This study examines the dynamics of political credit claiming and blame avoidance among local policymakers in the evolving context of regional Inter-Municipal Cooperation. It explores how political motivations, structural attributes of local authorities, and the institutional soundness of regional clusters jointly influence municipal collaboration and policy implementation. Using survey data from 337 Israeli local government policymakers, the findings reveal a significant positive relationship between the motivation for regional Inter-Municipal Cooperation and the preference for claiming political credit, challenging the traditional negativity bias theory that emphasizes losses over gains. Furthermore, the preference for claiming credit is moderated by the structural soundness of regional clusters: policymakers in more stable clusters exhibit a weaker inclination to claim political credit. Additionally, perceived capability mediates the relationship between motivation and credit claiming, suggesting that confidence in personal and institutional capacities strengthens proactive political engagement. By integrating Structural Choice Theory, the Institutional Collective Action Framework, and Second-Generation Rational Choice Theory, this study provides a comprehensive theoretical contribution. It highlights how institutional design, individual motivations, and bounded rationality jointly shape strategic behavior within collaborative governance arrangements. Moreover, it advances understanding of the Multiple Principal Problem in Inter-Municipal Cooperation by demonstrating how institutional robustness mitigates conflicts over the attribution of credit and blame. These findings offer actionable insights for improving multi-level governance structures and for managing political incentives in regional partnerships.
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