A German Preference for a Medium-Range Battle? British Assumptions about German Naval Gunnery,1914–1915

In several recent studies of the Royal Navy a theory has emerged about the development of British battle-fleet tactics. It is suggested that, in the period leading up to the battle of Jutland, the Admiralty possessed intelligence which indicated that the German naval leadership, if it sought to fight at all, wanted to engage at medium range, where its superior secondary batteries and heavier torpedo armament could be used to maximum advantage. Rather than seeking to frustrate this desire by manoeuvring to keep the battle at long range, the British, it has been argued, decided to accommodate to the German preference, but only with a view to using their superior main armament to unleash a concentrated five-minute pulse of fire at the approaching German vessels, before turning away. This article looks at one of the underpinnings of this argument, namely British intelligence on German gunnery. It shows that from the start of the First World War, if not earlier, the Admiralty had information that contested the idea that the Germans wanted a medium-range engagement. Not only was it discovered that the Germans had been practising long-range firing for some years, but, in addition, early wartime encounters with German vessels, for example at the battle of the Falkland Islands, showed that they had developed considerable proficiency in it. This quickly led the Royal Navy’s top leadership to the conclusion that engagements at maximum range rather than medium range might better reflect both German capabilities and intentions and that British tactics would need to take this into account. In the light of this finding, Grand Fleet Battle Orders, which have defied obvious explanation when it was assumed that the British naval leadership expected the Germans to seek a medium-range engagement, can now be put into a more logical context.