Helping Third-Party Implementers Meet Performance Obligations: A Multi-Level Examination of the Weatherization Assistance Program

Abstract

Research suggests that competitive markets and contract design and management influence contractor performance. However, there is less systematic knowledge about how a government's policy-specific capacity and programmatic support to contractors influences performance. This study asks the question of what states can do to maximize the performance of contractors in the context of fiscal federalism. This question is tested in the context of the Weatherization Assistance Program, a federal program where states are specifically instructed to use third-party implementers (i.e. contractors). Specifically, I examine (1) whether state policy-specific capacity enhances program implementation support to help contractors meet their performance goals and (2) how state-provided technical assistance to government contractors can help these contractors achieve performance goals.

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