Civil Society Participation in Advocating Interests on EU Legislation

Introduction

Ahead of the European Council budget negotiations on the Multiannual Financial Framework, more than one hundred farmers from the Baltic States gathered in front of the Council building in Brussels, demanding fairer direct payments. The farmers’ protests, led by the farmers’ associations, aimed at influencing the heads of states to respect their demands on increased direct payments, which currently are the lowest among the European Union (EU). ¹

Lobbying decision makers on EU legislative proposals in the capitals and in Brussels is one of the major influence channels that private actors have at their disposal in influencing policy outcomes. ² By “lobbying,” we understand strategies through which different non-governmental organizations “approach decision-making actors in order to further their own interests through transmitting information, arguments or threats.” ³

The EU institutions adopt laws that after transposition into the national legislative systems become binding for the member states. In the multilevel governance of the EU, lobbying by non-governmental actors is of significant importance because it organizes and represents the member states’ civil society and, thus, performs democratic functions “through traditional pathways of representative democracy.” ⁴ It is particularly true when the issues, negotiated by the legislators in Brussels, are of high domestic salience.

Who is lobbying and how active are non-governmental actors in capitals and in Brussels? Different interests in the EU are represented by a large variety of non-governmental actors, such as professional organizations, non-governmental and non-profit organizations (NGOs), trade unions, and business associations—all defined as interest groups referring to their main activity, interest representation. ⁵ The overall number of interest groups in the EU increases with each passing year. ⁶ However, their activity in influencing policy outcomes varies from country to country. Despite their number, not all organizations actively engage in policy advocacy. The level of inclusion of civil society in old and new member states differs. Several studies have indicated a rather low level of activity in civil society engagement in the new member states. ⁷ With respect to civil society participation patterns in the Eastern European countries after enlargement, Hallstrom speaks about the “under-development of civil society.” ⁸ In the same vein, a study by Panke shows that interest group lobby activity on EU policies in the new member states is twice as low compared to the old member states. ⁹ Therefore, it is surprising that no systematic studies have been carried out so far, in order to map interest representation in the new member states.

This article focuses on a member state that joined the EU in 2004, namely Latvia, and aims to explore interest group activity in this country by answering the following questions: What are the interest representation patterns in terms of structural resources and interest representation strategies? To what extent do the interest groups in Latvia target national policy makers, compared to direct engagement with policy makers at the EU level? How do activities and strategies differ across different types of non-governmental actors?

It is acknowledged that after enlargement, the participation of NGOs in EU policy making has been affected by the process of Europeanization. Research on interest representation in Eastern Europe has attempted to focus on the variables explaining the change in interest group activity. Apart from increased transparency and the “top-down nature of Europeanization,” ¹⁰ such factors as professionalization, institutionalization, and awareness of different lobbying strategies are reported to have played a significant role in “overcoming the weaknesses.” ¹¹ A study by Ekiert and Foa argues that the civil society organizations in Central and East European countries are not “as feeble as is often assumed” and their strength lies in transnational civic networks. ¹² An institutional legal framework is considered a necessary precondition for interest group activity, because it ensures interaction between the elites and civil society. ¹³ For instance, the establishment of the National Tripartite Cooperation Council following the regaining of independence by the Baltic States improved interest representation when preparing for EU enlargement. ¹⁴ By learning and adopting the “rules of the game” from Western democracies, the new member states have established corporatist principles, through which non-governmental actors can maintain links with decision makers. ¹⁵ Yet the studies do not specify how the interest groups themselves perceive their role in the increased corporatist culture. Focusing too much on the institutional factors of the lobby may lead to an underestimation of the non-governmental organizations’ perspectives. It is unclear what factors from the lobbyists’ perspectives determine their activity in exerting influence on policy makers.

In order to shed light on the existing gaps in literature, this article maps interest group activity in one of the new member states, Latvia. The analysis draws upon a qualitative research study that was carried out as a part of a broader research project ¹⁶ on interest group activity, where Latvia was included to represent the case of a new member state. Latvia was chosen for the following reasons—the research sample of the broader study represents member states with different sizes. It includes large member states (Germany, Spain) as well as medium and small countries (Ireland, Austria, Latvia), and there is also variation across the geographical axis, where Latvia represents the Northern part of Europe. Latvia belongs to the group of Baltic countries, which offers some potential for generalization about interest representation in this region of northeast Europe.

This article argues that interest group activity is determined by three major factors: (1) structural capabilities of non-governmental actors, (2) their engagement in selecting strategies for interest representation, and (3) the awareness of various influence channels. The variation in these background variables can explain the differences in the level of civil society engagement.

Drawing on the results from 122 interviews that were carried out in Latvia, the case study empirically demonstrates a rather low level of activity by non-governmental actors when targeting the EU decision bodies in Brussels. Instead interest groups prefer to contact policy makers at the national level by using direct means of interaction.

Channels of Influence by Non-governmental Actors

In the legislative process of the EU, formal and informal factors play an equally important role. While formal procedures foresee interaction between the EU institutions—the Commission (drafting the legal proposals) and the EU Council together with the European Parliament (acting as legislators)—civil society is involved mainly through informal channels of influence. Informal contacts among interest groups and policy makers are inputs through which non-governmental actors shape policy outcomes according to their preferences. Thus, by contributing to policy making with information and expertise, ¹⁷ interest groups ensure input legitimacy in the legislative process. EU decision-making bodies, in particular the Commission, “are deeply affected by the conditions of information asymmetry and rely on interest groups for a steady supply of policy-relevant information.” ¹⁸ One can say that from the EU institutions’ point of view, the input from organized non-governmental actors is beneficial and highly welcome. Consequently, a series of different mechanisms have emerged to integrate input from the stakeholders. For instance, the European Commission engages in a public consultation procedure prior to the drafting of a legislative proposal. The transparency rule is also observed when consulting NGOs in the European Parliament committees throughout the legislative process, or when engaging the National Parliaments of the member states, as foreseen by the Treaty of Lisbon. Likewise, the new ‘European Citizens Initiative’ is aimed at increasing participative democracy in the EU. ¹⁹ To promote these tasks, “grassroots oriented” interest groups target the EU institutions either individually or through larger “umbrella-organizations” of interest representation in Brussels. ²⁰

Apart from providing the decision makers with valuable input, interest groups tend to exert pressures on policy makers to integrate their preferences into policy outcomes. Depending on their structural capacities and experience, non-governmental actors directly or indirectly express their demands to policy makers. The success of lobby activities often depends on the channels of influence the interest groups select.

There are two parallel channels of influence that interest groups can opt for. First, they can chose to contact the institutions located in Brussels, that is, select the Brussels route. Second, they can act via the national route, that is, by convincing domestic public actors to represent the lobbyists’ interests in Brussels. These two distinct lobbying practices are not mutually exclusive. An interest group that is lobbying in Brussels may complement its activities with additional measures in the member state’s capital. The Brussels route would imply “higher pressure of convergence towards European lobbying practices” ²¹ and therefore is expected to be used by interest groups that are familiar with the rules and have sufficient resources at their disposal.

Determinants of Lobbying Activity in Influencing EU Policy

The aim of this article is to provide insights into lobbying trends of interest groups in Latvia by mapping their activity through the national route and the Brussels route. The author argues that lobbying activity depends on (1) structural capabilities of interest groups, (2) their decision select different lobbying strategies, and (3) their awareness of the availability of different influence channels.

There is a general assumption that East European NGOs are small in size. This trend can be explained by differences in corporatist traditions compared to the old member states. The mushrooming of interest organizations in the 1990s resulted in the formation of a large number of small NGOs. ²² The quantity of interest groups, however, did not automatically result in higher levels of interest representation. Weaknesses in civil society activity in the new member states stemmed from spreading resources across small and functionally vague NGOs, leading to low levels of organizational membership, and low trust in associational life in general.

The structural capabilities of the interest groups matter. To influene policy makers, NGOs must have at least some resources at their disposal. They need to be able to formulate their positions and to communicate with the institutions. Indeed, the capacity to influence policy outcomes depends on the interest groups’ financial resources and size. ²³ The “structural characteristics” in terms of the number of staff and members and financial resources largely determine whether and how interest groups interact with their lobby objects. One can expect that the larger non-governmental actors have enough personnel for mobilizing their resources via the Brussels route. Many large interest groups have even established their own representation offices in Brussels, which are located close to the EU institutions and provide for advantageous networking opportunities. ²⁴ Different lobbying strategies, in particular those related to the mobilization of public awareness, are cost-efficient. In order to launch an Internet campaign or to organize a demonstration, the interest organizations need to be adequately financially equipped. It is relevant to claim that civil society has a relative “dependence” on public funding. ²⁵ Structural resources also offer the advantage of establishing deeper expertise on the issues at hand, since knowledge and information determines the potential of interest groups to facilitate exchanges with decision makers. Accordingly, the article hypothesizes that the structural capacity interest groups possess, such as financial and human resources, allows them to demonstrate more activity in lobbying policy makers (hypothesis 1).

Previous scholarly research on civil society networks acknowledge that structural preconditions alone are not sufficient on ensure effective policy outcomes. ²⁶ Interest groups dedicate different amounts of time for various purposes. In order to manage day-to-day operations, they have to spend some time and resources on administration and management. Since most of the non-governmental actors are membership-based, they also need to provide information and services for their members. However, these activities are secondary, compared with their main activity—interest representation. When establishing a non-governmental organization, its creators have particular objectives or tasks in mind. By engaging in advocacy activities, the interest groups either directly contact decision-makers in the capitals or in Brussels, or choose indirect methods. In other words, the lobbyists deliberately choose strategies of interest representation. Indirect strategies include mobilizing public opinion through the distribution of press releases, organizing demonstrations, putting statements in newspapers or websites, and engaging other NGOs in their activities. The choice of strategies or “smart lobbying” may even counterbalance the lack of structural capacities. Small interest organizations may equally gain influence over policy outcomes when clearly formulating their objectives and deliberately selecting lobbying strategies. For instance, when the issue is of high domestic salience, the more indirect lobbying strategies by engagement of society can result in a “snowball effect” (as demonstrated by the ACTA movement ²⁷ in Europe in 2012). The engagement depends on both the strategic choices of each interest group and its type (professional associations, non-profit NGOs, trade unions, business organizations, etc.). One could expect that apart from national route activities, the interest groups actively use the Brussels route for policy advocacy when the lobby is related to EU issues (hypothesis 2).

Finally, interest group activity depends not only on the structural conditions and institutional framework offered by the elites to engage civil society but also on the awareness of the NGOs of the possibilities of participating in interest representation. The new member states may be an interesting field of research in this regard. The interactions with policy makers were established from scratch in the early 1990s and advanced step by step from the local to the international level. ²⁸ The awareness of disposing authority to change the decision makers’ minds in the “elite-led public sphere” was dependent on the success of the process of “learning to lobby” ²⁹ and also on openness to international influences and trends. It has to be noted that society’s low awareness in general goes hand-hand with a low public opinion of both the domestic public authorities and European Union institutions. Taking into account these background factors, this article hypothesizes that the level of interest group activity correlates with the degree of awareness of non-governmental actors of their ability to influence policy outcomes (hypothesis 3).

Data

In order to test the hypotheses, the study analyzes original data that were collected in Latvia, drawing on the joint methodology of the broader project with other EU countries (Austria, Germany, Spain, and Ireland). The first step was to create a research sample by selecting organizations from an overall list of thirteen thousand registered non-governmental organizations in Latvia. ³⁰ This was done according to the overall project criteria, excluding organizations that dealt with political, religious, and leisure activities. In order to be able to interview the groups, we focused only on organizations with contact information (phone and email). After this first step, we ended up with 344 organizations.

One of the objectives of the study was to compare different types of interest groups. We again followed the types proposed by the general project guidelines and divided the list of 344 organizations into sub-groups: professional associations, non-governmental non-profit organizations (NGOs), agriculture associations, business associations, and labour unions. Under this division, the study defines NGOs as “a group that defends interests that are broader than the narrowly-defined economic interests of its members and advocates public goods.” ³¹ The research sample contained 341 ³² organizations of five different types of interest groups and was used for carrying out the survey. Research participants were invited to answer a questionnaire with 27 questions in the online survey (Lime Survey). Figure 1 (graph on the left) illustrates the distribution across different types of interest groups in our sample.

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Figure 1

Participants and respondents according to the organization type

The highest representation (almost 40 percent) was from the NGOs, followed by business organizations (28 percent), professional associations (19 percent), agricultural associations (10 percent), and trade unions (8 percent). In the segment of NGOs, we did not specify the field of their activities; thus, the interest groups addressing social issues are integrated in this part of the sample, according to the methodological approach of the broader study.

After having sent out written invitations, including several reminders, the overall response rate of the study reached 35.8 percent, that is, 122 respondents. Figure 1 (on the right) illustrates the distribution of responsiveness across different types of respondents. The horizontal line indicates the response rate (35.8 percent).

Characteristics of Interest Groups in Latvia in Terms of Structural Capabilities

For testing the hypothesis on structural capacities (hypothesis 1), this section introduces our findings on size, age, and financial resources. The interest group population in Latvia consists of small-size actors with a low level of budgetary resources. Two-thirds of all interest groups employ fewer than five staff members. Only 4 percent of the respondents indicate the number of staff members to be between twenty and fifty and 2 percent at more than fifty. Most of the organizations (93 percent among respondents) are membership based. They are composed of either individual members or companies. In the questionnaire, they also indicate that 51 percent are part of EU federations and non-governmental umbrella organizations. This is indeed a high rate, leading us to expect high activity records on both the national and the EU level.

Our findings on interest groups’ structural capacities in terms of financial means show a rather gloomy picture. One-third of all respondents have an annual budget below 7,200 euros, that is, a monthly budget under 600 euros. Given the costs of different outreach activities, we can draw a conclusion that one-third of respondents have a limited capacity for lobby activities because of insufficient funding. Only 7 percent of organizations that participated in the study indicate a budget higher than 145,000 euros. ³³ The survey has not specifically acquired data on the sources of funding for the interest groups. Yet, drawing on some previous studies accessing civil society development in the Baltic region, it is stated that NGOs are often promoted by public funding, whereas EU support has been channelled to a few organizations depending on their eligibility in terms of EU acquis communautaire objectives. ³⁴ In our analysis, we see correlation between the size of the interest groups in terms of human resources and their financial means. Given the bureaucratic application procedures for the EU funding, small organizations with limited numbers of personnel are in a less advantageous situation in attracting EU funds for their operation.

Another interesting finding is related to the “age” of the non-governmental actors. In one of the survey questions, we asked the respondents to indicate the date when the organization was established. From the sample of 122 organizations, on average they were established thirteen years ago. Taking into account the fact that the Baltic States regained their independence in the beginning of the 1990s, one can claim that we deal here with the “second generation” of interest groups, which were in place at the moment of the accession of the country to the EU. After the first wave of emerging civil society awareness that was mainly related to the collective democratic movement to regain independence for the Baltic States, ³⁵ followed by disappointment in facing competitive market challenges, the new generation of NGOs started to engage in education, research, culture, environmental issues, and community activities. The political institutionalization of civil society organization in Latvia took place in 2002–2005, creating the national regulatory framework for their involvement. ³⁶ Thus, the interest groups that were established after 2005 operate on the basis of an existing legislative framework, and because of the country’s EU membership, have the necessary legal preconditions to advocate their interests on the national or the EU level. In Latvia, civil society engagement in EU decision making was defined by the regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers issued in 2005, ³⁷ updated in 2009. ³⁸

In order to clarify the interest domain of the interviewed groups, we asked the question “How important are the listed policy fields for your organization?” The domains included in the questionnaire were representative on the national as well as the EU level. The answers are summarized in Figure 2.

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Figure 2

Importance of the policy field for lobbying activities

The survey data shows that organizations consider research and education to be the most important policy fields of their activity, followed by environment and health policy. It has to be noted that these are the policy fields where many decisions are taken at the EU level. Thus, one could expect that the policy advocacy would be distributed across both influence channels, that is, through the national and the Brussels routes.

Interest Group Activity in Latvia: Channels and Strategies

This section is devoted to testing the hypothesis on interest group behaviour in selecting advocacy strategies (hypothesis 2). By definition, interest groups are recognized as channels through which citizens’ preferences are expressed to policy makers. ³⁹ Therefore, we expect the NGOs to consider interest representation as their most important field of activity. The findings support this assumption. Figure 3 shows that 40 percent of time and capacity are devoted to interest representation. The remaining 60 percent are distributed across services for members, research, and other activities.

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Figure 3

Importance of interest representation compared to other activities

Drawing on the assumption that interest representation includes advocacy on policy preferences by deliberately selecting lobbying channels, we asked our survey respondents to indicate the amount of time they devote to monitoring and influencing national and EU legislation. We assume that the time variable here reflects a deliberate choice by the advocacy groups to act in a decisive and targeted manner. The higher the frequency in addressing the target group, the higher is the commitment to deliberately influence the policy decision. Figure 4 shows that the interest groups in Latvia are in general more inclined to lobby their domestic policy makers compared with lobbying the EU-level actors.

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Figure 4

Frequency (annual) of lobbying on the EU or national legislative proposals and the applied strategies

When comparing different strategies, the variation is most distinct when using direct interaction with the policy makers, followed by meetings, written positions, and indirect mobilizing of other NGOs. According to our data, the organizations devote about 84 percent of their capacity to influencing decision makers at the national level (including contacts with government and public authorities) and only 16 percent to influencing activities related to EU legislations. In other words, the level of activity on the Brussels route is about four times lower, compared to the national route. This is quite a striking finding, with respect to the high share of legislation being carried out by the EU and its implications for the member states. ⁴⁰

After having identified a significant variation across lobbying activities at the national level vis-à-vis the Brussels route, we further explored the choices of institutions for lobbying activities. The respondents were asked which institutions they prefer for their outreach. Their choices may depend on the accessibility and openness of the institutions, ⁴¹ the existence of procedures and pathways for interest representation, ⁴² issue-specific preferences, or a strategic decision by the lobbyists to select institutions that could in the best ways accommodate their preferences. ⁴³ It is argued that the selection of lobbying objects matters. The Brussels strategy definitely has an advantage in terms of networking opportunities and the location of target institutions close to the decision-making process. Yet it requires some knowledge about the decision-making process in order to define the right target. Moreover, opting for policy advocacy through the Brussels route requires awareness and determination.

At the same time, influencing the EU legislative process through the lobbying of national-level institutions also has its rationale. The government officials are expected to react to this input from civil society at home, by integrating the lobbyists’ preferences into national positions. In regard to so-called high politics (affecting member states’ sovereignty), where EU legislation is adopted by unanimity, the use of the national channel strategies may ensure that the government officials use their veto rights in defending the interests of their domestic constituencies. ⁴⁴ For testing hypothesis 3, on the interest groups’ awareness of the interaction patterns among different institutions, the respondents were provided with several options for their answers, including different executive and political institutions in the member states and in Brussels. The answers are summarized in Figure 5.

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Figure 5

Contacts with institutions in Latvia and at the EU level

Figure 5 allows for a comparison between lobbying activity at the national and the EU levels in approaching particular institutions. The findings show that Latvian interest groups have more frequent contacts with the national decision-making institutions. An overwhelming majority of the respondents indicate a high interaction frequency with the government bureaucracy in Latvia. Regulatory agencies are also a popular target for the lobbying activities. The higher hierarchy of the government is as attractive for lobbying activities as the National Parliament (Saeima). Yet, it is interesting to note that political parties are contacted less frequently compared to the executive national institutions. This finding differs from previous studies of interest representation in new member states, which demonstrated a relatively “high emphasis on building relationships with party leadership in parliament.” ⁴⁵

Here again, we find support for the hypothesis that small-size interest groups with less experience and networking capital in Brussels opt for national channels of influence. The survey responses show very low interaction with EU-level institutions, including the representations of EU institutions in Latvia (the Representation of the European Commission and the Office of the European Parliament). Only 7 percent of the respondents selected the Brussels route and contacted the European Parliament more than three times during the past two years. Frequency of contacts with the European Parliament is twice as high (14 percent) but still much lower compared to those with the national decision makers. The findings also show that the interest groups are not fully aware of the influence of the Permanent Representation in Brussels in the EU legislative process, which comprises representatives from the national governments for representing each nation’s interests.

Finally, with respect to lobbying tactics, we compared differences across interest group types in selecting lobbying targets through the national route and the Brussels route (see Figure 6). In general, the pattern of interest representation repeats here as well; that is, all types of interest groups have more contacts at the national level than at the EU level. When breaking down the graphs according to particular types of non-governmental actors—business associations (U), NGOs (N), and professional associations (B)—the findings suggest that in almost all contacts with policy makers (both the national and the EU levels), the business associations and NGOs are more active compared to professional associations. NGOs tend to be more active in their contacts with the government, whereas business associations prefer to interact with political parties and the executive public institutions.

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Figure 6

Frequency of contacts with institutions by type of interest groups

When comparing the activity of the three types of organizations at the EU level, the findings show that business associations are more active in targeting the EU institutions, compared to NGOs and professional associations. The European Parliament is a preferred lobbying target by the NGOs, which is understandable, given the democratic role of this EU institution.

Conclusions

Lobbying of EU legislation is of significant importance, given the fact that the EU member states have to transpose EU legal acts into their national legislative systems. To shed light on the activity of non-governmental organizations in one of the new member states, Latvia, this article has anayzed the patterns of interest representation in exerting influence on decision makers. The study focuses on structural resources and interest representation strategies without addressing the determinants of historical evolution of civil society engagement.

The theoretical framework of the article has highlighted two influence routes. Pressure on decision makers can be exerted either through the national route or the Brussels route. With the help of a survey including 122 interviews, we clarified to what extent the interest groups in Latvia target national policy makers, compared to direct engagement with the policy makers at the EU level. Our attempt was to approach the patterns of interest representation from the interest groups’ perspective.

The empirical findings support the hypothesis linking structural resources with interest group activity. In our causality mechanism, we included the variables of staff, that is, the number of staff members; financial resources; and level of specialization in carrying out particular operational tasks. We found that the structural potential of interest group population is limited, with many small-size organizations that operate on a small budget. This in turn affects the interest group’s behaviour and choice of lobbying strategies. The resource-rich interest groups may engage in lobbying EU institutions directly through the Brussels route, since they have the necessary human resources for networking and the financial means required for outreach activities. Instead, small-size interest groups (the majority in our research sample) opt for more traditional strategies by targeting the decision makers at home, which can be explained by structural resources constraints. According to the survey findings, lobbying activity at the EU level (Brussels route) was four times lower compared with lobbying at the national level (national route). The lobbyists preferred direct contacts with the national government in their policy advocacy, compared to the other outreach activities, such as awareness raising in society through the media or by organizing demonstrations.

Finally, the study indicated that there might be a link between interest group activity and the organizations’ limited knowledge of EU decision-making procedures, including low awareness of their own potential for exerting influence on decision-making bodies in Brussels. This may be related to the “young combat age” of the interest group population in Latvia. Decision making in Brussels and European policy as such is not perceived by the interest groups as a lobbying target. In this regard, change in “mentality and behavioural patterns” ⁴⁶ is necessary, when realizing the magnitude of the effects of EU policies on domestic affairs and, consequently, the NGOs’ awareness of the potential of the Brussels route.

It has to be noted that in line with the overall methodology of the broader study, we did not compare interest group activity across different policy fields, such as social or environmental policies. Undoubtedly, there is a potential for further research in addressing these issues more systematically.