Evolving power of provincial political families in Thailand

Introduction: The historical development and the weak characteristics of provincial political families

The newness of provincial political families in Thai society is often forgotten by scholars and observers. The majority of these families entered politics only after the 1973 student uprising (Ockey, 2015; Thawatchai, 1998). ¹ Moreover, the power of provincial political families is largely unstable and vulnerable due to three major factors: their relatively late entry into politics; the high degree of competition in local politics; and the strong presence of a provincial bureaucratic structure. The political model of a single dominant family who can successfully monopolise power in their locality represents, in fact, an exceptional case rather than a general pattern. Most Thai political families began to embed their power only during the 1980s–1990s when parliamentary democracy was emerging in place of the authoritarian bureaucratic polity (interrupted briefly by the 1991 coup). Over time, the balance of power shifted from the bureaucratic elites to the metropolitan and provincial capitalists. Electoral politics became more significant as the primary channel to position, privilege, patronage and wealth. This changing political environment provided both opportunities and incentives for business leaders and local elites to enter politics (Anderson, 1990; Ockey, 1992, 2004; Pasuk and Sungsidh, 1996).

The fact that provincial businesspeople lived some distance from the central loci of power and were surrounded by limited local resources forced them to engage in national electoral politics more actively than their Bangkok-based counterparts, many of whom enjoyed proximity to, and financial clout over, the policy makers. For provincial businesspeople, sitting in the national parliament gave them influence over the allocation of patronage and rents and the policymaking process. Local economic conditions also explain why the provincial business elites were eager to enter politics. The economic activities of local provincial elites were neither diversified nor extensive. Most of them focused their investments in their own province or, at most, at the regional level. Generally, they have been unable to establish an economic foothold in the capital, let alone in international markets. Their province forms their business ‘enclave’, which they cannot afford to lose, and so they seek a solid base of political power from which to exert influence (Prajak, 2013).

Since the 1979 election, each province in Thailand has witnessed an increase in the numbers of provincial business-cum-political elites, popularly known as jao pho (godfathers), in national parliamentary politics. Their remarkable growth has attracted attention from observers in the media as well as from scholars. ² With the rise of jao pho came the emergence of provincial political families, whose power and wealth depended heavily on the political success of the family head. Despite the widespread attention given to local bosses and their families, there are two major misconceptions that need to be rectified. Firstly, not every jao pho has a monopoly over provincial political and economic resources; and, secondly, the power held by these families is not static but changes over time. Put simply, I argue that in order to understand the political activities and roles of provincial political families in Thailand, we need to recognise their relative weakness and vulnerability shaped by local and historical contexts.

First, not every provincial boss and their family enjoy monopolistic power in their own provinces, and their acquired power should not be viewed as a permanent attribute. The power of Thai provincial families is more limited than generally perceived and portrayed, and the monopolistic clan is the exception rather than the rule. ³ Thai local bosses are far from being a ‘minimal state’, namely one ‘which enjoys an undisputed control over the use of force in a certain territory and protects everyone, whether they like it or not’ (Nozick, 1974, cited in Gambetta, 1993: 7). In comparison to their counterparts in African countries and in neighbouring Philippines, Thai bosses have limited territorial and coercive power. ⁴ The ‘godfather’ literature which flourished in the 1990s tended to portray the omnipotent image of the Thai provincial bosses and their clan network, represented by just a few spectacular cases. The colourful lives of Kamnan Poh in coastal Chonburi, Charoen Phattanadamronchit (aka Sia Leng) in Khon Kaen and Piya Angkinan in Phetchaburi are the three most cited examples that tend to overshadow and distort the reality for the majority of these families. ⁵ Representations of these notable bosses are also inaccurate; instead of boundless and absolute power, they have had unstable and turbulent political careers (Prajak, 2013: 275–304). The boss’ terrain is, in fact, confined to their home district or province. Undoubtedly, most bosses had large businesses and controlled many subordinates but very few managed to expand their power beyond their own province and then only for brief periods. The power of local political families depends on their ability to monopolise the local economy and political system in which the absence of competition created considerable opportunity for profits and privilege. However, a monopoly is a rare commodity and needs to be established and maintained. Each province has more than one such family whose ambition it is to amass wealth and power at the expense of others and therefore there is a degree of political competition. The successful family is the most competent and cunning in exercising his or her financial, political and coercive resources to weaken and/or even eliminate their opponents. The path to securing a power monopoly, in certain circumstances, may also be marred by violence.

Apart from challenges from these rivals, provincial bureaucratic elites also seek to contest the power of political families. In other words, provincial political clans have had to operate and exercise their power under an archaic bureaucratic structure that has existed in the province since the time of absolute monarchy. It is misleading to think of them as local warlords or patrimonial lords who roamed freely in their territories, operating like a para-state, using power to administer, adjudicate and control all resources. Instead of functioning in the political landscape of a failed or dysfunctional state, Thai provincial bosses emerged and existed under local power structures that had previously been controlled by a coterie of bureaucratic elites: the provincial governor, provincial department heads, district chiefs, sub-district heads, village heads, as well as provincial police chiefs and military commanders. ⁶ The provincial bosses must negotiate, cooperate and/or sometimes strive against the state authorities to carve out their territorial power in their localities.

Since 1973, the wealth and power of provincial political families has varied from province to province and some have been more successful in business and political ventures than others. There is no unified characterisation or pattern of local family rule in Thailand. Any attempt to understand the dynamics of local power and patterns of political contestation needs to take this variation into account. Only a few families achieved a monopoly, which gave them high levels of rent and protection. The rest had to compete constantly against their opponents to acquire and maintain oligarchic positions. After losing several elections, many of them lost their fortunes and political standing, which in turn saw them exit politics. Some political dynasties declined or even collapsed after losing their charismatic patriarchs and in the absence of capable successors. ⁷ Others disintegrated due to intra-clan conflicts. Political bosses and their families therefore emerge and disappear as a result of changing political and financial circumstances. It is mistaken to portray their power as ubiquitous and permanent.

In contrast to the Philippine political dynasties that date from the early 20th century, the majority of Thai political clans entered politics after 1973. Out of 97 clans active in Thai politics from 1933 to 1996 (20 in the North, 21 in Central, 31 in North East, 17 in Bangkok and 8 in the South), only 18 local clans entered politics before the 1960s. And by 1996, all but two of these old clans had withdrawn or disappeared from national politics. ⁸ Moreover, their time in politics is relatively short: 25 percent of political families sustain power for only one or two legislative terms (Thawatchai, 1998: 335). Historically, their instability was due to frequent military coups, which interrupted parliamentary institutions and the electoral process. Their relatively short time in politics also meant these bosses were under considerable pressure from both business rivals and the local state apparatus. Moreover, by the time they had succeeded in climbing to the top of power under the Banharn Silpa-archa administration in the early 1990s, the political and economic landscape rapidly transformed in such a way that seriously reduced their power.

The emergence of Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT) in 1998 along with the tumultuous ideological conflict and the rise of the mass movement after the 2006 military coup, have diminished the status and power of old political clans. The immense popularity of Thaksin Shinawatra and his party subdued the power of political bosses and their families. The political party became a far stronger political institution than factions and families. Political party banners and policies had greater significance in electoral contestation than family names and personalities (Hicken, 2006; Prajak, 2014).

Since the 2006 military coup that ousted Prime Minister Thaksin, provincial bosses and families have been marginalised by street politics. The parliament and electoral democracy have been weakened through army interference, judicial activism and militant social movements. The struggle between the establishment and those aligned with the ousted Prime Minister has deeply transformed Thai politics. Overall, it has made political struggle more ideological. Electoral competition is no longer dominated by campaigns run by local strongmen and networks of their families, but is instead infused with ideological and policy debate. Voters have different political stances and ideas regarding democratic values. Colour-coded politics and ideological conflict at the national level marginalise the position and diminish the power of political bosses and their families at the local level (Prajak, 2014).

Against this changing political backdrop the provincial political families who have managed to maintain their dominance and secured control over their province are rather exceptional. The Thienthongs of Sa Kaeo, the Silpa-archas of Suphanburi, the Khunpluems of Chonburi and the Chidchobs of Buriram are prime examples. ⁹ The problem is these cases tend to be presented as representative of the whole of provincial politics in Thailand. By studying the Khunpluem family dominance in Chonburi, for example, Chaiyon and Chainarong coined the term ‘single faction dominance’ to explain the political life of provincial Thailand, as if this was the general status quo (Chaiyon and Chainarong, 2016: 121). ¹⁰ In fact, the more common situations for the local Thai political landscape are polarisation (two rival factions which compete with one another) and fragmentation (multiple groups which compete against one another). ¹¹

Overall, since 2006, we have witnessed the decline of political families as their power fades and with it their control locally. Those who have been able to sustain their family power are the ones who have a combination of considerable wealth and shrewd political skill and who possess a competent successor. Without this blend of political, financial and manpower resources, the family’s political fortunes would likewise fade away. Ample financial resources are necessary to build reliable and strong networks of vote canvassers to dispense goods and services to the electorate and to form alliances with other elite provincial groups. However, it requires political skill to dispense the money wisely. In addition, in the period of highly volatile politics that has persisted since 2006, savvy skills in electioneering and political maneuvering are required in order for the political family to develop good strategies, form and shift alliances and escape political defeat. Last but not least, having capable political successors is also important. Many provincial political families who have struggled and ultimately failed to sustain their power over a long period of time did so because they lacked competent political heirs and/or because serious conflict emerged within the family itself on the issue of succession.

As a case study of this development, this article traces the history of one of the most prominent Thai political dynasties – the Chidchob family – and explains how it has maintained that power through decades of political and social change. It investigates the political strategies they employed in response to the new political landscape, particularly after 1997. The Chidchobs entered politics in the late 1960s but only gained dominance in the 2000s, and continue to struggle to consolidate their control. The story of the Chidchobs represents the exceptional model, not a general pattern, of a single family’s struggle to build and sustain its dominance. As this article will show, this is a rare achievement requiring political skill, enormous wealth, a capable heir and occasionally the use of violence.

Buriram politics and the struggle for family dominance: Dynastic power, the party machine and ideological contestation

Similar to Suphanburi, often known as ‘Banharn-buri’ after its most powerful patron, Buriram is popularly known as ‘Chidchob-buri’, after its own most powerful patron (Nishizaki, 2011). Beginning in the 1980s and led by patriarch Chai Chidchob, the family was successful in controlling the province from top to bottom, from the city to the rural areas. The Chidchob family applied all available strategies to win over their political and business rivals. Unlike old-style godfathers in other provinces, Buriram’s godfather represented a new style of boss, highly skilled at adapting himself to a changing political world.

For decades, on 4 April every year, more than 10,000 people in Buriram attend an extravagant birthday party for Chai Chidchod at the city’s gigantic field. The family provides thousands of tables, free food and entertainment all night long. The attendees who come to greet the host of the event usually include cabinet members, senior bureaucrats from Bangkok, the provincial governor, the police chief, business elites from Bangkok, local entrepreneurs, the head of the Chamber of Commerce, bank managers, local government officials, celebrities, local polices, heads of housewife associations, vote canvassers and local tough guys. The prominence of the invitees has increased over time, along with the family’s political influence and fortunes. The event is organised by Newin Chidchob, Chai’s fourth child, named by his father after the notorious Burmese General Ne Win.

In 2010, the party was in full swing as Chai had been appointed House Speaker and his beloved son Newin had more than 70 MPs under his control with the newly created Bhumjaitai Party, the country’s third-largest political party. The attendees included not only the Buriram provincial governor but also his counterparts from 10 other provinces, including high-ranking officials from the Ministry of Interior. It was not insignificant that they had travelled from the capital Bangkok to visit the Chidchob patron in the countryside. ¹²

Buriram is one of Thailand’s north-eastern provinces. The province is large in terms of territory and population with 1,652,000 residents, which the 2010 census ranks as the seventh largest number in the country. In terms of economic development, however, the province does not perform well. Its wealth depends primarily on the agricultural sector – rice farming and cash cropping (corn, cassava, sugarcane, rubber trees and eucalyptus). ¹³ Despite its low level of economic development, however, Buriram has political significance due to the sheer size of its population. The province provides nine parliamentary seats where the average for a province is three to four seats. Therefore it is of keen interest to national politicians. ¹⁴ Be that as it may, Buriram’s most striking characteristic is that most of its politicians, including the Chidchob family, come from business elites who accumulated their wealth through the construction business and natural resource extraction industries.

The Chidchobs made their first entry into parliament in 1969 when the family patriarch Chai Chidchob won as an independent. Chai found his fortune in the gravel quarry business. He founded a company called ‘Silachai’ in the city district which later became his family political stronghold. At the same time, he was involved in local political affairs and was elected as a sub-district head. During this time Chai established good connections with his sub-district colleagues, and these connections contributed a great deal to his success when standing for election as a member of parliament ( Matichon Sutsapda, 1993a). Having an official position helped his family amass vast tracts of private and public lands through legal manipulation and loopholes. ¹⁵ During this early period his business and political careers did not proceed smoothly and he occasionally lost elections.

At this time, another prominent sub-district head, Sawat Khotcha-seni, who also owned a gravel crushing plant and construction company, was likewise highly respected locally and tended to overshadow Chai. Locals viewed Chai and Sawat as rivals. In fact, they were friends who had gravel plants located next to each other and whose children grew up together. They merely had different political styles and thus never represented the same ‘team’ or political grouping. ¹⁶ Sawat’s power faded in the mid-1980s as he had no capable political heir. Without Sawat, Anuwat Wattanaphongsiri, who owned several golf clubs and substantial real estate, and Pichit Thiraratchatanon, whose main business was construction, dominated the province. During this period, Chai was running independently or for a different party from Anuwat and Pichit. Over the decades no faction strove for political monopoly in the province. The substantial geographical size of the province was a major obstacle to any politicians moving beyond their constituency. ¹⁷ Each politician enjoyed their own ‘slice of the pie’ in their districts. In this way, for many years elections in Buriram were peaceful and without disturbances.

The situation changed, however, when the second generation of the Chidchob family came on the political scene. Chai’s advantage over his local opponents was his five able sons and one able daughter (see figure 1). His most politically potent son was his beloved Newin Chidchob (1958–), who first served as a Buriram provincial councilor and council president when he was only 27 years old. He was the youngest council president in the country at that time. In 1988, Newin ran for the Lower House and won. By the end of the 1990s, Newin had become a force to be reckoned with in national politics. Newin was more ambitious than his father and was able to achieve more political success than him. He was a rising political star who made his family wealthier and more powerful.

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Figure 1.

The Chidchob family (a selected genealogy).

Prelude to the 2001 poll: The violent path to clan predominance

Conducted under the new constitution of 1997, the 2001 election in Buriram was one of the bloodiest elections seen in the country. It was a critical battle between the Chidchob clan and their enemies. Up to this election, no party or family had ever dominated the province. For example, between 1996 and 2001, 10 Buriram MPs belonged to four different political parties (Ekkaphap, Prachathibat, Chat Phatthana and Khwam Wang Mai). The Chidchob family was the most powerful political clique in the province followed by the Petchsawang group, the Thongsri group and the Liangpongpan family represented by Panawat Liangpongpan. Each group had their own voter base in specific districts built through patronage and personal connections. Despite possessing more power than other political factions, the Chidchob family’s power was limited to the city district and its adjacent areas. To achieve their desired monopoly, the family needed to neutralise the political influence of these three other groups. Their task was made even more difficult when a new player entered the competition in the 2001 poll – Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai (TRT) Party, a newly founded but forceful and affluent party. TRT showed their seriousness by fielding strong candidates, some of whom were Newin’s former opponents.

There was bloodshed relatively early in the campaign. On the night of 18 December 1999, the Democrat MP for Buriram, Panawat Liangpongpan, was shot four times at close range by gunmen outside his apartment in Bangkok on the way back from Parliament. Panawat survived but was seriously injured. Panawat’s attempted murder made headlines in every major newspaper and television station as he was a well-known politician from the party of the current government. The fact that the assassination attempt occurred in the capital during the House session put high pressure on the police to solve the case. Police believed that the murder attempt was connected to political or business conflicts. But Panawat was convinced that it was purely politically motivated, to eliminate him before the next election ( Siam Rath, 1999; Krungthep Thurakit, 1999). The police were able to arrest a gunman within a week. The hitman confessed to the crime and told the police that he had received orders from Taweesak Chidchob, Newin’s older brother. The involvement of a member of the Chidchob clan in the shooting critically damaged the Chidchob name. Newin and Chai held a press conference, denying any involvement in the case and declaring that they had been estranged from Taweesak for a very long time.

In fact, the Chidchobs and the Liangpongpans were almost political identical twins. They had similar family backgrounds, had accumulated wealth in the same ways in the same territories and used exactly the same strategies to win votes. The national media portrayed Panawat’s murder attempt as part of a saga between ‘good politicians’ and ‘crook politicians’, but for locals it was the usual but uncompromising conflict between two forceful political clans competing for the control of the province. ²¹

In January 2000, after recovering from his operation, Panawat gave an interview saying ‘not everyone in Buriram is a godfather. There are only certain families destroying Buriram people’s reputation’. On 17 January 2000 in his criminal court testimony, Panawat made an audacious move by implicating the Chidchob family. He claimed that the primary motivation for his attempted murder was political conflict over the 2001 general election. He said this conflict was a matter of life and death because in the new electoral system of single-seat districts on a plurality basis (or first past the post, FPTP), there could be only one winner per constituency. The fact that his voter base overlapped with that of Chai forced a confrontation between them. Three days after Panawat’s testimony, the court delivered a guilty verdict and sentenced the gunman to life imprisonment for attempted murder. The police also charged Newin’s brother, who was on the run, for masterminding the murder.

Stories about Panawat’s attempted assassination ran for weeks in the media and damaged the Chidchob family’s political prospects. In 2001, again Newin and his faction had difficulty finding an established party with whom to stand in the general election. Finally, Banharn, his former mentor who had expelled him from the party a few years earlier, welcomed Newin back to the Chart Thai Party. Banharn desperately needed Newin’s faction to add more seats to his party after losing many strong candidates to Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai Party. Apart from his hometown, Newin had expanded his political power to cover the constituencies in neighbouring provinces in the lower North East, such as Sisaket, Sakon Nakhon, Ubon Ratchathani and Surin. Several candidates in these provinces were supported by the Chidchob family. Building up a large political faction beyond one’s own home province comes at a large cost. However, Newin’s wealth enabled him to expand his faction. Over the years, his family’s and his associates’ construction companies won many tenders for large government projects. By the end of the 1990s, Newin was one of the 10 richest cabinet members with total assets worth 298.50 million baht. He owned vast tracts of high-priced land in Buriram, Bangkok and Chiangmai, and his wife was even wealthier with a net worth 846.79 million baht (making her one of the richest cabinet ministers’ spouses at that time). ²²

The 2001 poll: The clan, fierce rivalry and the (party) dark horse

The 2001 poll in Buriram was a fierce three-way contest between the Chidchob family and its allies, the Liangpongpan family and Sophon Phetsawang and associates (TRT). Political observers focused on the rivalry between Newin and Panawat. In the end, however, it was the TRT party that emerged as the surprise winner and gained the most from the competition. Buriram electoral results truly demonstrated a significant change in Thai electoral politics, showing that (populist) policy packages and party branding were increasingly significant in shaping voters’ decisions. Clan networks remained important as long as they were able to control vital resources and deliver patronage to the local community, and were also capable of using coercive force to ward off their enemies. The political clans who were not in such a strong position were wiped out by the populist political party.

As everyone expected, the election was violent. Buriram was named one of the most violent provinces in 2001 (Thai Rath, 7 January 2001). The two most violent areas were the first and fifth constituencies. Record conflict levels in the fifth constituency were no surprise as it was the district in which Panawat competed with the Chidchobs. Newin positioned one of his brothers to contest the election against Panawat. As both sides employed coercive force, campaigning exploded with violence ( Matichon Sutsapda, 2001).

The first constituency had many violent incidents too. The constituency is in a long-standing Chidchob family city district and the family has consistently won elections by a high margin in this district. However, Newin fielded his business associate, Prasit Tangsikiatkun, to stand against the TRT candidate, Phanprapha Intharawitthayanan, who was born in Buriram but spent most of her life in Bangkok. Phanprapha was a high-profile businesswoman and socialite, married to a wealthy businessman-turned-politician. She was head of the TRT candidates’ team for Buriram and the party expected her to make her mark in this hard-fought territory. TRT had a bountiful war chest but they lacked a strong team of vote canvassers as they were newcomers to the area. The TRT invested heavily in influential local figures to work as their vote canvassers. Some of those figures were vote canvassers who formerly worked for Newin. This pattern of ‘buying’ votes disrupted the Chidchobs’ long-established political networks, thereby leading to violent tussles over control of the vote broker.

Since both sides felt they could not afford to lose, the first constituency abounded with intimidation, kidnappings, bomb threats, brawls and attacks involving cars with the intention of causing injury. On the eve of voting day, the local election commission and election monitoring group needed an army escort to the first and fifth constituencies, due to reports of impending clashes between opposing groups. Officials seized many weapons that night. One witness commented, ‘I was really scared … it was like they were going to war’. ²³

When the vote counting was over, two victors emerged – the Chidchobs and Thaksin’s party. The Chidchobs grabbed four seats, including one in the first district, in which Newin’s close friend defeated Phanprapha by a very small margin. One of Newin’s younger brothers was elected as a member of parliament for the first time. The TRT, on the other hand, finished with a more impressive performance winning six seats, including in the hotly contested fifth constituency. ²⁴ Surprisingly, in this district a new candidate from the TRT, Peerapong Hengsawat, a wealthy local businessman, emerged as a dark horse defeating the top contenders, including Newin’s brother and Panawat. Peerapong put his win down to Newin and Panawat underestimating him and voters being attracted to and enthusiastically supporting TRT’s populist policies. ²⁵

Generally speaking, TRT candidates’ qualifications were weaker than those of the Chidchob family. Their victory owed a great deal to Thaksin’s popularity and the party’s populist policies. For Newin’s candidates, their victory depended first and foremost on the Chidchob family political machine as much as their own clientelist networks. For the Chidchob team, the party brand contributed almost nothing to their campaign and electoral success. Some voters did not even pay attention to or were unaware of the Chidchob candidates’ party association. In every constituency, electoral results clearly demonstrated this pattern as the number of votes for a TRT’s party-list ballot was higher than the number of votes for its constituency candidate. For Newin’s Chart Thai, the pattern was the complete opposite ( Krungthep Thurakit, 2001). ²⁶ The 2001 election was a competition between the party machines and family networks, or, put another way, between programmatic politics based on policy and party branding, and particularistic politics based on personal popularity and patronage.

The 2005 poll: The political integration of clan networks and party machines

The 2001 election was the last election in Buriram featuring violence. Since then the absence of violence, particularly in the 2005 poll, is the result of political negotiation between two influential figures, Newin and Thaksin. Both were astute politicians who had learnt from the turbulent 2001 poll that it was too costly and damaging to have a head-on confrontation. They struck an important deal for the 2005 election so that both sides could avoid conflict.

The crucial deal was for Newin’s faction to move to the TRT ahead of the 2005 election. In exchange, the TRT assigned him to lead the party campaign in Buriram. For Newin, the best option was working with Thaksin’s party, thereby capitalising on party popularity and material resources to consolidate his family’s power. Indeed, Thaksin’s popularity and the TRT populist policies combined with the Chidchob family political machine to bring the TRT team a landslide victory in Buriram.

TRT won all 10 seats and Chai and Newin entered the parliament as TRT party-list candidates. The 2005 election went smoothly without any violent incident. Other old opponents of the Chidchobs were in no position to compete with the family this time. Panawat Liangpongpan, who replaced Newin as a Chart Thai candidate, was embarrassingly defeated by the TRT candidate for the second time, and by an even greater margin.

After the 2005 election, the Chidchobs’ political power reached its apex. It became one of the most successful political dynasties of the Thaksin era. The family dominated every level of political office in the province from member of parliament to sub-district administration. Newin and his father, wife and younger brother were in the House. His elder sister had been a senator since 2001. At the local level, Newin formed a political group called ‘Buriram Rak Thai’ (Buriram loves Thai(s)), a name that clearly linked and identified this local group with Thai Rak Thai. The Buriram boss exercised his political influence through this local group to assist his brother-in-law, Pol. Col. Chawalit Artarsa, in being elected as the Buriram Provincial Administrative Organization (PAO) Chairman in 2003. Chawalit was elected Buriram PAO Chairman, despite having no political or public office experience or ever having lived in the province. In the campaign, he changed his family name to Chidchob to emphasise his political belonging as his name was not known locally (Achakorn, 2007). As one former provincial councillor put it plainly, ‘the Chidchob family is everything to Buriram politics’. ²⁷ Indeed, most newly elected provincial councillors owed their own election victory to the Chidchob family political machine.

After the 2005 election, Newin was rewarded with a cabinet post and became one of Thaksin’s most trusted political assistants. In the wake of the 2006 coup, coup leaders arrested and detained Newin for several days as they knew he had sufficient influence to organise mass demonstrations against the coup. After he was released, he did not keep a low-profile but instead spoke out aggressively against the coup leaders. He was influential in the formation of the Red Shirt movement. He mobilised people from the North East to organise rallies against the coup-installed government and funded many radio stations and media outlets to launch attacks on the army and on Thaksin’s enemies. Just after the Constitutional Court disbanded the TRT on charges of electoral malpractice in May 2007, Newin and other former party executives formed a new party called the ‘Palang Prachachon Party’ (People’s Power Party or PPP). He effectively became a central figure of Thaksin’s new allied party and a leader of the anti-coup movement, and these two high-profile positions undoubtedly made him a chief enemy of army leaders. ²⁸

The 2007 poll: The emboldened clan, the undying party and army intervention

The 2007 poll was held about a year after the coup and a few months after the promulgation of the August 2007 constitution. This post-coup election was conducted in a tense environment. Heavy army interference in the campaigning ensured the election was relatively peaceful. Instead of electoral killings between opposing political bosses, in Buriram, as in other provinces, there was a pattern of state interference and repression. The military intimidated candidates and vote canvassers from parties allied with Thaksin. The situation in Buriram was arguably worse than in other provinces, as army leaders regarded Newin as Thaksin’s right-hand man. The military aimed to limit Newin’s movements, restricting his capacity to mobilise his political machine in Buriram and elsewhere in the North East region.

Fearing military pressure, several former TRT candidates abandoned Thaksin to run for other parties. In response, Newin recruited former opponents as PPP team members. The military kept all PPP vote canvassers under constant surveillance. They could not go out to campaign without their vehicles being thoroughly searched. Some managed to escape state vigilance, and some mobilised votes remotely from home using mobile phones. One of Newin’s key canvassers commented, ‘it was like playing a game of cat and mouse’. ²⁹ The military operation undoubtedly favoured other parties. Other parties’ vote canvassers were free to campaign and even to buy votes without being apprehended by the police or the election commission. Newin’s political rivals admitted they were ‘indirectly helped by the army’ because ‘a group of soldiers helped obstruct Newin’s vote canvassers in the course of buying votes’. ³⁰ A PPP candidate summed up the situation: ‘in the 2007 poll, we did not compete with opposing candidates, but we fought with a state apparatus controlled by a coup group’. ³¹

Despite every possible form of repression, the election results did not go as the army had expected. Newin helped the PPP win all seats except one in Buriram. The Buriram election commission, however, immediately issued three red cards to PPP’s winning candidates for several charges of voting fraud and they were prohibited from standing again. Newin’s resounding victory embarrassed the coup group and the Buriram election commission and proved how strong his local political machine was. It was a win for Thaksin too because five out of nine winning candidates defeated incumbents who had abandoned Thaksin to join other parties.

Following the consolidation of the Chidchob family’s provincial power in the 2005 election, violent methods became less necessary. The family had created a far-reaching patron-client network to maintain power, disburse various kinds of material resources and support their election campaigns. ³² They turned from bosses into patrons. They gave government projects, public funds and local administrative jobs to campaign workers, vote canvassers, business associates and relatives. Newin’s Cabinet positions and his father’s seat on the House Budget Committee made it possible for the family to channel public resources to fund their political networks. Also, the Chidchobs adeptly utilised Thaksin’s popularity and TRT and PPP resources for their own personal advantage. Since the late 1990s, when they were elected, many family associates were able to secure income from government construction projects, mainly from the Department of Highways, the Marine Department, the Department of Public Works and Town and Country Planning and the Airport of Thailand Public Company Limited. The clan-controlled Buriram Provincial Administrative Organization (PAO) was another major source of patronage flow. Normally, the PAO allocated each Chidchob-aligned provincial councillor a large budget for jobs and local development projects in their constituencies.

Newin treated those in his network fairly. He promoted bureaucrats and assisted local politicians in winning elections. They, in return, mobilised votes for him (if they were local politicians) or turned a blind eye to illegality, providing him an unfair advantage over his opponents during elections (if they were bureaucrats). The Chidchob’s absolute control over the local bureaucracy made violent methods unnecessary. Uniformed men facilitated and protected illegal electioneering. Many officials were cogs in the family’s political machine. In a clan-controlled province, the power relationship between bureaucrats and elected politicians was clearly unbalanced.

It was this kind of political influence over the local state apparatus that put the Chidchobs at a distinct advantage at every stage of the election process from voter registration, campaign conduct, ballot counting to election complaint adjudication. It was not a level playing field. A senior Buriram police officer commented, ‘since 2005, election contests [in Buriram] have been completely controlled by one political network’. ³³

Even though the Chidchobs’ political machine was very solid, Newin still demanded a lot from politicians and from his vote canvassers. They had to visit their constituencies every weekend and attend to voter needs. Newin dismissed those who failed in these tasks and recruited more capable people to the network. ³⁴ He used strong-arm tactics against those who betrayed him or were recalcitrant. And those outside his network faced difficulty gaining access to local resources or winning seats in elections. Local people referred to the Chidchob family ‘ban yai’ (‘big house’ or ‘house of the big man’), and it was popularly said ‘all roads in the province lead to the Chidchob family’, as the family has controlled nearly 90 percent of provincial elective posts. ³⁵ The Chidchobs certainly also had a fair number of enemies in the province, though no one had the audacity to challenge their power overtly.

The 2011 election: Battle between Newin and Thaksin

The general political backdrop to the 2011 poll was complex. After the 2007 elections, Thaksin’s allied party PPP was able to form two coalition governments in 2008. However, Yellow Shirt protestors, backed by traditional elites, paralysed both governments. Two Prime Ministers from the PPP party had been forced to step down as a consequence of controversial rulings by the Constitution Court in September and December 2008 respectively. The PPP party was dissolved by the Court and all executive members of the party were banned from any involvement in political affairs for five years. Newin decided to abandon the PPP for his political survival. As Thaksin’s right-hand man and a key figure behind the Red Shirts, Newin was under severe pressure from the army and the establishment.

Soon afterwards, Newin formed a new political party named Phumjai Thai (Proud to be Thai), and switched his support to the opposition Democrat Party leader, Abhisit Vejjajiva. Nearly 40 PPP MPs also defected and joined Phumjai Thai. ³⁶ Without Newin’s support, the political manoeuvre of the traditional elites in thwarting Thaksin’s power and elevating Abhisit to the post of prime minister would not have succeeded. Abhisit rewarded Newin with lucrative and highly powerful ministerial posts for his party members ( Matichon Sutsapda, 2009a).

It was ironic that, in an attempt to destroy the Thaksin dynasty, the army and other traditional forces were willing to collaborate with a provincial boss like Newin, whom they had once considered one of the nation’s most unscrupulous politicians. Indeed, the establishment put their entire faith in Newin’s ad hoc party, believing that Phumjai Thai would defeat the PPP in many constituencies, particularly in the North East. Therefore, in the 2011 election, the country witnessed a very strange combination of bedfellows – national military-bureaucratic forces and local bosses. However, it turned out that the Phumjai Thai Party did poorly nationally, gaining only 34 seats and 3.94 percent of party-list votes. The only place that the party performed well was Buriram, the political turf of Newin’s family.

The Chidchobs’ party-switching put Buriram voters in a difficult position. They wavered between voting for the local patron, Newin, or the national populist, Thaksin. Many simply said they loved both: ‘Thaksin is a great leader and I like his party’s populist policies’, and ‘Newin is good as well. His followers visit the constituency regularly. Newin is kind and generous. He has always given us whatever we have asked for’. ³⁷ But if forced to choose, voters seemed to choose the one who provided them with immediate benefits. ³⁸ However, not every Buriram voter shared this practical mode of thinking, particularly staunch Red Shirt supporters. One Red Shirt leader said, ‘I dislike Newin and Phumjai Thai because they betrayed Thaksin. They were not grateful to Thaksin’. This supporter strongly believed Red Shirt members would not vote for Newin.

In the 2011 Buriram election, the Thaksin-allied Pheu Thai Party was the only serious challenger to the Chidchobs since other parties were too weak to compete with the clan. However, the Pheu Thai Party did not commit significant resources in Buriram as the party executives thought it was too costly to fight with Newin in his political stronghold. They believed it was more rational to channel resources into other provinces rather than wasting them in Buriram. Pheu Thai expected to win only two or three seats in Buriram. In some constituencies, especially Newin’s hometown, the Pheu Thai Party had difficulty fielding qualified candidates because nobody wanted a direct confrontation with the Chidchobs. In Buriram, the only Pheu Thai strength was the Red Shirt’s steadfast support. Even though the Red Shirts were not satisfied with the quality of the candidates fielded by the Pheu Thai Party, they still strongly supported Thaksin and the policies of the party. ³⁹ In the run-up to the election, Red Shirts dutifully organised meetings, knocked on doors and distributed campaign leaflets. Just before the election, Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin’s sister, and other leading Pheu Thai leaders, went to Buriram to campaign. They emphatically announced that the Phumjai Thai Party was the archenemy of Pheu Thai and Thaksin. They told voters that if Pheu Thai received enough votes to form a coalition government, they would definitely not invite Newin’s Phumjai Thai Party to join the coalition. This announcement illustrated a new political phenomenon in Thai politics. The Pheu Thai party realised the Red Shirt movement would lose faith in the party if they did not take a tough stance on Newin.

The mass Red Shirt movement significantly shaped the party’s choice of coalition partner. Previously, political parties were not differentiated in terms of political ideology or policy platform and thus were willing to form a coalition with others if they successfully negotiated cabinet seat quotas and other vested interests. In the past, personal enmities among party or faction leaders could be easily forgotten or trumped by political expediency. Therefore, the overt and unwavering antagonism between Pheu Thai and the Phumjai Thai witnessed in the 2011 election marked a watershed in Thai politics. ⁴⁰

The 2011 Buriram election was peaceful and one in which the province witnessed a new pattern of political competition. Rather than a group of local factions or families vying with each other for electoral seats, Buriram experienced a political battle of mass mobilisation and ideology between two formidable figures, namely Newin and Thaksin. Colour-coded politics and ideological conflicts between the Abhisit government and the Red Shirt protestors dominated the general election and at the local level superseded particular family-driven politics.

Nonetheless, electoral results demonstrated that in Buriram the family’s political machine remained strong. The Phumjai Thai party secured seven seats and the Pheu Thai party managed to obtain two. Party-list votes, on the other hand, signalled that Thaksin’s allied party and his policy were still highly popular among the Buriram electorate as Pheu Thai received 329,568 votes in comparison to Phumjai Thai’s 226,741 votes (Election Commission of Thailand, 2012: 6). It simply meant that large numbers of voters cast their ballots for Newin’s candidates but did not support Phumjai Thai – a political manifestation of divided loyalties.

Given that Pheu Thai swept up 104 out of 126 seats in the North East region, the seven seats Newin and his family secured in his home province represented an important success. Except in Suphanburi and Chonburi, no other political clan elsewhere in the country was able to withstand the immense popularity of Thaksin and Pheu Thai as well as the Chidchobs. ⁴¹ The Chidchobs have been one of the very few political clans that has managed to survive and maintain power in the midst of the political storm of deeply polarised politics that the country has witnessed since the 2006 coup. Overwhelmingly, in electoral politics elsewhere, the political polarisation had clearly worked in favour of the two major contending parties – Thaksin’s allied party and the Democrat Party – with a detrimental effect on minor political factions and political families (Pasuk and Baker, 2013; Prajak, 2014).

Conclusion

Under the emerging parliamentary democracy of the late 1970s, elective posts became a major source of patronage, protection and high rents, thus providing incentives for provincial business elites and their families to enter electoral competition. From 1979 to 1997, the fragmented multi-partied party system and weak coalition government provided a favourable political environment for provincial families to assert their power at the national level and play important roles in shaping Thai politics. To be able to exercise their power in the parliament or the cabinet, they first needed to secure a political base in their home province. But gaining local dominance is a daunting task for any political family as they have to rival with other ambitious clans and negotiate or challenge the bureaucratic elite.

Provincial bosses also face higher stakes in elections than do other types of candidates since their family’s wealth is mainly based on rent-seeking and trade in the illegal economy, which requires political connections. They struggle hard to win electoral competitions, to eliminate their rivals and consolidate their long-time control over provincial territory. Not every family has succeeded in doing this: some families are able to gain dominance for a short period of time and then fade away. Those who have managed to sustain dominance, as demonstrated in the case of the Chidchob family of Buriram, are the ones who have good command over the use of wealth, electioneering skills and manpower.

Structural and institutional changes after 1997 did not favour the provincial families. The 1997 constitution and the new style of politics introduced by Thaksin and the TRT reduced the role of provincial bosses and their family network. Despite the fact that Thaksin and his Shinawatra family are the political masters of the party, Thaksin’s success in elections has been largely based on a strong party machine and populist policy package, rather than on old-style family-based politics. This explains why Thaksin’s allied parties had won four general elections consecutively since 2001, despite the 2006 coup, two party dissolutions and an electoral system (in 2007) designed to weaken them.

During the peak of Thaksin and his party’s popularity, the best strategy for survival for provincial politicians was to join the TRT, as the Chidchobs and several other families did in 2005. Parties became much stronger than families and factions. Many influential political families who lacked political endorsement from Thaksin’s party lost out. The political families who still managed to win seats in their own province without the help of strong parties were those who had a vast and well-oiled political machine of their own. In Buriram, the strength of the Chidchob family’s patronage network was proved in the 2011 poll when Newin defected from Thaksin and yet his family still won a majority of seats.

The turmoil that has engulfed Thai politics since 2006 is not yet over, but there are clear signs that the influence of the provincial families is diminishing. They have been tamed, weakened, co-opted and made less relevant with the rise of policy-based and ideological struggles. Party stances, policy packages and political ideology have shaped the decisions of voters to a greater extent than family fame and personality.

Functioning as political dynasties, provincial elites are inevitably faced with the issue of succession and the sustenance of their familial power. The power of many prominent political families is in decline. Some prominent bosses who are heads of such political families have been arrested and prosecuted, some have died of natural causes and others have failed to adapt to the rapidly changing political and economic environment. ⁴² Several clans who have lost their patriarchs are facing difficulty keeping their power intact, as the younger generations are often proving themselves to be incompetent and inexperienced, and/or lacking in charisma and leadership skills. The success of the Chidchob family stems from the fact that their second generation is capable and skillful. However, a challenge now lies ahead of them as their third generation is still too young to take on family businesses and politics. It remains to be seen whether they are able to carry on the legacy of the Chidchobs. ⁴³ Nonetheless, until now the Chidchobs have represented a provincial family that has bucked this trend of the declining influence of provincial political dynasties in Thai politics. Families who can adapt to change, like the Chidchobs, can be expected to continue to survive; but their roles in Thai politics are diminishing in the era of mass mobilisation politics and military dominance.