Community Responses to “Stop-and-Frisk” in New York City

Abstract

This study seeks to conceptualize individual and neighborhood conditions that affect the ability of residents to enact collective responses to intense policing practices such as “stop-and-frisk.” Drawing on prior research, we formulate four hypotheses that could jointly or independently shape mobilization around issues of policing: (a) neighborhood organizational infrastructure, (b) resident activism, (c) attitudes toward neighborhood change, and (d) perceptions of police performance. We provide a preliminary exploration of these arguments by combining administrative reports with surveys and observations in the South Bronx. Our descriptive work suggests that despite the lack of a robust local community response to high levels of police stops, this section of the city has many community organizations, significant levels of resident involvement, and general optimism regarding neighborhood change. There is some indication that residents may be willing to put up with frequent “hassles” from the police in exchange for less crime.

Keywords

police discretion police strategy community policing complaints against police

The volume of documented stops made by the New York Police Department (NYPD) surged from 160,000 in 2003, the first year for which the data are complete, to a peak of 685,724 in 2011, before declining to 533,042 in 2012 (NYPD, 2014). This increase in stops, coupled with the fact that about 90% of these contacts do not result in arrests or summons, has generated controversy regarding the social costs and benefits of this strategy. The NYPD and their supporters assert that stops have contributed to the crime decline, they are constitutionally sound, and most residents approve of them (MacDonald, 2010; Ridgeway, 2007). Critics claim the “stop-and-frisk” policy translates into racial profiling and high volumes of stops increase the likelihood of police abuse. Some academics, for example, argue there are no direct benefits of this policy in terms of crime reduction, there are better uses for police resources, and intensive policing may undermine the work of the police in the long term (Harcourt & Ludwig, 2007; Rosenfeld & Fornango, 2014).

Although much of the controversy surrounding the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk policy is couched in terms of its social costs or benefits, few researchers have theorized about the conditions that lead communities to mobilize collectively in response to the increasing number of stops or similar practices (for a partial review, see Prenzler, Porter, & Alpert, 2013). More specifically, we do not fully understand how local mobilization efforts may be shaped by neighborhood resources and conditions as well as residents’ perceptions of and experiences with law enforcement practices. For example, we do not know whether general support for the police can be accompanied by negative perceptions of specific tactics, or whether these attitudes are linked to variation in the intensity of local law enforcement activity. Furthermore, even if city dwellers feel dissatisfied with police practices, mobilization efforts may be hampered by a lack of access to or participation in local community organizations, which provide resources and legitimacy to voice concerns and coordinate actions. These specifications matter for theory and policy. Local conditions, resources, and shared experiences may shape the scope and nature of collective responses in connection to police accountability vis-a-vis broader deficits in social services and conditions (Putnam, 2000). In the case of New York in particular this is a timely issue, as it remains unclear to what extent ongoing action in the form of litigation on stop-and-frisk cases reflects widespread mobilization efforts at the grassroots level.¹

Drawing on these ideas, we develop a theoretically oriented perspective that seeks to better specify characteristics of individuals and neighborhoods that could affect their ability to collectively mobilize against intensive policing strategies. We anchor these avenues for potential mobilization on a specific practice—police stops—and formulate four hypotheses about the factors that could jointly or independently activate community responses triggered by these practices: (a) organizational infrastructure; (b) resident activism; (c) attitudes toward neighborhood change; and (d) general perceptions of the police. Each of these hypotheses refers to conditions that may facilitate mobilization via access to advocacy resources or perceptions of shared problems.

We use a case study of the South Bronx, a disadvantaged high-crime area of New York City, to explore how these conditions may trigger or amplify collective responses vis-à-vis practices such as stop-and-frisk. Rather than testing propositions empirically, we collate various types of neighborhood-specific data to discuss how community characteristics, police practices, and individual factors may play a role in the configuration of collective mobilization against intensive law enforcement practices. The South Bronx is a good fit for this research because this sub-section of the city is not only heavily policed but also has a rich tradition of community activism (Gonzalez, 2004; Rooney, 1995). Although no systematic data on collective action in this area exists, a reading of media reports indicates that local mobilizations in connection to police practices have been relatively sporadic, often linked to serious events such as a police shooting (Johnson, 2006). In the absence of robust measures of community mobilization, we use descriptive statistics and bivariate associations, supplemented with local press reports and academic research, to assess whether our observations of the South Bronx are generally aligned with our hypotheses. Results from this exploratory work are used to discuss how more systematic research on local, citizen-based mobilization, including their linkages to policy and social context, can inform the broader topic of police accountability and reform. This is an important issue because discussions surrounding police reform appear to be shifting in the United States and elsewhere from an exclusive focus on “bureaucratic accountability” to the more complex concept of “democratic accountability” (Home Office, 2010; see also Savage, 2013).

Background

There is well-documented evidence that stops, arrests, and other types of NYPD law enforcement activity are concentrated in poor minority communities even after controlling for crime and other characteristics (Fagan & Davies, 2000) and that these practices are not well-received (Fratello, Rengifo, & Trone, 2013). Research has also shown that police stops target a disproportionate number of non-Whites relative to their share of the population (Fagan & Davies, 2000; Langan, Greenfeld, Smith, Durose, & Levin, 2001) and relative to their participation in some crimes (Gelman, Fagan, & Kiss, 2007; but see Ridgeway, 2007). Importantly, these experiences generally result in negative perceptions of the police (Rengifo & Fratello, 2015; Weitzer & Tuch, 2002) and weaken potential collaborations between residents and law enforcement (Fratello et al., 2013; Tyler & Fagan, 2008).

Other studies highlight how these attitudes are tied to the context and experiences of specific neighborhoods and sub-populations. Qualitative research conducted in New York City, for example, indicates that most minority youth do not feel “comfortable” when they see the police, do not “trust” the police, and are more likely to report adverse contacts (Ruck, Harris, Fine, & Freudenberg, 2008; Solis, Portillos, & Brunson, 2009). Similarly, research using convenience sampling in Brownsville, a predominantly minority neighborhood in Brooklyn, found that 28% of those surveyed had been stopped in the last year and most of these respondents viewed this experience negatively (Hynynen, 2011, see also Stoudt, Fine, & Fox, 2011). Findings from another study of high-stop areas of New York link stops to residents’ reluctance to cooperate with the police: respondents who reported more stops were less willing to report crime, even after controlling for self-reported offending and demographic characteristics (Fratello et al., 2013). Research drawing on more diverse samples has documented pronounced racial differences in perceptions of the NYPD finding that minorities are more likely to believe that racial profiling is widespread (Rice, Reitzel, & Piquero, 2005; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003)—a pattern that reflects not only discrete encounters but also cumulative, direct, and indirect contacts with law enforcement (Brunson, 2007).

Citizen support for police work is generally higher when individuals are asked to address general practices and attitudes toward law enforcement rather than specific tactics and approaches, even in areas with intense police activity. For example, in the Vera Institute’s recent study on police stops in New York, it was found that only about 1 in 10 surveyed youth believed the police “had a good reason” to talk to them during their last police stop yet 6 in 10 expressed that they would feel “comfortable asking a police officer for help” (Fratello et al., 2013; see also Carr, Napolitano, & Keating, 2007). This pattern is consistent with more targeted evaluation projects showing that intense police practices do not weaken general support for police work (Chermak, McGarrell, & Weiss, 2001; Weisburd, Hinkle, Famega, & Ready, 2011).

When taken together, this work suggests that there may be community approval for general law enforcement strategies including some intensive policing tactics, but among those disproportionately exposed to these policies, there appears to be much less support. In heavily policed areas such as the South Bronx, mobilization efforts that seek to redress these policies may be triggered if residents collectively see discrete tactics such as police stops as problematic because they get stopped frequently, or because they do not perceive any direct crime-prevention benefits (Fratello et al., 2013). However, it is possible that even if local residents view stop-and-frisk as a problem, mobilization could be hampered by more positive general views on police work, or the perception that this practice has a potential to reduce crime (MacDonald, 2010).

There has been some documentation of individual responses to stop-and-frisk policies in New York City. For example, as observed by White (2014), the number of complaints received by the Citizen Complaint Review Board (CCRB) has increased steadily in recent years. Examples of systematic, long-term collective responses at the grassroots level are more difficult to find with the exception of “know-your-rights” campaigns and litigation, “cop-watch” projects, and albeit rarely, the mobilization of local elected officials. In particular, there has been a lack of a more robust framework that integrates the extant knowledge on community mobilization with specific responses to issues of police accountability. Such an effort would need to pair better data with creative research designs. This article provides a conceptual and methodological framework to begin to address these issues.

Theoretical Framework

Drawing on prior work on police accountability and neighborhood activism, we view mobilization as a set of localized, public, and purposeful responses to a discrete problem or issue by otherwise unrelated individuals (DuBow, McCabe, & Kaplan, 1979; Johnson, 2006; Sampson, McAdam, MacIndoe, & Weffer-Elizondo, 2005). These efforts may take a number of forms including letter-writing campaigns, rallies, and sit-ins, with specific manifestations linked to locally available resources and locally defined problems. Thus, we theorize local conditions that are likely to promote mobilization involve both individual and neighborhood dynamics including perceptions of neighborhood problems and policing activities, access to and participation in community-based organizations, and optimism regarding the possibility for change. This approach is consistent with long-standing perspectives that emphasize the role of police–community relations in the co-production of order at the neighborhood level (Taylor, 2005). It also dovetails with work that highlights how community mobilization is shaped by the presence of formal institutions and organizations as well as by individual experiences of local residents (Putnam, 2000; Sampson et al., 2005; Tyler & Fagan, 2008).

This neighborhood-based, accountability-centered approach has been seldom used in the literature on police–community relations. Instead, research on community mobilization has largely focused on the challenges of creating and sustaining partnerships between police and local residents for crime prevention (Carr, 2003; Skogan, 1988). These partnerships have been grounded in policing models that emphasize the “co-production” of safety between law enforcement and residents and have led to the development of new indicators of police performance such as public confidence in the police (Taylor, 2005). Yet, the degree to which these partnerships are driven by the community or whether they not only support but sometimes also challenge the work of the police remains unclear. As Skogan (2012) discusses, “bottom-up” approaches tend to replicate structural deficits in some communities with government actors pushing the form and content of collaborations (see also Carr, 2013). As a result, programs and policies intended to establish local police accountability have been limited in scope or reframed in terms of new rules and procedures aimed to oversee the legality and transparency of general policies (Savage, 2013).

To begin to address these issues conceptually, our exploration of pathways for mobilization first focuses on the role of neighborhood organizations and agencies, which may facilitate collective responses aimed at greater police accountability via access to formal structures and resources for the coordination of demands (Sampson et al., 2005). Organizations can also provide an “umbrella of legitimacy” that can facilitate the brokering of demands (Winship & Berrien, 1999). Second, residents may individually enhance the role of these organizations via membership and other forms of support—time, leadership skills—that may also facilitate mobilization (Putnam, 2000). Third, individual attitudes and valuations of local problems may foster collective responses independently of neighborhood factors and access to resources; if police practices are seen as illegitimate or unfair, individuals may activate behavioral responses at various levels—from avoidance of the police to community activism (Johnson, 2006). Individual attitudes and experiences, however, may not galvanize into purposeful reactions when these assessments are hampered by broader issues such as fear of police retaliation, or if the police are ultimately seen as effective at controlling crime.

This specification of neighborhood-and individual-level conditions that could influence mobilization is important because in some communities, high levels of informal control and cohesion may not be integrated with public or external forms of control such as police activity. Although a number of neighborhood-level theories propose the alignment of these forms of control, external controls may be stronger in areas with weak resident controls, hindering the community’s capacity to counterbalance intensive policing practices (Skogan, 2012). Examining the potential for collective responses to police tactics is also important because the capacity for resident mobilization in one arena, such as crime prevention, may not be activated for other purposes, such as police accountability, because they draw on different resources for activism (Goldsmith, 2010; Skogan, 1988).

With some exceptions (Johnson, 2006; Serbulo & Gibson, 2013), few studies document how mobilization linked to police practices can be shaped by individual responses and local influences. More often, researchers have identified various city-level correlates of the number citizen complaints of police misconduct . For example, drawing on aggregate figures of civil rights complaints of police abuse in a sample of large U.S. cities, Smith and Holmes (2003) conclude that aggressive police behavior may be linked to racial threat. Similarly, Prenzler and colleagues (Prenzler et al. 2013) use a case-study design to summarize research on reform programs linked to police use of force in the United States and overseas. They note that most initiatives are linked to trigger events such as specific incidents of police use of force.

Increasingly, researchers have sought to supplement the long-standing scholarly interest in community mobilization surrounding issues of crime prevention with a renewed attention to mobilization in connection to police accountability. They emphasize how these responses reflect broader racial tensions and structural deficits (Brunson & Weitzer, 2009) as well as reactions to discrete practices such as stops or use of force. Duran (2009), for example, uses ethnographic data to explore how Mexican Americans in two cities in the Western United States have coped—as individuals and as a collective—with intensive gang enforcement by the local police. He suggests that residents have a hard time engaging in visible, organized resistance to these practices because this kind of activity is perceived as reinforcing stereotypes about their anti-social behavior or attitudes and their lack of knowledge about or integration with “conventional” ideals. The section below describes in detail how our study contributes to this growing literature conceptually and empirically.

Current Study

We formulate four hypotheses on how neighborhood and individual factors can potentially shape community responses to intensive policing, including stops. Specifically, we argue that community responses to this issue may be influenced by (a) organizational infrastructure, (b) resident participation in organizations, (c) attitudes toward neighborhood change, and (d) perceptions of police performance. Although our primary focus is the conceptualization of these hypotheses, we discuss their empirical value by drawing on an exploratory case study of the South Bronx that combines available research, media reports,² and primary data, to describe how characteristics of local communities and the attitudes and experiences of their residents may shape mobilization efforts. By focusing on one area, we are able to explore ecological processes linking individuals to their immediate environments and we expand on recent efforts to ground citizen responses to police stops in a broader social context (Rice & White, 2010; Taylor, 2005).

Analytical Approach

The primary data used in this study were collected in 2005-2006 and cover the administrative area known as Community District 1 of the South Bronx, New York. This area encompasses the neighborhoods of Melrose, Port Morris, and Mott Haven in an area of 2.8 square miles. According to the 2000 U.S. Census, most of the approximately 82,000 District 1 residents are Hispanic (71%) or African American (20.8%). The South Bronx has been portrayed as a national symbol of urban decay and disadvantage. In 2000, the majority of households in this area lived below the federal poverty line (52%) with a median household income of $15,998. Media accounts have also linked this area to high levels of violence, but like the larger city, District 1 experienced a crime decline beginning in the mid-90s. For example, during 2006, 408 assaults and 242 burglaries were reported in District 1—down from 874 and 1,118 in 1994. This area also has been the site of intense law enforcement activity. In 2006, the local police registered 11,147 arrests and more than 13,000 stops—about 1.4 arrests per 10 residents, well above citywide figures. Through 2012, District 1 has been consistently listed as one of the top-ranked areas in terms of volume of police stops (Fratello et al., 2013), yet local mobilization efforts against this and other policing tactics are generally rare and not systematically recorded (Johnson, 2006).

Given this paucity of data and our focus on the conceptualization of conditions that could trigger mobilization efforts, we pool information from a variety of sources to tentatively describe, theoretically and empirically, how the neighborhood environment of the South Bronx and the experiences of its residents may shape collective responses vis-à-vis stop and frisk. Although each of these sources has inherent limitations, collectively they provide some insight into the issues at hand.

Data and Method

The case study consists of individual-level survey data on resident participation in local organizations, contact with the justice system (including “stops and searches”), and perceptions of policing and neighborhood conditions. We also use tract-level data on the density of organizations in the area and on the numbers of stops, frisks, and searches reported by the police in 2005.

Resident Surveys

Fieldworkers collected the survey data between August 2005 and October 2006. During this period, the number of recorded stops conducted by the NYPD surged from about 398,000 to 506,000 (NYPD, 2014). Such rapid growth, as well as the increasing concentration of police activity in local “hot-spots,” signaled the deployment of a new policing model (White, 2014). These patterns also created suitable conditions for a case-study approach to the specification of conditions for resident mobilization against discrete police practices.

The sampling strategy for the survey was divided into two stages. In the first stage, a sample of 50 buildings was drawn from a list of residential structures located within District 1, 45 of which had residents.³ One unit from each building was randomly selected for participation in the study. The residents of the unit were mailed a letter describing the study and were asked to contact researchers if they were interested in participating. Two successful contacts were elicited with these letters. The remaining housing units were visited in person by fieldworkers at different times/days. After a minimum of three unsuccessful visits (e.g., no contact), the initial sample was progressively substituted with other housing units that were physically contiguous to the ones in the original draw. This approach resulted in 20 completed Wave 1 surveys.

The second stage of the sampling design involved a chain-referral snowball procedure by which additional participants were recruited by our initial set of respondents. This process, known as “Respondent-Driven Sampling” (RDS), has been used in research involving hidden populations and sensitive topics. Some studies show that RDS generates estimates of population parameters that are not significantly different from those obtained by a larger, more difficult random sample approach (Salganick & Heckathorn, 2004; Stoudt et al., 2011). This sampling strategy is appropriate for this study area due to the sensitive nature of the issues addressed (e.g., criminal justice system involvement, experiences with the police) and the potential reluctance of respondents to answer survey-based questions on these topics (e.g., mistrust, fear of retaliation, language barriers; see Bourgois, 1995; Venkatesh, 2000). Following the guidelines of this methodology, respondents in Wave 1 were free to nominate any adults they “knew,” regardless of these individuals’ place of residence or relationship with the referral source. Potential new participants contacted members of the research team via the phone or through the respondents engaged in the recruiting process. Seven waves of recruitment were conducted using this methodology.

Overall, 103 adults were interviewed, but for the current study we use only the 83 who lived in our study area (about 5 per census tract). Their characteristics are generally aligned with area Census 2000 estimates, although our sampling strategy resulted in an over-representation of Hispanics (92% vs. 71%). The average age is 38 years and 57% are women. About 14% of the survey respondents report having been the victim of a violent crime in the 6 months prior to the interview and 29% report having been “stopped and searched” in the past 5 years.⁴ It should be recognized that our sample size is relatively small, which limits our power to detect significant effects. For this reason, we focus on the direction and pattern of the observed relationships.

Respondents were also asked to report on their participation in 10 different local organizations and how optimistic they were about the ability of community organizations and residents to bring about positive change in the community. In addition, a series of questions measure contact with the police, attitudes toward the police, and involvement in the criminal justice system.

Census of Community Organizations

To measure resident access to organizations in the community, we use a census of community organizations that was conducted in 2005 using systematic social observations of street blocks.⁵ These street-block-level data were aggregated to the census tract level to generate counts of the number of community organizations. We focus on the types of organizations that are likely to mobilize around issues related to policing and the treatment of minority populations—for example, places of worship, service providers, and advocacy organizations.

Official NYPD Data on Stops, Searches, and Frisks

To capture the extent of stop-and-frisk activity in District 1, we rely on data from the NYPD Stop, Question, and Frisk (SQF) Database for 2005 (NYPD, 2014). This data set contains information on street encounters between NYPD officers and citizens that resulted in the officer completing SQF worksheets (NYPD Unified Form 250). Officers are required to complete this form when the stop involves the use of force, a frisk or a more extensive search, an arrest or if the person refuses to identify himself or herself.⁶

Findings

This section describes and provides a preliminary exploration of four potential pathways connecting individual-and neighborhood-level factors to the capacity for mobilization in connection to police stops in our study area.

Organizational Infrastructure

It has been hypothesized that neighborhood-based organizations can facilitate the mobilization of local residents around problems (Dubow & Podolefsky, 1982; Putnam, 2000). Organizations enhance information sharing among members and other residents and amplify the reach of their personal networks by providing access to non-local sources of information and resources. They also provide an umbrella of legitimacy to air complaints and reformulate individual demands and problems as collective issues.

Although research on the mobilization potential of organizations is limited, some studies suggest that collective action events occur more frequently in neighborhoods with more organizations (Sampson et al., 2005). Thus, community responses to NYPD’s stop-and-frisk activity may be inhibited if neighborhood-based organizations in minority communities are weak, limited in reach, or distanced from crime and safety issues (Skogan, 1988, 2012). Areas with few organizations lack the infrastructure needed to help residents define and act on common issues, perhaps reflecting a more generalized problem of social disorganization. Some have suggested that police activity itself can further weaken already low levels of informal, resident-based controls and collective efficacy, especially when residents perceive the police strategies to be ineffective, unjust, or targeting minorities (Kochel, 2012; Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003; Sargeant, Wickes, & Mazerolle, 2013; Silver & Miller, 2004).⁷ The police may also compete with local organizations and residents for control over public areas, particularly in high-crime neighborhoods (Venkatesh, 2000).

The few studies that have systematically examined the density and characteristics of neighborhood-based organizations note that a wide array of organizations are present in poor, minority communities (e.g., Coulton, Korbin, & Su, 1996; Slocum, Rengifo, Polk, & Herrmann, 2013; Small & Stark, 2005), challenging in part the “de-institutionalization” thesis (Wilson, 1987). To our knowledge, however, there has been no systematic review of the types of organizations that historically have mobilized to change law enforcement practices and policies. Case studies, litigation, and media reports provide some insight into this issue (e.g., Winship & Berrien, 1999). These sources suggest that religious organizations often serve as liaisons between the police and the community and can apply pressure on law enforcement agencies as well as politicians. Other organizations, such as tenant associations, conduct public education campaigns on legal rights or provide forums for discussion (Rabins, 2010).⁸

To explore whether collective responses to intensive policing in the South Bronx may be hampered by a lack of organizations, we use data from our census of community organizations. We find that there is an infrastructure in place that could potentially help residents of the South Bronx to mobilize around policing issues. As shown in Table 1, the predominant types of organizations are places of worship and charitable organizations tied to religious groups (n = 101 and 21, respectively). Other organizations that could mobilize on behalf of residents are less prevalent but do exist, such as political organizations (n = 4) and advocacy groups (n = 7).

Table 1.

Presence of Community Organizations by Type, Community District 1 (2005).

Type	Number	%
Places of worship	101	43.2
Schools	35	15.0
Community gardens	24	10.3
Church-connected charitable organizations	21	9.0
Senior organizations	11	4.7
Community centers	10	4.3
Employment centers	9	3.8
Advocacy	7	3.0
Adult education	6	2.6
Political organizations	4	1.7

Youth education	3	1.3
Economic development/other	3	1.3
Total	234	100

It is possible that within the South Bronx, the organizational infrastructure is less extensive in areas where stops are more common.⁹ This would suggest that mobilization is inhibited because these organizations are less accessible to residents who are most affected by stop-and-frisk policies. Our exploratory analyses do not lend support to this argument. Using the census tract as the level of analysis (n = 22), there are no significant relationships between the rates of stops, frisks, and searches as reported by the NYPD and organizational density, and the correlation coefficients tend to be positive, rather than negative, as expected.¹⁰ Individuals living in neighborhoods with higher levels of police activity appear to have access to the same organizational infrastructure as those living in low activity areas. However, the backbone of this structure consists of religious organizations, and not organizations with agendas narrowly focused on civic or political issues.

Levels of Civic Engagement

Collective responses to stop-and-frisk policies may be linked to community organizations, but not in terms of institutional presence or density, but rather in terms of the level of resident involvement (Putnam, 2000). Low membership numbers and turnover both in leadership and the rank-and-file base have been shown to strain the financial and logistical resources of organizations, particularly in poor, minority neighborhoods. Weaker resident support for organizations may translate into the need for institutions to pool resources and consolidate agendas with other organizations or actors, including local governments (Gouvis Roman & Moore, 2004). As these instrumental forces develop, alliances may lead to more nuanced positions and roles regarding key problems, with leaders finding themselves caught between sets of competing expectations and shifting loyalties. According to a tenant association president in the South Bronx, crafting responses to resident demands is increasingly hard because “[they] believe you work for housing” (Rabins, 2010). The decline in reported crime in New York may have amplified some of these conflicts as some organization leaders and members find themselves supporting practices such as stop-and-frisk because they believe that they lower crime, whereas for others, the crime drop has not mitigated the significance of longer-term issues such as police harassment (Brunson, 2007; Johnson, 2006).

A number of approaches emphasize the role that organizational membership plays in increasing social capital and other resources that provide the capacity for mobilization (Putnam, 2000). For example, in their work on collective responses to crime, Dubow and Podolefsky (1982) find that individuals who are involved in organizations will engage in collective action not necessarily because they perceive a problem that needs to be solved, but rather as part of their larger participation in the group. They argue, therefore, that low rates of collective responses are due to low participation in organizations. Yet a more recent study (Sampson et al., 2005) found that the number of collective action events that occurred in a community is unrelated to levels of organizational participation.¹¹

Our survey data indicate that approximately half of the 83 respondents in District 1 participate in a local organization of some type (Table 2). Overall, participation is higher for organizations more likely to have indirect, rather than direct, involvement in activism, particularly as it relates to law and order (religious organization, leisure groups, parent–teacher associations). For example, a quarter of survey respondents participate in religious organizations and 17% belong to charitable organizations. Among the groups that seem most relevant for mobilization efforts—political groups; organizations of people with the same ethnicity/race; and block groups, tenant associations, and community councils—only the latter has participation rates of more than 10%. These results are largely consistent with studies of organizational density in poor, minority neighborhoods (Gouvis Roman & Moore, 2004) as well as with research showing low rates of civic engagement in the population at large (Putnam, 2000).

Table 2.

Percentage of District 1 Survey Respondents Who Participated in Neighborhood Organizations (n = 83).

Type	Number	%
Participation in any neighborhood organization or group	42	50.6
Church, temple, or any religious organization	22	26.5
Church-connected charitable groups	14	16.9
Block group, tenant association, or community council	9	10.8
Parent–teacher association	9	10.8
Informal leisure groups	8	9.6
Other	8	9.6
Organizations of people of the same nationality/ethnicity	5	6.0
Youth groups (explorers, scouts, etc.)	4	4.8
Political groups or organizations	3	3.6
Labor union	2	2.4

Although respondents in our 2005 survey did belong to the types of organizations that have been involved in mobilization efforts in the past (i.e., religious organizations and tenant organizations), it is possible that those who participate in these organizations are least affected by stop-and-frisk policies. That is, organization members may live in neighborhoods with fewer stops and frisks or they may not have been stopped themselves. If this is true, then members may be less willing to draw on limited organizational resources to mobilize against the NYPD’s policing practices. To tentatively address this question, we conducted two sets of analyses. First, we explored whether there is a correlation between the number of stops, frisks, or searches in the tracts in which the respondents lived and the number of organizations to which they belonged. We find that individuals are generally less likely to participate in all types of community organizations when they reside in areas with more stops, frisks, and searches, but these relationships are mostly non-significant, although this may be a function of our small sample size.

Second, using our survey data, we explore whether those who have been stopped and searched by the police, who make up 29% of our sample (n = 24), are less likely to be members of organizations. Chi-square tests of independence indicate that individuals who have been stopped and searched are less likely to belong to religious organizations and groups associated with religious organizations such as charitable institutions[religious organizations: χ²(1) = 3.54, p = .060; groups associated with religious organizations: χ²(1) = 3.99, p = .046]. For example, only one person who had been stopped belonged to a religion-affiliated organization compared with six of those who did not report this type of police contact (similar proportions are observed with regard to participation in religious institutions such as churches and other places of worship). There is no relationship between being stopped and participation in other types of organizations.¹²

Although we cannot directly link participation in organizations to mobilization, together these findings lend some preliminary credence to the idea that residents who are disproportionately exposed to stops, either personally or in their daily neighborhood life, are less active in one type of organization that might mobilize on their behalf, religious organizations. An alternate interpretation, however, is that high levels of public control (more stops) may lead residents to withdraw from collective life as formal social control comes to act as a substitute for informal control (Carr, 2003).

Attitudes Regarding Neighborhood Change

Research and media reports have consistently highlighted the harsh treatment minorities and their communities have endured at the hands of different criminal justice actors (see Rice & White, 2010, for a review focused on the role of the police). These accumulated experiences have the potential to shape not only the interpretation of discrete law enforcement contacts (Brunson, 2007) but also the form and intensity of individual and collective responses to these encounters.

More intense stop-and-frisk practices by the NYPD may have not triggered substantial local, collective responses because in the context of long-standing patterns of interaction between minority communities/residents and the criminal justice system, residents may lack confidence in the ability of specific forms of collective action to elicit change. There is evidence that residents in minority neighborhoods are skeptical of government initiatives to elicit feedback because they perceive these to be superficial and short-lived or because they fear retaliation. For example, in one qualitative study, young minorities described how they were not only concerned about abusive treatment by police but also resigned to it because they saw it as “inevitable and unlikely to change” (Ruck et al., 2008, p. 20; see also Jones, 2014). According to the authors, this perception was grounded in the notion that “no one listens to a black male complaining about the cops” (quotes in the original, Ruck et al, 2008).

More generally, there is growing concern about the “illusion of oversight” surrounding NYPD practices. This is based on the perception that the NYPD is not accurately reporting major crimes, lacks effective mechanisms of accountability to civilians, and exhibits bias in the planning of specific tactics (Eterno & Silverman, 2012; White, 2014). Other reports lend support to this perspective. For example, some have questioned the ability of New York’s Citizen’s Review Board to effectively document and prosecute allegations of police misconduct due to problems ranging from insufficient funding to lack of training and independence (Berry, 2000). If residents believe that in the past the NYPD has responded to community concerns with “smoke and mirrors,” they may view efforts by neighborhood groups and organizations to enact real change as futile.

Our case-study data are not aligned with this hypothesis. Drawing on our survey of South Bronx respondents, we find that respondents are relatively confident regarding positive community change: When asked whether it is likely, possible, or unlikely that “neighborhood organizations could improve neighborhood conditions,” more than 35% of those surveyed believe that it is “likely” with an additional 48% saying this is “possible.” Another question more directly aimed at concrete expectations of mobilization by residents to keep a “local firehouse open” showed similar results with about 60% of respondents reporting that neighbors would be “likely or very likely” to take action in such an event. Although respondents were not questioned directly about the ability of residents to mobilize against the use of specific police tactics or the effectiveness of such mobilizations, their responses tend to refute the idea that mobilization is hampered because residents are resigned to current neighborhood conditions or do not trust local organizations. Additional research is needed to assess whether this general optimism regarding the potential for positive neighborhood change extends to police-related issues.

It is also possible that mobilization in connection to police stops may be hindered because those who are directly affected by SQF practices, and therefore who have the most to gain by collective organizing, are more pessimistic about the potential for positive neighborhood change (Bourgois, 1995). We find limited support for this idea in our sample. Chi-square tests of independence indicate that there is no relationship between having been stopped and searched and the belief that local organizations can “improve neighborhood conditions,” χ²(2) = 3.91, p = .142; however, respondents who have been stopped and searched are less likely to think that neighbors can prevent the closing of a firehouse, χ²(2) = 9.19, p = .010. For example, of those who had been stopped and searched, 39% report that it was likely or very likely that residents could prevent the closing of a firehouse compared with almost 75% of those who have not been searched.

Similarly, perceptions of neighborhood change may be shaped not only by direct encounters with the police but also by indirect experiences of contact with criminal justice agencies by friends, relatives, and intimates (Brunson, 2007). Through these vicarious experiences, residents may become inured to pro-active policing, viewing these interactions as “routine” and possessing little optimism for change (Jones, 2014). To explore this idea, we examine whether individuals who have vicarious experience with the criminal justice system through the incarceration of family members or close acquaintances (an experience shared by almost 60% of the sample) are less likely to believe in the ability of organizations and residents to bring about positive neighborhood change. Results from a chi-square test of independence indicate that there is a relationship between having incarcerated friends or family members and optimism regarding positive neighborhood change, χ²(2) = 7.70, p = .021. Of those who reported that someone close to them has been incarcerated in the past 5 years, 27% said it is likely that community organizations can bring about positive change compared with 50% of those without incarcerated friends or family members. A similar disparity emerged between those with and without incarcerated friends or family members when the respondents were asked about their belief in the ability of residents to address a shared problem, χ²(2) = 7.34, p = .025. Again, research is needed to assess whether these findings apply more specifically to optimism about the ability of the community to influence policing practices.

Overall, our descriptive analyses suggest that there is substantial optimism regarding the ability of neighbors and organizations to promote neighborhood change, but this optimism is not shared by all residents. Those individuals who report criminal justice system contact, both personal and vicarious, tend to have more cynical attitudes regarding the potential for collective processes (carried out by both organizations and residents). It is possible, therefore, that collective action against NYPD’s policies is dampened because the people who are most affected by them have little faith in the ability of organizations or neighborhood residents to enact change.

Perceptions of Police Performance

In New York City, like in many other jurisdictions, crime has decreased significantly since the mid-1990s. Although heavily debated (Rosenfeld & Fornango, 2014), for the NYPD and its supporters, gains in public safety are linked to changes in policing strategies, including increasing stops (Dicker, 2010; MacDonald, 2010). However, even if the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk policy is not directly responsible for any of the drop in crime, residents may be unlikely to engage in collective response to stops if they perceive a connection between more intensive law enforcement practices and lower rates of crime. Furthermore, perceptions of effectiveness may be distinct from beliefs about the fairness or legitimacy of these practices (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003) and in high-crime areas residents may come to believe that intensive policing is the price they must pay for the promise of safety, especially if the stops are largely seen by residents as conducted in a procedurally just manner (Rengifo & Fratello, 2015; Tyler & Fagan, 2008).

This distinction between policing outcomes and process also structures interactions between law enforcement and residents on the ground. According to an officer deployed in the South Bronx, “I understand them not wanting to be stopped, but what else can we do? We are here to keep you safe. If you work with us, we will help you” (Rappleye, 2010). An activist from an area housing development supports stop-and-frisk because it “has been successful in getting guns off the streets” although her son was stopped and then arrested in the vicinity of their residence (Conkwright, 2011). This ambivalence has been captured in some qualitative studies as well. Research on legal cynicism conducted by Carr et al. (2007) found that although youth think that the police mistreat them and are unfair, they still believe that police have the potential to reduce crime (see also Ruck et al., 2008). Similarly, a recent study shows that residents of Brownsville, a predominantly Black neighborhood in Brooklyn, want both a stronger police presence as well as more “respectful” treatment by police officers (Hynynen, 2011). Adding to this complexity, Stoudt and colleagues (2011) report that more than a quarter of the youth in their study experienced both positive and negative interactions with the police and they conclude that although the strong presence of police in certain communities can be experienced antagonistically, effective policing in high-crime neighborhoods is also desired and relied on. More procedurally-just and respectful treatment of residents by the police—particularly during non-voluntary exchanges such as stops—could also contribute to decreased crime via more fluid cooperation between residents and law enforcement (Tyler & Fagan, 2008).

This discussion leads to the hypothesis that collective mobilization against intensive policing strategies is hindered because even though residents of the South Bronx dislike how these strategies are enacted, they view them as effective. Our survey lacks specific measures of residents’ perceptions of NYPD’s stop-and-frisk strategies, so to explore this hypothesis, we examine residents’ opinions of local police performance as a proxy. Respondents were asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 10 (1 = not a problem, 10 = big problem) the extent to which the following police-related issues are a local problem: the police not responding to calls, the police using excessive force, and the police having an unfriendly attitude. The first question captures perceptions of police performance in terms of “outcomes” (responsiveness) and the latter two questions measure “process” (excessive use of force and unfriendliness). The means on these items range from 3.9 for excessive use of force to 4.6 for unfriendliness, which indicates that residents generally seem to be satisfied with the police. All three measures are significantly correlated with one another, yet the associations between the outcome measure (responsiveness) and the process variables (excessive force and unfriendliness; r = .38 and r = .29, respectively) are much lower than the correlation between the two measures that capture process (r = .71). Consistent with prior research, this suggests that perceptions of effectiveness are related to, but also distinct from, perceptions of how police do their job (e.g., Hynynen 2011; see also more generally Tyler & Fagan, 2008).

Although the variable means indicate that residents are generally satisfied with the police, an examination of the frequency distribution for each of these scales reflects a slightly more nuanced picture: A relatively large percentage of individuals see the police as posing no problem and a smaller, but still sizable, group of individuals see a big problem. The percentage of respondents who viewed the police’s unresponsiveness, use of force, and lack of friendliness as a “big problem” were 20%, 14%, and 23%, respectively. This suggests there is uneven support for the police and raises the question, what prevents the group who is largely unsatisfied with the police from organizing to change police policies? One potential explanation is that individuals who are most dissatisfied with the police are least able to mobilize because of their own involvement in crime or the criminal justice system.

To further unpack this hypothesis, we examine the relationship between involvement in the criminal justice system and our three measures capturing perceptions of the police using independent-sample t tests (two-tailed). We find there is no difference in perceptions of responsiveness between those with (M_CJ = 4.7) and without criminal justice system involvement (M_{No CJ} = 4.1), t(80) = 0.67, p = .51. However, significant differences emerge between these two groups for our process measures: Those who reported criminal justice system involvement perceived that police use of force and unfriendliness are bigger problems in their neighborhoods—use of force: M_CJ = 5.3 versus M_{No CJ} = 2.3, t(75) = 3.96, p < .001; unfriendliness: M_CJ = 5.9 versus M_{No CJ} = 3.3, t(80) = 3.41, p = .001. The differences in process ratings are even larger if we compare those with serious criminal justice system involvement (arrest, conviction, jail, or prison) with others in the sample—use of force: M_{Serious CJ} = 7.0 versus M_{No Serious CJ} = 2.9, t(75) = 4.75, p < .001; unfriendliness: M_{Serious CJ} = 7.9 versus M_{No Serious CJ} = 3.7, t(80) = 4.73, p < .001—but there are still no significant differences in the assessment of effectiveness, M_{Serious CJ} = 4.9 versus M_{No Serious CJ} = 4.2, t(80) = 0.65, p = .52. Patterns are identical when comparing mean differences in these three variables for those who have been stopped (n = 24) versus others (n = 58). These findings support the idea that those who have the strongest incentive for collective action against stops (i.e., those who perceive the police as unfriendly and overly forceful) may not be well-positioned to act on these concerns. Consistent with prior research (Carr et al., 2007; Gallaher, Maguire, Mastrofski, & Reisig, 2001), they also provide further evidence of the distinction between subjective evaluations of policing outcomes and process and suggest that those with criminal justice system involvement may see the police as effective, but not fair.

Overall, our exploratory analyses suggest that residents, even those who have had contact with the criminal justice system, are generally satisfied with the responsiveness of the police. These results provide some support for the hypothesis that collective mobilization against intensive policing may be inhibited because residents are willing to put up with frequent “hassles” from the police in exchange for less crime (Ruck et al., 2008; p. 26). Yet, it is important to note that just because residents might be willing to accept stops as an effective tool for reducing crime, it does not mean that they would not prefer less invasive methods of policing (Carr et al., 2007).

Discussion

The four specified hypotheses are unevenly aligned with the exploratory data derived from our case study. Contrary to Hypotheses a and b, but consistent with prior research on minority neighborhoods (Fratello et al., 2013; Gouvis Roman & Moore 2004; Slocum et al., 2013), we find that there are a large number of organizations in the South Bronx and a majority of people participate in at least one type of organization; however, entities that may be best positioned to engage in direct, visible activism related to policing issues, such as political organizations and advocacy groups, are relatively rare and membership in these organizations is lower than in other types, such as religious organizations. Although religious organizations are the modal form of organization in the South Bronx, the media have criticized religious leaders’ lack of attention and action regarding community problems, suggesting this may be due to politics or other influences (Gangi, 2011; Levitt, 2010). Although there are many successful cases of church involvement in anti-crime programs and issues related to policing (Winship & Berrien, 1999), many of these are actually triggered by government action in the form of grants, new policies and programs, and public campaigns rather than residents’ concerns (Gouvis Roman & Moore, 2004). This is consistent with recent neighborhood-level case studies that highlight the central role of local government agencies in creating and promoting partnerships at the local level (Carr, 2013; Skogan, 2012). Some additional research also indicates that the “social capital” generated by religious organizations and religious affiliations may not generate high levels of civic engagement due to the vertical nature of these institutions (Putnam, 2000).

On the surface, our South Bronx observations are inconsistent with Hypothesis c), with descriptive sample statistics pointing to high levels of residents’ optimism regarding the ability of neighbors and organizations to bring about change. It is important to note, however, that survey respondents who had been stopped and searched and those with vicarious exposure to the criminal justice system exhibit less optimism. It is possible, therefore, that collective action against NYPD’s policies is limited because the people who are most affected by them have little faith in the ability of organizations or neighborhood residents to alter the behavior of the police. Ethnographic evidence supports this idea: Qualitative studies in high-crime neighborhoods have found that those targeted by SQF view these encounters as routine and have become resigned to them (Jones, 2014).

Our case-study data appear to be more aligned with Hypothesis d), which proposes that collective mobilization against intensive policing is limited because residents may put up with frequent “hassles” from the police in exchange for less crime. Our descriptive survey statistics are consistent with the idea that residents, even those who have had contact with the criminal justice system, are generally satisfied with the responsiveness of the police. Although perceptions of how the police treat residents are generally positive, those with police contact tend to see police use of force and discourteousness as more problematic.

These exploratory results inform the conceptualization of how different features of local social organization may coalesce in marginalized neighborhoods in connection to mobilization and police accountability. Indicators of neighborhood self-regulation, such as civic engagement and attitudes toward neighborhood change, may be aligned in some communities with positive perceptions of external controls such as the degree of police responsiveness. However, this “new parochialism” (Carr, 2003) may be compromised by direct and vicarious experiences of resident contact with the justice system. These underlying, often cumulative forces have the potential to constrain individual patterns of socialization and trust as well as projects of collective mobilization.

More robust research designs and better, more complete data are needed to further explore these arguments empirically and substantively. Insights discussed in this article need to be interpreted with caution as our empirical research lacks direct measures of mobilization and is derived from a case study of a highly policed section of New York City. Furthermore, the small number of survey respondents and the limited number of census tracts in our study area hinder our power to detect significant effects, specify multivariate models, and formally test hypotheses. Because of these constraints, we do not use our South Bronx data to test our proposed hypotheses but rather, to inform the conceptualization of pathways of citizen mobilization, to better specify individual and environmental influences, and to provide a blueprint that researchers may follow as better data become available and new hypotheses are developed.

We also realize that the present study uses a rather narrow conceptual framework to identify potential factors that may influence collective responses in reaction to intense police practices. Media reports and academic research, for example, point to recent changes in the form and content of citizen activism (Goldsmith, 2010). These changes include the movement to more issue-oriented activism as well as collective responses organized outside the influence of local/extra-local organizations. In some cases, legal organizations have joined with social justice organizations and the media to host and promote activism tied to policing issues. These emerging forms of “blended action” (Sampson et al., 2005) reflect collective initiatives taking place at many levels (micro-local, local, national) and can have many different forms. Moreover, they can be civic events, protests, or a hybrid of the two. Thus to fully understand this phenomenon requires mixed frameworks and methodologies and may require researchers to reconsider conventional notions about what types of actions they should study.

The present article contributes to ongoing conversations on the architecture of police oversight systems in the United States and elsewhere, by considering potential pathways of local community engagement and mobilization in connection to discrete police practices. This is important because, as suggested by Savage (2013), formal mechanisms of accountability—such as “transparency” and “independence”—need to be reassessed in connection to actual practices and specific contexts. We supplement his perspective,largely based on how these elements unfold within police department, to study how practices and context may operate in connection to community responses to specific tactics such as stop-and-frisk in New York. This approach is also consistent with other perspectives that seek to foster democratic accountability of the police (Home Office, 2010) and a better understanding of the “negotiated order” that governs police–citizen relations at the neighborhood level (Carr, 2013). From the point of view of research and policy, we argue that these renewed perspectives should consider exploring how communities may evolve from being rather silent partners in the implementation of community-oriented police models and de-facto checkers of the legality of specific practices to engage in broader conversations on the meaning and production of safety on more equal footing vis-à-vis government actors. This article provides a framework to begin to address these issues conceptually and empirically.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

Author Biographies

Andres F. Rengifo is associate professor at the School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University, and Research Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School. His research focuses on urban crime and disorder, corrections reform, and cross-national research.

Lee Ann Slocum is associate professor in the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Missouri St. Louis. Her research focuses on help seeking factors that influence citizen cooperation with the police, and community organizations as sources of crime control.

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