Abstract
This article aims to discuss the discursive legitimation strategies used by the Portuguese government to legitimate its political action between 2011 and 2014 in the context of the financial, economic and social crisis and the implementation of a three-year bailout programme and consequent austerity policies. Drawing from Critical Discourse Analysis for discussing discursive legitimation strategies, we selected eight political discourses delivered by the Portuguese Prime Minister and organised his discursive legitimation strategies into four main categories: (1)‘state of exception’, (2) blame allocation, (3) no alternative options and the appeal to emotions and (4) effectiveness. We conclude that, between 2011 and 2014, the Portuguese Prime Minister, through the ‘state of exception’ narrative and blame allocation strategies, sought to impose and legitimate governmental political action as the only viable option to overcome the crisis, as well as to reify the idea that austerity policies were the correct path to ensure a sustainable growth and to build a dynamic, prosperous and fair country.
Keywords
Introduction
The global financial crisis initiated in 2008 had a negative impact on several European countries. The bailouts of Greece and Ireland in 2010 and Portugal in 2011 are key moments in the Eurozone financial crisis that rapidly turned into an economic and social crisis (see Lapavitsas et al., 2012). In Portugal, the socialist government (centre-left) signed, with the agreement of the largest opposition party (Partido Social Democrata (PSD) – centre-right), a 3-year Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality (MoU, 2011) with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Central Bank and European Commission in order to implement, between 2011 and 2014, the so-called structural adjustment in return for financial assistance in the form of a loan of up to € 78bn (MoU, 2011).
In the Portuguese case, the MoU demanded a reduction in the general government deficit in order to reach a budgetary balanced position, and required a broad set of measures focused on the reform and the reduction in public welfare, health and education system costs, as well as on a broad privatisation programme and the flexibilisation of the labour market (MoU, 2011). In fact, austerity policies characterised by a substantial reduction in public spending have emerged as a political priority not only in Portugal, but also in Europe (see Caldas, 2012).
Between 2011 and 2014, there was a significant debate on the effectiveness of austerity policies adopted, to a greater or lesser extent, across Europe. The debate still continues today. Regarding austerity policies, there have been two main opposed narratives: (1) austerity is essential to deal with the high public debts found in several European countries to ensure a sustainable growth, and (2) austerity does not work and has been pushing several European countries into further economic recession or stagnation, particularly the most indebted who will have increasing difficulties in dealing with their obligations (see Blyth, 2013: 51–93; Lapavitsas et al., 2012: 59–125; Piketty, 2014: 540–570).
The Portuguese centre-right coalition government formed in 2011 between the PSD and the Centro Democrático Social–Partido Popular (CDS-PP) believes in the first position described above. Therefore, the fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the MoU (austerity policies) was seen as a key priority by the centre-right coalition. In 2011, the Portuguese Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho (2011a: 12) announced ‘that the fulfilment of the objectives of the Portuguese economic adjustment program’ took ‘precedence over all other objectives’. In addition, just after the victory in the June 2011 elections, the new Portuguese Prime Minister, Pedro Passos Coelho, declared that his government aimed not only to fulfil the MoU but also to go beyond the goals of the agreement, and stated that ‘the government will be more ambitious in carrying out the adjustment process in the economy than the objectives it assumed’ (Reuters, 2011). At the same time, Coelho (2011a) also stated that the government intended to build a ‘more dynamic country’, capable of providing ‘a more prosperous live’, as well as a ‘more fair society’ (p. 15). Clearly, Coelho considers that the fulfilment of the MoU objectives and the imposition of austerity policies are not only an obligation arising from the bailout, but also actually the correct path to ensure a sustainable growth and build a dynamic, prosperous and fair country.
However, the merit of austerity and of its capacity to promote a sustainable growth has been the object of several critiques (see Blyth, 2013: 51–93). Additionally, austerity policies are deeply affected by the ‘time inconsistency’ problem because they impose extraordinary costs in the short term, and the possible benefits (economic growth, job creation, a more prosperous live and a fair society) are uncertain and usually seen only in the medium and long terms (Buti and Carnot, 2013). In fact, the Portuguese structural adjustment programme was characterised by economic recession, the reduction in the population’s disposable income and purchasing power, the rapid rise in unemployment, the growth of bankruptcies and company closures, poverty, the increase in inequality and the growth of emigration flows (see Caldas, 2012). Those consequences are highlighted by the second position described, which refuses austerity and emphasises the dire costs.
Due to the contested relation between austerity and sustainable growth, as well to the existence of a significant lag between incurring the costs of austerity and seeing their possible benefits, political discourses play an essential role in the legitimation of governmental political action (Buti and Carnot, 2013). In the Portuguese case, this was even more important because several key governmental policies have been declared unconstitutional (see Gonçalves and Khalip, 2013).
Theoretically supported in Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), this article aims to study and analyse the discursive strategies employed by the Portuguese Prime Minister to legitimate his governmental political action between 2011 and 2014. We also seek to understand how he discursively articulates and reconciles the two main objectives of governmental action: (1) the fulfilment of the MoU through austerity policies and (2) to build a dynamic, prosperous and fair country.
This article is organised as follows. First, we discuss the relations between legitimacy, legitimation process and political discourses. This is followed by a section where we explain the theoretical foundations of CDA, the methodology adopted and some considerations about the discourses selected and analysed. The following sections are dedicated to discuss the discursive legitimation strategies developed by the Portuguese Prime Minister. Finally, the conclusion explains the main findings of our study and their implications.
Legitimation in political discourse: A framework for analysis
Legitimacy, legitimation and political discourses
Legitimacy has been one of the most important and widely discussed concepts in political studies and is frequently invoked in political debate (Beetham, 1991; Coicaud, 2002). Weber (1947) emphasises that every system of authority ‘attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief in its legitimacy’ (p. 325). Therefore, legitimacy could be defined as ‘the recognition of the right to govern’ (Coicaud, 2002: 10) being a fundamental principle of political authority that justifies political obedience and grounds the exercise of political power (Badie et al., 2011: 1415–1417).
Whereas every social order requires ‘a widespread acknowledgement of the legitimacy of explanations and justifications for how things are and how things are done’ (Fairclough, 2003: 219), legitimacy is particularly relevant in the pluralist democracies, where political power seeks obedience by consent and a crisis of legitimacy may affect the stability of democratic political systems (Lipset, 1959: 86–87). As a result, particularly in democracies, legitimacy is one of the main concerns of policy-makers, which depends not only on the respect for the laws and conventions of the political system but also on the ability to ensure social stability and cohesion (Klein and Marmor, 2001: 983–984). In fact, rather than analysing legitimacy as a static attribute of power, it is perhaps more important to study power relations and their legitimation as an ongoing and interactive process (Beetham, 1991) of ‘competition for social power’ (p. 103) in which legitimacy has to be ‘maintained, competed for, and denied to rivals’ (Alfonso and Escalona, 2004: xi–xii). Consensually, legitimacy is ‘permanently at risk’ (Rojo and Van Dijk, 1997: 524).
Understanding politics as the process ‘by which groups representing divergent interests and values make collective decisions’ (Ferdinand et al., 2009: 2), Hague and Harrop (2004) argued that ‘communication is central to politics’ because it involves the reconciliation of competing and divergent interests and values found in a political community through debate and persuasion (p. 3). In the same vein, Van Dijk (1997) characterises political discourse ‘as a prominent way of doing politics’ because ‘most political actions are largely discursive’ (p. 18). In this regard, Chilton (2004) states that ‘political activity does not exist without the use of language’ (p. 6), which plays a central role in the legitimation process because politics has a ‘linguistic, discursive and communicative dimension’ (p. 4) and the reasons to obey to a certain political power ‘have to be communicated linguistically’ (p. 46). Rojo and Van Dijk (1997) are even more specific in saying that the legitimation of public policies is ‘virtually always discursive’ (p. 527). In fact, according to Van Dijk (2001), political discourse has a central role in the ‘legitimisation of power and domination’ (p. 360) and, as noted by Wilson (2001), one of the central objectives of political discourse analysis is to seek ‘the ways in which language choice is manipulated for specific political effect’ (p. 410).
Concerning legitimation processes, Van Leeuwen (2008) considers that legitimation involves ‘answers to the spoken or unspoken questions: why should we do this? Or why should we do this in this way?’ (p. 105). Answers to those questions demand a focus on the structure of political argumentation which aims fundamentally to ‘convince an audience that a certain course of action is right or a certain point of view is true’ (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012: 18). Therefore, legitimation ‘is public justification, an argumentative process in which an action is justified in terms of reasons which can themselves, in turn, be justified as (worthy of being) collectively accepted or recognized’ (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012: 242).
Analysis, discourses and methodology
Taking into account the nature of the legitimation process and its centrality to political power, several investigations under the CDA approach have devoted their attention to legitimation processes (see Cap, 2010; Chilton, 2004; Fairclough, 2003; Reyes, 2011; Rojo and Van Dijk, 1997; Van Dijk, 1998, 2008; Van Leeuwen, 2008; Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999). This study rests precisely on the theoretical foundations of CDA which tries, under the critical approach to social sciences (see Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012: 78–81), to understand and decode ‘the way discourse (re)produces social domination, that is, the power abuse of one group over others, and how dominated groups may discursively resist such abuse’ (Van Dijk, 2009: 63). As Fairclough and Wodak (1997) point out, CDA views ‘language as a social practice’ (p. 258) and, as Wodak (2001) argues, it ‘takes a particular interest in the relation between language and power’ (p. 2). Particularly, Wodak (2001) states that CDA is ‘fundamentally concerned with analysing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language’, aiming ‘to investigate critically social inequality as it is expressed, signalled, constituted, legitimized and so on by language use (or in discourse)’ (p. 2). In the same vein, Van Dijk (2001) argues that ‘CDA focuses on the ways discourse structures enact, confirm, legitimate, reproduce, or challenge relations of power and dominance in society’ (p. 353).
Speaking specifically about political discourse analysis (see Wilson, 2001), we agree with Van Dijk (1997) that CDA has much to offer to Political Science and that some important political problems can ‘be studied more completely and sometimes more adequately when it is realized that the issues have an important discursive dimension’ (p. 12). This is the case of legitimation processes, which are crucial for the political process and are largely discursively constructed.
In order to achieve our objectives, we selected and studied eight political discourses delivered between 2011 and 2014 by Pedro Passos Coelho, the Portuguese Prime Minister, where he speaks in the name of the Portuguese government and seeks to legitimate the Portuguese government’s collective political action. 1 All political discourses were made at significant times (debates on the state of the nation, on the country’s general budget, on the government programme and also the Prime Minister’s inaugural discourse). In order to make our discourses representative, we have selected three discourses delivered in 2011, two in 2012 and also two in 2013, all delivered under the implementation of the MoU. Additionally, we have selected a discourse delivered in 2014 after the end of the MoU. In this way, and because legitimation is an ongoing discursive practice that regularly involves several interrelated discourses (Van Dijk, 1998: 255), we were able to analyse the legitimation process over the MoU period and immediately after.
A discursive legitimation process is bi-directional: top-down and bottom-up (see Van Dijk, 1998: 257). As Rojo and Van Dijk (1997) point out, there is a dominant group who seeks to ‘legitimate itself through the approval from the dominated’ (p. 528) (top-down). If the process of legitimation is successful, the dominated legitimate the dominant group through agreement, acceptance, compliance or tacit consent (bottom-up) (Rojo and Van Dijk, 1997: 528). Our analysis focuses on the Portuguese government’s discursive strategies of legitimation, which has a top-down orientation. With the exception of the inaugural discourse, all other discourses were delivered in the Portuguese parliament. However, this does not mean that the government’s main objective is to ensure the agreement of the opposition represented in the parliament. On the contrary, considering that the government is supported by a political majority, the main objective is to ensure a wide social acceptance at the level of the Portuguese society. Consequently, embedded in the CDA tradition, our analysis considers the political, social and historical contexts, which go beyond the discourses analysed but are essential to fully understand the legitimation process (see Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 41).
Legitimation processes involve several argumentation techniques communicated linguistically not only to legitimate the speaker’s policies and decisions, but also to delegitimate alternative options. According to Chilton (2004), legitimation strategies include ‘arguments about voters’ wants, general ideological principles, charismatic leadership projection, boasting about performance and positive self-presentation’ (p. 46). To delegitimate opponents, the ‘others […] have to be presented negatively’, and the techniques include the use of ideas of difference and boundaries, and speech acts of blaming, accusing, insulting’ (Chilton, 2004: 46). In fact, the positive self-presentation and the negative other-presentation, the positive evaluation of us/our actions and the negative evaluation of them/their actions, as well as highlighting our good things and their bad things/de-emphasising our bad things and their good things are central strategies in discursive legitimation and delegitimation processes largely developed in CDA that we will explore in our analysis (see Van Dijk, 1993, 1997, 2006a, 2006b, 2009). The discursive strategies of blame allocation (see Angouri and Wodak, 2014; Hood, 2011; Wodak, 2006) appeal to exceptionality (see Agamben, 2005; Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012), appeal to emotions (see Cap, 2010; Chilton, 2004; Reyes, 2011; Stocchetti, 2007; Van Dijk, 2006a), the use of narratives and hypothetical future (see Chilton, 2004; Dunmire, 2007; Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012; Reyes, 2011; Van Dijk, 1997) and effectiveness (see Van Leeuwen, 2008) also play important roles in our analysis.
Based on the literature review on CDA and political legitimacy processes (see earlier), as well as through the deconstruction of the political discourses selected, we have divided the discursive legitimation strategies employed by Coelho into four main categories, namely: (1) ‘state of exception’, (2) blame allocation, (3) no alternative options and the appeal to emotions 2 and (4) effectiveness. In the following section, we will discuss theoretically each of these strategies, applying them to the discourses that we have collected and selected.
The Portuguese government and its discursive strategies of legitimation
‘State of exception’: Facing ‘challenges of a generation’
Following Agamben (2000), the ‘state of exception’ translates a political context of ‘temporary suspension of the rule of law that is revealed instead to constitute the fundamental structure of the legal system itself’ (p. 2).
The discursive strategies through which the ‘state of exception’ is argued in the public sphere acquire a particular relevance because the invocation of states of emergency requires a specific language and terminology: a ‘language’ of exception (Agamben, 2005). To employ a ‘language’ of exception implies to assume an ontological stand on both the nature of the ‘political fact’ of emergency and how such ‘political fact’ should be understood (Agamben, 2005). As a political argument, the ‘state of exception’ is frequently associated with political exception contexts, with demands for the suspension of the legal order and, particularly, with the need to suspend the constitutional order itself (Agamben, 2005). However, the appeal to the ‘state of exception’ in pluralist democracies rarely involves a formal suspension of the law and of the Constitution. Much more important is the appeal to exceptionality made by political elites in order to limit political debate, to minimise the contestation to their political actions and, supported in the argument that exceptional times demand exceptional measures, to impose policies that were politically and socially inacceptable under ‘normal times’ (see Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012: 119–133).
In the context of Coelho’s discursive economy, one of the main legitimation strategies stands out: the ‘state of exception’. The ‘state of exception’ is intensely developed in order to legitimate governmental action when confronted with the negative impacts arising from the MoU implementation. In fact, between 2011 and 2014, Coelho (2012b) accentuated how the country passed through an utterly exceptional and ‘serious crisis without precedent in recent decades’ (pp. 2–3) (Excerpts 1 and 2): Excerpt 1 These are Excerpt 2 The challenges we face are
In Coelho’s words, the Portuguese context should be remembered in terms of the ‘dangers that have threatened our way of life and our welfare state and that could have irreversibly endangered our aspirations as individuals and as a nation’ (Coelho, 2012b: 3). The emotional reification of the narrative on the ‘state of exception’ is used by Coelho (2013b: 2) as a reason that accounts for the ‘painful choices’ that have to be taken. Because Portugal has lost its ‘economic and financial autonomy’ (Coelho, 2012a: 2), those choices were discursively represented as being fraught by the effects of the bailout that severely limited the margin of governmental action. Across the speeches analysed, several words and expressions are used by Coelho to describe and characterise the Portuguese situation that is directly related to the ‘state of exception’ (see Table 1).
The Portuguese ‘state of exception’.
The number following each keyword is the number of instances the word is used across the discourses analysed.
Coelho also builds a narrative on the Portuguese ‘state of exception’ through the use of discursive images, namely, the idea that the adjustment process is a tortuous and long ‘road’ whose effects are crosscutting and afflict the majority of the population (Coelho, 2011a: 11–12), as well as the idea that Portugal will face ‘storms’ throughout the adjustment programme (Coelho, 2011c: 1). Coelho also argues that the Portuguese ‘state of exception’ is so grave that its surpassing can only be accomplished if the government recognises the exceptionality of the moment and acts accordingly ‘without hesitation’ to correct the mistakes of the past (Coelho, 2011a: 14).
Another very interesting ‘narrativized’ analogy (see Van Leeuwen, 2008: 112) employed by Coelho concerns the appeal to the Portuguese maritime history (Excerpt 3). Coelho compares the need to manage the ‘state of exception’ period with the Portuguese maritime enterprise and associates the facing of such financial emergency with the historical act of sailing ‘through seas never before sailed’, something that in the Prime Minister’s perspective has never frightened the Portuguese people (Coelho, 2011c: 5). In fact, the expression ‘through seas never before sailed’ was taken from the epic poem Os Lusíadas (first published in 1572), in which the great Portuguese poet Luis de Camões describes Vasco da Gama’s maritime discoveries in the16th century: Excerpt 3 Given the complexity of the problems we face […] it may appear that we are now ‘through seas never before sailed’. But faithful to our noblest traditions we firmly say that
The employment of such maritime narrative has four main goals. First, it aims to emotionally accentuate the exceptionality of the Portuguese political and economic moment by clearly stating that the government has to cope with unprecedented and radically new challenges and has to deal, from a political perspective, with uncharted territory. Second, there is a clear intent to emotionally mobilise the Portuguese population through an argument based on the historical exceptionality of the Portuguese contemporary moment. Third, there is also the attempt to reify the idea that if the adjustment process imposed by the bailout is followed, then the Portuguese people will ‘arrive at a safe harbour’. Finally, Coelho presents his government as holding the map to deal with the storms, to sail ‘through seas never before sailed’ and to lead the country to a ‘safe harbour’ (positive self-presentation).
The reification of the belief that the country is going through a ‘state of exception’ is discursively associated with the naturalisation of a sense of widespread ‘ontological insecurity’ (see Mitzen, 2006). Between 2011 and 2014, Coelho (2013b: 3) persistently tried to normalise the idea that the international and domestic uncertain political and economic environments constitute a permanent and, therefore, ‘ontological risk’ for Portugal. Consequently, the success of the adjustment process is represented as being permanently endangered and the ‘risk of collapse’ as being always present (Coelho, 2013a: 7, 2013b: 3). Such an observation is intended to deepen the feeling of insecurity and dependence (Coelho, 2011b: 9). Additionally, Coelho (2013a), based on a careful construction of a politics of trauma and memory, presents the Portuguese financial emergency as a trauma whose memory must be preserved because ‘[w]ithout a clear memory of what brought us to the foreign bailout we will not resolve our problems’, and because the ‘[t]he technique of forgetfulness is the recipe for future bigger and perhaps insurmountable difficulties and for new downfalls that would come swiftly’. (pp. 2–3)
We therefore conclude that the narrative on the ‘state of exception’ plays a central role in the discursive legitimation strategies of the Portuguese Prime Minister, since all the speeches delivered under the MoU implementation period start and end with some kind of mention of the critical and exceptional situation that Portugal is experiencing (see Table 2). In fact, the ‘state of exception’ is a central discursive legitimation strategy to construct the foundations for other legitimation strategies, namely, blame allocation and no alternative options.
The critical and exceptional situation that Portugal is living.
Associated with the ‘state of exception’ narrative is the strategy of constructing a public narrative about the crisis as a turning point in the country’s history (see Angouri and Wodak, 2014: 544; Strath and Wodak, 2009: 16). Coelho states that Portugal faces a ‘clarifying moment’ (Coelho, 2012b: 2) and a ‘defining moment’ (Coelho, 2011b: 10) in its history, which demonstrates the ‘exhaustion of the old ways’ (Coelho, 2011c: 1) and represents a ‘great turning point’ for change (Coelho, 2011a: 13). Consequently, the ‘Portuguese people can trust this government to break the vicious cycle of hesitation and slippage in which we live in recent years’ (Coelho, 2011a: 12). Again, as a strategy of positive self-presentation, the exceptional moment that Portugal faces, characterised as a turning point in history, is exploited by Coelho to present himself and his government as the actors who will lead the change ‘desired by the Portuguese people’ (Coelho, 2011c: 2) with a ‘energetic and courageous reformist spirit’ (Coelho, 2011c: 1).
The implementation of the MoU in Portugal was characterised by an important confrontation between the government and the Portuguese constitutional court. In fact, several policies proposed and even adopted by the government in 2012, 2013 and 2014 were refused by the court and declared unconstitutional, namely, the decrease in public servants’ wages, the decrease in retirement pensions, the decrease in sickness and unemployment benefits and the dismissal of civil servants. The evident confrontation between the government and the court was characterised by significant criticism to the court by the right-wing political majority, with some demands for a constitutional reform (see Wise, 2013; The Economist, 2013).
In the discourses addressed, Coelho stressed that the decision of the constitutional court and its constitutional interpretation ‘raises problems that we have to overcome’ (Coelho, 2012b: 5), as well as preventing the budgetary adjustment from progressing healthily (Coelho, 2012a: 6). According to Coelho (2012b: 5), governmental policies refused by the court were the appropriate ones to deal with the Portuguese circumstances, and alternative policies would have negative consequences. However, Coelho states that his government will respect the court decisions and ‘will do everything possible to ensure that these measures are less penalizing for the Portuguese people and [we] will minimize the overall impact on the economy that they may have’ (Coelho, 2012b: 5). Therefore, Coelho clearly considers that the constitutional court decisions are not adequate for the Portuguese ‘state of exception’ and that alternative policies in line with the court demands are worse for the economy and for the Portuguese people. In fact, Coelho does not call explicitly for a suspension of the legal and constitutional order, but only, with great significance, for a more flexible interpretation of the Constitution that considers the exceptionality of the Portuguese moment, allowing the adoption of better solutions (his solutions). However, in the discourses analysed, the employment of the ‘state of exception’ argument in order to limit the political debate, to minimise the contestation to the government’s political actions, as well as to impose policies that were politically and socially inacceptable under ‘normal times’, is evident.
Finally, fairness appears regularly in the discourses associated with the ‘state of exception’ and with the negative impacts caused by the crisis on the Portuguese people. Coelho argues that difficult measures have to be adopted and some sacrifices have to be supported in order to deal with the ‘state of exception’. However, he also stresses that governmental political action promotes a fair and equitable distribution of the sacrifices, protects and helps the most vulnerable in the society and preserves social cohesion (see Table 3). In fact, political discourses regularly seek to incorporate the values of social fairness because they can increase the acceptability of political arguments and also because fairness is a ‘publicly shared value’ (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012: 166).
Legitimation through fairness.
In fact, the Portuguese government cannot ignore the unemployment, poverty and inequality increase over the MoU implementation period, which are indicators permanently invoked by the political opposition to emphasise the idea that austerity policies are not working and to delegitimate governmental action. Consequently, fairness allows the government to defend itself from such accusations, arguing that, even with several negative impacts and within a ‘state of exception’, governmental action has a fundamental social dimension. Moreover, fairness plays a fundamental role in Coelho’s overall discursive legitimation strategy because the ultimate goal of the government is to build a ‘more prosperous, fair, and democratic society’ (Coelho, 2014: 6) that promotes a sustainable and democratic growth and ‘boosts social mobility’ (p. 3). The commitment to build a ‘fair society’ as the main reason for action is present in several discourses and is associated with other positive values to create relevant and positive political images: prosperity, democracy, liberty and dynamism (Coelho, 2011a: 15, 2011b: 8, 2011c: 3, 2012a: 9, 2013b: 3, 2014: 6). However, before becoming a ‘fair society’, Portugal needs to deal with the ‘state of exception’.
Blame allocation: ‘the irresponsibility of the past’
The ‘state of exception’ is discursively associated with blame allocation. According to Wodak (2006), blaming often includes a direct or indirect accusation and consists of two parts: the first is presenting a ‘specific action’ (p. 60) and the second is negatively evaluating this action (see Table 4). Following Hood (2011), blame is ‘the act of attributing something considered to be bad or wrong to some person or entity’ (p. 6) and has two components: (1) ‘something is seen as being worse for some person or group than it could have been if matters had been handled differently’ and (2) ‘that harm was avoidable because it was caused by acts of omission or commission by some identifiable individual or organization or possibly some more abstract institution’.
Blame allocation.
Coelho (2013a: 4) allocates blame very generally to the ‘irresponsibility of the past’ characterised by years of poor financial and economic policies that increased the Portuguese debt to an unsustainable level (Coelho, 2011b: 8). Those policies are presented as the ‘deceiving melody of debt that ends up by converting itself into the scream of a cruel tyrant’ (Coelho, 2011b: 9). According to Coelho, his government ‘is not responsible for unfavourable starting point’ (Coelho, 2011b: 10) and the crisis was avoidable if the country had eluded ‘successive and increasingly serious political mistakes’ (Coelho, 2012a: 2). It is clear that referring to the ‘irresponsibility of the past’ is an implicit way to blame the crisis on the former Socialist Party governments, in power between 2005 and 2011, for their bad actions. Additionally, Coelho (2012a: 5) also stresses that the Portuguese adjustment programme was ‘negotiated by the previous government’ (led by the Socialist Party).
In the blame allocation strategy, it is important to note the desire expressed by Coelho to ‘maintain a constructive dialogue’ (Coelho, 2011b: 9) with the opposition in order to solve the ‘great national problems’ (Coelho, 2011a: 16). Coelho is explicit when challenging the Socialist Party to ‘assume its responsibilities and to participate constructively’ (Coelho, 2012b: 5) in the Portuguese adjustment programme because those who refuse ‘to learn from the mistakes of the past’ are ‘bound to repeat them’ (Coelho, 2013a: 3) and to condemn to ‘ruin all Portuguese generations’ (Coelho, 2014: 3). Again, a strategy of blame allocation targeting particularly the Socialist Party who now has the opportunity to admit its past mistakes and to redeem itself by supporting governmental policies is visible here.
In this context, the presence of negative other-presentation strategy, by implicitly presenting the opposition (mainly the Socialist Party) as irresponsible, becomes clear. The positive self-presentation is also evident in the discourses analysed because the government is presented as not responsible for the crisis and as courageously dealing with problems created by others. All the discourses analysed under the MoU implementation end with a positive self-presentation of governmental action. Facing the ‘irresponsibility of the past’, the Portuguese government responds with reflected action and decision capacity (Coelho, 2011b: 11), responsibility, a sense of reality and compromise (Coelho, 2011a: 16), endeavour, intelligence, courage (Coelho, 2011c: 5), determination, serene consideration and methodical action (Coelho, 2012b: 6), solidarity and responsibility (Coelho, 2012a: 9), realism (Coelho, 2013a: 7) and, finally, responsibility and realism (Coelho, 2013b: 5).
The blame allocation strategy developed by Coelho is part of the government narrative about the causes and nature of the Portuguese crisis, represented as fundamentally domestic and caused by the past poor financial and economic policies. This is very important because the representation of the causes and the nature of the crisis determines the responses to solve it. In fact, the political opposition systematically emphasised that the crisis also has external causes related to the European response to the financial turmoil. In fact, locating the causes and nature of the Portuguese crisis in the domestic arena is also a way for the government to delegitimate the alternative options and to legitimate the austerity policies as the right way forward. In this respect, Coelho (2013a: 3) is explicit by stating that ‘we cannot […] be waiting that Europe […] came to solve the problems for us’. Believing that ‘someone in Europe will do the essential for us’ is, argues Coelho (2013a: 3), a ‘deceptive illusion’ and is also an ‘imaginary’ and ‘failed’ alternative.
No alternative options and the appeal to emotions: ‘political realism’ to ‘save the country from a disaster’
The legitimation process regularly involves the construction of narratives about the past and present circumstances, as well as the setting of future objectives. In some way, politics is about past and future actions (Chilton, 2004: 157), and the policies proposed by decision-makers are presented as a result of a particular interpretation of the past and present circumstances, as well as of the goals to be achieved in the future (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012: 119–122). Typically, in political discourse, the ‘references to the present tend to be negative, and those to the future positive’, simply because the political decisions serve to make ‘life better, or at least prevent (further) deterioration or catastrophe’ (Van Dijk, 1997: 27).
Creating narratives about the past, as explored previously, aims to (1) identify the causes, the circumstances and those responsible for a certain problem that requires the adoption of particular policies proposed by the speaker who is presented as not responsible for the current problems, and (2) setting out the proposed measures and policies as an inevitability in order to deal with the present problems caused by others who are presented as guilty (Reyes, 2011: 793).
Additionally, one of the primary political discourse functions is to ‘project and shape conceptions and visions of the future’ (Dunmire, 2007: 21) in order to ‘get others to share a common view about what is useful–harmful, good–evil, just–unjust’ (Chilton, 2004: 199). The policies proposed by the speaker are presented as the perfect way to find a solution in the foreseeable future to the current problems (legitimation). Denying the policies proposed and to suggest alternative policies are both presented as a repetition of past mistakes which will deepen the current problems (the delegitimation of alternative options) (Reyes, 2011: 793). Therefore, the policies and decisions of the speaker will ‘benefit the country and all citizens, whereas those of the Others will not’ (Van Dijk, 1997: 28), which creates a clear opposition between the right (speaker policies) and the wrong (alternative policies) (Chilton, 2004: 199). In this context, the appeal to emotions such as guilt, fear, insecurity, among others, in order to reinforce the decision-makers’ narratives and to impose their decisions is also common (Cap, 2010: 60–123; Chilton, 2004: 111–118; Reyes, 2011: 788; Stocchetti, 2007: 223–241; Van Dijk, 2006a: 359–383).
The reification of the belief that governmental action is the only viable path and that alternatives are not sustainable is a key pillar of the legitimation strategy employed by the Prime Minister. Coelho (2012b: 6) starts with the idea that, taking into account the complexity of the Portuguese problems, they have to be tackled with ‘political realism’ (Coelho, 2011c: 1) and ‘anticipation capacity’ (Coelho, 2011b: 10), avoiding ‘dreadful simplifications’ (Coelho, 2012b: 6). Accordingly, governmental action should be based on a ‘serene consideration and methodical action’ (Coelho, 2012b: 6) and not on ‘magic, painless and instantaneous solutions’ (Coelho, 2013b: 3), as well as warning that there is no time to lose with non-realistic solutions (Coelho, 2012a: 2) because the future ‘would be incomparably more difficult’ if we refuse ‘an appropriate and timely response in face of the present difficulties’ (Coelho, 2011b: 10). Therefore, because politics is ‘an exercise of responsibility’ (Coelho, 2011b: 10), the government cannot hesitate and cannot allow itself to deviate its course from the bailout troika plan (Coelho, 2011b: 10).
What is extremely interesting is how Coelho constructs the argument that ideology is antithetical to political realism and responsible politics, which means that it is possible, and somehow it is a moral imperative, to exercise politics without being contaminated with ideological bias (Excerpts 4, 5 and 6). Ideology is represented as a path to ‘populism’ and ‘demagogy’ (Coelho, 2013a: 7). Coelho also reifies the belief that his plan of budgetary austerity was based neither on the troika’s imposition nor on behalf of ideological options (Coelho, 2012a: 9), but only on the ‘judicious study of circumstances’ (Coelho, 2011a: 11). Therefore, political realism is heralded as representing a new age of governance that privileges rational, considerate and ideological free action (Coelho, 2011c: 1). In fact, as Van Dijk (1998) points out, legitimate action ‘usually involves the claim that these actions are within the general moral order, and hence not justified only by partisan, self-serving grounds’, and therefore, ‘ideologies may be declared to be “common sense,” or principles that should be followed by all social members’ (p. 258). Taking into consideration the government position that the fulfilment of the MoU and the austerity policy are the correct path to ensure a sustainable growth and to build a dynamic, prosperous and fair country, it seems clear that governmental political action has a profound ideological content. However, Coelho has decided to present his policies as ideological, free and only guided by the ‘common sense’ ideas of responsible and realistic politics. This is a clear strategy, through persuasion and manipulation, to impose his ideology in a subtle way and, therefore, to legitimate governmental political action: Excerpt 4 We will be ambitious, certainly Excerpt 5 Came to an end a certain type of governance […]. The crisis we are experiencing today […] made a resounding call for change. […]. Not certainly an unfounded change. Excerpt 6 [The Portuguese people and government]
Based on ‘political realism’, Coelho emphasises that there is no alternative to governmental political action (Excerpts 7 and 8). The alternatives are classified by Coelho (2011a: 12) as ‘disastrous’ and as leaving the Portuguese to their fate in a turmoil whose consequences no one can predict. Therefore, Coelho (2012a) concludes that ‘no one has the right to sacrifice’ and to expose to ‘unpredictable dangers’ the Portuguese people (pp. 2–3). In addition, Coelho, in order to ‘save the country from a disaster’ (Coelho, 2011a: 12), claims that, contrary to the opposition, the government has assumed a proactive role in face of the crisis (Coelho, 2011b: 11). Facing the possibilities of leaving the eurozone or of a second bailout, Coelho (2012a: 3) states that these alternatives are ‘dangerous’ adventures, being the duty of his ‘responsible’ governmental cabinet to ‘protect’ the country from it because other countries’ experiences confirm that to comply with the troika’s bailout is the only alternative for Portugal: Excerpt 7 We have objectives to fulfil, Excerpt 8 A debate on the state of the nation should also be an opportunity to evaluate the choices that were made and compared with the available alternatives. […] It is very clear that
Additionally, Coelho assumes himself as interpreter of the will, the thought and the aspirations of the majority of the Portuguese (Excerpts 9 and 10). Thus, implicitly, he tries to impose discursively the idea that the majority of the Portuguese people reject alternative options and agree that governmental political action is the only viable and, therefore, legitimate path: Excerpt 9 I think that everyone will agree that Excerpt 10
As a discursive instrument, the reification of the idea that governmental policies are the only viable policy options and the alternatives are not sustainable serves two main goals:
To represent the policies proposed by the opposition as hollow and devoid of practical meaningfulness. The alternative options are ‘imaginary horizons of redemption that sometimes emerge in political debate’ (Coelho, 2013a: 3). Therefore, only governmental action can recover the autonomy of Portugal and the opposition policy ideas are equal to ‘giving up to search for our own solutions for the problems with the false presumption that someone in Europe will do what is necessary for us’ (Coelho, 2013a: 3).
To reify the narrative that ‘reasonable’ and ‘realistic’ proposals for the recovery of the Portuguese economy have to follow pre-determined parameters and to comply with pre-determined goals, which means an attempt to seriously limit political debate to policies that the governmental cabinet considers as ‘fulfilling with merit the solemn duty of representing the Portuguese people’ (Coelho, 2013a: 7).
In the discourses analysed, through the hypothetical future strategy, the effort employed by Coelho to impose the idea that governmental policies will result in future positive outcomes (legitimating governmental political action) and alternative policies will have negative consequences (delegitimating alternative options) is clear. In Tables 5 and 6 we summarise this effort. Related to this effort, the strategy of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation linking governmental action to positive outcomes, values and emotions, in order to create relevant and positive political images, as well as linking alternative options to negative outcomes, values and emotions in order to create a clear negative political image, is very interesting.
Future negative outcomes if governmental political action were/had been/are refused.
Future positive outcomes if the policies and decisions of the government are implemented.
Through the epistemic modality, the future negative consequences if government political actions were/had been/are refused are presented as something that will happen or would happen with a high degree of certainty if governmental actions are or were refused. The epistemic modality in the speeches analysed, which ‘can be seen as the question of what people commit themselves to when they make Statements’ (Fairclough, 2003: 165)’ and ‘asserts what will be at some future moment’ (Dunmire, 2007: 21), is denounced by the use of modal verbs ‘would’, ‘will’ and ‘should’ (see Table 5).
Under the MoU implementation period, in Portugal, there has been a rapid unemployment growth that largely exceeded the projections. Whereas unemployment is a major social concern, it is important to emphasise the absence in the discourses analysed of an explicit reference to the rise in unemployment as a future negative consequence if the government policies had been refused. This absence can be seen as an attempt to de-emphasise and downplay one of the most severe consequences arising from austerity policies. In fact, unemployment growth was systematically invoked by the opposition to delegitimate governmental political action and was also a difficult ‘terrain’ for the government. In the discourses analysed, Coelho (2012b: 5) recognises that ‘unemployment was more severe than initially anticipated’. However, this is not represented as a consequence of governmental action, but as a result of the ‘the financial disruption that we have reached in 2011’ (Coelho, 2013b: 2).
Tables 5 and 6 clearly show the strategy of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation developed by Coelho in order to legitimate governmental political action and to delegitimate alternative options. The strategy creates two opposed ‘worlds’: the positive ‘world’ of governmental political action and the negative ‘world’ of alternative options proposed by the opposition. In this dichotomy, emotions play a central role. The ‘world’ built by governmental political action is a ‘world’ of optimism, confidence, freedom, security, courage, pride, respect, enthusiasm, inclusion, respect and relief (positive emotions) (see Table 6). The ‘world’ resulting from alternative options is a world of insecurity, fear, sadness, frustration, despair, guilt, incapacity and exclusion (negative emotions) (see Table 5). The creation of these two opposed ‘worlds’ is reinforced by Coelho (2011a: 13) through the idea that governmental political action is in line with the ‘great reformist movement’ that is spreading throughout Europe and therefore is legitimated for being on the right side of history (positive self-presentation). Alternative options proposed by the opposition are isolated from this new era and consequently are represented as less legitimate for being located on the wrong side of history (implicit negative other-presentation).
In fact, in the discourses analysed, the positive self-presentation and the negative other-presentation strategies are largely developed by Coelho through the permanent linguistic effort to link his government to positive values (see Table 7). This is particularly important if we confront those values with their antonyms which have a clear negative connotation and constitute an implicit negative other-presentation associated with alternative options (see Table 7). It is significant to note the particular effort developed by Coelho to label governmental political action as guided by responsibility. In fact, Coelho blames the ‘irresponsibility of the past’ as the main cause for the crisis. Consequently, the value of responsibility plays a central role in the legitimation process developed by Coelho, who seeks to impose the narrative that those who oppose the government have no sense of responsibility, are not accountable or reliable, as well as acting in line with the root causes of the crisis. The message is clear: the government is saving ‘the country from a disaster’ and the alternative options would irresponsibly lead the country to a turmoil with severe consequences.
Positive values of governmental action.
The number following each word is the number of instances the word is used across the discourses analysed.
Effectiveness: ‘Consolidate a new era of our country’s life’
In the political process, decision-makers tend to discursively emphasise the merits and the positive outcomes of their actions (positive performance) in order to legitimate their past actions and future proposals. In fact, a manifest failure of government performance (not to achieve objectives) affects its legitimacy negatively (Beetham, 1991: 135–136). Therefore, effectiveness focuses on policy outcomes and seeks to demonstrate that decisions are useful and effective (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 113–114). Furthermore, highlighting the positive outcomes of previous policies gives credibility and legitimates political decision-makers (positive self-representation).
Concerning effectiveness, Coelho, from 2012 onwards, has claimed that his cabinet’s action has accomplished several successes and that, in some cases, the ‘concrete results’ exceeded all the expectations and ‘convinced even the most sceptical’ (Coelho, 2012a: 4–5), which of course clearly seeks to legitimate governmental political action. In Table 8, we summarise this effort.
Positive outcomes of governmental action.
In Coelho’s legitimation strategy, effectiveness is the logic epilogue. In fact, the main objection to governmental action is based on the argument that austerity policies do not work and do not have the capacity to promote a sustainable growth and development. Consequently, to underline governmental action achievements is a key strategy to legitimate them and to delegitimate alternative options. In other words, effectiveness is a powerful tool to show that, contrary to the predictions of the opposition, governmental action is successful, credible and has stood the test of time. Therefore, effectiveness allows Coelho to prove that the fulfilment of the MoU through austerity policies is the correct path to ensure a sustainable growth and to build a dynamic, prosperous and fair country. In fact, comparing the keys messages in Tables 6 and 8, we see a significant correspondence in the topics emphasised, which shows an important internal coherence among the several discourses analysed.
In a speech delivered in 2014 when the Portuguese adjustment programme was completed, Coelho (2014) predominantly used effectiveness as a legitimation strategy, systematically stressing several indicators in order to demonstrate the good performance of governmental political action. Therefore, Coelho (2014) argues that Portugal, after regaining its political autonomy, is now beginning a ‘new era’ (p. 3) in its history. In fact, Coelho builds a clear connection between the ‘new era’ and governmental action and states that ‘[w]e knew what we had to do to recover Portugal. And so we did, often with very difficult choices, but necessary’ (Coelho, 2014). In other words, this ‘new era’ (p. 3) in Portuguese history is only possible due to governmental action (our good action/performance), which demonstrates how Coelho seeks to legitimate governmental political action through the ideas of competence and credibility (positive self-presentation). Additionally, Coelho (2014) states that, despite the successes achieved, the political opposition refused irresponsibly to support the government and ‘preferred to bet everything on the failure of the emergency response to the country situation […]’ (p. 3) (their bad action/performance). It is also clear that Coelho intends to delegitimate alternative options and the opposition’s proposals, presenting them as irresponsible (negative other-presentation).
Conclusion
On a discourse in 2011, the Portuguese Prime Minister compared the need to manage the period of Portuguese financial emergency with the Portuguese maritime enterprise and the facing of such financial emergency with the historical act of sailing ‘through seas never before sailed’ (Coelho, 2011c: 5). Those comparisons demonstrate how the Portuguese government chose to represent the country’s political context as a ‘state of exception’ and to dramatise all political narratives concerning the overcoming of the Portuguese external financial dependency in order to discursively legitimate its political actions. The normalisation of an emotional sense of insecurity and permanent risk is also a consequence of the ‘state of exception’ narrative.
Defining politics as an ‘exercise of responsibility’ (Coelho, 2011b: 10) and stressing that the government had to respond to circumstances that it could not control (‘state of exception’), Coelho (2013a: 4) identifies the ‘irresponsibility of the past’ policies as the main cause of the Portuguese crisis (blame allocation) and presents his government as the actor that will ‘save the country from a disaster’ (Coelho, 2011a: 12) in order to ‘arrive at a safe harbour’ (Coelho, 2011c: 5).
Through the ‘state of exception’ narrative and blame allocation strategy, Coelho attempts to reify a ‘no alternative’ narrative, foreclosing political debate to the priorities and policy beliefs agreed between the centre-right coalition government and the troika of international lenders, seeking to demonstrate that the alternatives to governmental political action will lead the country to a ‘disaster’. Therefore, governmental action, focused on the fulfilment of the MoU and based on austerity policies (reduction in public spending on welfare, health and education systems, a broad privatisation programme and the flexibilisation of the labour market), is presented as the only viable option that will ensure a sustainable growth and build a dynamic, prosperous and fair country. Particularly from 2012 onwards, Coelho extensively stressed the positive outcomes of governmental policies and decisions (effectiveness), seeking to demonstrate that governmental action contributes to build a dynamic, prosperous and fair country as promised and that the idea that austerity policies do not work is unfounded. Effectiveness as a legitimation strategy was particularly developed when the Portuguese adjustment programme was completed (Coelho, 2014), at the time when Coelho presented governmental performance as a clear success story (for a summary of the Portuguese government discursive legitimation strategies, see Tables 9 to 12 and Figure 1).
‘State of exception’ discursive legitimation strategy – main government discursive arguments (summary).
Blame allocation discursive legitimation strategy – main government discursive arguments (summary).
No alternative options and the appeal to emotion discursive legitimation strategies – main governmental discursive arguments (summary).
Effectiveness discursive legitimation strategy – main governmental discursive arguments (summary).
Portuguese government discursive legitimation strategies (summary).
Finally, in the European context, the Portuguese case is very interesting because it is regularly invoked as the case study to prove that, in order to deal with high public debts found in several European countries and with the financial crisis, austerity policies are the correct path to ensure a future sustainable growth. The authors consider that it would be interesting for further studies to discuss the legitimation discursive strategies employed in other European countries also affected in the last four years by a severe financial crisis and by the consequent implementation of harsh austerity policies.
Footnotes
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.