Abstract
The Belarusian government’s decision of the last decade to build a nuclear power plant near the city of Ostrovets, in northern Belarus, has proven to be controversial, resulting in a great deal of debate about nuclear energy in the country. The debate was inevitably shaped by the traumatic event that affected Belarus – the Chernobyl nuclear accident of 1986. The Belarusian authorities have consistently promoted a positive view of nuclear energy to the population in order to overcome the so-called ‘Chernobyl syndrome’ and deliberately shaped nuclear risk communication. As a result, the issue of trust remains crucial in all nuclear debates in Belarus.
1. Introduction
Nuclear power is a controversial energy resource in contemporary society. Regardless of many claimed advantages, such as low-energy production costs and carbon neutrality, the use of nuclear energy raises a number of concerns related to its safety and security. These concerns have recently proliferated after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster and led not only to public debates about that issue but also to nuclear power opt-outs in several countries (Butler et al., 2013).
The debate on nuclear power is especially controversial in the Republic of Belarus, which experienced a dramatic event directly associated with the civil nuclear energy use – the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) accident of 1986. Although the Chernobyl NPP was located in neighbouring Ukraine, Belarus suffered the most among all of the Soviet republics from the radioactive contamination because of dominating winds and rainfalls during the first days after the explosion. This resulted in serious health issues for thousands of Belarusians (World Health Organization (WHO), 2006). In addition, more than 130,000 people were resettled from the contaminated regions, causing significant demographic, social, cultural, and psychological shifts in the society. The Chernobyl disaster caused vast economic losses for Belarus. In the early 1990s, up to 20% of governmental spending was targeted at mitigating the consequences of the Chernobyl accident. This burden has steadily decreased but even decades later it still forms a significant part of the total governmental spending.
Not surprisingly, Chernobyl affects the dynamics of every environmental debate in Belarus even to this day, almost 30 years after the accident (Novikau, 2015). However, in 2006–2008, the Belarusian authorities announced plans to build a state-owned NPP in Belarus, in order to decrease dependency on the importation of fossil fuels from Russia. Construction of the NPP began in the early 2010s near the city of Ostrovets, in northern Belarus. The plant is expected to begin energy production in 2018 (Belarusian Telegraph Agency (BelTA), 2014).
The objective of this article is to analyse the evolution of the debate and public opinion on nuclear power in Belarus during the last three decades. This study draws on several sources: Belarusian media coverage of the nuclear issue from 1985 to 2014, along with Belarusian and international political science and sociological literature; public polls on nuclear power conducted by both governmental and independent institutions; and discourse produced during the public discussion of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of the NPP in 2009.
2. Politics and public understanding of risks
There is a difference between understanding and accepting risks and, therefore, even an informed public will not always happily accept low-risk proposals (Douglas, 1983; Wynne, 1995). Social theory of risk implies that ‘subjective’ perceived risk is not simply a distorted version of ‘objective’ technical risk, but rather a social construct that includes broader realities not encompassed in scientific risk assessments. The perception of risks includes multiple factors such as the nature of the risks, the psychological characteristics and dominant values of the public, its experiences of risk, its trust in institutions and the current political system (Bocking, 2004; Jaeger et al., 2001; Krimsky, 1992; Slovic, 1992). For instance, the risks of nuclear energy are often judged to be greater and the benefits to be smaller than other technologies because the public views nuclear energy as being ‘unknown, dreadful, uncontrollable, inequitable, catastrophic, and likely to affect future generations’ (Slovic, 1987: 285). Perceptions of risks are also historical and social – experience with risks, and with the institutions that deploy and manage them, often generates considerable, long-lasting scepticism towards claims of minimal risk made by authorities (Bocking, 2004; Jaeger et al., 2001). Thus, the issue of trust in institutions remains crucial in the research of public understanding of risks (Wynne, 1995).
Risks also cannot be viewed independently from the political system within which they are perceived. Debate on risk has shifted from the scientific to the political arena and has become an area of intense political controversy (Bocking, 2004; Jaeger et al., 2001). At the same time, none of the political systems provide equal competition between political or social groups, and the state is usually a key player in risk-related issues. This is important because, as Douglas (1983) shows, there is a connection between the forms of political organisations and the understanding of risks. For instance, hierarchical organisations such as the state are usually ready to sacrifice the few for the common good and are therefore able to accept larger risks than individualistic groups. This has serious implications for everyday life because the state is usually responsible for the regulation and supervision of hazardous industries and is the key means by which issues of risk must be resolved.
Risk communication often emerges from tensions between state experts and the public and is focused on reducing these tensions. As Jaeger et al. (2001) say, ‘Risk communication as a systematic tool emerged partly out of the need for government to justify to citizens its actions with regard to risk management’ (p. 135). In the classical risk communication model, the sender (usually the experts) composes a message and sends it to the transmitter (usually the media), who decodes and recodes it, and sends it to the receiver (usually the public). The receiver can respond to the message by sending its own message to the original sender (Jaeger et al., 2001). Because the state is often involved in the promotion, development and regulation of the nuclear industry, it can deliberately affect any stage of the communication process. For instance, the government is able to shape the outcome of risk assessments by selecting scientists who are more likely to deliver the judgments the state wants (Bocking, 2004). The media is usually viewed as an independent transmitter, with its own rules on how a given risk should be covered (Weingart and Engels, 2000). However, the role of the media in risk communication depends on numerous factors, such as independence of the state-run and private media, media access to public information, journalistic self-censorship and state subsidies to the media (International Research & Exchange Board (IREX), 2014). Finally, the political system affects the ability of the recipient to respond to the information. For instance, risks often become a subject of analysis because of social movements that emerge around them (Jaeger et al., 2001). However, a social movement’s dynamic depends not on risks but rather directly on the political opportunity structure in a society (Tilly, 1978). As Koopmans and Duyvendak (1995) show in their study of anti-nuclear movements in Western Europe, there is no direct relationship between environmental risks, grievances and mobilisation. On the contrary, the mobilisation of environmental activism depends chiefly on the relative openness of the institutionalised political system in the society and the repressiveness of the state.
While some studies concerning the influence of politics on the perception of risk have been done in Western countries, rarely has any research been done in non-democratic countries. In this article, I focus on the Belarusian context and bring empirical insights to bear on the question of how politics influences public understanding of risks. Belarus represents a valuable case study for understanding this relationship. Although it is hard to deny that risk and politics are inseparable, their concrete relationships are not always clear. Indeed, in democratic countries, the scientific community, the media and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have substantial freedom from the state. The state’s explicit involvement in public understanding of risk is sporadic and often merely symbolic. On the contrary, in highly centralised authoritarian regimes, the government openly and aggressively intervenes in all aspects of societal life, and risk communication is no exception.
As mentioned above, Belarus was affected by a major nuclear accident – the Chernobyl disaster of 1986. Crucially, during the Soviet time, risk communication about the event was heavily interconnected with politics. For instance, the publication of ‘unauthorised’ measurements of radioactivity at universities after the Chernobyl accident was forbidden by the Communist authorities for political reasons. Similarly, physicians were instructed to exclude radiation as a cause of disease from medical diagnoses (Shlyakhter and Wilson, 1992). Soviet secrecy and restrictions on information related to the Chernobyl disaster caused mistrust not only in Communist leaders but also in the experts who followed politicians by accepting their constraints. Distrust in the ability of federal authorities to deal with the consequences of Chernobyl was the major topic in the Belarusian independence movement in the late 1980s. Later, the Charnobilski shlyach (Chernobyl Way) has become an annual protest of the Belarusian political opposition in which political and environmental issues are closely interconnected (Nikolayenko, 2015).
Beginning from the late 1990s, Belarus has represented a classic example of ‘full’, or ‘non-competitive’, authoritarianism with a near-monopolistic position held by the state in all areas of life (Silitski, 2005). For instance, the government actively participates in the subordination of science to politics, though to a lesser degree than in the Soviet Union. Almost all academic and research institutions are owned by the state and are incorporated in the highly centralised system of state power. This problem extends far beyond health-related radiation issues. Anyone hoping to research and publish the results of public opinion surveys about the social and political situation in the country must be licenced by the state. Thus, many non-governmental research institutions have to work in secret, and their research activities are subject to repeated threats from the authorities (Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS), 2012).
In contrast to pluralistic democracies where the media is independent of the state, Belarusian authorities deliberately control the media system. The state owns the major media outlets, especially television stations and major political newspapers, and the Presidential Administration plays an active role in determining and shaping their editorial policies. Although private newspapers and radio stations do exist, in order to avoid governmental repression they are forced to practise self-censorship, avoiding topics which might provoke a negative reaction from the authorities (IREX, 2014).
A similar situation exists with NGOs. The state strictly regulates the activities of NGOs and heavily penalises any activity by unauthorised civic initiatives, following the principle, ‘what is not permitted is prohibited’ (Amnesty International, 2013). Ordinary people demonstrating their civil position are also not free from potential governmental oppression, and participants of rallies and protests subject to governmental prosecution. As a result, as in the Soviet era, most people refrain from participation in even non-political protests, in order to avoid governmental repression (Silitski, 2005).
These specific features of the Belarusian political, social and economic systems inevitably influence risk debates in the country. A study of the political factors influencing public understanding of risk in their extreme, ‘pure’ form can contribute much to the understanding of relationships between risk and politics.
3. Historical background of nuclear energy in Belarus
Historically, the Belarusian economy has been characterised by two factors: intensive energy consumption and a lack of local energy resources. After World War II, Belarus, as a part of the Soviet Union, developed a solid industrial base including machine production, metallurgy, oil refining, chemical manufacturing, production of mineral fertilisers and other energy-intensive industries (Balmaceda, 2014; Mikhalevich, 2009). In 1983, the Soviet authorities began construction of an NPP near the capital city of Minsk. However, in 1987, in the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster, the project, which was 70% complete at the time, was frozen and later transformed into a natural gas power plant (Mikhalevich, 2009).
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the now-independent Belarus faced serious economic problems, partially caused by the energy structure of the economy. Although total energy consumption has decreased and the share of local energy resources has consistently increased, Belarus has still been highly dependent on imported energy resources from Russia (Balmaceda, 2014; Mikhalevich, 2009). As a result, in 1993, the Council of Ministers decided to create a state programme for the development of nuclear energy in Belarus but in 1998 decided to postpone it. The decision, however, did not greatly affect the energy system in Belarus. The Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko was able to receive energy resources from Russia at low prices and, therefore, to utilise ‘rent on energy dependency’ (Balmaceda, 2014). After Vladimir Putin’s election as Russian president, this state of things changed dramatically, resulting in energy disputes with Russia about natural gas and oil prices for Belarus (the so-called ‘gas wars’) in 2004, 2006–2007 and 2010 (Balmaceda, 2014; Marples, 2008). As a result, the Belarusian government had returned to the idea of building an NPP. The Presidential decree of 25 August 2005 ‘Regarding approval of the conception of energy security and the increase of energy independence of the Republic of Belarus’, among other measures, such as energy conservation and the development of renewable energy sources, explicitly mentioned the necessity of building an NPP in Belarus. In June 2007, Lukashenko signed Directive No. 3, ‘Economy and thrift as the main factors of economic security of the state’, which ordered the intensification of NPP construction works. The presidential decree of 12 November 2007 specified the organisations responsible for preparing the construction of the country’s first NPP and budgeted money for engineering and site selection. In January 2008, the Security Council of Belarus made a final decision regarding construction of an NPP. At the end of 2008, a construction plot was chosen near the city of Ostrovets in Grodno Region, and in 2012 construction works started (BelTA, 2014).
4. Public opinion on nuclear power
Data about public opinion on nuclear power in Belarus are unsystematic and often contradictory. Polls were conducted only in periods when the development of nuclear power was planned – in the late 1990s and from 2005 onwards.
The first known survey on public opinion about nuclear power in Belarus was jointly conducted in 1995 by the Institute of Sociology and the National Scientific, Educational and Information Centre for Radiation Safety, Energy and Radiological Education (Babosov et al., 1996). The period in which the survey was conducted was characterised by economic difficulties, and, not surprisingly, 84.9% of respondents were primarily concerned about price growth. However, 47.7% expressed concerns about the possible construction of an NPP in Belarus. These concerns were caused by the fact that the majority of respondents identified radioactive contamination from Chernobyl as a primary factor negatively affecting their health. In total, 40.9% of those surveyed were in favour of construction of an NPP, with 39.0% against and 19.2% undecided. A total of 20.3% of respondents expressed extremely negative views towards nuclear energy and called for all nuclear power plants working in the Commonwealth of Independent States to be shut down. Among the primary reasons given against nuclear power, 28.9% said that NPPs harm human health more than other industrial objects, 21.6% believed that construction of NPPs would increase deaths and the risk of environmental crises, 17.1% argued that nuclear facilities harm the environment more than other industrial objects and 7.6% believed that nuclear energy is no longer a cheap source of energy. In regard to information sources, people trusted information from the International Atomic Energy Agency and other international expert organisations the most, while the level of trust towards domestic experts and the media was extremely low. The authors of the research conclude,
The vast majority of the country’s population perceives the real risk from the use of different sources of energy, their real strengths and weaknesses, totally inadequately, has no idea about the energy resource situation in Belarus, and is unable to assess the economic, social and other consequences of the possible ways out of the energy crisis. The majority of people are guided by their personal experience and their own ideas (for example, advocating for the development of large-scale energy projects and simultaneously considering peat or wood as a fuel). This indicates a very low awareness among the majority of the country’s population. (Babosov et al., 1996: 24–25)
The authors also point out that the prevalence of ‘Chernobyl syndrome’ in the public is the main roadblock to the development of nuclear energy in Belarus: ‘The remaining mistrust in nuclear energy among a significant part of the Belarusian population is, first of all, determined by “Chernobyl syndrome”: a fear that a tragedy that happened 10 years ago at the Chernobyl NPP would happen again’ (Babosov et al., 1996: 18).
Initially, the term ‘Chernobyl syndrome’ emerged to describe the psychological reaction of the population affected by Chernobyl. ‘Chernobyl syndrome’ included concerns about ‘life and health; medical services; resettlement; benefits and payments; place in the social structure; lack of trust in the authorities; and absence of information’ (Shlyakhter and Wilson, 1992: 255). Later, the term ‘Chernobyl syndrome’ was broadly used by the Soviet authorities in the sense of ‘radiophobia’, or abnormal fear of radiation, as a tool to deny citizens’ questions about the health effects of Chernobyl. Thus, any complaints and concerns about the health effects of radiation were explained away as ‘Chernobyl syndrome’ and, therefore, could be ignored (Stsiapanau, 2010). Analogously, the Belarusian authorities used that concept in the 1990s and 2000s debates to neutralise the anti-nuclear discourse. According to the popularisers of the term, the ‘syndrome’ is supported by the media and non-fictional literature, and environmental NGOs which anchored a ‘victim complex’ in the population (Shavel and Martischenkova, 2013).
Beginning from 2005, the Institute of Sociology, by the contract with the Ministry of Energy, has started to conduct annual surveys regarding the possibility of construction of an NPP in Belarus (Table 1).
Responses by year to the question: ‘In your opinion, should Belarus have and develop nuclear energy?’
Adapted from Martischenkova and Borodacheva (2013) and Shavel and Martischenkova (2013).
Researchers from the Institute of Sociology attribute the nearly twofold growth in supporters of nuclear energy from 2006 to 2008, and a corresponding decline in its adversaries, to education conducted by the Ministry of Energy, the media, local authorities, sociologists conducting surveys and president Lukashenko (Shavel and Martischenkova, 2013). However, the poll results conducted by non-governmental sociological institutions show a different dynamic of public opinion on nuclear power in Belarus.
For instance, a series of polls regarding nuclear energy in Belarus were conducted by the IISEPS beginning from June 2006 (Table 2). The polls demonstrate approximately the same numbers for 2006, but do not register such significant growth of supporters in 2008 and after.
Responses by year to the question: ‘In the Ostrovets District of Grodno Region a nuclear power plant is being built with support from Russia. Some people regard it positively, others negatively. What do you think about it?’
Adapted from Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS, 2008, 2013).
Finally, a marketing company SATIO conducted a survey on public opinion about numerous environmental issues in Belarus in 2015. Among all environmental dangers, respondents most often mentioned the Ostrovets NPP – 87.3%. In total, 24.6% of respondents believed that the NPP would not affect the environment, while 52.5% believed that it would have a negative impact, and just 14.7% thought that the NPP would positively affect it (SATIO, 2015). Although the SATIO’s questions did not directly ask about general opinions on nuclear power, but rather about the environmental impact of the particular nuclear project, its results still support the IISEPS findings regarding the significant level of public concern towards nuclear power in Belarus.
5. Nuclear power debate
Pro-nuclear coalition
The pro-nuclear state discourse which existed in the Soviet Union (and therefore, in Belarus) did not end immediately after the Chernobyl accident. Even in 1986–1987, several articles in official newspapers of the Communist Party of Belarus were aimed at convincing the public of the necessity of civil nuclear power. The Chernobyl accident was either not mentioned in these articles at all or was presented as an unfortunate incident which should not impede the development of nuclear power. Anti-nuclear mobilisation in Soviet Belarus in 1986–1987 remained very weak and increased only in 1988–1990 because of changes in the political opportunity structure under the twin names of perestroika and glasnost (Novikau, 2015). The decision to terminate construction of the NPP near the Belarus capital of Minsk and a similar project in the Vitebsk Region can be explained not by the state’s loss of enthusiasm for nuclear power, but rather by the tactical interests of the Communist authorities.
Debates about the need for nuclear power in Belarus emerged in the early 1990s and peaked in 1998. In that year, in order to analyse perspectives on nuclear power, the Belarusian government created the Commission on the Assessment of the Advisability of Nuclear Power Development in Belarus, which consisted mainly of domestic scientists and politicians. Part of the commission, headed by the director of the Heat and Mass Transfer Institute, Oleg Martynenko, prepared a final statement in which they argued for the necessity of an NPP in Belarus, with an input in operation by 2030. In order to justify the construction of an NPP, experts relied mostly on economic factors such as the ability to save money on the importation of energy resources (Ecologia, 2001). The other part, headed by Ivan Smoliar, prepared a statement arguing that the development of nuclear energy in Belarus was inexpedient and that a moratorium on construction of NPPs should be imposed for 10–15 years. After the final voting on 29 December 1998, the commission recommended that ‘During the next 10 years it is inexpedient to begin construction of an NPP’ on the basis of citizens’ attitude towards nuclear energy, availability of alternative energy and fuel sources and limited financial resources. However, the question of nuclear power was not entirely removed from the agenda, and the commission mandated ‘to continue work for preparation of the development of nuclear power in the Republic of Belarus in the future’ (Ecologia, 2001). Although the commission’s recommendations were not made into law, they were generally viewed as a 10-year moratorium on the construction of NPPs in the country (Marples, 2008; Stsiapanau, 2016).
The frequency of debates on nuclear power decreased for several years after the decision was made. However, in spite of the moratorium, the discussion resumed in the early 2000s. The Ministry of Energy and its affiliated institutions remained the main initiators of the nuclear project. Nevertheless, some state agencies such as the Department of Energy Efficiency expressed a clear anti-nuclear position, appealing to reasons of energy conservation and renewable energy technologies.
In the 2000s, president Lukashenko, who had not expressed a clear position on nuclear power in Belarus during the 1990s debates, began to make some public statements with regard to the topic. In February 2003, at a meeting with students, Lukashenko said that an NPP could be one of the cornerstones of the country’s independence and sovereignty, especially in the area of energy. He argued that there was still a ‘Chernobyl syndrome’ in the country that had to be overcome in the future. The President also reassured everyone that the government would not do anything without first consulting with the population. In April 2004, during his traditional annual visit of the regions affected by Chernobyl, Lukashenko (2004) discussed the possibility of nuclear power in Belarus:
I uphold the following position: yes, this is inexpensive, safe (there are safe reactors), and beneficial. We currently do not have such a psychological barrier as we had before. But the question is not about that; we just simply have not used all other possibilities. We make little use of bio-fuel. Our forests go to waste – we could burn it and obtain energy. We have rivers … When we solve these issues, exhaust them, when we follow the ways the Finns, Norwegians, Swedes have come, who use biofuel for 40% of their heat production, and then we will see that this is not enough for us, then we will think about a nuclear power plant construction. Why should we think about it today? Today there are a number of problems, the solving of which would increase production of energy, heat, and so on. Today in Belarus there is no such issue as construction of a nuclear power plant. When the time comes, then we will talk about the construction of some compact power plant. But whether it will be during our lives or not – this is a question.
However, the gas disputes with Russia have changed his rhetoric substantially. In August 2006, Lukashenko (2006) was more explicit in his intention to develop nuclear power in Belarus:
I am going to speak separately about nuclear energy. For Belarus, construction of our own nuclear power plant is an important factor in energy security. In the future, we cannot go without it. Yes, Belarus has suffered from nuclear energy. But our decision to build a nuclear power plant should be affected not by radiophobia and other fears, but rather by scientific and economic calculation. If scientists, the government, and energy experts provide 100% justification of expediency than we will make an appropriate decision. But only using the newest, safest technologies.
After this statement, many state officials expressed explicit support for the idea of developing nuclear power in Belarus. Those who opposed the idea mostly refrained from making public statements. At the beginning of 2008, Lukashenko officially declared that the final decision regarding construction of an NPP in Belarus had been made. Immediately, pro-nuclear campaigns were launched in the state-run media.
Several key arguments were used in the justification of nuclear power use in Belarus. As in previous years, economic reasons continued to dominate in pro-nuclear discourse. It was argued that the development of nuclear power could save roughly 5 billion cubic metres of natural gas per year. Additionally, it would decrease electrical energy costs and, consequently, prices for local energy consumers. The notable characteristic of nuclear power discourse in the 2000s is the shift from predominantly economic arguments to those based on energy security. The Belarusian authorities argue that Russia uses its monopolistic position in energy resources in order to dictate political decisions, jeopardising Belarusian security and independence. The NPP is intended, therefore, to create an opportunity to counteract this external control (Marples, 2008; Pilibaityte, 2010; Stsiapanau, 2010). Although the proposed NPP would use nuclear fuel from Russia, its supporters argue that, in contrast to natural gas, it would be possible to create long-lasting reserves which would prevent ‘energy blackmail’. According to proponents of nuclear energy in Belarus, construction of an NPP is also in line with global trends towards nuclear power, caused by rising prices for crude hydrocarbon. For instance, an article in a governmental newspaper in 2011 justified the necessity of nuclear power by predicting a rise in oil prices by 2015 of US$300–350 a barrel. The idea of global nuclear trends is also used in the assessment of the possible risks of the NPP. Since Belarus is already surrounded by NPPs in neighbouring states, with these states planning to build more, construction of a single NPP in Belarus will not greatly increase the risk to the Belarusian population. Participation in this current trend would show Belarus’ ability to realise large-scale projects of this nature, thereby securing its status among the most developed countries. Belarus traditionally has held strong positions in physics and other natural sciences, and the development of its own nuclear facility should preserve and even further this (Pilibaityte, 2010). The pro-nuclear coalition also uses a climate change argument, arguing that the NPP would allow for a decrease in emissions of greenhouse gases by 7–10 million tons a year. However, this argument was used exclusively from an economic standpoint – the opportunity for Belarus to sell their surplus Kyoto quota units in order to generate additional income. Finally, it has been argued that an NPP would aid the development of currently underdeveloped regions (Pilibaityte, 2010). One feature of the pro-nuclear discourse is its deliberate distancing from Chernobyl issues. Since environmental debates in Belarus have been always shaped by Chernobyl, the discourse has been steered away from this issue because it contradicts the idea of nuclear power and they can hardly coexist (Stsiapanau, 2010).
Anti-nuclear coalition
The structure of the anti-nuclear coalition in Belarus has significantly changed since the 1990s debates. It is characterised by the total absence of anti-nuclear voices among state officials and employees of state-owned institutions because publicly opposing the nuclear project would effectively constitute career suicide. Thus, the anti-nuclear coalition has consisted of persons and organisations not dependent on the state in any way.
Surveys demonstrate low willingness of Belarusian public to participate in protest rallies related to environmental issues, including nuclear energy. Only around 5% said they were ready to protest against construction of the NPP (Shavel and Martischenkova, 2013; SATIO, 2015). The main barrier to participation in such actions was a fear of possible governmental sanctions against participants. As one of the respondents said, ‘I would go to a rally against construction of the NPP, but I would not go based on a principle “let’s meet and go to jail.” If an organisation with a strong voice participated, I would go’ (SATIO, 2015: 50).
However, in 2008–2009, several anti-nuclear grass-root initiatives emerged in regions where the building of an NPP was planned. Their members collected signatures and addressed petitions to the government, the president and the media. From the moment of the emergence of the initiatives, their leaders faced pressure from local authorities. Local administration prohibited rallies and picketing against the NPP (Novikova, 2010).
During the entire period of the nuclear debates, all Belarusian environmental NGOs have explicitly opposed the building of an NPP in Belarus and, after the construction started, have called for it to cease based on environmental concerns. Ecohome (Ekodom), one of the leading environmental NGOs in Belarus, is the most ardent and consistent opponent of the nuclear project in Belarus. Founded in 1996, Ecohome, similar to other Belarusian NGOs, has participated in a broad range of activities relating to global climate change, sustainable development, permaculture and deep ecology. In April 2006, Ecohome began protests in Minsk against plans to build an NPP in Belarus, and later coordinated the Belarusian anti-nuclear campaign, which united most of the NPP’s adversaries (Novikova, 2010). Because of its anti-nuclear activities, the NGO faces pressure from authorities and harassment through the state-run media. Its members were arrested for anti-nuclear protests (Novikova, 2010; Shabbir, 2014). Additionally, Ecohome has faced problems in realising their other, non-nuclear environmental projects because state-run organisations refused to collaborate.
Even though the Belarusian Greens initiated several anti-nuclear petitions, their effectiveness has been relatively low, due to the non-democratic nature of Belarusian politics and the resultant exclusion of civil society from the decision-making process. Representatives of the Ministry of Energy, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection, and the NPP administration all argue that it would be impossible to effectively deliver technical information about the NPP to the public and, consequently, for the public to participate in the decision-making process. The role of environmental NGOs was defined as supporting the government in its work in increasing trust towards nuclear energy and overcoming the ‘Chernobyl syndrome’ (Novikova, 2010). Although the majority of environmental NGOs have constantly opposed the idea to begin construction, and now call for the project to be terminated, they have largely come to see these actions as futile. Moreover, they believe that active counter-nuclear actions could jeopardise their other environmental projects.
In order to oppose the dominant, pro-nuclear state discourse, the anti-nuclear coalition has focused their arguments not only on the environmental and health risks but also on the economic ineffectiveness of the project. It argues that the concentration of energy production in one place would jeopardise the energy security of Belarus, as having one, large energy producer would make the system vulnerable to accidents (Novikova, 2010).
One important characteristic of the debate on nuclear power in Belarus is the use of external influence. As Stsiapanau (2010) rightfully notes, the Belarusian authorities, in order to legitimise nuclear energy politics, rely on international cooperation and approval. The Belarusian environmental NGOs, meanwhile, use the government’s attempt to gain international approval for the project as a weapon in their own fight. One strategy involves Belarus’ participation in the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (the Aarhus Convention), which was signed by Belarus in 1998 and came into force in 2001. All signees were mandated to provide access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters. However, precise mechanisms of public participation are not specified and in Belarus institutions of civil society are excluded from the environmental decision-making process (Novikau, 2015).
In contrast to Chernobyl-related issues, which have not involved any litigation (Kuchinskaya, 2011), Belarusian NGOs have initiated several lawsuits related to the NPP project. In 2009, Ecohome demanded from the NPP administration that the EIA for the Belarusian NPP be made available to the public. The Administration refused to provide printed or electronic copies of the report, arguing that it could be accessed only at its premises and only during working hours. Ecohome filed suit against the Administration in an attempt to force it to provide the documents in hard and electronic copies. During the trial, the Administration voluntarily published the EIA report on its website. As a result, in 2011, the court rejected the suit on the basis that the information provided on the website was satisfactory (Magonov, 2014). Although the case was lost, it has provided a platform for the articulation of the potential issues associated with nuclear power.
Public debate of 2009
The Ostrovets NPP was the first project which caused mass public participation in the discussion of an environmental issue. In order to comply with the provisions of the Aarhus Convention, in 2009 the preliminary EIA Report of the future NPP was discussed with employees of over 1670 organisations (mainly state-owned) and members of 70 NGOs at meetings in which more than 180,000 people participated in total. On 9 October 2009, a public hearing was organised in Ostrovets, in which more than 800 people participated. More than 700 questions were submitted before and during the public discussion, shedding light on public concerns about the project. Most of the questions related to the chosen construction method and technologies used in the NPP, and, therefore, to the reliability of the project and the risk of an accident. People were also concerned about nuclear waste and its management. Other factors such as the economic justification for the project and the availability of other energy resources were also among the popular questions.
The hearing received mostly negative comments from both Belarusian NGOs and the Aarhus Convention. For instance, the latter stated,
The Committee has not been provided with any evidence that the public was involved, in forms envisaged by the Convention, in previous decision-making procedures which decided on the need for NPP and selected its location. Once the decision to permit the proposed activity in the Ostrovets area had already been taken without public involvement, providing for such involvement at the following stage could under no circumstances be considered as meeting for ‘early public participation when all options are open’. Members of the public were impeded in their attempts to submit comments and disseminate them to the public attending the hearing. (UNECE, 2011)
Impact of the Fukushima accident
Although the Fukushima nuclear accident of 2011 did not change the path of the Belarusian nuclear project, it affected the debate surrounding it (Stsiapanau, 2016). The nuclear accident in Japan happened in the time of active negotiation with Russia about its participation in the Belarusian nuclear project. On 15 March 2011, 3 days after Fukushima, Belarus and Russia signed an intergovernmental agreement to cooperate in constructing an NPP in Belarus. In particular, a Russian company Atomstroyexport was chosen as a turn-key construction contractor. Inevitably, Fukushima was mentioned in the state-run media and governmental statements. Although it was admitted that the events that happened in Japan would affect the development of nuclear energy in the world, they would not affect the decision to build an NPP in Belarus (Shavel and Martischenkova, 2013). Similar to Chernobyl, Fukushima was framed in a way so as to distance it from the Belarusian NPP. Mikhail Mikhadiuk, the deputy Minister of Energy, stated that you could not compare Fukushima with the Belarusian NPP: ‘It is like a 30-year old “Mercedes” – it has a completely different level of safety and efficiency. We will have an entirely different project, of a new generation’ (BelTA, 2011). Although state sociologists admitted a certain decline in popular support of nuclear energy in Belarus due to Fukushima (Table 1), they emphasised that the decline was insignificant, ‘within statistical error’, and mostly among a ‘suggestible part of population’, and therefore would not cause a substantial long-term shift in attitude towards nuclear power (Shavel and Martischenkova, 2013). The anti-nuclear coalition made several statements using the Fukushima accident as an argument against the Belarusian NPP. However, since anti-nuclear discourse at that time focused mainly on the economic inefficiency of the project rather than on its safety, Fukushima played a relatively small role in it.
6. Conclusion
The word ‘debate’ in the title of this article and throughout the text may sound confusing for some. Indeed, nuclear debates in the sense of a forum in which both pro- and anti-nuclear points of view are aired, with one party responding to statements made by another, were quite rare in Belarus. Only hearings of the governmental commission in December 1998 and the public hearings in Ostrovets in October 2009 might be partially characterised as debates in that sense. In fact, the pro- and anti-nuclear stances in debates of the 1990s and the 2000s were mostly expressed independently from each other. At any given public meeting, scientific conference or media publication usually only one, either pro- or anti-nuclear point of view was presented. Explicit replies to counterpart statements were also rare. Often discussants attacked not the arguments directly but rather the political and psychological attributes of the counterpart. A good example was the use of the ‘Chernobyl syndrome’ by the pro-nuclear coalition as a tool to undermine concerns about the necessity of nuclear power in Belarus, labelling arguments of the anti-nuclear coalition as emotional and thereby allowing them to be ignored from a ‘scientific standpoint’. At the same time, the anti-nuclear coalition attracted groups unconcerned about the risks associated with nuclear power, but rather using the topic as a vehicle for other political debates.
The nuclear power debate in Belarus demonstrates that nuclear risk communication in the country is affected by the political structure of the Belarusian society. Authoritarian politics affected all three participants in the communication process – the sender, the transmitter and the receiver. The information provided by governmental research institutions – both nuclear and sociological – was deliberately constructed in such a way as to fit with the prevailing political agenda. The mainstream media was turned into passive transmitters, amplifying the governmental voice. Finally, the public and NGOs were not only excluded from the decision-making process but also had their voices muted. Thus, the debate turned into a one-way provision of risk information to the public by governmental structures. Although formally this type of risk communication can be defined as ‘first level debates’ (Jaeger et al., 2001: 133), simply providing information can hardly be viewed as an authentic risk debate because of the lack of necessary mutual trust and respect.
The issue of trust remains crucial in all nuclear debates in Belarus – from Chernobyl to Ostrovets. Discussing post-Chernobyl issues in the former Soviet Union, Shlyakhter and Wilson (1992) conclude, ‘Once trust is lost, it is difficult to regain. It is particularly hard when the people are asked to believe that the effects of radiation, which they do not understand, are limited’ (p. 255). The absence of proper communication inevitably affects public understanding of risk. When discussing post-Chernobyl issues in Belarus, Kuchinskaya (2011) rightfully says, ‘Without adequate conditions for public discussion and articulation, an affected population cannot be assumed to hold special knowledge about imperceptible hazards and their effects or to be the most risk-conscious’ (p. 419). For the nuclear energy issues discussed in Belarus during recent decades, the situation is quite similar. ‘Chernobyl syndrome’ obviously exists in Belarus. Moreover, it still dominates public opinion about nuclear energy. However, the syndrome is not the irrational fear of nuclear energy, as the pro-nuclear coalition in Belarus tends to define it. In a situation in which the majority of the population has personally experienced the negative consequences of Chernobyl, to talk of their fears of nuclear power as irrational is problematic. Obviously, trust cannot be regained simply by providing technical and economic ‘rational’ arguments. Only through an understanding of social concerns and proper responses during authentic dialogues, mutual trust can be gained.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions that helped to improve the earlier version of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.