Women’s quotas and their effects: A comparison of Austrian and German trade unions

Abstract

This article discusses the introduction of women’s quotas in the Austrian confederation ÖGB and the German union ver.di, drawing on interviews with union officials, documentary analysis and statistical data. In both cases, quotas increased women’s representation as lay delegates and full-time officials, and also affected union identity and image, equality bargaining and political activity. Overall, women’s quotas in unions had a positive effect both on women’s representation and on organizational outcomes, indicating that more generally, changes in union governance can contribute to revitalization.

Keywords

Austria Germany gender equality gender in organizations trade unions union governance union structure women’s representation women’s quotas

Introduction

Many trade unions have adopted quotas prescribing women’s representation in decision-making bodies. Women’s quotas are regulations that prescribe a certain (minimum) level of representation of women in decision-making bodies (such as committees and conferences) or types of position (such as regional secretary or department head). They may either prescribe a minimum percentage of members of decision-making bodies or position-holders who must be women, or specify that women must be represented according to their share in the constituency or membership. Quotas may be mandatory or voluntary, and may apply to all decision-making bodies and types of positions or only to some. In unions, quota rules usually apply to elected lay representatives, but they may also apply to elected or appointed full-time officials.

Not only do quotas increase women’s representation, they may affect subordinate levels of the organization. Within a confederation they may lead to similar quotas in the affiliates; within a single union, lower levels may have to implement a quota. The inclusion of more women in decision-making structures of a union can also lead to a change in its identity and public image as a more gender-balanced organization. In consequence, as a further outcome, women non-members could perceive the union in a new way and decide to join. Several studies confirm that the gendered image of the union plays a role in membership recruitment. For example, Bronfenbrenner (2005) argues that campaigns to organize women are more likely to be successful if women have a voice in union decision-making, and Kirton (2005) states that the propensity to join unions is influenced by gendered experiences, requiring unions to acknowledge gender differences when seeking to attract members. In this way, women’s quotas can increase membership among women. Finally, we could expect that more women in decision-making bodies would facilitate strategies of particular interest to women, particularly in collective bargaining and policy making. As Heery (2006) notes, studies have suggested that the participation of women in collective bargaining affects the bargaining agenda and is important for gender equality. Dickens (2000) also reports such evidence, yet stresses that the presence of women is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a gendered agenda. Other studies come to the same conclusion (Colgan and Ledwith, 2002a; McBride, 2001). An increased pursuit of issues in the interest of women in collective bargaining and policy-making brought about by the quota could be another cause for more women to join the union.

Changes to structures and governance systems that allow unions to represent an increasingly heterogeneous membership can be key factors for revitalization (Behrens et al., 2004). Given the widespread decline in union membership, union revitalization depends on attracting underrepresented groups of workers, especially women, so that unions’ membership structure more accurately reflects the increasingly diverse workforce (Colgan and Ledwith, 2002a; Foley and Baker, 2009; Kirton and Healy, 1999). This is a difficult task as long as there is a gender democratic deficit in unions (Colgan and Ledwith, 2002b), and women remain excluded from union leadership (Kirton and Healy, 2012).

As Healy and Kirton (2000) point out, quotas formally confer positional power resources to women, but this may not influence the mainstream union. There are other power resources (such as symbolic power) by which a gendered oligarchy may continue to constrain women. Similarly, Cockburn (1989) argues that women’s quotas may only modestly affect equal opportunities: while securing access to positions for women as a group, they do not necessarily alter the rules and culture of organizations.

In this article we analyse women’s quotas and their impact on both equal representation and organizational outcomes. We present two case studies of the introduction of quotas, in the Austrian confederation ÖGB (Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund) in 2007 and in the German union ver.di (Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft) in 2001. In the next section we outline our methods and present our cases. We then examine the introduction of quotas and their effects on women’s representation in the central decision-making bodies and at subordinate levels of organization, on union identity and image, the pursuit of women’s interests in collective bargaining and policy-making, and on female membership levels. A final section discusses our findings.

Cases and methods

The ÖGB introduced quotas prescribing proportional representation of women in union decision-making structures in 2007, as did ver.di in 2001. Using these cases for cross-national comparison allows us to develop explanations that are not bound to a specific national context and identify practices that unions can use elsewhere (Hyman, 2001). The comparison also allows us to clarify whether our findings are replicated across both cases and thereby strengthens the base for theoretical development (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).

The ÖGB has seven affiliates and comprises virtually the entire Austrian trade union membership. Since the 1980s there has been a more or less constant decline in membership. In 2011 there were 1.2 million members of whom 35 percent were women. Ver.di was formed by a merger of five unions in 2001 and represents workers in the public and private services. With nearly 2.1 million members it makes up around 35 percent of all members in the DGB. Overall, roughly half the ver.di membership is female, which is high compared to other German unions but below the proportion working in its sphere of recruitment.

The two cases are similar in a range of background conditions. This allows us to focus on the introduction of women’s quotas and their effects rather than discussing the impact of different institutional environments. First, the industrial relations systems and the roles of unions are similar in both countries. Second, union membership and density are falling in both countries, and third, the proportion of women among all union members is low compared to many other developed economies (Carley, 2009). In 2008, female union density in Austria was 20.6 percent, as against 36.6 for men; in Germany the figures were 12.9 and 24.7 percent (Visser, 2010).

The cases differ in terms of level of analysis: we compare the Austrian confederation with an individual German union. There are some limitations to the comparison of a confederation and an individual union: effects on affiliates cannot be analysed in the case of an individual union, while a confederation’s quota may have less encompassing effects in an individual union. However, our approach takes the different structure of the national union movements into account. Austrian unions are subunits of the ÖGB and are less independent than their German counterparts; many functions carried out by individual unions in Germany, including control over finances, employees and collective bargaining, are in the ÖGB domain. In addition, the national union movements vary greatly in size: the entire ÖGB is roughly half as large as either of the two largest German unions; we therefore focus on two organizations are not too disparate to provide a meaningful comparison. Finally, the introduction of the women’s quota in ver.di took place in the course of the merger and thus required the coordination of several organizations, as was the case in the ÖGB.

We draw on semi-structured interviews with union officials, selected for their knowledge of the introduction and operation of the women’s quotas in their organizations. In Austria the interviews were conducted between February 2010 and June 2011 and involved five officials, four of them women, all involved in the ÖGB reform process in the course of which the quota was adopted. Two were leading officials: the head of the ÖGB women’s department and the head of the women’s department of the manufacturing union PRO-GE. All except the latter were employed in the ÖGB central office. Supplementary information was drawn from five interviews which were conducted in 2003 and 2004 in the course of a study on women in trade unions. In Germany, 12 interviews were conducted between December 2005 and January 2010 with union leaders (nine of them women) in charge of gender policy, collective bargaining strategy, membership development and human resources within the organization, as well as a regional leader. All were paid officials.

The interviews were recorded and transcribed; where cited in this article the translation is ours. We also examined union reports, policy documents and data on numbers of female union leaders, officials, activists and members over time. We analysed our data by searching for underlying themes and categories that were both empirically grounded and informed by the research objectives; in doing so, we were able to explore the processes underlying the introduction of the women’s quotas and their effects.

The introduction of the women’s quotas

In both countries, women were seriously underrepresented in union decision-making bodies at all levels throughout the 20th century (Blaschke, 2003, 2008). However, women’s departments and committees strove to increase women’s representation; and from the 1980s, many were able to achieve majority approval for the introduction of voluntary quotas. Although women’s participation in central bodies and important positions began to improve, experience showed that voluntary quotas did not lead to proportional representation in either country. During the 1990s, women were able to achieve majorities for mandatory quotas in several unions, for example in the largest ÖGB affiliate GPA (Gewerkschaft der Privatangestellten) and in four of the predecessor unions of ver.di.

The ÖGB

Initially, there was no consensus on the issue of mandatory quotas in the ÖGB women’s department, which consists of representatives of the women’s departments of the affiliates. Many women active in the department did not consider quotas useful; but attitudes changed with time. The head of the department explained:

It was necessary to move from the initial attitude, ‘we can achieve everything without this stigma of being a “quota woman”’ to ‘yes, theoretically we can achieve everything, but in reality we are stopped again and again’. . . Then the GPA started to debate that internally, they were the pioneers for all the others. And in the Women’s Federal Board where I have been a member all these years. . . we finally agreed, we said ‘it cannot go on like this, we have relied on the belief that we are allowed to participate for too long’.

Not until 2005–2006 did the department propose the quota rule in the ÖGB reform process that took place in 2006.

This reform process was the consequence of a major financial scandal concerning the ÖGB bank, BAWAG (Bank für Arbeit und Wirtschaft AG): speculative transactions had resulted in massive losses which threatened insolvency. In 2000, leading ÖGB officials secretly assumed liability for the losses by using the union’s strike fund and other assets as collateral. Information on the issue became public in autumn 2005, and the full extent of the scandal was revealed in early 2006. The scandal led to a loss of members, resources and reputation, and in response the ÖGB launched a major reform which was prepared by six working groups. The women’s quota was mainly discussed in the working group Neue Glaubwürdigkeit (new credibility), intended to develop measures to (re)gain trust and credibility among members and non-members. The fact that women were underrepresented in the decision-making structure and especially in visible peak positions was regarded as one reason for the ÖGB’s low credibility. This argument was not only put forward by the representative of the women’s department and other members of the working group, but also confirmed by the results of group discussions with union members, who criticized the lack of women and young persons among union representatives. A female ÖGB federal official noted: ‘I think that [the quota] was the first thing of which it was clear that it will be done. And also in the press conferences, which took place in the course of the reform process, there it was the result. And in reality it is the result of the whole reform process. There are a few other, minor things, but there is not much more.’ And another female interviewee, a member of the working group, said: ‘it was like a ripe apple falling from the tree’.

The quota was adopted at the 2007 congress and incorporated into the ÖGB rulebook. It applies to all decision-making bodies, which consist mainly of lay officials delegated by the affiliates, and specifies that women must be represented at least according to their share in the membership. One of the three top positions (the president and the two vice-presidents) must also be filled by a woman.

Ver.di

The establishment of ver.di in 2001 was a key opportunity to guarantee proportional representation for women. Those involved in women’s policy in the five founding unions linked up during the merger negotiations, according to a senior official. They established informal connections as well as formal working and decision-making structures. Given their experience with the introduction of quotas in their unions, it was clear to them that proportional representation in ver.di would only be assured through a mandatory quota. International precedent, for example, rules on women’s representation in UNISON in the UK, did not play a role.

In the pre-merger phase, women’s policy officers and committees in the founding unions were prepared to make their endorsement of the merger conditional on the establishment of a mandatory women’s quota in ver.di. However, the proposal proved uncontentious. The executive council of one of the unions even included the quota in the merger negotiations of its own accord. An official for women’s policy explained why: ‘[they] knew that the demand for a women’s quota would come from the women’s committees anyway, as a knock-out criterion for the merger negotiations. They knew they couldn’t escape it.’ Both union leaders and women’s groups in the founding unions were convinced that a new union could not neglect the issue of gender equality, as another official for women’s policy elaborated:

The goal [of gender equality] was uncontentious. . . One reason was the view that we cannot fall behind the standards of this day and age when founding a new union, we don’t want that and we see it as unacceptable. There is a difference between a union rulebook that is 20, 30 or 60 years old and does not specifically deal with [gender equality] and writing a rulebook in 2001 in the public eye.

Besides the views that promoting gender equality was just and fair, and that it was something the public expected, leaders of the founding unions anticipated that the promotion of gender equality would allow women to identify more strongly with the union and that this would ultimately boost female membership. As the same official explained: ‘We have come to realise that nowadays we have to portray an image with which women can identify if we want them to join us. And then that has to be nominated as a key task, and then equality must be set down in the rulebook.’ Finally, the fact that women had already achieved quotas in several founding unions meant that the absence of one in ver.di would have been a step backwards for female members of those unions.

The core of the equality strategy is the mandatory quota for lay delegates. The ver.di rulebook prescribes the representation of women in all decision-making bodies and committees and in all delegate elections at least according to their proportion in the membership (or the section of the membership that a specific body represents). Further measures are women’s structures (committees and conferences) at all levels and in all departments of the union.

In both cases, there was some dissent and resistance. In several ÖGB affiliates, especially those with a predominantly male membership, there were objections to a measure that would interfere with their authority over selecting their delegates. But this did not develop into public or substantial resistance for two reasons: first, the ÖGB president supported women’s quotas; second, it was clear to the opponents that resistance would not be acceptable at that time. Despite widespread support for the women’s quota in ver.di, dissent and resistance also surfaced. For example, there were motions to remove the quota at the 2007 national congress, and in the run-up to the 2007 union elections it was suggested that a stringent application of the women’s quota was not legally tenable. An expert report was commissioned, which rejected this view.

The effects of the women’s quotas

Those interviewed in the ÖGB consider that the implementation of the quota works relatively well. At first there were some difficulties with affiliates that said they had no suitable women to delegate. As union women’s departments usually can name such women, the ÖGB women’s department successfully pursued enforcement of the quota rule and the following clause was added to the rulebook in 2009: ‘if the women’s quota is not fulfilled by an affiliate then its women’s department decides who will fill the seats, otherwise these seats will remain vacant’.

In ver.di, enforcing the quota among full-time union officials was particularly challenging. In 2007, when the women’s quota became mandatory, two further major organizational changes took place. In the 2001 merger agreement, decisions about the size of committees had been based on the need to represent members from all founding unions, but this turned out to be cumbersome and impractical, so numbers were reduced. Second, mergers were planned among union regions that were small or not financially viable. These simultaneous changes meant that the number of leadership positions was significantly reduced, and proportional representation meant that at least half the remaining positions would be held by women. Hence a number of men in leadership positions could not retain these, and the hopes of others who felt next in line for such positions were dashed.

Effects on lay delegate structures and full-time official positions

Previously, women were underrepresented in the lay delegate structures in the ÖGB and the founding unions of ver.di but the implementation of quotas assured their proportional representation, as Table 1 indicates.

Table 1.

Women’s representation in committees and conferences (%).

ÖGB	2005	2011
Membership	33	35
Präsidium^a (2005)/Vorstand^b (2011)	22	38
Bundesvorstand^c	23	37
Congress	21 (2007)	35
ver.di	1999	2001–2011
Membership	between 33 and 66^d,f	49–51
Gewerkschaftsrat^e		> 50
National congresses		> 50
Collective bargaining committees		57 (2003)

Executive Council, abolished in 2007.

Executive Board, founded in 2007.

Federal Board; its size was increased as part of the reforms.

IG Medien 32.5%, DPG (Deutsche Postgewerkschaft) 43%, ÖTV (Gewerkschaft Öffentliche Dienste, Transport und Verkehr) 46.1%, DAG (Deutsche Angestellten-Gewerkschaft) 55.6%, HBV (Gewerkschaft Handel, Banken und Versicherungen) 66.4%.

Union Council, the highest decision-making committee between congresses.

Quotas required proportional representation in ÖTV, DPG and IG Medien. In DAG, women and men were each entitled to a quota of 40 percent of seats. There was no quota in HBV.

Sources: ÖGB; Schambach-Hardtke, 2005; Tondorf et al., 2004; ver.di congress documents; founding unions’ merger report, 2000.

The ÖGB quota applies only to decision-making bodies, which consist mainly of lay representatives. A quota for paid officials was never discussed, at least not in broader circles. But since the early 1990s several measures have been taken to increase the number of female officials: the nomination by the women’s departments of specific women for vacancies, the qualification of female administrative staff for union official roles and regulations on equal opportunities. In consequence, by 2001 the percentage of women among officials (including leading officials) in the central office reached their share among members (Pircher et al., 2003). At regional level in the ÖGB and its affiliates unions, the share of women has also risen, but they remained underrepresented in the first years of the century (Blaschke, 2008; Pircher et al., 2003). Efforts to increase the number of women officials in the affiliates continued, and an additional measure was introduced around 2004: a new training scheme which is more compatible with family obligations. On average the proportion of women officials in the affiliates has increased, though recent data on the sex composition of officials in the affiliates and the regions are not available. The aim of increasing the share of women officials now seems to have vanished from the agenda (it was neither mentioned by the interviewees nor does it show up in the reports of the women’s department); it has to remain open whether this is due to (almost) proportional representation or to other reasons.

In ver.di, the quota did apply to paid officials in elected positions, in contrast to the ÖGB (where paid officials in elected positions are not defined as a separate group). However, the quota only became mandatory for this group in 2007. In line with past experiences in other unions, voluntary regulation did not result in proportional representation. For officials in appointed positions, there was initially no quota at all.

Despite rules stipulating that the National Executive Committee must take measures such as staff development programmes to increase the number of female officials, initially not much happened, according to senior officials from the HR and women’s policy departments. They explained that women were discouraged from applying for elected positions until the quota became mandatory, alluding to underlying power structures in the organization. For example, a female official from the HR department stated:

Women often don’t apply for these political posts because they work in an environment that. . . doesn’t facilitate success. You can’t just apply for a political post. . . you need support. And only then is it worth it to say ‘yes, I am prepared to perform this role’. Men and women can fall into disrepute if it becomes known that they were interested in a position and got zero support. It means that if I apply for a position as a district leader and don’t get it, I can forget my further career in ver.di.

They argued that it was leadership on this issue by delegates in various committees – in which women were represented proportionally! – and eventually by the National Executive that finally generated change, and in 2004 it was decided that the mandatory women’s quota would be extended to full-time union officials in appointed positions.

However, even after the quota was introduced, it was some time before steps were taken to ensure that it could actually be met. In 2006, a male regional leader complained:

We introduced the women’s quota but we failed systematically to support female candidates. There is no staff development programme, no strategy for the promotion of women. A few attempts are scattered like islands in the ocean. We are not systematically working towards the necessity of filling positions with women, and we will run into difficulties.

As the rulebook clearly stipulated that the quota for full-time officials, now referring to both elected and appointed positions, must be met by the 2007 national congress, changes were eventually made. They included giving women preferential treatment in selection for official roles, training female administrative staff and qualifying them for official roles and implementing a mentoring programme to prepare female officials for leadership tasks. By 2011, the quota had been met among full-time officials in elected positions, and good progress had been made among the appointed leadership positions, where women held 40 percent. However, women made up only around 35 percent of all officials, showing that their presence in mid-level positions is quite low and that overall their proportion among union officials has not significantly increased for a number of years. An official from the women’s policy department explained that many of the women currently working for ver.di who are interested in and suitable for leadership positions have now been promoted, and correspondingly the number of women in the middle levels of the organization has decreased. An official from the HR department concurred that the challenge now is to recruit women into the trainee programme in order to have enough women available for leadership positions in the future.

Effects on subordinate levels of organization

The decision to introduce quotas was made centrally in both cases, but given their distinct organizational structures, the effects on subordinate levels of organization differ. The ÖGB women’s quota applies only to its own bodies, not to those of the affiliates, which remain free to fill positions in their delegate structures as they please. However, after ÖGB adopted the quota, the women’s departments of several affiliates pursued a mandatory women’s quota for their own organizations. So far, four of the seven unions have introduced these. An initial effect, therefore, has been the introduction of further quotas.

While ver.di as an individual union does not have affiliates, the quota did have to be implemented in the delegate structures and full-time official positions at regional and local levels. Although data on this are not collected centrally, interviewees were sure that all organizational units comply with the women’s quota.

Effects on union identity and image

The financial scandal in 2006 had damaged the reputation of the ÖGB and weakened citizens’ trust in trade unions. In the following years its reputation recovered, and in 2010 trust in trade unions was about as strong as before the scandal (SWS, 2007, 2011). The women’s quota may have contributed to this recovery: it was an important signal to members and the public. The majority of those interviewed (all female) thought that this improved the ÖGB’s credibility and its public image.

The head of the women’s department of one affiliate said:

I think that the quota has improved the external image of the ÖGB. And I think it is important that we have a female vice-president and. . . that the female vice president often acts in the public sphere. I think that this appeals to women differently than a male-only domain. . . . I notice that it is better when the ÖGB has a more women-friendly image.

A female ÖGB official at federal level was somewhat less enthusiastic: ‘to say, “we have given ourselves a gender quota as a basic principle”, I think that was very important and has done something. Although I think that there also have been disappointments. But I think that nonetheless it was perceived as a positive signal.’ The one male official interviewed was reluctant to give an assessment, but doubted a positive effect.

The women’s quota and the aim to become a gender-democratic organization was an important issue in ÖGB communications during and after the reform. However, these topics are no longer mentioned in press releases. Nor do the ÖGB mission statement and other publicity materials refer to the women’s quota or the proportional representation of women in decision-making structures, nor are these attributes of the ÖGB an argument in membership recruitment materials. However, policies in the interest of women are part of the ÖGB’s self-presentation, as we indicate below.

The public image of unions as men’s organizations is enduring in Germany: they are still seen as organizations that primarily represent skilled male workers. Even where this is no longer true, this image persists and unions do not publicly position themselves as organizations that represent women’s interests. Nevertheless, interviewees in ver.di thought that its gender equality policies have the potential to transform its public image into that of a modern organization that represents a heterogeneous workforce, in turn facilitating recruitment. But a male official from the gender policy department pointed out that this image transformation is limited:

Gender is not part of an overarching organizational strategy and it is not at the centre of the communication work which is run professionally [at the headquarters]. Generally there is no emphasis on gender, and accordingly, any change in image is restricted to the circle of people we can reach with our own work [in the women’s and gender policy departments].

Within ver.di, the increased presence of women in elected and appointed positions and the inclusion of gender aspects in leadership training have certainly influenced organizational identity. However, this has not created complete gender equality: union employees still perceive a masculine culture. Several high-ranking female officials shared this view. One commented: ‘union culture is still male dominated. . . it is a political organization, it’s about power, and men know the game well. They have the power to define the rules of the game.’ Another added: ‘I still say, despite everything this is still a men’s organization in some form. Substantial men’s structures still exist.’

Impact on equality bargaining

How far has better representation of women in union decision-making structures, as required by the quotas, contributed to an increase in equality bargaining? The concept of equality bargaining includes negotiating provisions in collective agreements that are of particular benefit to women (‘special measures’), considering the gendered effects of bargaining items such as pay (‘gender proofing’), and addressing gender disadvantage in the negotiation of change (such as when a new grading structure is introduced) (Colling and Dickens, 1998: 390).

In the ÖGB there are no women’s quotas for the negotiating and bargaining committees in the affiliates, but a higher share of women in various union bodies may have influenced the composition and policies of the committees. Several efforts to advance women’s interests have been made in the area of collective bargaining since 2007; an important instrument in this process is the ÖGB guideline for union negotiators on how to pursue gender equality. Recent achievements in collective bargaining include higher increases for low-wage earners, who are often women, as well as the provision that time spent on maternity leave partly counts for pay increments based on years of service. These efforts are the continuation and reinforcement of a process which started several years earlier, and thus cannot be wholly attributed to the women’s quota. Whether the recent increase in the promotion of women’s interests in bargaining is an effect of the higher proportion of women in decision-making structures remains an open question.

More women may join unions if their efforts in pursuing women’s interests in collective bargaining are highlighted in membership recruitment. In the ÖGB, pursuit of issues in the interest of women constitutes an important element of its self-presentation and the mission statement contains equal opportunities and equal treatment as objectives. The limited amount of material for the recruitment of (female) members presents the ÖGB’s achievements in promoting issues in the interest of women as an argument for joining.

In ver.di, work–life balance and ways of combining work and family responsibilities are new bargaining themes, and their inclusion is of particular benefit to women. Ver.di has also strengthened its efforts to gender-proof its collective agreements: its bargaining policy department examines collective agreements for discriminatory clauses, and provides information and training to bargainers on how to avoid them. In particular, it has addressed discrimination against part-time workers (who are mainly women). When major changes to collective agreements are planned, gender equality is included in the proposals. A prominent example is the new pay structure for the public sector, which was under negotiation for several years; a key demand was the elimination of gender discrimination, for instance through amending job evaluation and classification systems to include social competences such as cooperation, empathy and communication, which are often features of feminized occupations.

Overall, there have been improvements in equality bargaining in recent years. Are these attributable to the women’s quota? A senior woman officer from the collective bargaining department provided a nuanced view. On the one hand, ‘it is not the case that pay policy is going to improve per se when women are on bargaining committees, because people – men or women – need certain basic knowledge about pay inequity’. But on the other:

The fact that we have quotas in the bargaining committees and committed women in those committees. . . who always make [gender equality] a subject of discussion, means that it can’t be pushed off the table again. It needs to be triggered again and again. . . and then it’s not so easy to ignore it. . . I think that without the quota, we wouldn’t be where we are today.

Her first comment confirms the findings by Heery (2006) in the UK, indicating a link between negotiators’ exposure to influence from specialist equality officers and committees and their involvement in bargaining on equal pay. It shows that the gender of the negotiators does not in itself generate change, but their behaviour does. Nevertheless, the second comment highlights that women were more active than men in pushing for equality bargaining, and therefore their presence on committees led to change. The same official emphasised that sustained commitment to gender equality is paramount: ‘we just need people who take on themes [and don’t] become discouraged because it doesn’t work the first time, or the second time. . . . And we need lots of people at different spots who work differently and bring these themes to the fore. Men and women. Because otherwise there will be no change.’ This calls attention to the divergence between formal statements and resolutions calling for gender equality, and the unremitting process of putting equality into practice.

We found that these efforts in equality bargaining were not well linked to membership recruitment. One female official noted:

I don’t think it is really perceptible that ver.di is doing so much equality bargaining. Sure, we always talk about non-discriminatory collective agreements, the evaluation of men’s and women’s work and so on. But it’s a difficult subject area and even women sometimes don’t understand it. They don’t even understand that they are being paid less and that their work is undervalued. And we don’t publicize it properly either, as in ‘here, this is explicitly equality bargaining. . . so that’s why you women should join, because we have recognized this and we’re working whole-heartedly on this because 50 percent of our members are women so it’s a key theme for us’. No, I haven’t heard that being said.

Impact on political activity

A key aspect of union activity is to initiate, support or oppose new legislative measures. Unions are especially concerned with issues that affect the welfare of their members, such as pensions, unemployment benefits, working time, health and safety and minimum wages (Hamann and Kelly, 2004). We discuss whether the proportional representation of women, an effect of the quotas, is associated with the promotion of political objectives and concern with legislative measures that particularly affect the welfare of female members.

The ÖGB influences legislation through peak-level social partnership, especially in the area of labour law and social security. Since 2007, the ÖGB has successfully promoted several statutory changes which are in the interest of women, such as improvements in overtime pay supplements for part-timers, unemployment insurance for freelancers (among whom women are overrepresented), more flexible child-care benefits, wage transparency in large firms and a women’s quota on the supervisory boards of state-owned firms. As in the area of collective bargaining, however, the pursuit of women’s interests by influencing legislation continues a process which started a number of years ago, and it is debatable how far it is an effect of the higher proportion of women in decision-making structures.

One of most prominent German political campaigns in recent years is for a statutory minimum wage. This was initiated by ver.di and the hospitality union NGG in 2006 and placed the issue of working conditions in the low-wage sector firmly on the political agenda (Bispinck and Schäfer, 2006). The campaign was soon supported by all DGB unions, successfully politicizing the issue of low-wage work; and the introduction of a statutory minimum wage was part of the agreement establishing the coalition government in December 2013. Around 70 percent of low-paid employees are women (Kalina and Weinkopf, 2008), so a statutory minimum wage would particularly benefit women. However, it cannot be said that ver.di’s initiative followed a changed political agenda that reflected the interests of the many women in the union’s decision-making bodies. Rather, the campaign was a response to union bargaining weakness in the service sector and an attempt to raise wages by shifting the conflict into the political sphere. The campaign materials mention that a statutory minimum wage will improve gender equality, but the main message is that low-wage workers are poor despite being in work. Ver.di has also engaged in lobbying for tax reforms and child-care facilities that would alleviate women’s disadvantage at work, but these initiatives are on a smaller scale.

Impact on membership

In both countries, as indicated above, union density among women is lower than for men. But has increased representation of women in the decision-making structures of the ÖGB and ver.di contributed to increased membership among women?

In Austria, all or most of the gender gap in density can be attributed to two factors. First, women more often work in industries, occupations and establishments where overall density is low; second, women more often belong to employee groups with lower density, such as ‘atypical’ employees and younger persons. The proportion of women among union members usually increased to a lesser extent than the share of women in the labour force between the 1980s and the early 2000s; but during 2007 (the year the quota was adopted) there was a significant increase, with an overall growth in female membership, while the number of male members declined by more than 3 percent. The trends are shown in Table 2.

Table 2.

Membership trends, ÖGB, selected years 1990–2011.

	Members	Female	Female %	Annual % change in female %	Annual % change in female % of employment
1990	1,644,841	512,253	31.1
1995	1,583,356	501,635	31.7	0.34^a	0.77^a
2000	1,442,393	465,191	32.3	0.36^a	0.54^a
2005	1,335,421	441,135	33.0	0.48^a	1.05^a
2006	1,272,011	422,950	33.3	0.66	0.04
2007	1,247,795	425,076	34.1	2.45	−0.46
2008	1,238 590	420,948	34.0	−0.24	1.33
2009	1,222,190	420,055	34.5	1.13	1.74
2010	1,211,111	419,592	34.6	0.80	−0.03
2011	1,205,878	419,018	34.7	0.30	−0.22

Notes: ^aannual average 1990–1995, 1995–2000 and 2000–2005.

Sources: ÖGB, Statistik Austria, own calculations.

As mentioned above, there had been a constant decline in total ÖGB membership since the 1980s. In the year of the scandal, this was three times larger than in the years before. After the reform the decline was not reversed or even stopped, but it slowed down. Since 2006 the decline in membership has been mainly a decline in male membership; in most years, female membership fell to a much lesser extent, or even increased.

Whether, and how far, the introduction of the women’s quota contributed to the rise in the share of female ÖGB members in 2007, to the gender-specific development after 2007, or to the slowing down of membership decline cannot be determined on the basis of our empirical material. The gender-specific development of membership decline suggests that the union has become more attractive for women (compared to men), and the quota and its effects could be one reason for this increased attractiveness.

Ver.di has experienced membership decline since its establishment in 2001, particularly in the initial years. In this process, the absolute number of female members has dropped as well, though less rapidly, as Table 3 indicates. On the positive side, the proportion of women is increasing despite membership decline, and now the majority of ver.di members are women. However, an overall loss of more than 335,000 women members and a rather modest increase in the proportion of women members (1.3% in 11 years) bear little relation to the far-reaching organizational reforms that have taken place to improve gender equality.

Table 3.

Membership trends in ver.di, 2001–2011.

	Members	Female	Female %
2001	2,806,496	1,385,697	49.4
2005	2,359,392	1,172,140	49.7
2006	2,274,731	1,132,963	49.8
2007	2,205,145	1,100,057	49.9
2008	2,180,229	1,089,529	50.0
2009	2,138,200	1,077,285	50.4
2010	2,094,455	1,058,554	50.5
2011	2,070,990	1,050,408	50.7

Source: DGB (2012).

While the proportion of female members in ver.di is exceptionally high compared to most other German unions, women remain underrepresented, as the proportion of women in the service sector overall is around 55 percent and some of the largest industries covered by ver.di are highly feminized, especially retail, public administration and health.

Discussion and conclusion

Comparison of the two cases reveals broad similarities and small differences. Especially the contexts in which women’s quotas were introduced and the stimulus to further equality measures were similar, and there were also some similarities in the impact on union identity and image, equality bargaining, political activity and membership trends.

The women’s quotas in the ÖGB and ver.di were introduced within the context of broader organizational reforms. In the Austrian case, an organizational reform process was initiated after a major financial scandal caused the loss of members and reputation. In the German case, ver.di was formed through a merger of five unions in a response to membership decline and financial difficulties. In both cases, women’s groups within the unions championed the introduction of quotas with a transformative motivation. In the context of the broader organizational changes, they were successful. Nevertheless, there was resistance and opposition to the quotas, making their implementation difficult.

Considering the effects of the quotas, we find that in both cases the initial quotas were extended. In Austria, several ÖGB affiliates subsequently introduced their own quotas; in the German case, the quota which originally applied only to lay delegates was widened to include paid officials in elected and appointed positions. In this way, the quotas led to further equality measures.

The quotas have resulted in some changes to union identity and image, so that both the ÖGB and ver.di are seen as somewhat more gender-balanced organizations than was previously the case, but there has been no fundamental change. The quotas were viewed as radical initiatives when they were introduced, but after some time their prominence faded and gender equality is not central to the way the unions present themselves internally or externally.

In both cases, the representation of women’s interests in collective bargaining and policy-making has improved in recent years. There has been an increased focus on equality bargaining and on legislative measures that affect the welfare of working women. Yet these improvements cannot be unequivocally attributed to the introduction of the women’s quotas. In the Austrian case, such developments began before the introduction of the quota. In Germany, other factors also played a role; legislative measures such as the minimum wage may be of particular interest to women but also benefit men, and are not necessarily pursued out of equality concerns alone. In any event, an increased focus on gender equality in the economic and political dimensions of union work is discernible, and is attributable at least in part to the efforts of women occupying various positions throughout the union hierarchy. As quotas have helped them reach these positions in which they can represent women’s interests, they may be viewed as a contributory cause.

A stated intention of the women’s quotas in the ÖGB and in ver.di was to increase female membership; but in both cases, absolute membership among women has continued to decline. However, the decline has been slower than among men, leading to a slight increase in the share of women in overall membership. While this slight increase in the context of overall decline might signal that union membership has become more attractive to women, this may or may not be attributable to the quotas.

Most of the effects of the quotas are enduring. In particular, they ensure women’s proportional representation in the lay delegate structures, and in the case of ver.di also among paid union officials, now and in the future. Another effect which is not as strong but is also long-lasting is the slight increase in the share of women among members. Further, the quotas have contributed to lasting improvements in the representation of women’s interests in collective bargaining and policy-making. The quotas also had an effect on union image, yet the prominence of gender equality in the unions’ self-representation has faded, and it is an open question whether that means it was of a temporary nature only.

Overall, the cases indicate that women’s quotas in unions have a positive effect both on women’s representation and on organizational outcomes; and that more generally, changes in union governance can indeed contribute to revitalization. It appears that once women’s representation in union decision-making bodies is assured through quotas, establishing an organizing strategy specifically for women, promoting gender equality in their self-representation and broadcasting their achievements for women in bargaining and policy-making are promising avenues for unions seeking to increase female membership.

Footnotes

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Author biographies

Anja Kirsch is Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of Management, Freie Universität Berlin, Germany.

Sabine Blaschke is Professor in the Department of Economic Sociology, Universität Wien, Austria.

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