely dependent on how the problem is going to be addressed at the local level. In Orange County, CA, 76% of police departments, for instance, reported increases in violent and property crimes resulting from the realignment (Emery, 2013). In contrast, other reports suggest that there is no direct link between a statewide increase in crime and the realignment (Males & Goldstein, 2014). In fact, realignment may even have a positive impact on counties, as they are now more focused on helping offenders find jobs and learn basic life skills (Moore, 2013). Because it is still too early to determine the impact that the realignment has had on recidivism statewide, questions remain regarding the long-term repercussions of shifting the responsibility of confinement.
A growing number of states have been forced to make reforms to address the burgeoning prison population, including closing entire prisons; restructuring sentencing guidelines so that offenders will serve sentences in jail; and placing an increased number of offenders into community corrections (Subramanian & Tublitz, 2012). For example, in the late 2000s, multiple prisons in Georgia were closed as the Georgia Department of Corrections began the process of realignment, including one prison with 1,700 beds (Georgia Department of Corrections, 2007, 2009). Other states like North Carolina (Markham, 2014), West Virginia (Justice Center, 2013; Tomblin, 2014), and Nebraska (“Nebraska Lawmakers Move Bills to Ease Prison Crowding,” 2014) have recently engaged in a reinvestment of resources from prisons to community corrections. Although statewide correctional overhauls like the one witnessed in California are rare, it is clear that multiple states are reconsidering correctional structures.
Similar strategies have been considered or adopted in multiple states for juvenile corrections, including California, Illinois, New York, Ohio, Texas, and Washington (National Juvenile Justice Network & Texas Public Policy Foundation, 2013). For example, over the past decade, a variety of strategies have been used to decrease reliance on state juvenile corrections in Illinois, many of which have been statutory. Because the state had historically paid for confinement, counties had grown reliant upon state corrections for programming and treatment for juveniles of all risk levels. The result of the partial realignment, where low-risk juveniles were retained in the counties, was the closure of state juvenile correctional facilities and reduced costs. Juvenile corrections in New York similarly reformed following task force recommendations made to the Governor to shift resources from confinement to community corrections (Vera Institute of Justice, 2009). The reduced use of detention was partially accomplished by counties using state funding to provide resources to juveniles in their counties instead of placing them in state custody. Although such policy changes are very much in line with most juvenile justice research suggesting that juveniles are better rehabilitated when they are treated in their communities, many states are just beginning to catch on to these best practices in confinement.
When faced with realignment, it is critical that counties make specific preparations to ensure they are able to safely and effectively absorb an influx of inmates (Petersilia, 2011). Prior to California’s realignment, Petersilia outlined specific steps that should be taken by individual counties prior to receiving the prisoners. Among these steps were suggestions to develop an executive committee with key stakeholders in the community, conduct a risk/needs assessment of the offending population in the county, identify county resources, develop a plan for the “hand-off between government and non-government funded programs” (p. 5; e.g., formal to informal social controls), and identify critical community issues impacted by the realignment. Although the extent to which counties adapted these suggestions is unknown, it is evident that advisories were made at the state level for counties to engage in a thought out planned change.
Alternatives to Traditional Confinement
One reason to reform correctional structures is that rehabilitation may be better achieved when confinement occurs close to communities as opposed to large central facilities. Multiple issues, including aggravated mental health problems and struggles with reentry, have been associated with confinement, especially in institutions with conditional problems (e.g., overcrowding; Chen & Shapiro, 2007; Cullen, Jonson, & Nagin, 2011; Haney, 2006; Kashani et al., 1980). Similar challenges have been reported for juveniles reentering their communities following confinement; however, formerly confined juveniles have reportedly faced struggles with enrolling in school, further making reentry difficult (Holman & Ziedenberg, 2006). Furthermore, diversionary and community corrections have been shown to be the most effective at reducing future delinquency when compared to secure confinement (Pullmann et al., 2006; Whitehead & Lab, 1989).
Recognizing that confinement in centralized correctional facilities can harm reentry and increase recidivism of juveniles, many states are now shifting toward regional models with smaller facilities (Butts & Evans, 2011; Lee, Bright, Svoboda, Fakunmoju, & Barth, 2011). These changes have been most evident in Massachusetts, Missouri, and Utah. Most notable was the “Massachusetts Experiment,” in which the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services (DYS), Jerome Miller, made the controversial decision to close all centralized state juvenile correctional facilities in the early 1970s (Miller, 1998). In response to concerns that juveniles were being ineffectively rehabilitated and mistreated by staff, Miller restructured the agency by housing juveniles in small regional facilities. Although the changes in Massachusetts were controversial and at times implementation was challenging, by the end of the 1980s the agency had one of the lowest recidivism rates and lowest cost for juvenile corrections in the country (Krisberg, Austin, & Steele, 1991).
Following the success of the Massachusetts Experiment, Missouri made the controversial decision in the mid-1980s to begin closing large centralized facilities and housing juveniles in small facilities close to their homes (Mendel, 2010). The structure adopted by Missouri’s DYS has been deemed the “Missouri Model” and is characterized by six factors. These include (1) housing in small facilities close to home, (2) group and individual treatment, (3) protection of juveniles from other juveniles who may inflict abuse, (4) development of skills that are necessary for reentry, (5) involvement of families, and (6) services to transition from incapacitation to release. Although these factors require a significant amount of resources, they are an improvement on many juvenile justice models, as they have resulted in lower recidivism rates (approximately 8%) when compared to other facilities (Nelson, Jolivette, Leone, & Mathur, 2010). The facilities are also notable because they have reportedly not had conditional problems exhibited in similar facilities, and no juveniles have committed suicide since the change in program structure.
A more extreme example of correctional reform occurred from 2010 to 2011 in Arizona when Governor Jan Brewer proposed that state juvenile correctional facilities would be closed and delinquents would be sent back to their respective counties (Governor’s Office of Strategic Planning Budgeting [GOSPB], 2010). In contrast to previous realignments of juvenile justice systems in states like California and Michigan which only partially realigned (Butts & Evans, 2011), state corrections for juveniles would be disbanded in Arizona. Because the state would no longer provide the financial support for juveniles, counties would have assumed both the financial responsibility and the physical custody of serious and violent delinquents. This decision raised an important issue regarding the role and responsibility of state government versus local government. This tension is an important issue in our case study. Ultimately, however, in 2011, it was announced that plans to close ADJC had ended.
Many state correctional departments currently are confronted with the potential for realignment of responsibilities from state to local agencies. The process of change ranges from being well thought out and time intensive to little planning for the resulting reforms. The current article presents a case study of the proposed realignment of the ADJC from 2010 to 2011. This comprehensive overview of the proposed realignment of Arizona’s juvenile justice system sheds light on the feasibility of realignment and what other states may face when they consider transferring authority to counties. This work also highlights the tensions between state and local government, particularly in terms of financial and supervisory responsibilities. These issues are important to understand as an increasing number of states begin experiencing similar situations, where radical changes to correctional systems occur over a short period of time.
Method
The realignment of California’s adult system has been in the spotlight of correctional reform in recent years (Flynn, 2013; Owen & Mobley, 2012; Petersilia & Snyder, 2013; Shelden & Teji, 2012; Whitehurst, 2012), but the initial stages of correctional realignments, along with any focus on juvenile reform, have been largely neglected. The current study examines the potential Arizona reform for three reasons. The first is to examine the differences in services offered by state and county corrections and how these would be impacted in light of realignment. A specific consideration is given to the difficulties in providing services in rural counties that are dependent upon state resources. Second, potential realignment methods initially considered by county administrators are examined, as they shed light on options that may be available if a realignment did occur. Finally, the current study will consider the long-term impact that realigning juvenile corrections would have had for the state.
Research Setting
As a result of the class-action Johnson v. Upchurch lawsuit in 1987, which resulted from poor conditions in the institutions and a failure to provide adequate services to juveniles, juvenile corrections in Arizona was separated from adult corrections in 1990. Over the next 12 years, the department struggled to effectively change both the staff culture and institutional conditions that had been engrained prior to the agency being formed. Three suicides in 2002 and 2003, along with the overuse of separation and inadequate mental, physical, and educational care, contributed to a second lawsuit with the Department of Justice (DOJ) in 2004. As part of an agreement with the DOJ under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, the agency worked for 6 years to make tremendous changes to programming, facility safety, staff culture, and treatment. For the most part, the agency was highly successful at making long-lasting changes, albeit at a high financial cost to the state (Taylor, 2013).
Following the costly reform of the agency from 2004 until 2009, Arizona Governor Jan Brewer announced in January 2010 that she was eliminating all funds for the agency in the state budget (GOSPB, 2010). Although many departments faced cuts in the Governor’s proposed budget, this was the only agency to be disbanded. The proposed closure would have saved the state of Arizona US$67 million, by pushing those costs onto counties. It is unclear if the state would have provided the counties with monetary support for the care of juveniles or if they would have been solely responsible for funding the care.
At the time of the proposed closure, the ADJC had three “safe schools” (i.e., institutions for secure confinement): one in Phoenix (Maricopa County) for males, one in Phoenix for females, and one in Tucson (Pima County) for males (Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections, 2011). In 2010, the agency housed a total of 535 juveniles, of which 87% were male, 51% were Hispanic, 27% were White, and 69% were 16 or 17 years old. Nearly, 90% of the juveniles were sent from 5 of the state’s 15 counties. Forty percent of youths were committed for a property offense, 21% for a crime against another person, and 19% for drug-related offenses.
Research Design
The current study employed a case study research design due to the wide range of issues being examined and the need to consider context in the process of reform (Cunningham, 1997; Yin, 2003). Throughout data collection, data were continually coded and organized chronologically and categorically (Schatzman & Strauss, 1973). This allowed for the identification of patterns, relationships, and processes that emerged. To ensure that findings were accurate, multiple sources of data were used to reach conclusions, observations were made, and multiple researchers served as peer examiners to control researcher bias (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Marshall & Rossman, 1995; Merriam, 1988). This approach allowed for an understanding of the ability for Arizona’s juvenile justice system to be realigned within the context of county resources, population density across the state, and ideologies of stakeholders statewide. To accomplish a contextual understanding of reform, data from interviews with juvenile justice practitioners, newspapers, and government documents were analyzed.
As part of a larger project examining the institutional sustainment of changes following a lawsuit under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, interviews were conducted with various juvenile justice officials across Arizona from July 2011 to April 2012. These included administration and line-level staff at ADJC, county court employees from probation agencies and courts, and various community advocates with an interest in juvenile justice and reform. Participants were initially identified from newspaper and government reports, where they had been identified as being involved in or concerned with operations at ADJC. Due to time and financial constraints, interviews were only conducted with representatives from the 7 counties (out of 15 counties) that sent the greatest number of juveniles to the ADJC (i.e., Maricopa, Pima, Pinal, Yavapai, Mohave, Yuma, and Coconino). Snowball sampling was then used to further identify participants who had been less publicly vocal about the agency but had a vested interest in agency operations (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981; Wright, Decker, Redfern, & Smith, 1992). A total of 46 interviews were conducted, including 27 current and former ADJC employees, 12 county employees (e.g., courts, probation), and 7 community advocates.
To ensure that participants were comfortable speaking with the researchers, interviews were not tape recorded, with extensive notes being taken with pen and paper. At the time of data collection, many participants were on the verge of losing their jobs, so this tactic was used to encourage participants to speak freely. All efforts were made to write participant responses verbatim. This was not always possible, so slight variations may be present in quotations in the current article. Interviews typically lasted from 45 to 75 min, with participants selecting the location of the interview.
In addition to interviews, documents dating from 1993 to 2012 were reviewed regarding historical context of the agency and how this shaped the proposed realignment. These included 58 newspaper articles and 27 government documents related to the proposed closure and juvenile justice issues occurring around the time of the closure. These articles were able to provide an even more expansive perspective of the impact of the proposed realignment than could be gained during the interviews. For example, resource limitations made it impossible to visit some of Arizona’s most rural counties, but the newspapers in particular were able to shed light on the impact of realignment on these counties because detention administrators in rural counties expressed their opinions on the issue.
Most newspaper articles were gathered from the websites for the Arizona Republic (Phoenix metro area), Arizona Daily Star (Tucson metro area), and Arizona Daily Sun (Flagstaff metro area), three of the largest Arizona newspapers that cover state issues. Articles were identified through word searches of each newspaper website using the following search terms: “ADJC,” “Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections,” and “Arizona Juvenile Corrections.” Articles that included these search terms but did not directly relate to management of the institutions or the realignment were not included. For example, some articles mentioned the agency with regard to the placement of a specific juvenile but made no mention of agency operations. Articles that were inaccessible through newspaper websites were accessed through Lexis Nexis and Google.com. These included local media sources like the Yuma Sun, The Phoenix New Times, AZCOPS, and Arizona Family. The same search terms were also used to access various government documents from a statewide database, the Arizona Memory Project, which included reports from the Governor’s office.
Analysis
In January 2010, Arizona Governor, Jan Brewer, announced plans to eliminate the ADJC (GOSPB, 2010). In direct response to the state’s budgetary crisis, the Governor’s office reported that the “reform is part of a restructuring of State government to address the current-year deficit and the State’s structural deficit, and is an opportunity to enhance the rehabilitation of juvenile offenders” (p. 22). If the closure had occurred, the state would have saved US$67 million by laying off nearly 1,000 correctional officers and no longer providing custody and treatment to juveniles. In addition to the cost savings, the report stated that: extensive studies show that keeping juvenile offenders in their own communities, closer to their families and support systems, offers better opportunities for more successful rehabilitation…[Also], having juveniles remain within the county in which they reside will increase the likelihood of success for them and their families and enhance public safety. (p. 22)
The announcement of the closure received tremendous pushback from correctional administrators and citizens across Arizona. Typical statements that were made in media sources included “If the governor’s proposal goes through, their portion of juvenile-corrections costs would be $50 million…even increasing property taxes wouldn’t cover the expense” (Maricopa County representative); “most counties don’t have the facilities, the physical plant, to be able to house juveniles over the long term…you have to ask yourself, ‘What does that do to the kids?’” (Coconino County representative); “the state juvenile facility…has medical and dental clinics, treatment centers for substance abuse, and other addictions” (Navajo County representative); and “Are we going to be able to find qualified professionals to provide those services…if we can find the money to do it, does that mean we have the ability to do so?” (Yuma County). One report listed those who were opposed to the plan, including “the Arizona Sheriffs Association; County Boards of Supervisors Association; Arizona Association of Counties; Sheriff Clarence Dupnik, Pima County; Sheriff Paul Babeu, Pinal County; Sheriff Don Lowery, La Paz County; Sheriff Joseph Dedman, Jr., Apache County; and AZCOPS.” With the exception of individuals in the Governor’s office and the Maricopa County Sheriff, there was no public support from counties or juvenile justice advocates to close the ADJC. The severe backlash from counties likely impacted Governor Brewer’s later decisions on the future of the agency. Interestingly, counties did not publicly consider simply releasing youth sent to them from the state into the community.
In March 2010, Governor Brewer called a special session to discuss the state budget, as it was evident that the closure of ADJC did not have sufficient support from policy makers or legislators to succeed. One article reported that “the budget has been produced behind closed doors, and details remain sketchy. But the proposals that have leaked out have drawn complaints from the counties, which say that proposals such as shifting the responsibility for juvenile corrections to them will bankrupt them.” While lawmakers recognized that the budget needed reform, they criticized Brewer for acting too quickly in her attempt to close ADJC by July 2010. Following the special session, the Governor appointed a committee that would discuss the best method for the dissolution of ADJC. The committee would then report back to her in November 2010 in order to prepare for a new closure date of July 2011. However, in December 2010, little publicity was given when “a spokesman for Gov. Jan Brewer…stated that her proposal to close the department [was] no longer active.”
Governor Brewer never publicly addressed the exact reasoning for the decision not to close the agency, but much speculation was made by local groups in newspaper articles as to why the closure never occurred. Likely, the most influential factor in the decision to maintain ADJC was the tremendous pushback and criticism that was expressed by county representatives in local media. In addition to the statements made by representatives over how they could not take on the financial burden of custody (discussed above), many actively campaigned to prevent the closure of ADJC. One local media source reported that “in response to a swell of public opinion generated by AZCOPS and its affiliates against the plan, Governor Brewer bowed under pressure and took her idea off the table.” This source reported 14 separate tactics used to encourage Governor Brewer to keep ADJC from closing. These included (1) Pima Juvenile Corrections Association created a radio advertisement highlighting the dangers to the state if juveniles were released, (2) two county agencies placed door hangers on homes across the state that “warned the public of the danger of releasing dangerous juvenile felons from state custody,” (3) radio ads were aired on radio stations in Phoenix, (4) a second round of radio ads aired on Pima county radio stations, (5) AZCOPS, an Arizona agency representing the interests of various law enforcement agencies across the state, employed a public relations agency to assist with the campaign to keep ADJC open, (6) “warning” postcards were mailed across the state to voters, (7) automated phone calls were made to voters, (8) individuals advocating to keep ADJC conducted radio interviews, (9) AZCOPS created a website (www.protectarizona.org) detailing the harms of releasing juveniles and listed the counties and interest groups opposed to the Governor’s proposal, (10) prior media coverage was made available online, (11) AZCOPS provided lunch to lawmakers to discuss the proposal, (12) newspaper editorials detailed opinions on the closure, (13) the Pima County sheriff participated in newspaper and television interviews, where he stated Brewer’s plan was a “travesty,” and (14) funds from Maricopa and Pima counties were used to pay for the ADJC for a 1-year period.
Although the agency did not close, for approximately 17 months, it was believed that the ADJC would close and juveniles would be transferred from state to county custody. In light of this announcement, counties held discussions regarding the supervision of juveniles in state custody. The following sections will outline the specific challenges faced by counties if the ADJC had in fact closed, initial solutions developed by the counties if the realignment had occurred, and perspectives on how juvenile corrections should be dealt with in the future.
Barriers to Reform
The proposed reform of ADJC presented extensive challenges to the counties that were going to be tasked with their care. The barrier inhibiting the counties from reform was clearly a lack of financial, physical, and staff resources. The ADJC employees, juvenile justice advocates, and county court representatives interviewed for the current project all recognized that if the reform was to occur, then the counties would struggle to provide care. The potential challenges for counties addressed in this section were all but ignored in Governor Brewer’s proposal, in favor of pointing out the benefits that realignment would have for rehabilitation of delinquents and the elimination of resource duplication.
In stark contrast to Governor Brewer’s proposal, nearly all participants recognized the fundamental differences between state corrections and county corrections and how the elimination of state corrections without additional funding from the state would harm rehabilitation and public safety. For example, one news article reports that “counties hold youths for an average of 11 days, kids who are waiting for a long-term foster plan or a drug treatment program. The average stay in the state juvenile-corrections system is 7 months.” Before placement at ADJC, a county judge will decide if the juvenile can be rehabilitated in the county under the supervision of probation. If probation has not worked previously or if the juvenile has committed a more serious crime, then the juvenile is placed in state custody with the ADJC. The tension between state and local corrections, particularly as they impact juveniles, highlights the discussion of closing the statewide agency.
The ADJC is equipped to house juveniles for a long period of time, where juveniles are provided with education, mental health treatment, drug treatment, programming to assist with future employment and general rehabilitative services. One ADJC employee noted, “a lot of people have this perception that there is duplication between state and county corrections and that they do the same things. The important distinction between the two is the programming piece offered at ADJC. In counties they just don’t have these types of services.” Other staff praised the education offered in state care with statements like, “we now have a robust educational program. At ADJC, we meet the standards to be accredited and give out diplomas.” In one news article, a county court judge noted that, “one of the ways we do the best job of core safety is being able to properly educate and treat these children…ADJC kids have been through our system again and again and again and were not amendable to other services, so they had to go to ADJC.” Although some participants in the current study questioned the safety of juveniles in ADJC’s Safe Schools, all recognized that the treatment, programming, and education offered at ADJC was more substantial than that provided in counties.
County court employees also reiterated the sentiment that state and county corrections were different, and therefore necessary, but for two distinct reasons. Similar to ADJC employees, county representatives recognized the value of programming and secure care. Statements like, “counties could have never been able to provide programming,” “the most serious kids are housed at ADJC and are required to have specific services and be in secure care,” and “counties aren’t set up to house kids” were common, reflecting the perception that ADJC was better equipped than counties in terms of confinement and programming.
Although county court employees felt that secure confinement was necessary, they perceived the parole function of ADJC as being ineffective compared to probation. All but two county representatives suggested that the parole function of ADJC was lacking and that juveniles were better serviced in their communities by probation. This was further evidence of the tension between state and local functions in juvenile corrections. County representatives were highly critical of parole, making statements such as “parole is just not a priority for the ADJC, it is a secondary service. They have high caseloads and their staff aren’t required to have bachelor’s degrees,” “the parole office does the best they can. [We have] intensive probation for the worst kids, but the ADJC doesn’t have an equivalent level of supervision while on parole,” and “parole officers have areas that are way too big, so they cannot effectively supervise.…There are no quality services being provided to the kids.…I don’t think that parole would even meet the standard probation requirements.” These participants suggested that probation was a critical function and operated dissimilarly to parole. Although all participants varied in their reasons why state and county services were valuable, none expressed the sentiment that a duplication of services was occurring as was suggested by Governor Brewer.
A review of newspaper articles during the time of the potential closure further demonstrates the financial burden that reforming ADJC would have placed on counties. Typical statements made regarding the realignment included “does the Governor not think that Arizona citizens also live in Arizona counties,” “closing Juvenile Corrections will not erase the cost of dealing with at-risks youths,” and “even increasing property taxes wouldn’t cover that expense,” which would cost about US$50 million for Maricopa County alone. Severe budget cuts would have made it difficult for the individual counties to provide treatment and services to juveniles, potentially undermining their rehabilitation. It is evident that questions were arising across Arizona about how well thought out the reform really was and if it was even feasible.
The challenges that counties would have faced if the realignment had occurred were further evidenced in the impact that relatively minor changes had on counties. One example of this was the impact that the reduction in number of days that ADJC would conduct intake of juveniles each week had on counties. As a result of a change in ADJC intake procedures to reduce operating costs, counties were forced to oversee custody for up to 6 additional days. One county administrator reported “the ADJC only taking kids 1 day a week was problematic. Because they were only allowing probation officers to send kids over 1 day a week, this meant that the county had to absorb the costs while waiting to be transported.…The county fought back against the ADJC and they now take kids more than 1 day per week.” Two other county representatives made similar comments that “despite the day of the week the juveniles were booked, they are only allowed to enter ADJC on [1 specific day].” This challenge highlights the inability of Arizona counties to absorb juveniles in state custody without additional resources.
Interviews and document reviews suggested that the brunt of the struggles in realignment were going to be faced by rural counties in Arizona, although they provided the smallest numbers of juveniles to ADJC. In these counties, supervision and confinement of more serious juvenile offenders would have been nearly impossible. In fact, none of the participants in the current study suggested that the rural counties would be able to oversee custody and still be in compliance with federal standards of care. While most believed that larger counties like Maricopa (approximately 4 million residents) and Pima (approximately 1 million residents) could take on the role, many were concerned that rural counties like Greenlee (approximately 9,000 residents), La Paz (approximately 20,000 residents), and Graham (approximately 37,000 residents) would be ill equipped if the realignment were to occur. For example, one county court representative who was opposed to the reforms noted that “the rural counties wouldn’t have enough resources if the state didn’t pay for the kids to have services. It was possible that the counties were going to have to contract with the state where they paid for each kid to be held, which would have been too costly.” Other juvenile court representatives from across the state reiterated this sentiment, claiming that “the rural counties don’t know where the services would come from” and “in more rural, counties it wouldn’t be logical to have services that would be provided to just one or two kids.” Newspaper reports documenting the views of officials in small counties also showed that they feared the realignment would result in their counties having to file for bankruptcy. Despite these challenges that would be faced by counties if ADJC were closed, many counties began considering how they would respond if the realignment did occur.
Initial Responses to the Realignment
When Governor Jan Brewer announced that the ADJC would be closed, juvenile justice workers across the state believed that it would be difficult to accomplish and was potentially harmful to the juveniles and to public safety statewide. However, it was also recognized that in the dire budget crisis that the state and nation were facing, closure of the ADJC was a very realistic possibility. Although no formal changes were ever made to modify the structure of juvenile corrections, about half of the counties reported that they had given some initial considerations as to how they would respond if the realignment did occur. The current section will examine the potential solutions that were considered in the wake of the closure announcement.
Four participants discussed how Arizona’s Administrative Office of the Courts worked to put together a committee that would respond to the realignment. It was reported that they Had formed two work groups that would make plans separately to examine how to respond. The counties were concerned with how they were going to provide long-term services because they are all short term.…The questions that the work groups sought to answer were what to do for education, housing, rules, visitation, work release, and other issues.…Probation was going to take on parole, which would be possible because there were so few kids on parole.…Parole would have no problem absorbing the kids but detention was going to be more difficult.…There were questions on where the funding was going to come from to provide the new services, but this was never fully established.
Two participants stated that if the realignment had occurred, then the more rural counties were going to partner with another county to provide services. Because some counties only commit one or two juveniles to ADJC per year, it was recognized that it would be impossible to provide extensive treatment for so few juveniles. Partnerships would have allowed these counties to concentrate their resources on a larger group of delinquents. Another option that was raised in one newspaper article was: Adobe Mountain and Black Canyon Schools (ADJC’s Safe Schools) [would be given] to Maricopa County and the Catalina Mountain School to Pima County, with each county having to absorb the cost of operating them. Other counties would then contract with these two counties for housing their own juveniles.
A final effort to prepare for the realignment was seen when the Commission on Juvenile Corrections Reform was established to aid in the reform. The Arizona Criminal Justice Commission’s 2010 Legislative Report notes, “the commission is tasked with examining Arizona’s juvenile corrections system and making recommendations for its improvement. The commission must present a plan with its recommendations on juvenile corrections reform to the Governor.” Similarly, one newspaper reported, “Brewer would appoint a special commission to study the best way to dissolve the agency. Recommendations would go to Brewer in November, giving her and lawmakers some additional time to enact necessary legislation when they reconvene[ed the] next year.” This requirement that the dissolution of state juvenile corrections be planned seemed logical and a step in the right direction for a sweeping reform of this nature. However, three juvenile justice advocates interviewed for this project stated that this commission never actually met and members were never selected. One community advocate stated that it “was never fully appointed” even though money was put aside “to assist the task force.” Another advocate stated, “counties had been waiting for directions from the Governor and had been sending names to her” for potential candidates to be on the task force. Despite the lack of holistic planning for the realignment, participants in the current study had strong opinions on how juvenile corrections in Arizona should change in the future.
What Should Juvenile Corrections Look Like in the Future?
Over the course of data collection, it became evident that multiple perspectives were emerging regarding whether or not the counties could absorb the juvenile corrections population and whether or not individuals believed that the realignment should occur. Surprisingly, these responses were somewhat inconsistent. The majority of county court officials suggested their counties could assume the influx in juveniles and that they should take on this responsibility. About three quarters of juvenile justice advocates expressed similar sentiments. Two court representatives felt like the county could take the responsibility, but they should not do so. Finally, two court representatives and one juvenile justice advocate reported that the counties could not take the burden and felt that corrections should not be decentralized in the future. None of the ADJC employees suggested that the ADJC should close, with all feeling like counties could not provide the required services for juveniles.
Most court representatives reported that the closure could occur and that it would be more beneficial for juveniles in the long term if they were kept closer to home. County representatives were very aware that the realignment would be extremely challenging for them, but many had begun looking at possible solutions to the reform. Counties had prepared by forming working groups to allocate new responsibilities within juvenile probation. These participants appeared optimistic that the realignment was going to provide meaningful reform to juvenile corrections. For example, one court representative noted that “the closure would have been the perfect time to implement the Missouri model. If their system could provide safety and save money, then it could be possible here. It would make communities safer in the long run.…There are a lot of schools closing because of budgets and there are large homes that the state could purchase for very little.” Other county representatives claimed “we welcomed the possibility for a closure,” “they had the opportunity to make a change…it would have been an interesting and nice challenge,” and “if a well thought out plan had been made to restructure the agency over time with the financial resources, it would have been a better idea.” These county representatives felt that they were not ready for the closure, but that they eventually could be, and that this would be more beneficial for the juveniles in the long term.
Two thirds of the county court participants reported being frustrated with the organization of juvenile corrections in Arizona and had been hopeful that the reform would occur. One concerned court representative noted that It is really frustrating to go somewhere like Missouri and see this is how you work it. There was no violence with the kids.…This is an attitude that comes down from the top.…They had a strong bi-partisan commitment at the legislature to juvenile justice. Once a kid is released from the state, the judge then has some power to oversee kids.
A minority of participants from county courts and advocacy groups suggested that a realignment of the juvenile system would be harmful to juveniles and hinder their reentry. For example, one court representative contended, “the closure was a terrible idea because they could have never been able to provide programming. This was not a function of whether they were from rural or urban areas.” Likewise, a juvenile justice advocate stated, “the closure would have been a negative thing for the state and a failure on our part. Yes, some counties might be able to take kids, but overall this would harm treatment of kids.” Those that were opposed to the reform felt that effective treatment of juveniles would be virtually impossible if provided by counties.
This division in opinions about the best course forward reflects long-standing tensions in juvenile justice between local control and state supervision. In many cases, it is argued that juveniles need to maintain contacts with family and community and that these processes are best sustained close to home. Others argue that it is a state responsibility to maintain secure facilities, and that this is a burden not effectively shouldered at the local level of government. Clearly, the checkered history of juvenile corrections in Arizona contributed to some of the lack of consensus.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
This case study is important because of the lessons it provides for other jurisdictions. Current trends in the criminal justice system suggest that more states are seeking alternatives to incarceration because of the high financial costs of incarceration (The Urban Institute, 2013), a circumstance not likely to abate. In 2010, the United States experienced the first decrease in incarceration rates since the 1970s, with part of this decrease being the direct result of responses to decreased resources (Cole, 2011; Guerino, Harrison, & Sabol, 2011). The fact that this trend continued into 2012 suggests that states are now reconsidering incarceration practices. Now that states are reducing their dependence on incarceration, it is important to address how this can be accomplished. One solution has been to transfer the burden of custody from the state to county level through the practice of realignment. The current article addressed how one state responded to a proposed realignment of a juvenile correctional facility during a time of severe budget cuts.
Multiple themes arose from the analysis of interviews and documents. The first was that the failure of the governor to provide realistic solutions in her proposal to close ADJC led to the demise of her plan. Because juvenile courts failed to recognize the viability of her plan when considering the ability of counties to provide mandated treatment, they appropriately fought back against an ill-planned proposal. A second theme that arose was that we can do it but not well. In other words, counties could physically take the juveniles, but by doing so, they would be unable to maintain an appropriate level of care. This was due to counties being ill equipped financially and in resources (e.g., space in juvenile detention and service providers), which would have harmed both juveniles and public safety. The final theme that emerged was a sentiment by counties of we want to but we can’t. Most counties welcomed the reform because it was in line with best practices in juvenile justice, but only if financial resources were passed to counties by the state.
The impetus for the proposed reform in Arizona was unique to prior juvenile justice realignments, as the Arizona realignment would have likely shaped the long-term effectiveness of juvenile corrections statewide. In contrast to realignments like those occurring in California ( Cole man v. Schwarzenegger, 2009), Michigan (Wayne County Children and Family Services, 2010), Ohio, Illinois, and New York, which transpired in large part because of concerns over conditions of confinement and ineffective rehabilitation, the primary motivation for the reform in Arizona was budgetary. Prior juvenile justice realignments were also unique to the proposed shift in Arizona because they primarily shifted the responsibility of low-risk juveniles back to counties, instead of shifting responsibility for all juveniles to counties. Although the Governor made claims that ADJC was closing due in part to best practices in keeping juveniles closer to home, the timing of the closure (i.e., at the peak of the budgetary crisis) and the nonexistent funding being passed to counties for the custody of juveniles suggested otherwise. In the aforementioned states where adult and juvenile justice systems were realigned, states still provided financial and physical resources to counties, which contributed to their ultimate success.
In 2011, a planned realignment occurred in California’s prison system. Although the realignment was not without flaws, it was done over a period of time that allowed counties to develop plans including: risk/needs assessments of offenders, consider the unintended consequences that would occur as a direct result of the reform, reflect on how counties would respond to failures, and seek alternatives to such problems. Individual counties in Arizona appeared to be in the beginning stages of such a plan, but it was also evident that the plan was very rushed and little consideration was given at the state level as to how the reforms would occur. Despite the complete lack of resources granted to Arizona’s counties, most counties still began developing solutions in anticipation of the realignment. This planning was apparently minimal, with decisions made on who would be responsible for the juveniles coming back to counties.
In order to consider the outcomes of juvenile corrections reform in Arizona, it is critical to make a distinction between reforms where funds were passed down from states to counties and the one in Arizona where resources were never assured to counties. Most states that have reformed their correctional models with state support, especially those adopting regional models, have been successful at reducing recidivism and lowering correctional costs (Krisberg et al., 1991; Miller, 1998; Nelson et al., 2010). Although Governor Jan Brewer claimed a key reason for closing ADJC was to place juveniles closer to home, the lack of funding to provide them with rehabilitative services once they returned to their home counties suggests that they would have received less treatment in the counties. The Governor’s argument is further weakened when considering that approximately 61% of confined juveniles were already being confined in their home counties (i.e., Maricopa and Pima; ADJC, 2010). Although some counties had limited resources to accommodate for an influx in incarcerated juveniles, it is unlikely that counties would have been able to make up for the US$67 million in services, staff, and facilities that it cost to run ADJC.
Under the conditions of the reform in Arizona (i.e., Great Recession, lack of resources), it is doubtful that the state would have been able to successfully adopt a model similar to Missouri and Massachusetts, where regionalization of juvenile corrections has shown tremendous benefits (Butts & Evans, 2011; Huebner, 2012). However, the potential to eventually reform exists. Statewide, county court actors and juvenile justice advocates are supportive of keeping juveniles closer to home but with true support from the state both philosophically and financially. It was perceived statewide that the Arizona reform was going to occur without funding, leading to a lack of public support statewide. The current project shows that support did in fact exist for a correctional reform but not in the manner that was presented by the Governor. In order to accomplish a sustainable reform, it is first critical to garner support from the state government, not just county courts that were willing to assume control and custody of juveniles.
The proposed reform of the ADJC demonstrates the challenges that states will face when they attempt to make drastic changes to correctional care with little planning and few solutions are given as to how the reform can realistically occur. This case study of Arizona’s proposed reform demonstrates that when considering correctional reforms from a variety of perspectives, county and state, there is legitimate support for change, but only if that change comes with financial and political support. When that support is nonexistent, tremendous pushback from counties can exist that will stop potentially positive changes from occurring. As a growing number of states are looking to use substantial correctional reforms to reduce state spending, consideration of the challenges and pushback experienced in Arizona are informative. Even in light of the failed realignment in 2010, Arizona’s most recent governor is now proposing a similar plan, where counties are increasingly taking on financial responsibility for juvenile custody (McNamara, 2015). Although it is too early to determine the outcome of the most recent attempt to cost shift the responsibility of juveniles from the state to counties, it is evident from past experiences that it will be challenging.
A few caveats should be noted regarding the findings of the current study. First, in some counties, only one or two participants were interviewed from a single county. Participants may have had differing views on the realignment when compared to others in the county or had little involvement in the actual process of realignment, making it difficult to generalize their statements. Furthermore, some participants interviewed had an extensive working relationship with ADJC, but that relationship had ceased prior to the realignment for various reasons (e.g., retired and transferred). These participants may have heard about the closure and had feelings on it but had no role in planning or familiarity with the reform. Second, a concern that many representatives from county courts had was the ability of rural counties to assume custody of juveniles following the closure. Newspaper articles were used to tap into these issues for rural counties, but not all rural counties were included in these articles, making it difficult to determine the potential for the counties to absorb the extra juveniles or how they responded to the announcement that ADJC would be closed. Finally, no data were available on the types of juveniles that were being placed into ADJC by individual county courts, so their offending histories were unknown. This is problematic, as some ADJC employees noted that rural counties were sending low-risk juveniles because they would receive better services in ADJC custody. This suggests that some rural counties may have potentially been able to respond to the additional juveniles, but this is unclear without the appropriate data.
The proposed reform in Arizona was unique from other state reforms because of the speed and scope by which the reform was going to occur. Although the realignment in Arizona didn’t occur in the manner that was initially proposed, due in part to the backlash that was felt statewide to the poorly planned reform, this does not mean that the reform should not occur. Nationwide, it is now recognized that smaller, regional facilities are beneficial to the rehabilitation of juveniles, but these models have occurred in states where support was given to counties and the ultimate goal was to improve treatment of juvenile delinquents. The current project shows that the support for realignment exists in Arizona, but in 2011, it was not occurring under the appropriate conditions. A realignment will only successfully occur when it is supported both financially and philosophically by local and state governments in Arizona.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research and/or authorship of this article: This research was supported by the National Institute of Justice, 2010-JB-FX-0014.