A Model of Johannine Ethics 1

Johannine Ethics as Problematic, Productive and Promising

Johannine ethics was a problematic topic for a long time in both Johannine studies and early Christian ethics. ‘John’ does not address moral issues such as divorce, purity laws or sexual morality, and there is no set of moral codes like the Sermon on the Mount or a systematic reflection on morality like Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. ² John ostensibly promotes just one ethic—to love one another—and this too has garnered much debate. In 2012, however, the first book on Johannine ethics provided scholarship with a new impetus to explore the subject. ³ Taking this landmark study as the terminus a quo for Johannine ethics as a recognised subject, the subsequent decade has seen a surge of studies with diverse approaches and topics (see the Appendix).

Johannine ethics is expected to remain a productive and promising subject of research. This article seeks to contribute to Johannine ethics by exploring key aspects of John's ethical thought. Building on earlier work, I will articulate in this study a model of Johannine ethics that consists of five aspects: (1) Graeco-Roman virtue ethics is the ethical context for Johannine ethics; (2) family is the theological context for Johannine ethics; (3) mimesis is the centre or nucleus of Johannine ethics; (4) moral reasoning is the cognitive means to do ethics; (5) Spirit and community are the empowerment for John's ethics. Since Johannine ethics is largely implied (see below), it comes as no surprise that these five aspects are implicit rather than explicit in the Johannine text.

The five aspects or elements of our model are not mutually exclusive but have overlapping areas of thought. We will see, for example, that family is not just a major theological category in John but also a sphere for mimesis. In Graeco-Roman antiquity, mimesis occurred in the overlapping areas of religion (devotee–god imitation), education (pupil–teacher imitation) and family (child–parent imitation), and these areas also feature in John. Mimesis is also important for moral progress in Graeco-Roman virtue ethics in that people are encouraged to imitate exemplary characters, so we might consider mimesis a subset of virtue ethics. The five aspects of our model are arranged in a particular order and relation to each other to present a thesis that may advance the current discourse on Johannine ethics. My thesis is that, within the broad context of Graeco-Roman virtue ethics, Johannine ethics refers to divine family education that has mimesis as its nucleus and is facilitated by moral reasoning and the Spirit as the moral force.

I use the term ‘Johannine ethics’ to refer to the moral values and principles that govern the conduct and character of a particular group of ‘believers’ in relation to their God and fellow human beings, as envisaged by the Johannine writings. ⁴ While ethics is usually limited to the realm of human interactions, I broaden Johannine ethics to the divine realm because the Johannine writings (1) present God as a moral being who extends various divine commodities to people and operates at the human level through the incarnation, and (2) use the human category of ‘family’ to explain the divine–human relationship (see ‘Family’, below).

Methodologically, given the stated difficulties on the topic, Jan van der Watt and Ruben Zimmermann have argued that the most suitable approach to Johannine ethics is through narrative and is mainly implicit. ⁵ While my model of Johannine ethics is anchored in Johannine language, it is primarily conceptual in nature and logically extends from the foundational work of van der Watt and Zimmermann that outlines the syntax of Johannine ethics. Lindsey Trozzo and Sookgoo Shin partially take a genre approach to the ethics of John's Gospel, looking at moral aspects of the ancient Graeco-Roman biography. ⁶ While genre considerations are useful, their studies do not consider the epistolary genre of the Johannine Letters, so we need an approach that can hold together different genres. In my view, Graeco-Roman virtue ethics is the single ethical system or school of thought in antiquity that can best account for Johannine ethics, so this will be the starting point for our study.

Graeco-Roman Eudaimonistic Ethics

Having begun as a messianic Jewish sect in Palestine, early Christianity soon spread throughout the Graeco-Roman world and its moral teaching is partially indebted to or associated with Graeco-Roman ethics. ⁷ While there were different philosophical thinkers and schools in antiquity, ancient Greek and Roman ethical traditions were essentially eudaimonistic in nature. That is, they focused on how to live the good life and achieve εὐδαιμονία (‘well-being’, ‘happiness’, ‘flourishing’) in accordance with virtue (a quality of moral excellence). ⁸ I wish to suggest that Graeco-Roman eudaimonistic or virtue ethics is a useful heuristic framework for understanding Johannine ethics. ⁹ While many in John's first audience were undoubtedly familiar with the Jewish traditions, ¹⁰ the first-century Mediterranean world was so influenced by Greek culture that many would have been Greek philosophical-aware auditors or readers (whether Gentile or Jewish) who could have understood John's writings in light of Graeco-Roman virtue ethics.

For a manageable comparison between Graeco-Roman virtue ethics and Johannine ethics, I will look at Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, arguably the most important virtue treatise in antiquity. ¹¹ Aristotle starts by addressing the supreme goal in human life. He postulates that every human activity is aimed at some end or good, but since there are numerous activities there are as many ends. Even so, Aristotle reasons that people do not choose every action because of something else (otherwise it would go on without limit and be futile), but that there is an ultimate end or good (Nic. Eth. 1094a18–22). Aristotle describes this supreme good as εὐδαιμονία (‘well-being’, ‘happiness’, ‘flourishing’, ‘welfare’), which is generally likened to ‘living well’ and ‘doing well’ (Nic. Eth. 1095a19–20). Aristotle mentions two features of εὐδαιμονία: (1) it must be ‘final’ or ‘complete’ (τέλος), in that it must be desired for its own sake and not for the sake of something else; (2) it must be ‘self-sufficient’ (αὐτάρκεια), that is, it must inherently make life choices worthy and lacking nothing (Nic. Eth. 1097a25–1097b22). For Aristotle, εὐδαιμονία is achieved through virtue (ἀρετή) and some kind of learning or habituation (Nic. Eth. 1099b9–27). Besides virtuous activity, εὐδαιμονία requires ‘external goods’ such as friends, wealth, good birth, good children and beauty (Nic. Eth. 1098b13–1099b8). Achieving εὐδαιμονία takes a lifetime. As Aristotle says, just as one swallow does not make a summer, so one day or a short time of happiness does not make a man blessed (μακάριος) and happy (εὐδαιμονία) (Nic. Eth. 1098a19–20). Aristotle perceives εὐδαιμονία teleologically, with the end (τέλος) in mind, and hence is a verdict on a person's entire life.

In the Johannine writings, ζωή (‘[divine] life’) is the closest equivalent to εὐδαιμονία. We learn from John's stated purpose for his writing that ζωή is the ultimate good people should pursue for nothing but its own sake (20:31; 1 Jn 5:13). In John's worldview, people do not (naturally) know God (1:10, 18; 8:47, 54-55; 17:25; 1 Jn 3:1)—in the sense that it will save them—and hence the ultimate good is to know God and partake in the divine ζωή that the Father and Son share (17:3). In other words, ζωή, the Johannine equivalent of εὐδαιμονία, is the supreme moral good people attain when they enter into a relationship with the Father and Son because it is only there that ζωή is available. Since John's Gospel tells the story of how Jesus provides ζωή from start (1:4) to finish (20:31), the implication is that the entire Johannine narrative has a moral dimension. ¹²

Like Aristotle's concept of εὐδαιμονία, John depicts the pursuit of ζωή as a sustained activity over a lifetime (or part of it) rather than a sudden event. It is crucial for John that one does not simply come to believe in Jesus to receive life but remain with him in discipleship (see, e.g., 6:60-69). So long as believers remain ‘in’ (relationship with) Jesus (15:1-8), they have access to the divine ζωή. Moreover, as Aristotle states, along with virtuous activity εὐδαιμονία also entails external goods such as good birth (Nic. Eth. 1099b2–5), so also the Johannine quest for ζωή starts with a suitable lineage—a birth of God through the Spirit (1:12-13; 3:5). Such birth brings a person into God's family where one partakes in the divine ζωή. This sharing in ζωή becomes a lifelong journey. In 14:6, Jesus asserts that he is the way, the truth and ζωή, so to walk with Jesus becomes the journey of εὐδαιμονία. Corresponding to Aristotle's account of εὐδαιμονία, in John ζωή is both the journey and the destination. Hence, ζωή is not simply a reward for virtuous living at the end; rather, believers already partake in the divine ζωή as they journey with Jesus, and virtuous living affirms that they share in this ζωή. Aristotle also includes friends among the ‘external goods’ that facilitate εὐδαιμονία, so it is fitting that Jesus depicts himself as a friend to his followers (15:13-15).

We learned that for Aristotle εὐδαιμονία is achieved by practising the virtues during one's life. When we turn to the Johannine writings, πιστεύειν (‘to believe’) is the particular virtue needed for obtaining ζωή. John's purpose statements in 20:31 and 1 Jn 5:13 make clear that πιστεύειν in Jesus results in a share in the divine ζωή, which means that πιστεύειν has a moral dimension. This idea is confirmed in 6:27-29. When the crowd enquires about τὰ ἔργα τοῦ θεοῦ (‘the works of God’) in reply to Jesus' exhortation ‘to work’ (ἐργάζεσθαι) for food that leads to ζωή, Jesus states that the singular ἔργον (‘work’) God requires is πιστεύειν in Jesus. ¹³ Hence, believing is the right moral response to God because it renders to God the respect due to him. ¹⁴ Both John and the Johannine Jesus thus regard πιστεύειν as the virtuous activity that leads to ζωή. Authentic Johannine belief, however, is more than propositional knowledge of Jesus or God (although there is that too): πιστεύειν refers to an authentic belief-response, expressed in an allegiance to Jesus that is then continued in discipleship. In other words, the Johannine concept of ζωή refers to an activity over a lifetime rather than a single act. For John, ζωή is achieved through πιστεύειν and sustained by appropriate virtuous behaviour that embodies discipleship. ¹⁵

In conclusion, Johannine ethics has close affinity with Graeco-Roman virtue ethics. When we view the Johannine writings through the lens of Graeco-Roman virtue ethics, I suggest that ζωή is the Johannine equivalent of εὐδαιμονία, with πιστεύειν as the primary virtue through which one achieves this supreme moral good. For John, believing in Jesus is a moral act not only because it is the sole means by which people attain ζωή but also because it is, as the sole ἔργον God requires, the proper moral response people should render to God. ¹⁶

Family

The Johannine writings delineate a narrative world where two moral realms and rulers are set in opposition. Immoral categories such as darkness, hate, lies, sin and murder are related to the devil and his realm (including its people). Moral attributes such as life, love, light, truth, honour and qualities such as being good, righteous, pure and holy are ascribed to God and Jesus. The dynamics of the relationship between Jesus, God and believers are often expressed through the language of family. When people enter and live in God's world, their character and conduct are being shaped by the moral beliefs, values and norms of the divine family.

For John, ‘family’ is a major theological category. The terms οἶκός and οἰκία can refer to a physical building (‘house’; 2:16; 11:31) or a social construct (‘household’; 4:53; 8:35; 14:2). ¹⁷ Just as ‘family’ refers to the basic social unit in ancient cultures, so the ‘family of God’ denotes the basic unit of the divine society. ¹⁸ The divine family dynamic is epitomised in the concept of communion and while the term κοινωνία (‘fellowship’, ‘communion’) occurs only in 1 Jn 1:3-7, the concept is widespread in John's Gospel through the terms for oneness/unity (ἕν εἶναι) and indwelling (μένειν ἐν; (εἶναι) ἐν). The core of the divine family consists of God the Father and Jesus the Son, and people can enter this family through a birth of the Spirit (1:12-13; 3:5). ¹⁹ The new birth includes a new identity—believers become children of God (τέκνα θεοῦ in 1:12; 1 Jn 3:1-2, but also note the use of τεκνία) and siblings of Jesus (ἀδελφοί in 20:17)—and this new identity should result in new behaviour. Believers are exhorted to think and live according to this new environment, that is, in line with what Jesus taught and exemplified. So, a person's moral transformation starts with a new birth of the Spirit, a relocation from the dark, immoral world to the moral world of God, and their ongoing moral transformation will correspond to the extent that they behave according to the divine reality. I will elaborate on this now.

When people enter the divine family, the moral attributes of God begin to shape their identity and behaviour. I mention five prominent attributes. ²⁰

Life. Ζωή is the perpetual, indestructible life that the Father and Son share and is what defines them (1:4; 5:26; 14:6): Ζωή is a moral quality because, as we saw earlier, John presents it as the supreme good that God offers to people (20:31; 1 Jn 5:13). When believers partake in the shared life of the Father and Son, they then become a derivative source of life for others (4:38-42; see also 7:38).

There is further evidence that membership of God's family promotes a new kind of conduct in keeping with the ethos of the divine family. Various ethical imperatives in the Johannine writings intend to guide the believer's behaviour, such as to love one another, abide in Jesus and his word, bear fruit, keep his commandments, serve one another, lay down one's life for others, testify about Jesus, do the truth, walk in the truth, and be pure and righteous. This progressive moral behaviour is typically designated as ‘discipleship’. John goes so far as to stress the correlation between identity and behaviour, indicating that moral transformation concerns both. John 8:39-47 particularly reveals the dynamics of two mutually exclusive families and exemplifies the connection between identity and behaviour. When ‘the Jews’ assert that Abraham is their father (an issue of identity), Jesus replies that if this were the case, they would show matching behaviour. The behaviour of ‘the Jews’, however, reveals that they are members of the devil's family rather than God's. John's Gospel further manifests this relation between identity and behaviour. Jesus stresses to his disciples that obedience demonstrates their love for him (14:15, 21, 23) and guarantees his abiding love (15:10). Likewise, their love for each other testifies to their identity as Jesus' disciples and their membership of the divine family (13:35). In the parable of the vine and its branches, Jesus declares that in staying in relationship with him (identity), they continue to bear fruit (behaviour) (15:4-5) and their bearing fruit reveals their identity (15:8).

This correlation between identity and behaviour is also evident throughout 1 John: (1) a claim to have communion with God (identity) must be backed up by matching behaviour; conversely, one who ‘walks’ in the light or darkness (behaviour) is part of that corresponding realm (identity) (1 Jn 1:6-7; 2:9-11); (2) obeying God (behaviour) affirms one's communion with God (identity) (1 Jn 2:3-6); (3) behaviour reveals family identity—to do right is to be of God while to commit sin is to be of the devil (1 Jn 3:7-10); (4) God's abiding love in the believer (identity) should lead to corresponding behaviour (1 Jn 3:17), just as to ‘love in truth’ (behaviour) shows that one is ‘of the truth’ (identity) (1 Jn 3:18-19); (5) to love others (behaviour) shows that one is (born) of God and in relationship with him (identity) (1 Jn 4:7-8, 12); conversely, love (identity) is inextricably related to obedience (behaviour) (1 Jn 5:2-3).

A picture emerges that the believers’ sharing in the divine identity will lead to transformational behaviour in that they are expected to behave according to the divine family code. Continuing access to the divine reality should produce an increasing understanding of who God is, what he does and what he expects from his people. This moral knowledge should motivate believers to do what is right. Conversely, behaviour is transformative in that right behaviour affirms and shapes one's identity. Ongoing acts of discipleship (behaviour) validate and shape the family tie between the believer, God and other believers (identity). Moral education and transformation thus occur within the theological context of the divine family, where the reciprocal, transformative dynamic between identity and behaviour affect each other. In short, the Johannine writings reveal the importance of family for ethical living where partaking in the divine identity and knowing the divine family code informs and shapes people's identity and behaviour. We will now explore the inner workings of John's family ethics.

Personal Example and Imitation

Discourse on mimesis began in Greek antiquity (with Plato and Aristotle) and carried on in the Roman era. Mimesis originally referred to the creative representation of nature through the fine arts but over time it extended to other areas of life. In religion, people's goal was to imitate or assimilate to god (e.g., Plato, Theaetetus 176ab; Aristotle, Nic. Eth. 1178b27), while in the family and education, children were expected to imitate their parents and teachers and become like these role models. ²³ The spheres of family and education intersected because the family operated as a microcosm of the polis and, conversely, the teacher often functioned as an extended parent. ²⁴ The ancient Graeco-Roman world thus knew about imitating others, whether god, parent or teacher. ²⁵

Aristotle recognises the prominent role of mimesis in education: ‘From childhood, it is innate for humans to imitate [μιμεῖσθαι], and in this humans are different from other living beings that they are most capable of imitation [μιμητικός] and learn their first lessons through imitation [μίμησις]’ (Poetics 1448b). We saw earlier that for Aristotle, a person achieves εὐδαιμονία through practising the virtues—a process he calls ‘habituation’ (Nic. Eth. 1103a–1104a). However, just as good and bad harpists stem from their training, which shows the need for a (good) teacher, so by implication one must have good role models to perform the right activities or correct habituation (Nic. Eth. 1103b). Referring to Nic. Eth. 1176a, Hallvard Fossheim contends that students ‘should turn to the good man and the good man's actions as the source of insight into the human good … not in order to know, but in order to become more of what he already is’. ²⁶ Hence, for Aristotle, imitation has a role in education in that good exemplars facilitate practising the virtues and consequently achieving εὐδαιμονία.

Aristotle is critical of indiscriminate imitation: ‘The fact is that [the proud] try to imitate the great-souled man without being really like him, and only copy him in what they can, reproducing his contempt for others but not his virtuous conduct’ (Nic. Eth. 1124b). Andreas Vakirtzis explains that a virtuous person can continue to cultivate one's eudaimonic state through ‘character friendship’ (Nic. Eth. 1156b), where a person selects certain patterns in a friend's conduct and ‘copies’ (ἀπομάττονται) these to their own life to enhance their moral development (Nic. Eth. 1172a11–14). ²⁷ This ‘copying’ is not slavish imitation but a process of ‘interpretative mimesis’ where a person observes, interprets and imitates a virtuous action in keeping with one's own personality and abilities. ²⁸ Turning to the Roman era, Rebecca Langlands states that Roman exemplary ethics advances Aristotelian virtue ethics in that it makes Aristotle's philosophical-theoretical virtue ethics practical to everyday Roman life through specific examples and ethical stories that can be easily disseminated and applied. ²⁹

Prolonged contact with the Graeco-Roman traditions led early Christians to adopt the concept of mimesis into the overlapping spheres of religion, family and education. ³⁰ Here it became almost exclusively an ethical concept, in that one imitated an exemplary person to become virtuous. The Johannine writings particularly show how mimesis functions at the junction of religion, family and education. ³¹ In the moral environment of the divine family where believers live, personal example and imitation are important in shaping moral behaviour. Jesus is the prime example of ethical living for his disciples. The episode that illustrates this best is the footwashing episode in John 13 where Jesus exhorts his disciples to imitate him in serving one another in loving humility: ‘For I gave you an example (ὑπόδειγμα), that just as (καθώς) I have done to you, you also (καί) should do’ (13:15). ³² Further on in John 13, Jesus provides another example of ethical living for his disciples to imitate. John 13:34b expands the love command in 13:34a as a mimetic imperative: ‘just as (καθώς) I have loved you, you also (καί) should love one another’ (see also 15:12). This indicates that the love command is not given in a vacuum but is derived from a precedent, such as the footwashing where the disciples have observed and experienced Jesus' love for them. In the words of 13:15, Jesus' love for his disciples is the ὑπόδειγμα for their love for one another.

A note on the Johannine mimetic language: Except for 3 Jn 11, John does not use the typical language of the Greek mimetic traditions—the lexeme μιμεῖσθαι. Instead, I have shown that John develops his own vocabulary, with a broad semantic domain, in which the comparative conjunction καθώς (on its own or with the correlative καί or οὕτως) communicates the concept of mimesis most often. ³³ Interestingly, καθώς rarely features in ‘secular’ (i.e., not Judeo-Christian) Greek literature from the fifth century BCE to the first century CE (see the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae database). ³⁴ While the term frequently occurs in the LXX, the pseudepigrapha, the New Testament and Josephus's Antiquities, generally it does not indicate mimesis. In this Judeo-Christian tradition, John's choice of making καθώς, instead of the lexeme μιμεῖσθαι, central to his mimetic language seems unique.

John's characteristic mimetic καθώς language occurs, for instance, with reference to obedience (15:10), ³⁵ unity (17:11, 21-22), ³⁶ existence (17:14, 16) ³⁷ and mission (17:18; 20:21). ³⁸ In his first letter, John creates new forms of mimesis, often employing his distinctive καθώς language, urging his readers to behave like Jesus (1 Jn 2:6), to be like Jesus (1 Jn 3:2), to be pure (1 Jn 3:3), to be right(eous) like Jesus (1 Jn 3:7) and to lay down one's life like Jesus did (1 Jn 3:16). ³⁹ We noted that the goal of mimesis in antiquity is moral transformation in that the imitator seeks to become (gradually) like the exemplar. Hence, believers imitate Jesus in serving one another, loving one another, being one, and so on, in order to become people characterised by service, love and unity. A pattern emerges of transformation through mimesis where Jesus demonstrates ethical living and his followers can then (and therefore) imitate him. This will be explained further.

In the previous section, we learned that the Father and Son are characterised by the moral attributes of life, love, light, truth and honour. I now suggest that believers share in these divine attributes through the mechanism of mimesis. The Johannine writings reveal a sequence of mimesis where the Father sets the example for the Son, and in turn the Son sets the example for believers. In other words, in imitating the Father, Jesus mediates these moral goods to people. Regarding life, just as the Son is a source of life in imitation of the Father (5:21, 26; ὥσπερ … οὕτως καί indicates the mimesis), so believers become a derivative source of life in imitation of Jesus. For example, when the Samaritan woman has drunk from the life-giving water that Jesus offered her, she becomes a mimetic source of life in leading her fellow villagers to the source of life (4:28-30, 39). Likewise, the disciples’ testimony will stimulate life-giving belief (17:20) because they have become a derivative source of life (7:38-39). Access to the divine life is ‘passed on’ as it were via a mimetic chain from the Father to the Son to believers to potential believers. As for love, the mimetic chain is clear: the Son loves the disciples just as the Father loves him (15:9) and the disciples should love one another in imitation of Jesus (13:34; 15:12). ⁴⁰ Jesus' teaching, which imitates the Father's speech (3:34; 8:26, 28; 12:50), ⁴¹ is a source of liberating truth for people (8:31-32). Believers, in turn, become a source of truth for others because their life-giving testimony (informed by the Spirit of truth) is modelled on Jesus' teaching (15:26-27; 16:12-15; 17:20). There is no Son–Father mimesis regarding light but there is arguably an implied believer–Jesus mimesis. Jesus' portrayal of John the Baptist as a derivative ‘light’ in 5:35 refers to John's activity of testifying to the Light, which prompts belief (1:7; 1:35-37; 10:41-42). Believers are also called to testify to the Light (15:27) and their testimony potentially gives light (17:20), so in a sense believers ‘imitate’ Jesus as light. Regarding honour, just as the Father honours the Son, so the Son honours believers (17:22), although this is admittedly a ‘weak’ case of mimesis. Nevertheless, it seems that the main attributes of the Father and Son are mediated to believers through mimesis. Since these attributes shape the believers’ identity and behaviour, mimesis seems key to moral transformation.

We noted earlier that when people become part of the divine family, the shaping of their identity and behaviour amounts to moral transformation. It now appears that mimesis is a critical mechanism in this process. Concerning the footwashing, imitating Jesus the δοῦλος–κύριος (‘slave–Lord’; 13:14-16) by simply performing acts of sacrificial service (behaviour) would fall short of what is intended; the disciples must also become δοῦλοί to one another (identity). This means that sacrificial service is inextricably related to adopting a δοῦλος-identity, and conversely, the mimetic act of serving others affirms and shapes one's δοῦλος-identity. In other instances, too, there is a correlation between mimetic behaviour and identity. Jesus's mimetic imperative in 13:34, for example, is not simply to guide the disciples’ behaviour but also to confirm their identity since 13:35 states, ‘By this everyone will know that you are my disciples [identity], if you have love for one another [behaviour]’. Elsewhere, the mimetic unity among believers (identity), modelled on the unity of the Father and Son (17:21-22), is linked to testifying about Jesus (behaviour) (17:20). The Johannine letters present the same reality. For example, 1 Jn 3:7 shows that the habitual practice of what is right transforms the person into being right(eous), in imitation of Jesus. In 1 Jn 3:16, the imperative that believers lay down their lives for each other, just as Jesus did, is directed at believers who have experienced a transformative relocation from death to life (1 Jn 3:14). At the same time, the practice of this sacrificial love-in-action (1 Jn 3:17-18) will affirm and enhance their transformation (see also 3 Jn 5–8). In 1 Jn 3:2, the mimetic transformation of believers into the likeness of Christ at the Parousia very likely results from a lifetime of imitating Jesus. Mimesis thus shapes both the believer's identity and behaviour and is crucial for Johannine ethics.

Our analysis has shown that the core attributes and activities that characterise the Father–Son relationship also inform and shape the believers’ identity and behaviour through the mechanism of mimesis. And if divine identity and behaviour are modelled to believers by mimesis, mimesis is instrumental in the divine–human relationship. To put it differently, the Son–Father mimesis is for the sake of people—the Son imitates the Father in order to mediate various moral goods to people through the mimetic chain. ⁴² John's construction of several new forms of mimesis in 1 John also shows that mimesis is integral to his ethical thinking. Accordingly, we can speak of a mimetic family identity and behaviour and conclude that mimesis is central to Johannine ethics. Hence, Johannine ethics is mimetic ethics. ⁴³

Moral Reasoning as Cognitive Enabling

On becoming members of God's family, believers must start to think according to their new environment. This new thinking, which I call ‘moral reasoning’, should inform their behaviour. Moral reasoning is to think in line with God's character and purposes, to reason according to the beliefs, values and norms of the divine family. For Aristotle, the purpose of the rational part of the soul or reason is to attain truth, and to do this well one must practise the intellectual virtues (Nic. Eth. 1139a19–1139b13). Similarly, for John, moral reasoning refers to the practice of the intellectual virtues to attain truth. ‘Truth’ or the divine reality is not naturally accessible to people (1:5, 10; 8:23, 43-47, 54-55; 1 Jn 3:1), but Jesus has open access to the divine realm and mediates truth to people through his teaching (1:51; 3:31-35; 8:31-32, 40). Jesus' revelatory teaching thus forms the epistemological basis for the human practice of the intellectual virtues.

The principal intellectual virtues in John that inform or constitute moral reasoning are perception, understanding, remembrance and belief:

Perception. John's language for sensory perception, ‘to see’ (he uses βλέπειν, ὁρᾶν, θεωρεῖν and θεάσασθαι interchangeably) and ‘to hear’ (ἀκούειν), implies cognitive perception of what is seen or heard in relation to Jesus. For example, in 5:24-25 ‘hearing’ Jesus' words implies understanding them, in 6:40 to ‘see’ Jesus is to perceive his significance, and in 8:43 to ‘hear’ Jesus' words is akin to understanding (γινώσκειν) them. John 9 explores the dual levels of seeing, where physical sight should lead to insight. For John, genuine ‘seeing’ and ‘hearing’ involves perceiving the meaning of Jesus' teaching and works.

This suggests that moral reasoning and moral behaviour are closely related. Just as for Aristotle, prudence guides the moral virtues (Nic. Eth. 1102a5–1103a10), so for John the intellectual virtues inform and direct moral behaviour. This might explain why neither John nor Jesus spells out the particulars of moral behaviour. Moral reasoning must guide believers on how to testify to the truth in a particular context, what bearing fruit looks like or what constitutes a loving action in a specific situation. At the same time, moral behaviour promotes moral reasoning. Hence, remaining in Jesus implies ongoing examination of his teaching and exploring its possible applications, which, in turn, stimulate and shape moral reasoning. The Johannine concepts ‘to be in or from the truth’ and ‘to testify, do or be guided according to the truth’ connect moral thinking and moral behaviour. In essence, moral behaviour refers to the practice of moral virtues guided by reason.

Moral reasoning also applies to mimesis because Johannine mimesis is not about simplistic replication but a dynamic and creative hermeneutical process. Revisiting the footwashing, when Jesus returns to the table after washing his disciples’ feet, he does not merely tell his disciples to imitate his example. Instead, he asks in 13:12b, ‘Have you understood what I have done for you?’ Jesus' question poses a cognitive challenge for the disciples, indicating that what they have observed must lead to understanding. ⁴⁶ They should comprehend, for example, that if their κύριος–διδάσκαλος has become a δοῦλος, no one is exempt from humble service and that they need to become δοῦλοί too (see 13:13-14). Other instances of Johannine mimesis also suggest the need for moral reasoning. Regarding the mimetic love command in 13:34, the mimetic actions that show the believers’ love for one another in different situations involve interpretation. Likewise, being sent into the world by Jesus just as Jesus was sent into the world by the Father (17:18; 20:21) looks different for each believer. Interpretation of the mimetic unity between believers and the Father and Son (17:11, 21-22) should guide how this is worked out in the corporate life of the believing community. In sum, authentic mimesis entails moral reasoning in that the intention and attitude behind Jesus' example must be interpreted and articulated in a corresponding mimetic act.

Moral reasoning will even lead to new forms of mimesis because, as we noted in the previous section, John created several new mimetic instances in his first letter. In 1 Jn 3:16, John not only reminds his audience of Jesus' saying in Jn 15:13 but turns it into a new mimetic imperative: just as Jesus laid down his life for his followers’ sake, so believers should lay down their lives for each other. John then applies more moral reasoning to make the leap from this imperative to imitate Jesus' sacrificial love to the specific mimetic act of providing economic assistance to a fellow believer in 1 Jn 3:17. The general mimetic imperative to ‘walk’ (περιπατεῖν) like Jesus walked, in 1 Jn 2:6, is probably derived from Jesus' saying in 14:6 and requires interpretation, as is indicated by other expressions of περιπατεῖν in 1 Jn 1:6-7; 2 Jn 4, 6; 3 Jn 3-4. Elsewhere in the letter, John formulates more mimetic imperatives, such as in 1 Jn 3:3 (perhaps rooted in Jn 17:19), 1 Jn 3:7 (perhaps influenced by Jn 5:30 and 7:24) and 1 Jn 4:11 (a conflation of Jn 3:16 and 13:34). 1 John thus presents several instances of moral reasoning where John devises new forms of mimetic behaviour from Jesus' teaching and personal example.

In conclusion, moral reasoning is the cognitive ‘engine’ of Johannine ethics in that it informs and enables moral behaviour within the divine family.

Spirit and Community as Relational Enabling

The last aspect of our Johannine ethical model relates to the issue of empowerment for ethical living and consists of a combination of Spirit and community. ⁴⁷

The Spirit as a moral agent. In Johannine ethics, the Spirit is the moral force within the divine family. Most scholars agree that a person's entry into the divine family through the birth of water and Spirit in 3:5 should be interpreted in light of Ezek. 36–37. YHWH promises that he will restore and transform Israel by cleansing her from moral impurity and giving her a new ‘heart’ or ‘spirit’—metaphors for Israel's corporate renewal (36:25-26). YHWH further promises to place his Spirit in Israel's ‘inner being’, that is, at the centre of Israel's life or existence, so that she can relate correctly to him (36:27). Reading on, Ezek. 37:1-14 suggests that this entire process of restoration and transformation is brought about and sustained by YHWH's Spirit. ⁴⁸ In sum, YHWH will transform Israel by his Spirit and his ‘indwelling’ Spirit will be the moral force that guides Israel to live as his renewed covenant people. Against this background, the Johannine birth of water and Spirit is a metaphor for a person's entry into the divine family through the cleansing and renewing work of the Spirit. The concept of the Spirit as a moral agent is found elsewhere in John under the label ‘Spirit of truth’, which is shorthand for the Spirit who mediates the truth in Jesus' teaching (14:17; 15:26; 16:13). Based on this Spirit-provided understanding of the divine reality, believers can know God's character, purpose and values—all of which are vital for living in the divine family. The ‘Spirit of truth’ thus directs the believers’ thinking and behaviour in keeping with the divine reality. In sum, John depicts the Spirit as a moral agent who will facilitate entry into God's family and assist believers in ethical living according to the divine family code.

The Spirit enables moral reasoning. We saw earlier that moral reasoning relates to a person's understanding of Jesus' teaching about the divine reality but that Jesus' teaching is enigmatic and open to misunderstanding. When Jesus refers to his teaching as being ‘veiled’ (παροιμία), and then promises to speak ‘plainly’ (παρρησία) in the future (16:25), he refers to the time of the Spirit. According to 14:26 and 16:12-15, the Spirit will explain everything that Jesus has said so that Jesus' words become plain. John records a few instances where the disciples remember and understand Jesus' teaching after the resurrection (2:17, 22; 12:26; 16:4), most likely as the result of the Spirit's anamnesis (14:26). Indeed, the post-Easter reality is marked by an increased understanding of the divine reality because of the Spirit (1 Jn 2:27; see also the frequent phrase ‘[by this] we/you know that’ in 1 Jn 2:5, 18, 21; 3:5, 14-16, 19, 24; 4:2, 6, 13; 5:2, 15, 18-20). In the post-Easter era, the cognitive darkness that envelops the world and its people (Jn 1:5, 9-11) is dissipating (1 Jn 2:8) because the Spirit functions as a decoder of Jesus' ‘veiled’ teaching, thus enabling moral reasoning. Moral reasoning facilitates ethical living because it informs and shapes both the believers’ thought and behaviour according to the values and norms of the divine family. Taking on a didactic role, the Spirit shapes the overarching moral story of the believing community.

The Spirit enables mimesis. Mimesis is a sensory process where the imitator usually observes the exemplar to discern what to emulate. This raises the question of how Johannine believers in the late first century can be expected to imitate the departed Jesus whom they cannot see. David Capes explains that there was a literary ethos in antiquity that promoted the idea of mimesis. ⁴⁹ In Graeco-Roman and Jewish Hellenistic cultures, the virtuous lives of notable people were upheld as models for imitation, and while living models were preferred, the lives of great men from the past could be ‘observed’ (and imitated) through spoken and written accounts. Capes then shows that the Gospels as ancient biographies of Jesus provided early Christians with a script for imitation. ⁵⁰ Indeed, John's recording of Jesus' life and teaching in his Gospel enables the Johannine text to function as the basis for imitation, where believers, aided by the Spirit, can visualise and ‘observe’ a reconstructed Jesus to imitate.

Spirit, community and mimesis. Volker Rabens has done important work on how relationships empower ethical living. In the context of John's family and friendship ethos, he argues that love expressed and experienced in intimate relationships empowers people for ethical living. ⁵¹ While mimesis did not feature strongly in his model initially, he has recently strengthened his case in interaction with my work and perceives mimesis as one of the ‘connecting mechanisms’ between what he calls ‘initial love’ and ‘responsive love’. ⁵² I concur. Intimate relationships empower believers for ethical living precisely because at their heart the mechanism of mimesis drives various aspects of behaviour and existence. As such, mimesis is central to the life of the community of faith. When Jesus was about to depart from this world, he assured his followers of his ongoing presence with them through the indwelling Spirit (14:16-23). The mediated presence of Jesus in the community of faith provides believers with continued access to his example. Besides, just as various characters in the Johannine narrative exemplify aspects of ethical living, so believers in real life can exemplify the moral life to one another. After all, the most prominent Johannine forms of mimetic behaviour are to love one another and to wash one another's feet. Similarly, the understanding of the divine reality obtained from Jesus' teaching is to be shared among the members of the community for mutual edification. Hence, the mimetic behaviour of members of the believing community serves to edify one another. In other words, the practice of mimesis among believers strengthens the moral fabric of the community of faith.

In sum, ethical empowerment lies in the combination of a relationship with Jesus and the Spirit's didactic functions. The Spirit is depicted as the moral force of the community of faith, shaping its moral vision and directing its actions. The Spirit mediates Jesus' presence to the believing community and in unveiling the ongoing significance of Jesus' teaching, the Spirit provides understanding of appropriate behaviour in the divine family. In the community of faith, believers continue to imitate Jesus' example under the guidance of the Spirit.

Conclusion

This article has outlined a model of Johannine ethics that consists of five aspects. First, Johannine ethics is best understood within the broad moral context of Graeco-Roman eudaimonistic or virtue ethics. Second, the concept of the divine family supplies the main theological context for considering Johannine ethics. In understanding the divine family dynamics, believers will know their status or identity in the divine family and the expected moral norms of behaviour. Third, personal example and imitation regulate the inner workings or mechanics of Johannine ethics. Within the divine family, a chain of imitation (believers imitate Jesus as Jesus imitates the Father) guides ethical living. Instead of a list of dos and don’ts, believers are to ‘observe’ and imitate the example of Jesus in the Johannine text or in the lives of others. Fourth, moral reasoning is the cognitive ‘engine’ of Johannine ethics and is needed for understanding the values, norms and behaviour in the divine family. Besides, the imitation of Jesus is a cognitive, creative practice to which believers must apply moral reasoning to determine what constitutes a proper mimetic act. Fifth, as a moral, relational and cognitive agent, the Spirit informs and enables the ethical life of the believing community.

Our model essentially argues that, within the broad context of Graeco-Roman virtue ethics, Johannine ethics refers to divine family education with mimesis at its heart. Moral reasoning and the Spirit are the cognitive and relational means by which John's mimetic ethics is shaped and lived out in the community of faith. Our model may advance the discourse on Johannine ethics in several ways. Even though Johannine ethics has rapidly become a fruitful area of research, there is no agreement on what goes to the heart of John's ethics. While some scholars have noted the theme of mimesis in John, my contention that mimesis is the primary mechanism for shaping believers’ identity and behaviour will trigger debate. In addition, the notion of moral reasoning as the ‘cognitive engine’ of John's ethics that informs and regulates mimetic behaviour within the believing community will need further discussion.

This study has implications for Christian ethics. In antiquity, the primary concern was a political-ethical one—how to live well as a citizen in the Greek polis or Roman society—and example and imitation were instrumental for civic education. This so-called ‘exemplary ethics’, where a person's character and conduct are shaped by imitating the personal example set by others, is also central to Johannine thought. John's ‘exemplary ethics’ can promote a Christian ethic that is embodied and modelled rather than expressed by precepts or abstract rules. It can contribute to civic education by guiding Christians on how to be good Gospel citizens and by holding together the religious, political and ethical aspects in seeking to live well in society.