Come rain or shine? Public expectation on local weather change and differential effects on climate change attitude

Abstract

Tailored messages are instrumental to climate change communication. Information about the global threat can be ‘localised’ by demonstrating its linkage with local events. This research ascertains the relationship between climate change attitude and perception of local weather, based on a survey involving 800 Hong Kong citizens. Results indicate that concerns about climate change increase with expectations about the likelihood and impacts of local weather change. Climate change believers attend to all three types of adverse weather events, namely, temperature rises, tropical cyclones and prolonged rains. Climate scepticism, however, is not associated with expectation about prolonged rains. Differential spatial orientations are a possible reason. Global climate change is an unprecedented and distant threat, whereas local rain is a more familiar and localised weather event. Global climate change should be articulated in terms that respect local concerns. Localised framing may be particularly effective for engaging individuals holding positive views about climate change science.

Keywords

climate change attitude climate change communication Hong Kong local weather risk perception

1. Introduction

Ordinary people tend to see global climate change as a distant probability or uncertainty that is geographically and/or temporally detached from their everyday life. The disconnect between the perceived distant causes and consequences of climate change and people’s experience with the immediate lived environment can undermine their propensity to act (Leiserowitz, 2005; Norgaard, 2011; Whitmarsh, 2009; Whitmarsh et al., 2011). Moser and Dilling (2007, 2011), Whitmarsh (2009) and Myers et al. (2012) suggest that proper use of tailored framing and messages that are attuned to the pre-existing values and concerns of the target audience is instrumental to engaging the public with climate change. From a geographical perspective, what matters is the spatial (and temporal) scale by which climate change narratives are constructed and articulated (Hulme, 2008).

Proprietary connection with climate change can be made discernible by articulating climate change narratives in terms of local issues (Lorenzoni et al., 2007). Local weather, which involves short-term meteorological fluctuations experienced at the immediate spatial level, is a promising candidate for tailored framing. This is because weather is invariably embedded into everyone’s daily life, and causally related to changes in the global and regional climates. Scientists have suggested that human-induced climate change accounts for the increasing frequency and intensity of local extreme weather (Parry et al., 2007). Extreme weather events, such as heat waves, tropical cyclones, and prolonged rains and flooding, are substantive consequences of climate change materialised at the local level. Perceived weather changes could act as a cognitive proxy or heuristics for individuals to comprehend the more abstract and distant global threat. The intuitive connection between weather and climate could offer a basis for customisation of messages.

‘Localising’ the framing of climate change begs a few normative and empirical questions. A key normative challenge is that laypeople often conflate long-term climate change with short-term weather variations (Joireman et al., 2010; Li et al., 2011); for example some people misinterpret occasional cold weather as counter-evidence on global warming (Washington and Cook, 2011). This can be seen as a source of cognitive bias and a problem to tackle rather than a solution. However, Moser and Dilling (2011) and Norgaard (2011) contend that rationally organised and objective information might be counter-productive by creating a feeling of disempowerment and undermining concern and action. Emphasising the weather–climate distinction could discourage individuals who are preoccupied with present and local considerations or overwhelmed by the far-reaching and rather unfathomable implications of climate change. There is a need to demonstrate the causal linkage between weather and climate, and creatively present it to the otherwise unconcerned or inadequately-informed public without compromising their other priorities.

A related empirical question is how weather changes influence climate change belief. Recent years have seen an increasing number of studies seeking evidence on the relationship between perception of weather changes and climate change belief. Laypeople tend to associate global warming with images or feelings of heat (Leiserowitz, 2005). Supporting evidence has been reported by Deryugina (2013), Egan and Mullin (2012), Joireman et al. (2010) and Li et al. (2011). These studies consistently show that global warming belief is correlated with actual or perceived outdoor temperature variations.

This burgeoning literature has left many important questions unaddressed. For example, all of four studies cited (Deryugina, 2013; Egan and Mullin, 2012; Joireman et al., 2010; Li et al., 2011) probed belief in global warming and gauged information on or people’s responses to temperature fluctuations. A broader ontological scope is needed to engage the generic concept of climate change, which includes other forms of meteorological perturbation. From a methodological point of view, the measuring scales are over-simplistic. The number of survey items used for measuring global warming belief was fairly small, ranging from one (Egan and Mullin, 2012) to four (Joireman et al., 2010). There are limited considerations on the complexity of and distinction between climate change beliefs (Corner et al., 2012; Poortinga et al., 2011). Moreover, the geographic scope of research is limited to the United States, so that generalisation across cultural contexts is not warranted. Further evidence is needed to substantiate the claim that climate change belief is a function of perception of local weather.

We address these inherent conceptual and methodological limitations by employing a more diverse array of measurements. To broaden the analytic landscape, we assessed perceived risks associated with temperature rises, cyclones and rains, and assembled a more comprehensive suite of climate change attitude variables. The study aims to ascertain the systematic relationship between these two sets of variables and identify their differential effects on each other. It contributes to the emerging body of research into the entangled attitudes toward weather and climate changes by differentiating the types of adverse weather events that are causally related to climate change. Findings could inform the use of targeted climate communication strategies that respect local concerns and circumstances.

In the next section we elaborate on the complexity of climate change attitude and belief, with an emphasis on spatial dimensions. This is followed by a description of research methods and the study area. Results of a quantitative analysis are then reported and discussed. Implications for climate communication are highlighted in the conclusions.

2. Spatial orientation of climate change belief

Notions of climate change are contested. The impacts of climate change are catastrophic but far-reaching in space and time. The lack of immediacy and the remoteness of these impacts have created difficulties for laypeople to comprehend (Lorenzoni et al., 2007; Moser and Dilling, 2007). Some individuals fail to integrate knowledge about climate change into their everyday life, or even turn to a denial position when it appears to threaten cherished values and established norms (Norgaard, 2011). Over-emphasis on the global and distant generational implications falls short of an effective communication strategy (Moser and Dilling, 2007, 2011; Whitmarsh et al., 2011).

Hulme (2008, 2009) notes that people dispute climate change because of the power of prevailing cultural imaginations and political preoccupations which influence the ways in which scientific knowledge about the climate is interpreted. Public concerns about climate science are culturally driven (Darier and Schüle, 1999; Thompson and Rayner, 1998), socially organised (Frank et al., 2011; Lo, 2013; Norgaard, 2011), and politically oriented (Corner et al., 2012; Hobson and Niemeyer, 2011). Climate is perceived and represented predominantly on the basis of pre-existing values and concerns, and cognitively constructed around the perceptive trajectories to which we have access and in terms attuned to us. These constructions tend to be localised or personalised, and anchored upon the immediate or associated cultural, social or political worlds. Misinterpretation and misrepresentation of scientific knowledge is a regrettable outcome of this process, known as ‘social amplification’ (or ‘attenuation’) of climate risks (Renn, 2011; see also Kasperson et al., 1988).

Notions of climate change are therefore multilayered and fraught with perceived uncertainties and ambivalent elements. Following Rahmstorf (2004), Poortinga et al. (2011) show that at least three forms of climate scepticism exist: ‘Trend scepticism’, ‘Attribution scepticism’ and ‘Impact scepticism’, by which people dispute over the existence, causes and seriousness of climate change, respectively. Therefore, climate change belief cannot be adequately represented by a dichotomous response (as used by Egan and Mullin, 2012, for example). A more intelligent and qualitatively diverse measuring scale is needed.

The measuring scale used by Whitmarsh (2008, 2009, 2011) is a useful reference. It has more than 20 reported items spreading over a wide spectrum of climate change attitudes and beliefs and including multiple psychological, social and political dimensions (see Whitmarsh, 2009: 412 for an exhaustive list). Climate change attitudes (and beliefs) measured on this scale can be differentiated not only by political ideology, but also by non-residential spatial orientation. Whitmarsh (2008: 368) compares responses from those individuals who had been affected by air pollution and flooding, and finds that ‘flood victims view climate change and flooding as largely separate issues’ (emphasis in original). A possible explanation is that flood victims see flooding as an immediate, tangible and locally observable problem, whereas climate change is a distant, intangible and global threat. The causal linkage between these two meteorological events is not subjectively discernible (Whitmarsh, 2008). On the other hand, air pollution is viewed as a similar issue to climate change, even though, from a scientific point of view, there is no necessary causal linkage between them. Personal experience and observation of regular and recurrent local flooding events could displace or undermine knowledge of an unprecedented global challenge that is far away from home, such as climate change. Risk perception is thus spatially oriented.

Norgaard (2011) has reported a similar observation in a Norwegian rural community. Climate change failed to attract attention from members of the community because knowledge of it came into conflict with the established, locally distinctive communal values and norms. Members of this community shared a ‘collective backward focus’, which describes the phenomenon that they relished and felt very proud of their community history and past successes (Norgaard, 2011: 117). Climate change, however, entails a forward focus and is conceived to be a remote reality. These perceptive variations across space and time result in cognitive tension or decoupling, and consequently a decline in concern among individuals, including those equipped with a sufficient level of scientific knowledge about climate change (Norgaard, 2011). Spatial (and temporal) orientation of the acquired knowledge offers an explanation for the public apathy.

Seemingly the spatial disparity in risk perception is at odds with the idea of ‘local warming’ (Li et al., 2011). Several recent studies have indicated that global warming belief is a function of perceived or actual local temperature variations (Deryugina, 2013; Egan and Mullin, 2012; Joireman et al., 2010; Li et al., 2011), suggesting a conflation of global climate with local weather. On the other hand, Whitmarsh (2008) and Norgaard (2011) have demonstrated that the local and global are viewed as separate issues, and these authors raise concerns about the more entrenched sense of ‘locality’ which might impede desired behavioural adjustments and result in maladaptation. Linking climate change to local precipitation trends, for example, may be an unproductive strategy for climate communication when the latter is seen as merely an outcome of normal fluctuations.

Not all localising strategies are successful; for example a national security frame could boomerang among audience segments already doubtful or dismissive of climate change science (Myers et al., 2012). Different climate change belief groups might respond to such strategies in different ways. Therefore it remains contested as to whether or not localising the discursive framing of climate risk is conducive to engaging the public with the global issue of climate change. The empirical issue to interrogate is how perceived risk of local weather change is related to climate change attitude and belief. Supporting evidence from previous studies is limited because of the incomplete representation of climate change and the use of over-simplistic measuring scales. These limitations are addressed by the survey-based research described below.

3. Methods

Questionnaire items

A structured questionnaire survey was administered in Hong Kong in late 2012 and early 2013. It was designed to gauge laypeople’s responses to probable weather changes and attitudes toward climate change. The former is couched in terms of perceived risk of local weather change. Risk can be defined in technical terms as a functional relationship between the probability (or likelihood) and consequence (or severity) of an undesired event or activity (Bubeck et al., 2012; Renn, 2008). This study employed an ordinal scale split into two items representing expected likelihood and severity of damage, presented in the questionnaire as ‘the weather in Hong Kong will become hotter in the next few years’ and ‘Hotter weather will affect my standard of living’ respectively. Response options ranged from ‘Strongly agree’ to ‘Strongly disagree’, based on a five-point Likert scale. Two additional pairs of questions were created for other forms of adverse weather change, namely, increasing frequency of tropical cyclones and prolonged rains.

Climate change attitude was measured by eleven survey statements adapted from Whitmarsh’s (2011) attitudinal scale and other relevant protocols, such as Hobson and Niemeyer’s (2011). Factor analysis, reported later in this paper, found that four of these statements constituted a coherent factor conveying a climate-sceptical perspective. The four statements are characterised by a tendency for downplaying the reliability of climate science (e.g. ‘Climate change is just news speculation’) and a self-assuring belief about the consequences of climate change (e.g. ‘Climate change won’t affect Hong Kong’). Scepticism is depicted as a multifaceted concept and not aligned to the outright and uninformed rejection of climate science, which is defined as climate ‘denial’ (Washington and Cook, 2011). The measuring scale allows ambivalent elements that implicitly recognise the existence of climate change and encompass a sense of self-assurance, as observed by Hobson and Niemeyer (2011) and Norgaard (2011). It is labelled as ‘Qualified Scepticism’.

The remaining seven items capture concerns about climate change blended with a modest level of response optimism. These statements recognise complex subjective dispositions, including ‘The effects of climate change are likely to be catastrophic’ and ‘I am confident that the government of Hong Kong can tackle the problem of climate change’. Positive responses to these items mean that the individual is concerned about the dreadful consequences of climate change but has some confidence in the government’s actions and technological solutions. Also, these concerns over climate change may be driven by moral principles or social influences. The combined messages pertain to not merely the reality of climate change, but also the intrinsic and socially driven motives behind the sympathetic attitude toward the science (Hulme, 2009; Renn, 2011), coupled with a sense of optimism. This measuring scale, called ‘Concerned Optimism’, can be distinguished from the crude, singular measure of climate change belief used in other similar studies (e.g. Deryugina, 2013).

In keeping with Whitmarsh’s (2008) assumption, it is hypothesised that perceived risks of weather change correlate with climate change concerns (and negatively with scepticism). Evidence was sought from a survey conducted in the Asian city of Hong Kong. Study area and sampling method are described in the next section.

Survey administration

The questionnaire survey was administered in 13 local council districts in Hong Kong, which is situated on the southern coast of China. The summer in Hong Kong is hot and humid with frequent showers and thunderstorms, and occasional tropical cyclones. Long-term projections have confirmed the trend of more frequent climate perturbation over the territory. In this century, extreme rainfall events (at the hourly rainfall of 100 mm or above) are expected to have a return period of 18 years, collapsing from the observed 37 years in the 1900s (source: Hong Kong Observatory, www.hko.gov.hk/climate_change/climate_change_e.htm). The return period for extremely hot days (daily maximum temperature at 35°C or above) diminishes from 32 years in the 1900s to 4.5 years in this century. Very hot days will no longer be a rare event in the 2050s with an annual frequency of 51 days, soaring to 89 days in the last decade of the 21st century. Milder changes in rainfall are anticipated. The annual number of extreme rainfall days is projected to rise from 3.5 days (1980–1999) to 4.3 days (2050–2059) and later 5.3 days (2090–2099). Hong Kong is witnessing increasing trends for heat waves and heavy rainfall throughout the 21st century.

Hong Kong is on the common track of tropical cyclones. Every year, two to three tropical cyclones come close to or pass through Hong Kong. The number of tropical cyclones has been decreasing since the 1960s, at a statistically insignificant rate of 0.17 per decade (Lam et al., 2004: 39). Nevertheless, cyclonic impacts on the city are acute and destructive due to the extraordinarily high concentration of human activities and infrastructure. The substantial economic losses and other tangible impacts, amplified by extensive media coverage, have attracted considerable attention from Hong Kong citizens in the event of tropical cyclones (Fok and Cheung, 2012).

This research was based on face-to-face interviews conducted in public areas. The sample was distributed amongst these districts approximately according to local population size. One major public park or multiple neighbourhood parks were selected from each of the selected districts as study sites, based on proximity to housing clusters, pedestrian traffic, and feasibility for conducting a street survey. Park visitors were invited to participate in the research. A certain number of passers-by were also inadvertently included, since urban parks in Hong Kong are tightly integrated with the street footpath system which has high pedestrian traffic. It is difficult to distinguish between bona fide park ‘visitors’ and ‘non-visitors’. Thus the sample included both park visitors and pedestrians passing by the parks.

Stratified random sampling was adopted based on the latest available census data. One out of every three park visitors or passers-by over 18 years old was selected as a respondent. The sampling quota was determined by age distribution in the district concerned. Trained interviewers were instructed to approach a particular age group when the sampling quota for the remaining age groups had been exhausted.

A university-based research service provider administrated the survey. Several undergraduate students with prior interview experience were recruited as interviewers and coached in the procedures of the survey. Fieldwork was supervised by a senior staff member and each completed questionnaire was checked in situ by the interviewer. Survey activities commenced in October 2012 and were completed in February 2013.

4. Results

Respondent demographics

A total of 800 face-to-face interviews were completed in the selected council districts. A comparable number (787) of individuals contacted on-site refused to participate or terminated the interview halfway through. This yielded a completion rate of 50.4%.

The number of male respondents (53.2%) exceeds females (46.8%). Most respondents identified themselves in the 25–44 age group (38.8%), followed by the 45–64 group (33.8%). Senior respondents of 65 or older (14%) were similar in number to younger ones aged 24 or below (13.5%). For personal income, 17.5% of respondents earned less than HK$8,000 (HKD/USD: 7.8/1.0) per month, and 22.0% earned HK$8,000–HK$14,999. The highest income group, i.e. HK$25,000 or above, contributed 16.1%, and the HK$15,000–HK$24,999 group took 15.1%. The rest of the respondents (27.1%) are non-income earners, such as retirees, housewives, job seekers and students. About 41.1% of respondents hold a tertiary degree, 31.2% possess high school qualifications, and 27.6% are at a lower education level (junior high school or below).

Perceived risk of weather change

Table 1 displays respondents’ expectations about future weather changes and impacts. The first two items (1a and 1b) represent expected likelihood of increasingly hot weather and its potential impacts on the respondent’s daily life, respectively. Both items recorded a mean score greater than 4, indicating a widespread belief that Hong Kong’s air temperatures would continue to rise and adversely affect its inhabitants. In this study, perceived risk is operationalised as the interaction term between expected likelihood and impacts, i.e. Item 1a multiplied by Item 1b. This resulting variable is called Rising Temperature, which has the highest mean value of 17.46 among the three interaction items.

Table 1.

Descriptive statistics for expectations on weather changes and impacts.

Item	Description	Range^a	Mean	S.D.	N
1a	I believe the weather in Hong Kong will become hotter in the next few years	1–5	4.09	0.66	795
1b	Hotter weather will affect my standard of living	1–5	4.22	0.67	800
1a × 1b	Interaction term: Rising Temperature	3–25	17.46	4.58	795
2a	I believe cyclones in Hong Kong will become more frequent in the next few years	1–5	3.52	0.78	771
2b	More cyclones will create inconvenience to my daily life	1–5	4.02	0.75	798
2a × 2b	Interaction term: More Cyclones	2–25	14.30	4.66	770
3a	I believe Hong Kong will have more rainy days in the next few years	1–5	3.32	0.78	774
3b	More rains will create inconvenience to my daily life	1–5	3.92	0.78	799
3a × 3b	Interaction term: More Rains	1–25	13.17	4.56	774

Measured on a five-point scale ranging from ‘Strongly agree’ (5) to ‘Strongly disagree’ (1).

Items 2a and 2b refer to the expected increase in the frequency of tropical cyclones in Hong Kong and its potential impacts on the individual. The former yielded a mean score of 3.52. This suggests that relatively fewer respondents anticipated that the number of tropical cyclones is on an increasing trend. The latter item, with a mean of 4.02, can be interpreted as the average respondent agreeing that more frequent cyclonic events would affect their daily life. The interaction item, i.e. More Cyclones, has an average value of 14.30, far lower than the Rising Temperature variable.

Items 3a and 3b concern the probable increase in precipitation in Hong Kong. Although meteorological data outlined in the previous section predict a modest increase in rainfalls, the average respondent tends to be indifferent to this view, as indicated by the mean score of 3.32. Yet, they are generally concerned about the adverse impacts of heavy rains, with the mean reaching 3.92. The variable More Rains has the lowest average value (13.17) among the three interaction items.

To summarise, Hong Kong people appear more sensitive to the prospects of rising local temperatures than those of increasing frequency of tropical cyclones and prolonged rains. The next step of analysis is to statistically test the relationship between these perceived risk variables and climate change attitude, which is reported in the ensuing section.

Perceived risk of weather change and climate change attitude

The survey began with a binary question concerning the existence of climate change. Nearly 94% of respondents believed that climate change is real. This is consistent with the findings of a recent local report indicating a high level of awareness among Hong Kong people, i.e. 92% of respondents believed that climate change has posed a serious problem (Oxfam Hong Kong, 2010). Responses to this binary question were compared across the three perceived risk variables, using the ANOVA technique. As shown in Table 2, the variables Rising Temperature and More Cyclones can explain the dichotomous variation in climate change beliefs. Climate change believers tend to rate the risks of hot weather and cyclones higher than do self-identified non-believers. Significant association was not found for More Rains. Climate change believers are no more likely to nominate the risk of increasing rainfalls as high.

Table 2.

ANOVA for general belief in climate change and perceived risk of local weather changes.

Do you believe that climate change is real?	Mean score^a (standard deviation in parentheses)
Do you believe that climate change is real?	Rising Temperature	More Cyclones	More Rains
Yes	17.60 (4.483)	14.44 (4.679)	13.24 (4.576)
No	15.22 (5.347)	12.29 (4.068)	12.02 (4.290)
F statistic	12.601**	9.652**	3.192
df	781	758	761

Possible minimum and maximum are 1 and 25 respectively. ** denotes significance at the 1% level.

Further analysis is based on a more diverse array of attitudinal variables. Factor analysis identified two factors, listed in Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the constituent items of each factor are presented in Table 4. The Qualified Scepticism factor consists of four items, all of which scored less than 3. This suggests a general disagreement on the sceptical view among the respondents. There was weak support for the claim that climate change is just news speculation and that it will not affect Hong Kong. Yet relatively more respondents tended to downplay the severity of climate change and described green groups as being alarmist. A composite scale is created by combining these items to represent the discourse of Qualified Scepticism, which has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.75. Overall, the level of climate scepticism among Hong Kong people is modest, as suggested by the average value of 9.70.

Table 3.

Factor analysis of Hong Kong people’s climate change attitude.

Item	Description	Factor loading
Item	Description	Factor 1: Qualified Scepticism	Factor 2: Concerned Optimism
Exaggeration	We shouldn’t panic as the severity of climate change has been exaggerated	0.78
Alarmism	Green groups are often too alarmist about issues like climate change	0.72
News Speculation	Climate change is just news speculation	0.73
Minimal Impacts	Climate change won’t affect Hong Kong	0.65
Catastrophe	The effects of climate change are likely to be catastrophic		0.51
Moral Duty	I feel a moral duty to do something about climate change		0.46
Peer Concern	The people I know are concerned about climate change		0.58
Knowledge	My knowledge about climate change is adequate		0.55
Government	I am confident that the government of Hong Kong can tackle the problem of climate change		0.50
Technology	Technology can solve the problems created by climate change		0.42
Economy	Economic growth should be controlled to reduce damage to the environment		0.46

Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser normalisation.

Cut-off point: 0.40.

Table 4.

Descriptive statistics for climate change attitudes.

Item	Range^a	Mean	S.D.	N
Exaggeration	1–5	2.50	0.97	794
Alarmism	1–5	2.70	0.92	792
News Speculation	1–5	2.24	0.86	792
Minimal Impacts	1–5	2.30	0.91	798
Composite item: Qualified Scepticism	4–19	9.70	2.74	783
Catastrophe	1–5	3.88	0.78	797
Moral Duty	1–5	3.96	0.70	798
Peer Concern	1–5	3.42	0.84	795
Knowledge	1–5	3.01	0.80	798
Government	1–5	2.62	0.88	795
Technology	1–5	2.96	0.94	797
Economy	1–5	3.70	0.86	795
Composite item: Concerned Optimism	11–34	23.55	2.90	782

Measured on a five-point scale ranging from ‘Strongly agree’ (5) to ‘Strongly disagree’ (1).

The remaining seven statements gauged positive attitude toward climate change, which is labelled Concerned Optimism (Tables 3 and 4). While these statements cohered and converged toward a factor, they indicated a complex set of sentiments characterised by a strong sense of concern and a modest level of confidence. Among the respondents there was a widespread belief that climate change will create catastrophic impacts. This may be driven by a strong moral commitment and peer effect, but the concern does not always come with good knowledge about the problem which is reported to be inadequate among some respondents. Furthermore, although confidence in the government’s ability to tackle the problem was modest, there was a balance of views concerning the efficacy of technological solutions and a strong belief that controlling economic growth is acceptable for environmental reasons. The composite scale Concerned Optimism has a marginal alpha value (0.50) (dropping any one of the constituent items reduced the alpha value). This warrants an additional analysis for individual items, which is presented in the online Appendix. The overall average value of 23.55 means that Hong Kong people are fairly concerned about climate change.

Linear regression analyses show that the two forms of climate change attitude vary with the levels of perceived risk in a different way (Table 5). Qualified Scepticism was significantly associated with Rising Temperature and More Cyclones. The strength of the sceptical view decreases with the level of perceived risk of hotter weather and more frequent cyclones only; it has no observable relationship with the prospects for prolonged rains. Socioeconomic characteristics also matter: the less educated, older, male, and lower-income individuals are more likely to accept the sceptical view.

Table 5.

Regression analysis of climate change attitudes.

	Qualified Scepticism			Concerned Optimism
	Beta	S.E.	t	Beta	S.E.	t
(Constant)		0.675	21.222		0.732	24.501
Rising Temperature	−0.189	0.022	−5.167**	0.169	0.024	4.517**
More Cyclones	−0.125	0.024	−3.036**	0.168	0.026	4.000**
More Rains	0.011	0.024	0.281	0.155	0.026	3.753**
Education	−0.234	0.131	−5.890**	−0.018	0.143	−0.446
Age	0.087	0.115	2.303*	0.114	0.125	2.938**
Gender	−0.078	0.184	−2.295*	0.034	0.200	0.989
Income	−0.077	0.205	−2.153*	−0.036	0.222	−0.978
Adj. R²	0.18			0.15
S.E.	2.433			2.642
F	24.654			19.878
df	738				739

** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively.

On the other hand, the concerned optimist is sensitive to all of these risk issues. Concerned Optimism is positively related to Rising Temperature, More Cyclones as well as More Rains. Public concern about climate change is predicted by perception of local weather fluctuations, regardless of the type of adverse weather event. Only one socioeconomic factor has a significant effect, i.e. age. Interestingly, the positive sign of this variable means older individuals are more concerned about climate change, contradicting the earlier observation implying otherwise.

In an additional analysis (included in the online Appendix), each of the risk variables is regressed on the individual items of Concerned Optimism. The first three and the last items (i.e. Catastrophe, Moral Duty, Peer Concern, and Economy) consistently yielded significant positive predictions across the three types of weather changes. The effects of the Knowledge and Government variables were restricted to an individual risk issue, whereas the last item, i.e. Technology, had no significant impacts.

5. Discussion

Climate change attitude is a function of perception of local weather. Our findings corroborate earlier studies that offer evidence on this systematic relationship (Deryugina, 2013; Egan and Mullin, 2012; Joireman et al., 2010; Li et al., 2011). Nonetheless, we proposed and have shown that this relationship is not restricted to the perception of warming, or anticipated temperature rises. Perceived cyclonic risk as a surrogate for extreme weather phenomena also correlates with climate change attitude and belief. Local weather and climate change are viewed in tandem. It is worth noting that the significance of association depends on the type of weather event. Perceived risk of prolonged rains does not explain disbelief in climate change. The type of weather event has differential effects.

Locality is a possible explanation. Whitmarsh (2008) has reported a similar observation in the South of England where individuals understood climate change and flooding as separate issues. Inland flooding can be caused by excessive precipitations, and their causal relationship is sufficiently visible to local people. The subtropical city of Hong Kong is no stranger to heavy rain. The prospects for more frequent rains may be seen by the public as a prelude to intensified urban flooding. Flooding and rains are a local, observable weather event. Climate change, in contrast, is often depicted as a global threat belonging to a different category of environmental stressor (Whitmarsh, 2008). From the perspectives of ordinary people, the global orientation lacks connection with local concerns and constraints.

However, this explanation cannot fully account for the observed effects of perceived cyclonic risk, i.e. cyclones can create local damage to buildings and infrastructure. It is plausible to advance a broader explanatory framework relating to familiarity, which recognises the idea of locality suggested by Whitmarsh (2008). Both heat waves and tropical cyclones are occasional threats concentrated in the summer, whereas rain is pervasive in the sense that it could occur on any one day of the year (at least in Hong Kong which is known for its high humidity and rich rainfalls). People tend to react rather directly to extreme events. In Hong Kong, the occurrences of hot days (> 33°C) and hot nights (> 28°C) are getting more frequent in recent years. Typhoon Vicente struck Hong Kong directly in July 2012 shortly before our questionnaire survey, and its ferocity and damage remained fresh in people’s minds.

In contrast, prolonged rains are a milder and more common weather event so that some respondents might not have mentally connected them with the catastrophic consequences of climate change. They are different from rainstorms which refer specifically to rainfall intensity and are generally perceived as an extreme weather event. For those individuals who tend to engage themselves in familiar weather fluctuations, such as rainfall, global climate change is far away from daily life. On the other hand, the incidence of heat waves and tropical cyclones is seasonal and episodic. These occasional threats appear to be symbolically more resonant to the usual framing of global climate change as an unprecedented catastrophe. The generic concept of climate change can therefore attract attention from those who have been preoccupied with occasional threats.

The differential impacts of Qualified Scepticism and Concerned Optimism add complexity to this possible explanation. There is no evidence that the sceptical individual is susceptible to the prospects for more frequent rains, whereas the optimist attends to all types of adverse weather events. The former tends to see climate change and localised rains as separate categories. The lack of intuitive connection has been a common theme in the climate scepticism literature. The most relevant example is the idea of locality, in contrast to ‘globality’, suggested by Whitmarsh (2008) (although the author does not use these terms). This is akin to what is known as ‘double reality’ in sociology, which could explain how imaginations of global climate change are cognitively and culturally detached from people’s everyday life and local traditions (Norgaard, 2011; see also Hulme, 2009). This amounts to a specific form of scepticism, called ‘displaced scepticism’ (Hobson and Niemeyer, 2013; see also Poortinga et al., 2011), where individuals lack motivation to act because climate change is manifested as a temporally or geographically distant issue. Subjective spatial displacement is a key barrier to engaging the unconcerned public in behavioural change.

Consistent with the conclusions of Whitmarsh (2008), we find that expectations about a regular, local weather event (i.e. rain) are not associated with attitude towards and belief in global climate change. This lends support to the common observation that individuals encounter barriers to understanding climate change when its causes and consequences are articulated in terms that are not symbolically resonant to personal or local concerns or recognised connotations or norms (Moser and Dilling, 2007, 2011; Ungar, 2007; Whitmarsh et al., 2011). To bridge the gap in public understanding, it is worth exploring the mediating role of factors such as credibility of information sources (Buys et al., 2014; Lorenzoni and Hulme, 2009), trust in politics (Vainio and Paloniemi, 2013), social norms (Lo, 2013), and familiarity of context.

Localised framing of climate change may be ineffective, if not counter-productive, in climate change communication to the extent that the subjective connection is not clear or persuasive to the audience. This may be particularly true for engaging the climate-sceptical public. The choice of audience segments for public engagement is important, because not all people attend to specific message frames. For instance, disengaged climate change believers might pay attention to climate change messages framed in terms of public health, whereas climate deniers might respond negatively and radically to those messages framed in terms of national security (Maibach et al., 2010; Myers et al., 2012). Our study suggests that the right audience for localised framing strategies is perhaps those individuals who are optimistically concerned about climate change. Emphasising the link between climate change and local events might impress this group of individuals, who are in the great majority in Hong Kong society. Localised communication resources and public engagement efforts should be focused upon the concerned individuals. This is important for climate change communication in Hong Kong, because the city is in a better position to engage in climate change adaptation than mitigation owing to the scale of its economy and adaptation is largely a local activity that crucially requires local people’s contributions and engagement.

6. Concluding remarks

Tailored messages are instrumental to effective communication on climate change. This research addressed the quest for ‘localisation’ of climate change information and ascertained the relationship between climate change attitude and perception of local weather. We found that concerns about climate change increase with expectations about adverse weather events, regardless of the type of hazard. Knowledge and/or experience of local weather events could enable people to readily comprehend the problem of climate change. Making the causal linkage explicit is crucial.

Nevertheless, this claim has to be qualified by the observed differential effects associated with climate scepticism. Responses from climate-sceptical individuals provide evidence on subjective spatial displacement. The global climate change mechanism would generate episodic but extreme weather events with fast rates of change at the local scale, which could be vividly perceived by humans. Since climate change is an unprecedented and distant catastrophe, it is deemed to be of a hazard category that is qualitatively different from localised, regular, and familiar weather events, such as rain. The differential spatial orientations of global climate change and local rains could explain why climate scepticism is not found to be related to perceived risk of more frequent rains.

The challenge for climate change communicators is how to articulate global climate change in terms compatible with local concerns and constraints. It is important to localise or personalise messages about climate change, but the subjective connection has to be established to make communication effective. Further research should explore what kinds of local issues and concerns are commensurate with the idea of climate change. Also, we suggest that localised framing may be more important and effective for communicating with those individuals who are open-minded and do not appear to be sceptical toward climate change science than those who tend to dismiss it. Such creative strategies might result in different outcomes, depending on the audience segments (Maibach et al., 2010; Myers et al., 2012; Nisbet, 2011). Nonetheless localised frames are likely to be a feasible option for engaging unmotivated members of the public in societies in which the majority hold positive views about the science, such as Hong Kong.

Furthermore, research should recognise the subjective sensitivity to the spatial context in which the local impacts of climate change would eventuate. Climate change believers and sceptics respond to probable weather changes in different ways. Using binary belief items to predict variations in perceived risk is over-simplistic, because the two forms of response contain nuanced analytic qualities. In addition, the association between climate change belief and perceived risk of more frequent rains is not evident. Using only perceived temperature rise to predict variations in climate change attitude is inadequate, because other forms of weather fluctuations could yield different results. Our findings address the identified limits of previous studies (Deryugina, 2013; Egan and Mullin, 2012; Joireman et al., 2010; Li et al., 2011) and call for the use of multidimensional measuring scales.

A methodological limitation of this study is that the composite scale of Concerned Optimism has a modest level of internal consistency. A well-tested and statistically reliable scale for recording climate change attitude is required to verify the present findings. Further research may consider a wider range of attitudinal measures. Including other forms of natural hazards, such as sea level rise and drought, into questionnaire design may also help broaden the scope of analysis and interrogate the arguments presented in this paper in a more comprehensive way. Also, our conclusions are entirely based on statistical results and some of our findings require verification by in-depth inquiries. Open-ended interviews with individuals, especially those who are sceptical toward climate change science, are needed to provide stronger evidence on the lack of subjective connection between climate change and rain.

Footnotes

Funding

This research received funding from Griffith University and the University of Hong Kong.

Author biographies

Alex Y. Lo specialises in political economy and geography. He is currently affiliated with the Urban Research Program at the Griffith University, Australia. His research focuses on public perception of the environment, public engagement in climate change mitigation and adaptation, and the political economy of climate change.

C. Y. Jim focuses his research on the nature-in-city core theme, encompassing urban ecology, urban forestry, urban green spaces, urban green infrastructure, green roof, green wall, urban soil science, and urban nature conservation. Adopting an interdisciplinary approach with an emphasis on compact and south cities, he studies mainly Hong Kong and other Chinese cities.

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