Social Interests,Policy Networks,and Legislative Outcomes

Analytical Framework

Here, social policy is understood “as both real, having concrete impacts on the well-being of people, and epiphenomena with a logic derived from the interests of those engaged in the process.” ⁴ Therefore, in order to understand policy and legislative processes, it is necessary to both analyze and understand policies themselves as well as to investigate the societal structures and interests that shape them. Societal interests are mediated by policy networks—sets of formal institutional and informal linkages between governmental and other actors structured around shared, if endlessly negotiated, beliefs and interests in public policy making and implementation. Actors in these networks are interdependent and policy emerges from their interactions. ⁵ It is precisely this mezzo level of policy making that this analysis seeks to shed light on in an effort to understand structural determinants of the policy-making process.

The concept of policy networks has been the subject of a long list of discussions dealing both with the theoretical and epistemological aspects of the concept. ⁶ In this research, the concept of policy network is not understood as an independent variable that can explain the outcome of the policy process. On the contrary, networks are understood as structures/frameworks that constrain or enable actors. Because structured inequalities within society are reflected in the access certain groups have to the government through policy networks, ⁷ the policy network approach has been chosen for the analysis of employment and social welfare policy. This will allow identification of key social groups and interests involved in the shaping of these policies. Furthermore, this approach can also show how policy networks enable linking of actors with common interests even when they come from different social groups. Thus, the analysis of these structures furthers our understanding of policy and legislative processes as well as their outcomes.

Methodology

The analysis is focused both on the features of social changes induced by social policy reforms and the process of shaping such policies. The research starts by analyzing the outcomes of reforms, that is, particular policies and legislative solutions, and then tries to trace the process of how these policies were shaped. Thus, the first step is identifying actors immediately involved in the process and reconstructing the policy process, that is, conflicts, coalitions, and decision-making process itself. Here, we also try to identify broader societal interests with which they are related. The analysis will therefore be grounded in qualitative research methodology that combines content analysis of relevant laws and strategies and in-depth interviews with persons engaged in their drafting as representatives of particular interest groups. In order to reconstruct the process of the policy change and map various social interests that underlie these changes, we combined positional and reputational methods ⁸ of examining interrelations among actors and their impact in the given process. In the first phase of the study, all types of actors involved in processes of adoption of key legislation had been identified, and then twelve interviews were conducted with individuals who have been involved in the process as individual experts (as is the case, e.g., with representatives from universities, socioeconomic councils, etc.) and government officials. ⁹

The importance of this research lies in its academic relevancy and practical need for deeper understanding of social problems related to the inconsistent transformation in the sphere of employment and social protection. The academic interest comes from the desire to obtain insights in policy-making processes from a more structural perspective. By applying policy network analysis that combines a structural and action element in the attempt to understand articulation of interests, relations, conflicts, and other forms of action behind policy outcomes, we will be able to link policy changes to societal processes and thus broaden our understanding of the welfare and employment reforms in Serbia. Thus, we will add to a growing body of literature on welfare reforms in Serbia and the region a profoundly sociological analysis of the role of power relations and structures in shaping these policies ¹⁰ As Serbia’s transformation and development is slow and problematic, the practical interests as well as social relevancy comes from the desire and need to understand reform inconsistency, grounds for development of broader social conflicts, and political instability more comprehensively. ¹¹

In the following sections, we will briefly describe the policy changes, map policy networks and social interests underlying particular policy outcomes, and explain how they were articulated and how they influenced policy processes and their outcomes. In order to delineate these aspects of policy reform process, the article is composed of four parts. In the first part, we set the analytical framework, methodology, and social context for the analysis. The second part of the article deals with the labor market and employment policy processes and outcomes, whereas the third part elaborates on policy changes in the case of social welfare. In the final part, the process of policy networks formation, the role of specific redistributive interest and broader ideological frameworks in the shaping of employment and welfare policies will be presented.

Social Context of Policy Reforms

In order to understand the policy processes and interplay of societal interests analyzed in this paper, we will first give a brief introduction into the broader social context that influenced the structure and the role and articulation of these societal interests. The last decade of the twenthieth century is referred to as a period of “blocked” or “delayed” transformation of the Serbian state, society, and economy. The notion of “blocked transformation” is used primarily to describe blocking of changes toward a market economy and political pluralism. Here, stagnated reform was upheld by the political elite in order to usurp public economic resources and to remain in power as long as possible. ¹² During this period, societal foundations for political changes were limited as liberal opposition was backed only by highly educated and younger segments of the population, which was not enough to render political change. ¹³ Workers, farmers, and the rural population started to support political forces for change only in 1999. ¹⁴ Furthermore, Serbia was in a conflict with the international community throughout this period, which further delayed democratization and economic recovery. ¹⁵ At the time, this conflict with the international community was also used by the government as a justification for the country’s economic failures and political oppression. ¹⁶ It was only after the political changes in 2000, that post-socialist transformation started. However, by now the new government faced severe economic scarcity, deep poverty, and institutional breakdown. These factors influence the pace and course of political changes in the new millennium.

Policy changes in regard to employment and social welfare were also determined by specific features of the labor market and the welfare system itself. During the 1990s, behind many economic and social policies, there was an aspiration of the state to distribute the burden of economic decline to the largest population possible. The initial liberalization of the labor market and labor relations started in the early 1990s, but as the economic and political situation deteriorated, the government returned to measures aimed at protecting the labor force and jobs, causing the decline in employment to be disproportionately smaller than the size of the economic recession. This led to an increase in hidden unemployment as masses of workers kept their jobs with minimal salaries and social insurance but in fact did not work. The labor market at the time was also characterized by a high proportion of people active in the informal economy; approximately 20% of unemployed people and a quarter of people employed in the state sector were engaged in the gray economy. ¹⁷ Thus, as an effect of the policy to protect jobs and the high hidden unemployment rate, the official unemployment rate was not so high (13.3% in 2001, in contrast to 5% in 2012). With this in mind, it is not surprising that labor market trends did not reflect the real economic situation in the country. Poverty levels were much higher and did not correspond to the official employment figures. In 1990 the poverty rate was 14.1% (based on the Household Budget Survey), and in 1995 it rose to 28.9% and culminated in 2000 with 36.5%. ¹⁸

Unemployment insurance during the same time period was generous and was often a substitute for other measures of social policy. However, only a very small number of the unemployed actually received this form of compensation (only about 6.5% ¹⁹ ). It was administered by the (then named) National Labor Market Bureau that was focused on registering unemployed people who received health insurance (also the main reason why those informally employed registered). However, this Bureau was not motivated to actively seek new job opportunities for its users nor would it sanction them (e.g., delete them from unemployment registries) if they failed to do so.

This inability to serve the public and meet the needs of beneficiaries and actively support them was also a characteristic of the welfare system. Welfare services were provided by a network of Centers for Social Work (CSWs) ²⁰ and residential institutions (for children without parental care, disabled and elderly citizens, etc.). However, CSWs were more engaged with paperwork related to administration of social assistance programs than professional work and service delivery. ²¹ Social services provided by the CSWs were thereby not meeting the needs of the beneficiaries. Their underdevelopment was attributed to a lack of interest from local governments or lack of municipality or city funds. ²² One effect of such circumstances was the favoring of institutional placement even when, from the standpoint of the best interests of beneficiaries, it was not necessary. ²³ All these developments created adverse circumstances that the new political structure, which came into power at the beginning of the twenty-first century, wanted to change.

Public Policies and Legislative Changes

Labor market reforms began with the new 2001 Labor Law. Drafting of this Law was highly influenced by the World Bank. The new law enabled employment without complex administrative procedures, more flexible forms of employment, more simple procedures for layoffs, reduced rights to severance pay, etc. Just four years later, when a new government came into power, a new Labor Law (2005) was also adopted, influenced, this time, by policies formulated by the International Labor Organization. This law reinstates prior provisions related to two instances of the layoff process and sets up the Solidarity Fund, from which severance pay is paid to workers from bankrupt companies (though its role is rather marginal as only 0.95% of the budget for unemployment benefits was allocated to this purpose in 2010). The main effects of this new policy was that the rigidity of the labor market slightly increased (as measured by the employment protection legislation index); however, the rigidity of the labor market was not excessive, nor did it have a key influence on employment (which is structural, not cyclical ²⁴ ). Furthermore, the application of the law was additionally weakened because of widespread informal employment (20% in 2007, 37% with self-employed persons, farmers, and unpaid family workers ²⁵ ) and reluctance of the state to take appropriate measures against the informal economy more decisively.

New employment policies were further shaped by the adoption of the Law on Employment in 2003 with which significant institutional and procedural changes were introduced. The former Labor Market Bureau was transformed into a National Employment Service (NES); the Law enabled the work of private employment agencies whose services are free for the unemployed; it redefined the concept of the unemployed (status is given to those actively seeking employment and not rejecting the offered jobs) and reduced the amount and duration of unemployment benefits. The law puts more emphasis on active labor market measures and encourages local self-governments to establish such programs. ²⁶ The coverage of unemployment benefits has remained low, with the highest proportion of older workers (5% of the unemployed received compensation in 2005 ²⁷ ). Because of a low proportion of unemployed who receive unemployment compensation, the new 2009 Law on Employment tried in part to redefine the conditions, by reducing funding for benefits and increasing the amount allocated for active employment measures. ²⁸ The number of unemployment benefit users remains low and now amounts to 11% of registered unemployed, while the amount of compensation has been reduced to 50% of the average salary (whereas according to the previous legislation it was 60%).

All changes in legislation and public policies in the area of labor and employment aimed at liberalization and increase of flexibility of the labor market although employment and labor market performance were more influenced by other laws and policies, such as privatization, personal income tax, social insurance, monetary policy etc. ²⁹ The intention was to improve the performance of the economy, by facilitating hiring and firing, reducing the share of the gray economy, and encouraging workers to actively seek employment. Reforms also provided for a partial marketization in the field of mediation, and in general their aim was to shift the responsibility for their own welfare to the unemployed and the workers.

Mapping of Actors

The most important actor active in the process of preparing laws on labor and employment was the state, embodied in a number of line ministries. In the first post-2000 government, the Ministry of Labor was led by a trade union leader with little experience in public policy making, while the second ministry was led by much more active and competent trade union leader with a clear interest in labor policies. This is why respondents stated that the first ministry (2001–2004) was less active in public policy making, had less professional and administrative capacities, less political clout, and left most professional tasks to foreign consultants. The second ministry (2004–2008) was much more interested in labor policies, had clear political goals, and cooperated more closely with the ILO than with the World Bank. The ministries had limited capacity to engage in policy debates and relied in their work on external experts. ³⁰ These experts operate as full- or part-time associates of the ministry, conduct analyses, participate in various working groups, and engage in shaping and implementing policies using their knowledge and experience. Thus, they are working within their ideological preferences while representing both their professional interests and the interests of the ministry.

The second important actor active in the public sector is the NES, which is accountable to the line ministry but is also a large professional and bureaucratic organization with its own interests. Process analysis indicates that in many aspects of legislative and public policy changes, the NES acted independently. ³¹

The articulation of views and interests of citizens and workers was weak. These questions were dealt by trade unions but not the otherwise vocal and active nongovernmental sector, except for some specific marginalized groups and their position in the labor market. In Serbia, there are three major trade unions and a handful of smaller ones (all of them having doubtful capacities to influence labor relations ³² ; this correlates to other Eastern Europe countries’ experiences ³³ ). In mid-2010, around 30% of workers were enrolled in trade unions, whereas this number is twice smaller when it comes to youngest workers. ³⁴ Most members work in the public sector and partly in the privatized enterprises, while the coverage of workers in small and medium enterprises is insignificant. Since the position of the working class deteriorated during the 1990s (high unemployment, economic collapse, widespread gray economy, etc.), trade unions have substituted the lack of social power that would result from a “broad base” with a political engagement. ³⁵

Representatives of employers did not directly participate in passing the laws in question. However, they generally participate in the legislative initiatives and have an institutional channel to influence legislation. This influence is exercised in a noninstitutionalized manner or through the socioeconomic council (SEC). The interests of employers in the SEC, as in many working groups for drafting laws and strategies, are represented by the Union of Employers. However, this organization brings together small and medium enterprises and has little political influence.

All respondents indicated the important role of multinational companies, especially those gathered around the foreign investors’ council and large domestic companies gathered around the Business Club “Privrednik” (both of which do not participate in the SEC as a formal framework for harmonization of social interests of employers, workers, and the state).

These are mainly noninstitutional influences. One of the reasons why a number of these employers do not become members of associations or why foreign investors do not enter the national employers’ associations is precisely because they do not need anyone to open doors in the ministry, they can do it themselves (interview, a representative of the public administration).

Throughout this period, representatives of big businesses openly advocated for the liberalization of the labor market in the media and public debates. In addition to this, our field research recorded that some changes in the Labor Law were made after a direct request from a large western-based production company to the Minister himself.

Policy Networks and Legislative and Policy Outcomes

In the process of creating the 2001 Labor Law, representatives of the then Ministry of Labor and Employment (MoLE) and the World Bank had the most important role, while the ILO was excluded from this process. ³⁶ Survey data indicate that trade unions and employers were involved in the process but they had limited capacity to monitor, analyze, and propose public policies. MoLE was not even interested in bringing together local experts, as done by the Ministry of Social Affairs when, for example, the Poverty Reduction Strategy was being prepared. In such circumstances, expert advice and analysis was provided by the World Bank which, therefore, had the most influence on the framing of the law. ³⁷ Although trade unions strongly protested against this law, including organization of street protests, they were not able to significantly influence its final form. The law was supported only by the Union “Nezavisnost” whose representative at the time was the Minister of Labor.

The next Labor Law in 2005 was adopted under different circumstances. This document was prepared within the Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Policy (MoLESP). The head of the line ministry at that time was also a former trade unionist, but this time the ministry had a clear political agenda and wanted to introduce a more balanced and “more European” labor law. The changes were opposed by representatives of international financial institutions, foreign investors, and representatives of employers, and some “radical” ideas of ​​the ministry were eased after a “typical night government session with World Bank representatives.” ³⁸

As opposed to the Labor Law, the 2009 Law on Employment was drafted with the participation of a small number of actors. The most important and most influential among them were the Ministry of Economy and Regional Development (MoERD), NES, and experts invited by them. The working group did not include representatives of social partners or international organizations, but the advisory support was given by the ILO representatives who were involved in other projects in Serbia. Trade union representatives and employers who employed workers over the NES were invited to a public debate, but it was too short and only organized in Belgrade. One of the participants thus testifies:

The Employment Law was mainly done in the ministry; it had a very brief seven-day public debate, which was more a presentation to certain institutions than a public debate. In this regard, trade unions and employers did participate, gave their remarks to something that was already finished, and they were very unhappy because almost nothing was essentially accepted. (interview, representative of the public administration)

The Ministry itself, or rather its executives, had the greatest impact on the final wording of the Law on Employment. It was the result of a clear division of competencies (horizontal, but according to the actors also the vertical and the hierarchical structure of public administration) and a small interest of stakeholders in this area. The unions and employers did not participate in the working group formed for drafting of the law, and neither did nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the public. NGOs are not concerned with this (except for organizations of persons with disabilities, who are only dealing with issues relating to the status of persons with disabilities), and the wider public remained largely indifferent. ³⁹ Labor and employment policies have been marginalized to some extent in this period. Flexibilization of the labor market was carried out quickly to facilitate the post-socialist transformation. As we have said, various sectoral policies have had devastating effects on the labor market and employment (most of all privatization and monetary policies), but the issue has not attracted public attention. One of the participants in the process of creating legislation commented on isolation of labor and employment policies:

One of the reasons may be excessive optimism and this is a benevolent interpretation. Another interpretation is that there was not a lot to be distributed. (interview, academic, member of the working groups for drafting the law)

Interviews indicate that networks and coalitions were created with the aim to pressure changes in public policies and law only when it suited a specific and direct financial interest. ⁴⁰ However, there was no policy network formed around the law on employment or employment policies that would clearly articulate particular social interests. The line ministry with the support of NES formulated a law that was passed very quickly without extensive public debate. Apparently, behind this initiative, certain assessments had been conducted expressing the need to improve the law (provided by independent experts) on the one hand and professional interests of the NES to retain its position of unavoidable institutional actor in this field, on the other. Unlike the Law on Employment, both labor laws have attracted a larger number of actors, with international organizations being especially prominent. In either case, the coalition that stood behind the legal documents did not represent policy network. Although all involved actors do share the same ideology, it appears that these laws did not bring the potential redistributive gains to interest groups and institutions that could facilitate the creation and maintenance of a policy network. ⁴¹

Public Policies and Legislative Changes

Social welfare reforms started in 2001. The first task of the new ministry, led by a moderately liberal economist from the ranks of the Democratic Party, was the consolidation of social spending, from pensions to social assistance. At that time, the budget allocations for these programs were small and payments were delayed for several months. As the third of the population was poor, ⁴² establishing a support system to the most vulnerable citizens was a political priority. However, the Ministry lacked professional and administrative capacities to carry on the complicated task of sustaining the ruined system and creating a new one. As the capacities of the state bureaucracy were diminished, the void space was filled with external actors. In this case, it was a group of liberal economists and international financial institutions. A good example is the Law on Financial Support for Families with Children which was passed in mid-2002 with the expertise and financial support of the World Bank. This segment of reforms carries the seal of ideas and the ideology of the World Bank: social assistance program targets the poor well, has low coverage, and the level of public expenditure for social protection is small, even by the criteria of the World Bank itself. ⁴³

Compared to the reforms of the systems for social benefits, reforms of ​​welfare services lasted longer and were carried out with less efficiency and conceptual clarity. Key reform ideas were formulated against the background of underdeveloped community-based services (as well as their dependence on municipal budgets) and poor conditions in residential institutions. Their leitmotif was deinstitutionalization, the establishment of cross-sectoral collaboration, decentralization, and development of community-based services that would be implemented by public and private institutions. ⁴⁴ During this period, the government and external donors were financing numerous local projects to provide social work services for elderly, persons with disabilities and other groups of beneficiaries. These services were delivered by private and public institutions, and these ten-year efforts resulted in a significant share of private nonprofit sector in the field of social welfare services. ⁴⁵ After a series of projects and strategic documents were finalized, policy reforms resulted in the adoption of the new Law on Social Protection in mid-2011.

The Law on Social Protections has several key features. First, it deals with social welfare service and social assistance within the limited framework of social protection. Wider concepts of social inclusion and cross-sectoral programs are completely missing. ⁴⁶ Second, it opens the field for private providers of welfare services. It stipulates that the services that are needed but cannot be provided in sufficient quantity by public institutions can be “purchased” by local self-governments through the public procurement system. These services are procured from a licensed provider and thus the new law carefully and gradually opened the door for marketization of social work services. Third, it stands moderately vis-à-vis the transformation of institutions for accommodation of beneficiaries. Although deinstitutionalization is high on the priority lists of all previous documents, ⁴⁷ this law does not pay particularly close attention to closing of large residential institutions and referral of current and future users to social work services in their communities. Finally, it introduces a quality assurance system that is also a ground base for the reproduction of the profession of social work. The law introduces a system of licenses for provision of services for organizations and individuals. Licenses for organizations are issued by the line ministry, whereas licenses for individuals are issued by the Chamber of Social Protection. ⁴⁸ The requirement for the licensees is to attend trainings accredited by the National Institute for Social Protection and the line ministry. As a rule, authors and implementers of trainings are experts from the public and NGO sector and the academic circles. Judging by the number of members and the length of the text, this is the single most important part of the law. It concerns the quality assurance mechanisms but also the status and legal issues of professionals working in the social welfare system.

Mapping of Actors

There were several groups of actors involved in social welfare policy changes. The first one included the experts and politicians from the line ministry—mostly legal professionals and social workers who spent most of their career in the ministry or were transferred to the ministry from a social welfare institution (CSW or residential institution). Their professional socialization took place in relatively limited circles of social protection. ⁴⁹

The second one included experts from the nongovernmental sector and academia, mainly social work specialists, lawyers, and economists. They were primarily engaged in projects of international organizations or consulting firms. ⁵⁰ They are the most active and articulate interest group that has influenced the agenda and the course of policy changes. ⁵¹ As we shall see later, through a series of systematic changes in social protection they would in fact primarily strengthen their structural position.

The third group included international actors. The trend of internationalization of social policy did not bypass Serbia. ⁵² International development partners have had a dual function: (1) providing funding and operational and technical support to reform programs and (2) educating professionals and creating policy hegemony. ⁵³ Among the most engaged and influential international actors were the World Bank, UK Department for International Development (DFID), and UNICEF. Their role is illustrated by a respondent as follows:

We have conceived the reform ourselves with the help of our colleagues and friends from UNICEF, Fund for an Open Society, Save the Children. If it were not for the international and nongovernmental organizations, contemporary ideas about social security would never come to Serbia. (interview, former executive in the line ministry)

These organizations have supported projects that led to particular policy changes, facilitated and paid working groups that designed law, and financed local project to deliver welfare services. In terms of ideology, the World Bank brought liberal ideas on restrictive budgetary allocations and well-targeted but modest material benefits, UNICEF insisted on ideas of deinstitutionalization, the development of community-based services and support for families, while the DFID brought ideas of ​​new service providers, subcontracting of services by local governments, and the quality assurance system based on the standards of services. ⁵⁴ At the heart of most laws and strategies lie values ​​such as marketization, privatization, reducing the role of social solidarity, strengthening of individual accountability, etc. ⁵⁵ To some extent, this “ideological” hegemony had been established before this course of changes even started. ⁵⁶

Policy Network and Legislative and Policy Outcomes

The reform of the system of welfare services was conceived and implemented by a group of experts in various fields (lawyers, social workers, and economists) from the ministry, NGOs, and the university. ⁵⁷ This group was composed of representatives of (1) the Ministry (with participation of the employees in the public sector, such as experts from the CSWs or the National Institute for Social Protection), (2) nongovernmental organizations (CLDS, Centre for Child Rights, etc.), (3) University (Faculty of Political Sciences, Faculty of Special Education and Rehabilitation, and Faculty of Philosophy), and (4) international organizations (Save the Children, UNICEF, DFID, etc.). This was a network that in the early years of intensified social reforms (i.e. since 2001), and a decade later, had a decisive influence on the strategies and course of changes of public policies and laws.

Although there were political changes in this period, they did not affect the course, but just maybe the pace of changes, because of the strength of the network itself. Although members of the network changed their professional and institutional positions, the network has remained relatively closed and its institutional and personnel composition has not significantly changed. Our findings indicate that relationships within the network were not devoid of conflict and disagreement, but they were related to solutions to specific issues. The homogeneity of the network itself was such that at no stage did the individual members or segments of the network criticized, challenged, or questioned the main course of changes, nor did they propose alternative solutions that would go out of the framework of commonly accepted professional and political paradigm. The only apparent differences were between local experts and bureaucrats, on the one hand, and international actors, on the other, as the latter often advocated for profounder and faster reforms (e.g., merger and abolition of social welfare programs, more decisive deinstitutionalization, and the like).

Wider participation of professional and scientific public has not occurred. Throughout the entire reform process, there was virtually no political pressure by beneficiaries (except for a very vocal and influential group of persons with disabilities), ⁵⁸ while the general electorate was occupied with huge economic and political problems the country was facing. Such circumstances, in principle, open the space for the intervention of the state administration ⁵⁹ and in these circumstances one should look for sources of power of state bureaucracy and experts from the public sector. The specific composition and professional history of the network, combined with the institutional environment, has led to the Law on Social Protection focusing on (1) closely defined issues of social protection, rather than a broader framework of social inclusion and (2) professional interests of the members of the network.

Many of the priorities that could have been chosen set more difficult technical, organizational, and political challenges—referring primarily to issues that go beyond a single administrative sector. At the same time, they could also lead to better results in support to and protection of the most vulnerable population. One of the explanations given by respondents is that “social protection moved faster than others and that is why cross-sectoral cooperation was slow.” We are not inclined to believe this—we think that, in addition to the rigid administrative structure of Serbian ministries and segmented political system that does not give incentives for cross-sectoral collaboration, the character of a policy network and institutional factors are crucial variables that affect these outcomes in terms of laws and public policies. ⁶⁰

The interests of the wider professional community and the network members themselves were primarily related to the consolidation of professional status: (1) protection of the public sector interests, (2) establishment of control over services, and (3) establishment of control over the conditions of reproduction of the social work profession. Social workers did not have the real market for their services, through which they would strengthen their profession, like medical professionals or university professors. For these reasons, the professional interests were protected by establishing monopolies on existing public resources and the market for public services. Professional interests were also protected by the rules concerning entry and staying in the professional community and this is the place where the interests of management and scientific segment of the profession overlap. ⁶¹ The Chamber of Social Protection was established for this purpose and its authorities include licensing of training programs, as well as professionals and organizations seeking to take part in service delivery. The experts who wrote the law and created public policies also participate in the process of writing training programs, their accreditation and finally licensing of institutions and individuals who intend to provide social work services. In this way, the professional circles have secured a legal monopoly over the reproduction of the professional community, which is something that doctors, university professors, lawyers, and other established professions have already achieved. In this way all key resources (education and administration) are placed in the hands of network of managers and scientist-researchers in the social work profession.