Abstract
The results of the 2013 Philippine mid-term elections highlighted the dominance of political dynasties in the country. With all 80 provinces littered with political families, 74 percent of the elected members of the House of Representatives came from such dynastic groups. Despite overwhelming recognition that political dynasties breed patronage politics and corruption, no substantial steps have been undertaken to address this issue. This article examines the general nature of Philippine political dynasties, the reasons for their continuing existence and their adverse impact on the country. This problem emanates basically from three factors: (1) the political and socio-economic foundations upon which political dynasties are built; 2) the inability to effectively implement Philippine constitutional provisions by enacting an enabling law; and 3) the weakness of potential countervailing forces that would challenge political dynasties.
The so-called ‘People Power Revolution’ in February 1986 raised hopes that the dominance of the Filipino oligarchic class would be ended or seriously diminished, 1 but this was not to be the case. As one commentator put it, ‘The first elected Congress of the post-Marcos era, installed by the May 1987 elections, turned out to be a replica of the pre-martial law era. Of the 200 elected House of Representatives, 169 (84.5 percent) were members of pre-1972 traditional families’. 2 This signified a general trend in modern Philippines politics that continues until now.
In 2011, when handing down judgment in a case involving a dispute around electoral boundaries, Supreme Court Senior Justice Antonio Carpio defined political dynasties as a ‘phenomenon that concentrates political power and public resources within the control of a few families whose members alternately hold elective offices, deftly skirting term limits’. 3 Two years later, in the 2013 Philippine mid-term elections, the dominance and perseverance of political dynasties in the country was again clear. 4 Election results showed that members of political families were present in all 80 provinces and made up 74 percent of the members of the House of Representatives. Of the 23 sitting senators, 19 were from political families. Furthermore, 85 percent of the provincial governors and 84 percent of the town mayors belong to political families. 5 Although there seems to be overwhelming agreement that it breeds patronage politics and corruption, the substantive steps taken to address this political phenomenon have all so far been rendered futile.
This article outlines the origins and general nature of Philippine political dynasties, and examines the reasons for their continued existence and their adverse impact on the country. It will argue that the resilience of political dynasties is due largely to the following factors: first, the formidable political and socio-economic foundations which established political dynasties; second, the failure to effectively implement constitutional provisions to address the adverse effects of political dynasties; and third, the weakness of potential countervailing forces against political dynasties.
The rise of political dynasties
The family is the foundation of Filipino political dynasties. In the scholarship in this field, if not yet constitutionally, it is widely agreed that the definition and understanding of what constitutes ‘family’ in this context refers not only to blood relatives but also to ‘primary groups’ – small, informal and non-specialised groups that openly and intimately interact with each other. For example, Park’s definition of the political family is broad and inclusive, extending to ‘the kinship group, the peer group, the group of friends and playmates, and the informal group of co-workers’.
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As McCoy further explains, in the political sphere, family ties acquire greater meaning and importance beyond the household. Many politicians try to transform their electoral offices into lasting family assets, building on what Filipinos call a ‘political dynasty’. Once entrenched, influential politicians often work to bequeath power and position to their children, in effect seeking to transform the public office that they have won into a private legacy for their family.
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two key elements seem to have contributed most directly to the formation of powerful political families – the rise of ‘rents’ as a significant share of the nation’s economy and a simultaneous attenuation of central government control over the provinces. The results are the privatization of public resources which has strengthened a few families while weakening the state’s resources and its bureaucratic apparatus.
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Following independence in 1946, the story of the political family is one of remarkable resilience facilitated by a combination of militarisation and economic diversification. In keeping with Sidel, as McCoy explains, the Filipino oligarchy was further strengthened as the fledgling Philippine central government effectively lost control over the countryside to regional politicians, some so powerful that they became known as warlords. Reinforcing their economic power and political offices with private armies, these warlords terrorised the peasantry and extracted a de facto regional autonomy as the price for delivering their vote banks to Manila politicians.
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Upon declaring martial law in September 1972, Ferdinand Marcos disarmed the provincial warlords and stripped the oligarchs opposed to him of their wealth. He transferred their assets to his relations and retainers. The late 1970s saw a new system of power sharing emerge between the political executive and the oligarchs. However, ‘(i)nstead of breaking the entrenched provincial elites and ruling through the central bureaucracy, Marcos tried to control them by creating a new stratum of supralocal leaders whom he financed with rents’. 16
After the fall of Marcos in 1986, new party elites emerged from ‘a broader economic base and diverse career backgrounds, and they were more disposed towards free enterprise and limited government’.
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Nevertheless, the diversification of economic interests adopted in the post-war period among elites, both established and emerging, continued.
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The resilience of the established political dynasties across the decades was in great part due to their ability to diversify economically, enabling them to adapt and hold on to their political power. At the same time, for new dynasties, the accumulation of a diversity of economic interests means that a small dynasty can emerge from even the poorest provinces of the country. As David and Legara explain, While in office, they amass both money and political capital through favors and patronage-driven spending of public funds. They collect enough to field multiple family members in the next elections. Armed with the advantage of capital, all members enjoy an advantage and then many of them win.
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Patronage politics
As patrimonial politics became ingrained in the Philippine state in the post-war period, political dynasties were also strengthened and the need for the oligarchy to entrench itself in Philippine politics through dynasties was intensified. 20 In addition to expanding their economic interests, it was also ‘common for families to diversify their political networks to guard against changes in political leadership’. 21 According to Parks, the ‘oligarchy’ can be viewed as a subset of political families and comprises ‘a small group who are a very powerful and prestigious element of the political families and, as such, are the upper echelon of the ruling class’. 22 Following this definition, Hutchcroft describes the Philippine state as a ‘patrimonial oligarchic state’ 23 whereby ‘the dominant social force has an economic base largely independent of the state apparatus, but the state nonetheless plays a central role in the process of wealth accumulation’. 24
The scholarship in this field recognises variants of political dynasties within Filipino politics. McCoy observes that the main ways political dynasties perpetuate themselves is through political violence and rent-seeking, with the former prevalent in the provinces and the latter concentrated in the cities. These political families generally fuse local power with national access by delivering blocs of votes ‘by whatever means’. 25 As for the rent-seeking families, McCoy cites Eugenio Lopez as the most prominent case of someone who ‘used his commercial and legal skills to become the Republic’s leading rent-seeking entrepreneur. Simultaneously, his younger brother Fernando maintained the family’s political base in the home province of Iloilo and used it to bolster his climb to national elective office’. 26
In addition to economic, military and bureaucratic means, another power base for political dynasties in the Philippines is through electoral politics and networks. 27 Mojares points to the Osmeñas of Cebu as an example. By winning ‘mandates’ from the voters in their local province, which comprises 25 percent of the population of the Philippines, this family have successfully extended their power base from the local to the national level of politics. 28
Adverse effects of political dynasties on Filipino society
The persistence of political dynasties in the Philippines is acknowledged as bringing adverse effects on the country including the perpetuation of poverty and underdevelopment, the propagation of political and socio-economic inequality and the prevalence of massive corruption. Political dynasties breed an incoherent economic policy that has stunted the development of a strong state apparatus whereby ‘the personal favor and disfavor of those currently in power is a critical determinant of business success and failure’. 29 Empirical evidence also shows ‘a significant relationship between political dynasties and lower per capita income, higher incidence of poverty, and lower human development indices (specifically, lower primary elementary completion rates) in their areas’. 30 Members of political dynasties in Congress are also wealthier (as evidenced by their statements of assets, liabilities and net worth) than their non-dynasty colleagues’. 31
Political dynasties are also symptomatic of the country’s underdevelopment because many of these political families come from very poor regions and provinces that rely heavily on the central government. These political clans act as ‘channels for Manila’s beneficence’, deriving kickbacks from public works and other public projects. In the process of ensuring funding support from Manila, ‘they neglect the programs to foster commerce and development in their territories, a task that requires vision, competence, and ethics, which they sorely lack’. 32 A 2012 study found that political dynasties have also perpetuated political inequality ‘which reinforces the unequal distribution of political power thereby producing a type of low level democratic equilibrium where mutually reinforcing forces of weakened democratic institutions lead to poor economic outcomes and vice versa’. 33
Socio-economic and political inequalities are further perpetuated with the association of political dynasties with massive corruption. This in itself is a ‘form of threat to democracy’, a kind of distortion in social relations, and makes the field of competition (such as political competition) uneven. 34 It was also pointed out that when a family member takes over when the term of an incumbent runs out, there are no checks and balances in place over the process. 35
Tackling dynastic dominance
Constitutional attempts to challenge political dynasties
After the 1986 People Power Revolution, there was an attempt to curb the power of political dynasties through significant constitutional efforts. The new Philippine constitution issued in 1987 included provisions for term limits, an anti-dynasty provision and party list representation. Provisions on term limits were instituted in the 1987 Constitution as a means of breaking ‘the perpetual control, from generation to generation, of the old oligarchy and political families over various policy-making institutions’. 36 The term of office of senators was set at six years with no senator serving for more than two consecutive terms, while members of the House of Representatives were limited to three consecutive three-year terms. However, established political elites have easily circumvented the term limit clauses by ‘passing their congressional seats on to their heirs’ or re-contesting the seats after a short absence. 37
The Anti-Dynasty Provision was instituted in Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution and prescribes that ‘the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law’. Aside from this, there are other relevant constitutional provisions, for example Article 7, Section 13 bars presidential relatives from office. 38 Several bills have also been proposed but are mostly in hiatus with either the House Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms or the Rules Committee. None have come close to being passed into law. 39
There are other major obstacles to the implementation of the constitutional provisions on eliminating political dynasties. One substantial hurdle is that those in Congress charged with enacting and implementing law themselves belong to political dynasties. A second hindrance is the different interpretations among legislators on what constitutes a dynasty, and thirdly, some politicians simply do not see anything wrong with political dynasties. 40
In an attempt to break this logjam on the Anti-Dynasty Bill, in December 2013 Caloocan Rep. Edgar Erice of the Liberal Party introduced a bill limiting the number of MPs from one family to one or two members at most. The bill proposed limiting the number from one family holding or running for office in ‘successive, simultaneous, or overlapping terms’. 41 Anti-dynasty advocates were allowed a glimmer of hope when the bill successfully reached the plenary in the House of Representatives in mid-2014. Known as House Bill 3587 or an ‘Act Prohibiting the Establishment of Political Dynasties’, the bill had made slow progress to the plenary where it was then stalled and has since remained. 42 As Edgar Erice himself admitted when he introduced the bill, its success was always in doubt given that of the 290 members in the House, 180 would be affected by his proposed original cap of one family member only and 60 of the total would be impacted if the cap was upped to two members. At the time it was debated, House speaker Feliciano Belmonte commented that a limit of one family member had ‘absolutely no chance’ of passing in Congress while he doubted whether a dynasty cap of two would be enacted either. 43
Since mid-2013 the Philippine Senate has filed another three anti-dynasty bills. One bill proposed an even stricter version than House Bill 3587, allowing only one member of a family to run for office in all levels. 44 Unsurprisingly, it too failed, paving the way for the further proliferation of political dynasties in the coming May 2016 national elections. These failures were especially disappointing for advocates, since in his sixth and final State of the Nation Address in 2015, President Benigno Aquino III (despite having relatives of his own in public office), had endorsed the anti-political dynasty bill. 45 As will be explained below, however, Aquino’s message on political dynasties has also been highly inconsistent.
The system of party-list representation
Another potential foil against political dynasties is the Constitutional provision for party-list representation in Congress, which seeks to remedy the problem of under-representation by less privileged classes of society.
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As Coronel observes, in contrast to the traditional electoral system of ‘simple plurality or first-past-the post’, which only favours members of the major established parties, the goal of the party-list system was to open up the hall of Congress and political society to … the marginalized sectors including labour, peasant, urban poor, women, and other civil-society groups, which had so far been underrepresented in the institutionalized political arena. The intent was to allow the delegates from small parties, particularly those from the left, to have a presence in the hall of Congress …
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The Local Government Code
The enactment of the 1991 Local Government Code (LGC) which devolved significant powers to the local government units (LGUs) provided some hope in altering the character of Philippine political parties and lessening the hold of political dynasties. The Code provided local governments with greatly increased and automatic financial allotments from the central government, ranging from 11 percent to as high as 40 percent of its internal revenue allotment (IRA). 50 As a consequence, local officials have become less dependent on patronage resources from Manila, whilst, on the other hand, national-level politicians still need local assistance in securing the votes from the provinces. 51 The LGC also mandates an increased role for NGOs in local governance bodies.
The LGC was thus seen as encouraging ‘new types of popular participation and new types of political leadership at the local level, which in turn can engender new pressures for important political reforms at the national level’. 52 However, several challenges confront the proper implementation of the LGC: traditional politicians continue to dominate through patronage and coercion; the presence of NGOs remains uneven and insufficient to fill available positions on local special bodies; and non-traditional and well-intentioned officials are largely powerless as they are simply too small or too poor to invest resources of their own. 53
Tests of resilience
Aside from the various constitutional and legal efforts to restrict political dynasties, there are other potential challenges to the dominance of the political family. Quite simply, one challenge facing dynasties is to be able to adjust to the changing times. As pointed out, political families like the Osmeñas of Cebu have generally adapted to shifting conditions, as Mojares describes, by ‘modifying their rhetoric by adding new messages, revising their campaign style, and addressing new issues’. 54 This has enabled some to appropriate new symbols and co-opt new leaders, but pressures from below have also made this difficult to sustain. 55 The 2013 elections seemed to validate this, as political families that have long dominated Cebu slowly lost their grip on their traditional power base.
Political dynasties have also faced challenges from the new breed of celebrity politicians in the Philippines who have cashed in on their popularity and successfully run for office, in the process toppling members of political dynasties. One example is Ted Failon, a popular broadcaster for ABS-CBN, a major television network in the Philippines, who defeated a member of Imelda Romualdez Marcos’ clan of Leyte, to win his parliamentary seat in 2001. In the more recent 2013 elections, Maria Leonor ‘Leni’ G Robredo, widow of the late Interior and Local Governments Secretary Jesse Robredo, won a congressional seat in Camarines Sur garnering 80 percent of the votes. 56 She defeated a member of the Villafuerte clan, which has been in power in Camarines Sur for over 40 years. 57 In addition to the celebrity candidates, though in no way what could constitute a sustainable trend, there are examples of NGO and church personalities who have successfully challenged political dynasties at elections. This was seen, for example, in the much celebrated victory of NGO activist, Grace Padaca, as Congressional representative of Isabela, Northern Luzon and governor of Isabela in 2004, over the powerful Dy family dynasty. 58
Presidential plays
As in the past, the role of the Philippine president is crucial in sustaining or hindering the power base of political dynasties. President Aquino played a role in perpetuating political dynasties during the May 2013 elections, coming under fire for including in his advisory team – Team P-Noy 59 – members of political dynasties including his own cousin Paolo Benigno Aquino. The basis of Philippine presidents’ support for a political dynasty appears to be a simple case of reciprocity for support given to his/her administration.
During the 2013 elections this was seen with the defeat of all members of the dominant Jalosjos clan in Mindanao, previously undefeated since 2001, to Liberal Party candidates in the provinces of Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga Sibuguey and Misamis Occidental. This defeat was credited to President Aquino’s support for the local Liberal Party’s campaign to strike a fatal blow on the Jalosjos clan’s grip on local politics. 60 On the other hand, Presidential backing does not always guarantee a win. In the case of Panlilio, despite Aquino’s support for his candidacy in the 2013 gubernatorial race in Pampanga, he lost to Pineda by a margin of four to one. 61 Through his Liberal Party, President Aquino also played a role in divisions and feuds within political clans such as the Ecleo family of Dinagat Island, a province in the Southern Philippines. The party backed Jade Ecleo in a failed bid for the vice-governorship during the May 2013 elections against her mother Glenda Buray Ecleo. Through their religious cult, the Philippine Benevolent Missionary Association (PBMA), the Ecleos have dominated politics in Dinagat for several decades. 62
The role of the president to potentially make or break political dynasties came to public attention in August 2013 with the ‘pork barrel’ scam. This involved alleged ‘con-artist’ Janet Lim-Napoles, who was accused of being the mastermind of a P10-billion scam using the priority development assistance funds (PDAF), or pork barrel, of five senators and 23 congressmen over the past 10 years for ghost projects channelled through bogus NGOs. 63 The public see the pork barrel funds as resources used by Philippine presidents to perpetuate dynasties, as the ‘main sources of financing for projects or assistance that politicians belonging to known political clans deliver to their constituents’. 64 Despite an initial refusal, public outcry and protest actions forced President Aquino to announce the abolition of the Congressional pork barrel, with the exception of the fund allotted to his office. The initial scandal resulted in the Office of the Ombudsman charging three senators and Janet Napoles with plunder. This did not, however, appease an enraged public, which continued to demand the abolition of the Presidential pork barrel fund. The result was a drastic drop in Aquino’s popularity rating by 15 points to 49 percent in mid-2013. 65
Poverty and socio-economic inequalities have been major factors in the perpetuation of political dynasties in the Philippines and their persistence has placed great pressure upon the government to implement economic policies which will address ‘inclusive’ growth. In May 2013, the Philippine economy posted a stunning quarterly growth of 7.8 percent, outperforming China and the rest of Asia. This data came right on the heels of the election results, reinforcing the dominance of political dynasties in the country. 66 While raving about the unexpected growth, Presidential spokesperson Abigail Valte acknowledged that it needed to be sustained to enable the masses to benefit from it, admitting that ‘the trickle-down effect does not happen overnight’. 67
The role of civil society
Traditionally, in the Philippines strong challenges to the status quo have been mounted by social movements and from within civil society. The split in the mainstream Philippine Left movement in the early 1990s over ideological and strategic differences has stymied this potential countervailing force. 68 This break between an orthodox reaffirmist group (RAs) and an opposition rejectionist faction (RJs) occurred in mid-1992. RAs maintained that the left revolutionary movement should continue to strictly adhere to the orthodox Marxist-Leninist and Maoist principles that they had advocated from the early days of the movement in the late 1960s, while the RJs opted for exploring other non-mainstream left paradigms and more nuanced strategies of struggle. The weakening of the left movement is also because it is perceived to be unable to offer any concrete or feasible alternatives to what traditional politicians are offering. Given this, its preferred electoral strategy is through alliances with the traditional elites, which in turn has damaged their reputation and tainted their moral authority.
There are, however, civil society movements in the Philippines that are not part of the left ideological blocs and which have spearheaded a campaign against political dynasties. One of these is the Movement Against Dynasties (MAD) supported by the Catholic Church hierarchy. MAD maintains that there is no such thing as a ‘good’ political dynasty. Ahead of the May 2013 election it launched a petition to gather at least 5.2 million signatures to push for a people’s initiative to put an end to political dynasties. 69 At the time, the group recognised that it would be a significant challenge to gather the required signatures as stipulated by Republic Act 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act, to mount an initiative in which ‘the people themselves would craft an enabling law that would define and ban political dynasties’. 70 At the time of writing, this petition has fallen short of its target. Moreover, in November 2015, a founder of MAD and the so-called ‘father of the anti-dynasty campaign’, Quintin “Ting” Paredes San Diego, was assassinated on his property in Dingalan, Aurora. 71
Nevertheless, perhaps the most formidable stumbling block to the ability of popular movements to mount a serious challenge to dynasties is the economic growth and aid-dependent model pursued by all ruling regimes since independence. This development model is based on neo-liberal strategies of free trade, market liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation which have continuously exacerbated political and social inequalities and widened the gap between rich and poor. With the impact of these strategies as a context, Hutchcroft sums up the situation for potential countervailing social forces: ‘External resources and economic growth have done more to strengthen the oligarchy’s hegemony than to encourage the growth of social forces to challenge it’. 72
Conclusion
A Pulse Asia survey of 1800 registered voters conducted in January 2016 revealed that public opinion on political dynasties in the Philippines is split. 73 The poll showed that 32 percent agreed that ‘one should not vote for candidates who have children, spouses, siblings or parents who are current or former elected government officials’, while a further 34 percent disagreed, and the remaining 34 percent were undecided. Given this lack of significant popular concern about their role, it will be no surprise that the May 2016 national elections have once again been dominated by political dynasties.
Since the American colonial period, political dynasties in the Philippines have continued to gain prominence and become more widespread nationally. Their resilience is due to various mechanisms at work within the patrimonial state such as rent-seeking, warlordism, electoral politics and patronage networks. The results are rampant patronage politics, corruption, poverty and underdevelopment and glaring socio-economic inequalities. During the post-martial law period, institutional efforts have been sought to address the elimination of dynasties. These include the 1987 constitutional anti-dynasty provisions, term limits on members of Congress, the party-list system and the 1992 Local Government Code. As evidenced by the results of electoral contests over the years, all have been ineffective in curtailing the dominance of political dynasties. Lawmakers in a position to enact the enabling law to implement the anti-dynasty Constitutional mandate have different perceptions of precisely what constitutes a political dynasty. But the bottom line is that an overwhelming majority of the legislators are themselves from political clans.
That Philippine presidents, including the incumbent, Benigno S Aquino III, support political dynasties so long as these are supportive of his/her administration is a major impediment to real change. Aquino’s rhetorical support for the anti-dynasty bill in late 2015 was contradicted in statements made in a televised presidential debate in February 2016 by presidential candidate Vice-President Jejomar Binay who commented, ‘Why would there be a law preventing those who want to serve (the country), are qualified and elected in honest elections?’. 74
Other potential challenges to the political dynasty, including individual candidates, remain the exception rather than the rule and have been shown to be unsustainable. Aggravating this situation is the inability of social movements and civil society to challenge the power base of these political families or to affect public opinion. A major reason for this is the decline of a once formidable left movement due to ideological divisions, which have driven its various factions to enter into counterproductive alliances with traditional elite and dynasty-infested parties.
Such is the state of Philippine political society, the paradox of a country with one of the most vibrant popular movements in the region but which is dominated by the hydra of political dynasties. The consequence of this is a dysfunctional democracy and electoral system in which the political hegemony of elite families endures, the majority of Filipinos remain marginalised and disempowered and wealth and power is increasingly in the hands of the few.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.