Abstract
This article deals with the implementation of British blacklists in Spain, leading to a case study not widely seen before in the international historiography of the First World War. It shows how British intervention in the southern and eastern Spanish markets set a de facto model for the operation of the embargo system. Under the strong stimulus of economic nationalism, the British actions regarding the commercial vetoes were tested against Spanish local interests during the short war (1914–15). The initiative was supposedly fuelled by a sense of revenge against pre-war Germany’s commercial progress as well as the desire to control a very appetizing market share, for the British and French alike. In a climate of inter-Allied commercial rivalry, this study focuses on the key role played by members of the consular service. It explains the spurious motivations that in many cases underlay the practical implementation of the blockade from below, and analyses how partisan procedures which lacked homogenized and clarified criteria for collecting and applying commercial intelligence challenged British strategies and the inter-Allied united front in Spain until well into 1917.
By contrast to what happened elsewhere in Europe, where the controversy over the Great War took shape around international responsibilities once hostilities broke out, public debate in Spain arose over its domestic position towards the conflict. Neutrality appeared to be a mere subterfuge used by discredited politicians to keep control and stability as well as to silence popular demands for electoral integrity. Spanish historiography has been dominated by such a national perspective because of the breakdown of the constitutional framework between 1917 and 1923, which marginalized the complexity of the inclusion of the neutral position in the global stage of the conflict. 1
So it might appear that there is little new to write about the war of 1914 with regard to Spain. However, if we are to develop a fuller understanding of the conflict, the relations between belligerents and neutrals remain an important area of study. The neutral countries’ low profiles had long been justified by their peripheral or marginal locations in relation to the hotspots of the confrontation. This resulted in the development of a theoretical approach based on how neutrality should have worked, not on how it really worked. On the whole, Spanish neutrality has traditionally been examined through official statements.
The best-known case studies of what happened in the northern European neutral countries have proved that relations with belligerents could hardly be restricted to a merely legal status. With regard to the Netherlands, for instance, van Tuyll, Abbenhuis, and more recently Kruizinga have shown the unprecedented intrusion into the Dutch economy by Britain and Germany, giving remarkable examples of violations of neutrality from both sides. 2 So, then, what could be said about the Spanish experience of the effect on its economy of commercial war antagonisms?
Two lines of study can be clearly identified in the literature: one concentrating on the legal and political aspects of neutrality, whose first exponent was the classic work of Fernández de la Reguera, and the other focusing on the mobilization of intellectuals and public opinion, for and against the Central Powers in a kind of civil ‘war of words’, whose leading contributor was Díaz Plaja, later updated by Meaker and Romero Salvadó. 3 The overwhelming tendency to focus research in these two areas has obscured the need to pay attention to a third crucial aspect of the war: the plans and activities of the warring powers for neutral Spain between 1914 and 1918. Carden has concentrated on German policy towards neutral Spain, and French Hispanists, chiefly Delaunay and Aubert, have worked on Allied propaganda and, to a lesser extent, French mining corporations’ strategies. 4 Nevertheless, the different approaches to studying Spain’s role during the war tend rather to rise from political interpretations than from research focusing on the development of belligerent strategic goals in neutral Spain. One important recent exception has been the contributions of Fernando García, whose work has looked at the various facets of Spain in the Great War, including the missions of the Allied secret services in the western Mediterranean. 5
There is a full range of international and national factors to be taken into consideration in analysing the interference of the belligerents, because neutrals could not challenge external pressures in the same way. Northern European states were able to maintain their neutral status, whereas southern European and Mediterranean neutrals, such as Italy, Portugal, and Greece, entered the war. Indeed, Spain made an exception to that rule not only because it maintained its neutrality, but also because it strengthened its connections with the Entente between 1914 and 1918. Spain was the largest of the European neutrals and the most self-sufficient regarding minerals and foodstuffs. Most importantly, its geostrategic position between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic increased its importance for the belligerents beyond the sphere of diplomacy. From this perspective, it is a good case study not only in order to understand better the Madrid government’s benevolent policies towards the Entente, but also to challenge traditional neutral perceptions of total war. The Allies’ immediate basic objectives in Spain were to control the production and export of raw materials (such as pyrites, lead, and iron) essential for war industries and to control shipping lanes in the Strait of Gibraltar. Although they started from a primarily defensive approach to safeguard areas of influence over a particular geopolitical and economic area, the goals of France and Britain gradually moved towards a more offensive position in Spain during the course of the Great War.
Hence, the inevitable extension of the fight to neutral countries demonstrates one of the most complex challenges for combatant states. The war forced them to build up military capabilities while at the same time developing mechanisms to establish some degree of influence in important areas far from the hotspots of the conflict. The Hague Protocols (1899, 1907) did not provide the necessary guarantees to preserve the rights and duties arising from declared neutrality. The initial hope that the war might be short and lead to a lasting peace explained the degree of improvisation of the warring strategies in neutral arenas. These began with the gradual implementation of the commercial blockade.
So in order to place Spain in the general scheme of the First World War, this article will analyse the British blockade from below, on the basis of the factors which played an important role in setting bans on local trade, while at the same time attempting to define British objectives and incentives, and the chronology of the blockade’s implementation. In the improvised Spanish theatre of operations, clearly foreseen from the spring of 1915, the warring powers found themselves relying on well-established consular agents to take the lead against the enemy, initially by cutting off their supplies. Sooner rather than later, blacklists became one of their most powerful instruments for commercial intervention, a rewarding tool easily adaptable to international circumstances to the benefit of Britain.
Members of the consular service did not hesitate to use their power over export and import licences to promote specific products or goods in Spain. And, as other studies have already shown in Asian and Latin American contexts, ‘the terms “enemy nationality” and “enemy association” allowed for much interpretational leeway’ for the sake of business. 6 If American or Swiss interests suffered ‘from the Divine Right that made Englishmen believe that all trade is theirs’, the Spanish were not an exception. 7 The term ‘German’ was used to denote ‘enemy’ in many instances, and even for the sake of convenience in cases where the arguments and conclusions applied to what were not specifically German organizations. 8
Therefore, policies to counteract German commercial networks were also used to intensify the Spanish traditional commercial and financial dependence on Britain. Between 1910 and 1913, Spanish imports by country of origin came from France (15.80%), Britain (17.70%), and Germany (9.90%). Similarly, top export destinations were France (24.90%), Britain (21.40%), and Germany (5.90%). According to the commercial data, during the conflict German imports were reduced to 0.90% and exports to the Central Powers were completely eradicated (0%). 9 This study will prove that the British hard-line strategy against the enemy on commercial grounds seemed inevitably to drive Anglo-French competition.
If we follow Soutou’s arguments, the Allied blockade can be seen as not simply a self-defence mechanism against the aggressive plans of a central European economic bloc, especially given its consequences for inter-Allied relations in neutral arenas. 10 I have used some case studies which have already been analysed in a previous study, and amplified their scope to include new sources as well as present an innovative approach to British blockade policies for an anglophone audience. 11 General statements on the history of the blockade need to be reconsidered by understanding the grassroots effects of blacklisting, while at the same time finding more creative ways of connecting micro and macro levels of analysis.
I. Business as Usual in Spain?
The Great War sneaked unannounced into neutral Spain, overwhelming any precautions taken by the political class of the Restoration, as well as by the diplomatic representatives in Spain of the belligerent countries, especially those who had most at stake: the Allies. In particular, members of the consular services of France and Britain were the first witnesses and, later, players in the far-reaching changes that the conflict was to produce in Spain. Many of these changes were linked to the opportunities the war offered to extend the influence of their respective countries. They thus understood, earlier and better than anyone else, that their national interests would turn this neutral territory into another hotspot of the war against the Central Powers. 12
Against this background we may see as significant the words chosen by Luigi Arduini, Italian vice consul in Alicante, to inform his superiors in Rome about what was happening in Spain: It is inaccurate to say that Spain stays out of the conflict: it has been experiencing war, probably to a greater extent than any other neutral country, as much in the social and political fields as at the economic level. Spain, without being in war, has the war at home.
13
To confirm this it was enough to observe the scene in Mediterranean ports such as Alicante, which was overflowing with goods waiting to find a destination in a belligerent country, either of the Entente or of the Central Powers. It was in this particular climate of ‘war’, which would very soon be visible in maritime, peripheral, and export-oriented Spain, that blacklisting would find its justification. Indeed, the business intelligence gathered by the French and British consulates was the key to their expansion in southern and eastern Spain.
The blacklist was a register of natural and legal persons, with whom nationals were prohibited by their governments from contractual union, so closing any type of business or financial operation. However, from the beginning, its application presented difficulties in neutral countries, both practical and legal, creating contradictory de facto and de jure situations. For example, while the French had a specific law which interdicted trading with German residents abroad, the British administration refrained from any action in this regard. Although there were internal pressures in Britain, concurrent with the French legislation, to amend and extend the Trading with the Enemy Proclamation of 5 August 1914, they were successfully opposed by the Board of Trade with the parliamentary support of the Liberals (Trading with the Enemy Act, September 1914).
This does not mean that exports from neutral ports were not an issue for the British government. Francis Hopwood, civil lord of the Admiralty, was commissioned in August 1914 to chair a committee to inform and advise the Home and Foreign offices on the traffic in transit to Germany. One of the main tasks of the Committee on Restriction of Enemy Supplies was to prevent goods from reaching the enemy via neutrals and to hamper the British sales to neutral purchasers who were not willing to guarantee that their imports were for domestic consumption. It was, however, a very different matter to place legal restrictions on British trade. Thus, while a French citizen was totally forbidden to remain associated with persons of enemy nationality, regardless of their place of residence, the British could theoretically keep their German partners or do business, provided the registered office of the firms involved and the origin and/or destination of the transactions were not located in an enemy country. Although in 1915 the criterion of extraterritorial law was established when considering certain operations dealing directly with neutral interests, it was not until February 1916 that a legal move was made towards the broader endorsement of blacklisting as a tool in the fight against trading with the enemy, regardless of origin and nature, neutral or otherwise. 14 The embargoes therefore represented one of the most controversial extremes of the application of the doctrine of contraband of war and its attendant concepts within the policies of naval and economic blockade. 15 Although this controversy had complex political and legal implications in the United Kingdom between 1914 and 1916, the subject of this article is not so much them as an analysis of their repercussions on the practical implementation of blacklists in Spain.
The principle of freedom of trade, defended by representatives of the London Chambers of Commerce in the autumn of 1914, was never an obstacle to interfering in trade for the sake of national defence. 16 The war appeared to be an interesting and lucrative stage in the redistribution of markets, and blacklists presented a very competitive environment where British subjects working and living in neutral countries could gain new shares in a market, to the detriment of German trade. 17 What follows, therefore, is an analysis of the factors that influenced the introduction of British embargoes in Spain.
II. Bases for Intervention
For the Allies the Iberian peninsula’s importance was initially based on their concern for control of the sea. Between September 1914 and January 1915 the most urgent task for the French and British was to monitor and, if necessary, prevent the naval communications and business transactions of the Central Powers between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic seaboard, while at the same time guaranteeing their own. One of the first tasks in Spain was the imposition of rules for the gathering and management of business information, connecting the activities of the Naval Intelligence Centre in Gibraltar with Foreign Office policy in Spain. Not only were commercial interests cancelled, but logistical and strategic aspects came into play. Hence, one of the most urgent areas for action was the Strait of Gibraltar.
In the first place, control over the strait was necessary to hamper the illegal traffic of arms to Morocco, channelled by the Mannesmann brothers, technical experts and businessmen, who had created an authentic empire based on concessions in Moroccan iron-ore mining. 18 On 19 November 1914 Major Charles Julian Thoroton, in charge of the Naval Intelligence Centre in Gibraltar, had an interview with the British ambassador in Madrid, Sir Arthur Hardinge, about a matter connected with the Mannesmanns’ activities. A report came in regarding the presence in Malaga of the German officer Felix Wisotzky, who had arrived in Cadiz in September aboard the Norwegian steamer Unita. Wisotzky’s mission apparently consisted of contacting a score of German officers, who had arrived in Malaga from Morocco and the United States, with the aim of laying underwater mines around Gibraltar. It was essential for the consular network to find out about the Mannesmanns’ businesses in Malaga, Cadiz, and Seville, and in particular about the purchases of vessels from local shipping companies. 19 The prevention of acts of sabotage against the colony’s naval base thus became one of the principal duties of the Admiralty’s naval information service in Spain during the first weeks of the conflict. Indeed, information about the machinations of German espionage would provide the first opportunity for The Times to place Spain on the map of an embryonic and still far-off conflict. 20
Consulates in the Spanish Levante
In December 1914 French and British consular representatives were more concerned by the strength of German commerce in the Spanish Levante than by the supposed enemy blocking of the Gibraltar naval base. Between January and May 1915 the commercial departments received a significant amount of information from the south of Spain about the activities of German residents. On 19 April 1915 the French consul in Malaga, Louis Santi, stressed to the Directorate of Foreign and Commercial Affairs the need to take action against the great number of agents from enemy countries that were operating along the Spanish coast between Huelva and Cartagena. 21 In fact they were Spanish citizens whose surnames may have gone back three generations, and many of them did not even speak German. In the same vein, Santi’s British counterpart in Malaga, Henry Montagu Villiers, also set to work, instituting a series of proceedings affecting this group. In Almeria, for example, the vice consul John Murison had discovered an illegal traffic in small quantities of wolfram, which were sent to Holland in barrels supposedly meant for the transport of grapes. 22 The accumulation of hundreds of barrels for weeks in the port of Almeria, as a direct result of the hostilities, made it easy to get hold of the barrels, to falsify their labels and so use them for the distribution of other products. Personnel from the Department of Naval Intelligence were requested to come and investigate this enemy network of illegal trade from Spain; among them were the famous novelist and member of the Royal Marines, Alfred Edward Woodley Mason.
The war might offer certain opportunities for the enemy in Spain, and what happened in Almeria meant that it was necessary to investigate not only what was transported and by whom, but above all where it was sent. Between January and May 1915 a monthly export of 200 tons of olive oil had been recorded from Malaga to the Italian ports of Oneglia and Porto Maurizio. 23 In addition there was an increase in demand for the product in France (via Sète and Marseilles) and the United States (via New York). Particularly striking was the case of fruit. Massive quantities of almonds, raisins, and wine left the ports of the Malaga district for other neutral states in northern Europe, in the build-up of commercial relations with Scandinavia and the Netherlands. The most frequent destinations were in Denmark (Copenhagen, Odense, Kolding, and Aarhus), Sweden (Stockholm, Gothenburg, Halmstad, Malmö, and Helsingborg), Norway (Christiania/Oslo, Ålesund, Trondheim, Stavanger, Bergen, and Bodø), and the Netherlands (mainly Amsterdam). Clearly, this phenomenon could not simply be explained by the distortion of the markets and international trade brought about by the suppression of supply from the warring states. Specifically, the inclusion of figs in the diet of the soldiers, and the high content of glyceride compounds in olive oil and their chemical use in the manufacture of nitroglycerine, encouraged the representatives of the Entente to begin to take action. Fruit exporting and oil manufacture were local businesses whose products might fall into the category of contraband. 24
In late March 1915 the British foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, instructed consuls in Malaga and Barcelona to maximize the surveillance of items likely to follow the route via Italy and Switzerland to Austria-Hungary and Germany. 25 The Malaga office was noted for its initiative in investigating firms engaged in that kind of traffic. In December 1915 distributors of agricultural food products operating in the district were included in what could be considered a de facto blacklist, including Baquera, Kusche & Martin, Garret & Co., Federico Gross & Cía, Heinsdorf & Lemke, Loos & Gompels, Petersen & Co., Rein & Co., Scholz Brothers, and Torres Roybon. 26 Upon the recommendation of the consular office, companies began to suffer precautionary measures, such as the termination of British coal supplies from local agents and, later, the paralysis of the credit that financed trade with Scandinavia. After consideration of each case by the relevant committee of the Foreign Trade Department, numerous contracts were terminated because the payments for these transactions were made to order via deposits in the London Joint Stock Bank. However, the withdrawal of banking facilities by the cancellation of accounts or the freezing of deposits would generate considerable controversy, and not only in Spain. Walter Cunliffe, governor of the Bank of England, was not always in favour of such interventions in the financial system, as he made clear on 23 May 1916 to the commercial department of the Foreign Office. 27 As reinforcement, the French also froze the channels of credit.
The reservations of the Bank of England had a legal basis, since there was no express provision for the inclusion of some of the companies affected in the Class A/Consolidated List. In fact those reservations went beyond legal niceties. There were three types of blacklist: A, firms with which no trade should be done; B, highly suspect firms; C, firms that required watching. This precautionary classification was maintained when the blacklist became the Statutory List in February 1916. Several businesses in Malaga found themselves legally defenceless. The protests of the local business media were therefore not long in appearing. Throughout 1916 La Defensa, one of the Spanish publications to enter the blacklists as Germanophile, carried on an intensive campaign against the British consul. Furthermore, the lists could be legally binding only on British citizens. In practice Villiers was trying to make the bans on trade binding on local firms. He was accused of coercing the owners of shipping companies, coal shippers, and agricultural and food distributors so that they would breach their obligations to the banned companies, all to the benefit of his British compatriots. 28 One of the export companies that benefited most from the new situation in the Spanish Levante proved to be Thornton y Cía, owned by the British vice consul in Malaga. 29
Thanks to media pressure and the mediation of the Spanish Ministry of State, some of the businesses affected were able to have the financial restrictions partially lifted. Despite the protests of the Spanish government, British representatives in Spain – whether consular service personnel, agents of Lloyds of London, or Gibraltar naval authorities – continued to interfere with all Spanish shipping companies in order to make them yield to their demands, particularly in relation to the portfolios of clients and the distribution of tonnage. For the companies, at stake was not only the supply of coal but also the ability to emerge unscathed from the naval searches made by Gibraltar patrol vessels. In 1915 companies such as Transatlántica or Ybarra took several complaints to the Ministry of State for this reason. 30 In the face of criticism from the Spanish authorities and the Spanish press, Villiers himself reminded the ambassador in Madrid, Sir Arthur Hardinge, that consuls were only a means to an end that, despite the legal ambiguity, was covered by the offices in London. After the war Villiers stated that ‘compiling and amending this Black List was arduous and very exacting work for British consuls’. 31 But in his case the collateral and bilateral problems of the implementation of the bans were handsomely offset by their virtual profits.
However, not all consuls shared this unwavering enthusiasm for the policy, with its dubious legal cover. Among the less enthusiastic was the consul general in Barcelona himself, Charles Smith, who had jurisdiction over the ports of Alicante, Valencia, and Palma de Mallorca. As in the district of Malaga, trade statistics provided by the Spanish customs authorities and processed by the consulate staff put the focus on the true destination of exports through the ports of the Mediterranean to France and Italy. Cargoes of olive oil, lead, manganese, and copper came by coastal shipping to the port of Barcelona for re-export. In 1915 the process of gathering and organizing trade information monopolized much of the human and financial resources of the consulate in the city. That year Smith maintained a constant flow of letters to the ambassador and the foreign secretary asking for more resources, as well as for precise instructions on procedures to be followed with companies. 32 The consulate in Barcelona decided to apply a policy guaranteeing the rights of the Spanish companies. Staff answered queries issued by their superiors at the Foreign Office and Board of Trade. But Smith’s low level of activity continued. In fact the Committee on Restriction of Enemy Supplies considered reports coming from Spain to be meagre. 33 This was a period in which Villiers’s office became the most active source of information on the traffic in transit from Spain via Barcelona to Italy.
There is no doubt that the perception of the German threat in the trade area played an important role in the early stages of embargoes (OED) imposed in the Spanish Levante. However, between 1915 and 1916 there was some inconsistency in the application of sanctions against companies at a local level, depending fundamentally on consular initiatives. Would the same thing happen in other areas of activity or business? Would the idea of enemy danger have the same influence? In answering these questions, the following section contrasts the Spanish Levante with the experience in the western districts of Spain, closely linked to mining interests, which were practically ‘colonized’ by the Allies.
A particular case study: western mining districts
One area vital to British interests was the Cantabrian coast. The consolidated monopoly over the industrial and financial heart of Bilbao led from the start of the war to, if anything, tighter controls than those which were already imposed on Spanish production and trade. Prices for the trade of coal and iron ore with Britain were imposed to such an extent on carriers that they chose to lease their vessels directly to the British. Among them were important firms such as Altos Hornos, Sota y Aznar, or Orconera Iron Ore. Simultaneously, a lengthy legal process started in London for the sale of the Orconera shares owned by Friedrich Krupp. 34
In this area the only real threat from the enemy was attempts by German submarines to interrupt naval communication channels between Bilbao and Wales. It is precisely here where blacklists came into play, with special features regarding their implementation in Spain. As the maritime aspect of the blockade became more important, supervision of commercial activities fell to a member of the Naval Intelligence Department in Spain, Lieutenant Albert E. Dawson of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve. He was also acting, interestingly enough, as the vice consul for trade in Bilbao. 35 Hence, from the outset individuals were blacklisted who were suspected of involvement in the network providing fuel and supplies to German submarines. One of Dawson’s main objectives was to deny the Germans access both to the boats and to local stores of fuel and other oil products.
Commercial intelligence in northern Spain had a special character, as priority was given to military and strategic considerations. More interesting was the introduction of blacklisting to the districts of the south-western ferro-pyrite belt, where they acquired greater importance as an instrument of commercial interference. It was precisely these which would have a more direct effect on inter-Allied relations.
On 22 December 1914 the French consular agent in Huelva, Monsieur Marchal, had suggested that it would be appropriate to include pyrites as war contraband in the Journal Officiel. Until that point Marchal had confined himself to providing information about the German engineers hired by consortiums with British capital in the area. However, the French blacklisting of individuals soon spread to the companies that employed them. The main consortiums involved were British (Peña de Hierro Copper Mines, San Miguel Company, and the United Alkali Company), since the introduction of British capital in this sector had generally taken place with the cooperation of German technology. All these companies found themselves threatened with the loss of their licences to export copper to Marseilles. 36
For this reason the consul general in Seville, Arthur L. Keyser, advised the Foreign Office on the wisdom of dismissing from the British companies any employee of enemy nationality and any Spaniards of dubious sympathies. The war was not an issue as remote from Spain as some managers in London believed. The prevention of sabotage, coinciding with the early submarine campaign in the North Atlantic, gave the consul another persuasive argument. Those employees could report to enemy spies the dates of departure of ore from Huelva, the names of the ships carrying it, their routes to its final destination. After sending a report to the Intelligence Division of the Admiralty, Keyser knocked on the doors of the managers of the companies concerned in order to make them give in to the new conditions regarding their staff. 37 After overcoming protests such as ‘as it would be bad for business to quarrel with him’, he succeeded in having the manager of Peña and San Miguel, the German Ludvig Linnartz, replaced by his vice consul in Huelva, Alfred Attwood. 38 This operation was repeated with other companies under identical conditions in autumn 1915. Allan Henderson, vice consul in Seville, would play the same role as Attwood by substituting individuals of enemy nationality at the head of their management.
Having overcome that initial hurdle, the tight British control over both the production and marketing of pyrites was guaranteed by the all-powerful Rio Tinto Co. However, we may wonder about the reasons surrounding the early and determined French interest in the use of legislation to curb contraband in a sector dominated in terms of production and distribution by Allied interests. In this respect a memorandum prepared by the French National Office for Trade in July 1915 called for an effort to achieve a change in the structure of the world market of pyrites. According to a report of the special envoy to Spain, Marius André, the French seemed to be unaware of the existence of average exports of 3,000,000 tonnes of iron with an annual value of 30,000,000 francs. Of these, 350,000 tonnes belonged to the Société française des Pyrites de Huelva. However, the French merchant fleet hardly benefited from the 3,500,000 francs represented by the transport of this share of the production. Statistics were quite conclusive on this point. In 1913 the pyrites loaded from Huelva and bound for France, Algeria, and Tunisia had been transported in 87 Spanish ships, 9 British, 8 Italian, 2 German, 2 Danish, 5 Norwegian, and 5 French. From this point of view the financial structure of the Spanish merchant fleet gave an overwhelming advantage to the British, and the withdrawal of export licences could therefore be an instrument to enable the French to challenge British hegemony. 39
Within the context of the war, exhortations to commercial patriotism fell on very favourable ground with certain sectors of the French business community in Spain, to such an extent that the German threat was diluted by the intensity of the Allied commercial rivalry. They may have been associates in war but they were adversaries in peace. Nonetheless, German targets remained a priority, as the letters exchanged between the French consular agent in Huelva and the president of the Chamber of Commerce of Limoges reveal: It is important to substitute, wherever possible, German trade for the French. Although the fight is already harsh, I have no doubt that, if our efforts are united, progress will be quickly made in advantage of French industries and commerce. We should not overlook new sources of wealth. The French Government has not entrusted me to find the ways to that purpose but, if we work to promote trade in Huelva, the sources for national wealth will certainly be increased. At the same time, we will be attending to the wishes of the French companies and individuals located in this province.
40
Clearly, in the absence of Germany, the British were the principal and immediate competitors for the French. Precisely in order to promote the interests of national trade, in September 1915 the French proposed to create a regular sailing route between Huelva and Marseilles. 41 However, in order to cover the needs of wartime industry, cooperation with the British was necessary. Under these circumstances, the French were obliged to set aside the nationalist argument as unfeasible. The opportunity proved very different for British interests.
The nationalist alibi in the south
In 1916 the extension of British lists in Spanish commercial districts, especially in the south-east where they had been introduced under strong consular pressure, clearly showed how strong a motivation local commercial rivalries were in international war. In many cases the harassment of interests allegedly in enemy hands was a convenient pretext for undermining the more advantageous positions of competitors, regardless of their nationality and allegiance to one side or the other. The French tried it in the south-west, and the British would follow suit.
On 19 February 1916 Villiers informed Hardinge of the opportunities presented by blacklists in Malaga’s trade in oxides: ‘Moreover, when war is over and Germany requires large supplies of red oxide there will only be one German factory in Malaga, instead of two, and the best supplies of crude ore will already be under our control.’ 42 The British hoped to move into a sector where the French and Belgians were well placed, with the Sociedad Anónima Española Metalúrgica-Minera (Société Anonyme des Hauts Fourneaux, Forges & Aciéries). The blacklists seemed to be an ideal instrument to achieve this objective. One example of this exploitation of the blacklists can be seen in what happened with the factory of Carlos Ayasse. He was a Spanish factory owner of central European descent who decided to transfer his business in 1916 when faced with the impossibility of obtaining suppliers of coal after the blockade. One of the members of the Patriotic League in Malaga, Lancelot Colvile, offered to buy the factory with a mixture of Spanish and British capital. If he controlled the factory, he would be able to supply the British lead producer, Sopwith Lead Co., on more competitive terms. However, Colvile was not the only party interested in making an offer to buy out Ayasse. In no time Colvile’s competitors were recommended for inclusion in the blacklist. 43 Without guaranteed supplies of British coal, the purchase of the factory would make no sense.
The policy of transfers promoted by Villiers, and warmly welcomed by his compatriots, produced results. In September 1916 British demand already absorbed 89.66% of the local production of oxides, as against the 57.74% share of December 1915. 44 The bans were not only an effective weapon but also an extremely flexible one to promote specific or general British interests, as each case required. Their implementation usually depended on the correlation of forces involved at the local level. One of the most significant examples of how this political dynamic played out locally is provided by what happened with La Compañía Sevillana de Electricidad, which in theory met all the requirements for appearing on a blacklist. 45 The ban was therefore removed, in spite of the fact that its director general, Otto Engelhardt, had been acting as consul and head of German espionage in western Andalusia. 46 The independence of the electric company from British imports of coal, and its position as a supplier to the British companies the Seville Water Works and the Seville Sulphur & Copper Co. Ltd, made it advisable to adopt a policy quite different from that followed with the German electricity company AEG in the rest of Spain. On 8 May1916 distinguished members of the British colony in Seville argued as follows to their consul general: ‘Thus it might seem an unnecessarily provocative act to attract attention by placing the name of this firm on the Black List.’ 47 One of the opinions which carried most weight in this regard was that of John MacDougall, owner of a pottery factory in the municipality of San Juan de Aznalfarache, and director of the Seville Sulphur & Copper Co. Personal interests led British representatives to choose an alternative channel of intervention. 48
These examples show the flexibility of the British system, even though the use of the dreaded blacklist would also entail certain disadvantages for the British. This was particularly the case for the legitimacy of the Allied cause in Spain. Given this kind of casuistry, it was common to hear talk of the British ‘blacklist business’, in which German propaganda found a particularly fertile field to win over Spanish public opinion. Among the press La Defensa was one of the most outspoken and hostile towards what it considered the abuse of blacklists on the hardest-hit commercial communities, such as that of Malaga: ‘Move over and let me in.’ What does the Government think of this? Do we Spaniards not deserve a little more respect from the Consular Gentlemen of the Entente, or shall we see the fulfilment of the proverb ‘De la calle vendrá quien de tu casa te echará’ (‘The one who throws you out of your home will come from outside’)?
49
For the Italian vice consul in Malaga, Giovanni di Modica, the blacklists did not reflect favourably on the image of the Allies. 50 This opinion was not shared by the French, who in an assessment commissioned by the Army General Staff on the work of Allied propaganda wrote the following: ‘The blacklist is our best propaganda in Spain.’ 51 Of course, the consequences of the bans provided a convincing argument to discourage cooperation with German agents in Spain.
In any case, the British knew that, quite apart from the propaganda use that could be made of their lists, excessive pressure on the markets might also prove to be counterproductive in economic terms. As early as 1915 members of the consular service expressed their concern about the substitution of imports being detected in the energy sector: when coal supplies were withdrawn from embargoed companies, alternatives were found.
52
The consul general in Seville expressed himself in those terms on 22 October 1915, addressing a British wholesaler: We do not know what may happen after the war but for the present it is necessary to keep off the American coal at all costs as, once they get in and find the stuff is really very good, there may be great difficulty in ousting them.
53
The US government had been negotiating bilaterally with the Spanish administration for the abolition of the customs barriers that taxed the importation of coal and achieved the abolition of the transport tax in April 1915.
In the same context the importation of cotton to Barcelona had already given a dramatic example of some of the problems generated by American competition. The supply of American cotton in the market mitigated the effects of the withdrawal of British import licences on the textile industry. In 1916 the port of Barcelona received 5,016,000 bales of Indian cotton which, together with 735,000 from Egypt, fell far short of 12,938,000 bales imported from the United States. 54 The consul general in Barcelona, Charles Smith, warned that the same could happen with coal.
However, despite the most pessimistic forecasts, the relative positions held by the British and Americans in the Spanish energy market were far apart. In general the American supply of coal in Spain remained stationary. In addition, the decrees issued by the Spanish government to regulate the shipping of wheat and coal in March 1916 put imports from Britain back on more competitive terms. 55 Two important factors enabled the British to outdo the Americans. First of all the British enjoyed the support of the Spanish government. Secondly, the robustness of the British monopoly which controlled the channels of import and distribution, in addition to the greater part of the necessary productive network, was no match for the Americans. British consular representatives maintained their capacity to intervene through the office of naval transport and through the supply of coal from approved agents.
III. Rationalization and Optimization of Procedures: The Embassy’s Role
As we have seen, the British embargoes on Spanish companies had been the first link in a chain of actions aimed toward their replacement by, for example, British investment or British management. However, entry into a new phase of hostilities in 1917 would entail modifications in this scheme of operations. The rise to power of Lloyd George in December 1916 marked the turning point. His cabinet endorsed a package of measures to provide the blockade policies with more resources and embodied them in the Statutory List. Under previous administrations, this list had gained recognition among neutral countries from as early as February 1916. Now, British work in Spain could proceed in two directions: optimizing the management of business intelligence and cooperating with their French ally on the embargo policy.
One of the first practical measures implemented in this second stage was the codification of the data-collection process through the so-called Form K (Commercial Information Report) already designed in 1915. From January 1917 onwards, members of the consular service collected the data required, covering aspects such as the following: business reputation, modes of transport chosen by companies, port agents and routes selected, trade balances and those of the companies’ partners abroad, and reasons why, if applicable, these companies were not marketing British products or operating with British companies. The information was regarded of vital importance because the compilation of a complete index of the reports sent by each British Chamber of Commerce would serve as its own intelligence system with regard to export trade. 56
The intention behind this was to reduce the dysfunctions caused at the operating level by inconsistencies between lists, a natural consequence of the disconnection between the work of the various consular offices in Spain and other neutral countries. Another objective of the new protocol was to end the partial and arbitrary application of lists because, more often than was desirable, commercial patriotism had served to benefit only private interests. Consular representation had tolerated false accusations of trading with the enemy in order to promote compatriots, regardless of the implications for their cause and for inter-Allied relations. The French and British had entered into a war of mutual accusations which did nothing to help their united front. 57 For example, French distrust of the agents for stocks of British coal in Spain led to situations that often complicated Franco-British relations. Lambert Brothers, an Admiralty contractor, had to instigate several internal investigations into the reliability of its distributors in the Spanish ports because of constant reports from the French. This wasted time and resources.
One of the most notorious cases was that of the firm of Fernando Suárez. A series of anonymous complaints reached the British vice consul in Huelva, accusing it of trading contraband on the Portuguese border. Fernando Suárez was allegedly supplying German buyers in Ayamonte. After opening an investigation, a special envoy from Lambert Brothers concluded that the allegations were false. Paradoxically, the French consular agent in Huelva was behind the accusations. According to a French wine merchant named Michel Labadie, Suárez was defrauding the Admiralty. In addition to dealing with Germans, the company was supposedly manipulating weights and using the enormous power that it gained from the management of the British coal stocks to harm its rivals. These discrepancies resulted in an extensive correspondence between Allied consular representatives. In fact, the French continued to consider Suárez guilty of trading contraband. It seems that the heart of the issue was the competition for British coal concessions. 58
To avoid such situations, as well as the need to conduct personal investigations, more comprehensive control was implemented over coal stocks transferred to individuals. The goal here was to reduce the margin of manoeuvre of the consulates for the authorization of so-called Reliable Coal Importers. In June 1917 the British government was obliged to extend restrictions and impose surcharges on the sale of coal in neutral countries. Conflicting reports on the same firms or individuals slowed down the proceedings, as various departments in London were pledged to issue further consultations on each case.
Further complicating this investigation of the reliability of the firms was the Spanish custom of using paternal and maternal surnames, which created great difficulties in establishing proper correlations between individuals and companies. There were frequent errors or inaccuracies that required successive changes in the lists published in the London Gazette and the Board of Trade Journal. The key to so many failures lay in the organization of the system itself, as the British consul in Malaga reminded his ambassador in Madrid: ‘The failure in results has been the want of [a] link at home, namely a strong organization to guide, instruct, inform and connect consuls and the merchant community.’ 59 Hence it was confirmed that all proposals for embargoes should be sent to the embassy.
Madrid issued the business intelligence section with a single list of firms, which was published with regular updates in the War Trade Department Bulletin, in the Contraband Herald, and by the Inter-Allied Bureau in Paris. The Foreign Office revived its former status as a ‘post office’. It was the embassy’s job to filter all the documentation, collating, analysing, and ultimately backing it up with the data supplied by the maritime intelligence service. This work was carried out by Horace S. Birch, second secretary at the embassy and head of business affairs, his assistant Francis W. Manners, and Oliver Baring. Baring was associated with the Admiralty War Staff, acting as the liaison between naval intelligence in Gibraltar, the embassy in Madrid, and the Admiralty in London.
60
The greater consistency of the intelligence gathered reduced the fragmentation of information, limiting the margin of error when coordinating blacklists by country. On 24 July 1917 the Contraband Herald published that the French postal censors had furnished a report upon intercepted correspondence: ‘The British Statutory List had made it very difficult for Germans in Spain to obtain any employment. Letters from Barcelona, Bilbao, Málaga, Madrid and Valladolid complained bitterly on the effects of both British and French Lists.’
61
However, some British merchants still considered that the system did not work properly. In May 1918 Frank Wilson complained about evasion of the blacklist in the Spanish colony of Fernando Poo: If, I suppose, the Black List is devised to assist British houses to crush German competition, it is not working that way as regards this island. Its immediate effect is to make us extremely unpopular, through Spanish houses being put on the black list while German houses are not; indeed they appear, in spite of their difficulties, to be the best stock houses here.
62
The fight against fraud was another of the basic lines of action taken in order to optimize the implementation of the blacklist. Banned intermediaries turned, more and more often, to illegal devices to avoid punitive measures. Over the months they had improvised ways to challenge the British embargo. The British consular service identified the most common:
The banned company turned to other firms to load the merchandise.
The firm continued exporting under the names of its employees.
The recourse to friends who lent their names as a personal favour.
The use of false identities. 63
The last variation generated numerous lawsuits over the falsification of cargo manifests. This type of fraud also distorted the customs and port statistics, just when London was demanding the greatest reliability in the information provided. As a result the generalization of fraudulent transactions made it necessary to double the consular control on the exit and entry of goods at ports. This was especially true in small coastal towns which lacked significant port infrastructures, despite having registered an exponential growth in traffic throughout those years. The limited presence of the Spanish administration at these points was a challenge for both the consular and the naval intelligence services. 64 The most important ports for Allied interests were those in the area of the Strait of Gibraltar and the Levante, such as Marbella (Malaga), Motril (Granada), Garrucha (Almeria), Mazarrón (Cartagena), and the Balearic Isles, where most of the illegal trading operations took place.
Finally among the effects of the normalization of the British lists we should highlight the creation of a stable framework of cooperation with the French. As already mentioned, France had established its own business intelligence infrastructure, including the liste noire protocol (August 1916). But France’s organization was never as effective in Spain as that of its main allies. So from a very early stage French officials were aware of the importance of collaboration, in order to utilize British embargoes to their own advantage. The consular staff thus transferred copious quantities of commercial information to their British counterparts. 65 Naturally, one of the main objectives for the French service was that the firms on its list should also be included by the British. The latter would study case by case the requests received, whether for the inclusion or for the exclusion of naturalized persons and legal entities. In general, since 1916 some steps had been taken to create a protocol aimed at safeguarding the strategic interests of the Entente in Spain. Most notable among them were those of Peñarroya (Société Minière et Métallurgique de Peñarroya), whose suppliers of metals became untouchable. One of these was the Sociedad Metalúrgica de Mazarrón. Despite complaints from the British vice consul in Mazarrón about the technicians of German origin who ran it, the embargo was unsuccessful because, as noted, it provided very important services to companies controlled by the Allies: Peñarroya (French), Compañía de Águilas (French), Compañía de Lujar (Belgian), and Messrs Orchardson & Enthoven (British). 66 More importantly, from 1917 onwards, the synergy between the French and British blacklists was embodied in collecting intelligence for the amendment of the Statutory List in the Spanish areas of the Moroccan protectorate, using the French infrastructure to do so. 67
The average level of collaboration in Spain proved to be far removed not only from the objectives proposed in the spring of 1917 in the Inter-Allied Committee which met weekly in Madrid, but also from those already established in the Inter-Allied Economic Conference in Paris in June 1916. Achieving a united front on this matter involved overcoming powerful resistance driven by theories of economic nationalism, a decisive stimulus for interference from the initial moments of the conflict. The British had brought about strategies and tactics that, despite their deviation from the objectives of the Allies, were very difficult to change on the ground. This should not be surprising, given that those in charge of direction at the highest level were not only patriots but also businessmen, in essence both judge and jury. The appearance of a new element on the stage, with the entry of the Americans into the war, represented another challenge on the local level. The British consul in Malaga, Villiers, was unable to get along with his US counterpart. Both would receive a warning in October 1917 from their respective embassies about their personal conflicts, which jeopardized the dialogue that they were now meant to consolidate. 68 Episodes such as these gave rise to the idea that inter-Allied cooperation remained one of the main unresolved challenges right up until the end of the war.
IV. Conclusions
The First World War was felt intensely in neutral Spain. From its outset the domestic version of the international conflict was based not so much on ideologies, dividing the Spanish according to their likes and dislikes, but rather on the importance which Spain acquired for the British and French in extending and amplifying their influence throughout neutral markets to the detriment of the Germans. Specifically, Britain’s blacklists were an instrument of interference, designed to serve not only the Allied cause but also the needs of its local resident colonies in Spain. The examples given in this study show the unstable balance between economic nationalism and a genuine inter-Allied economic strategy of war. The cases discussed here also illustrate the de facto and de jure legitimacy for such interference, rather than revising the impact of the war upon global trade patterns. The annihilation of the commercial interests of the Central Powers represented the first part of a plan of action, in addition to serving as a justification for their immediate replacement by national investment and/or management.
On the one hand, British consular representatives enjoyed a privileged view of naval and commercial intelligence, which under the new circumstances of war proved extremely useful for extracting ground-level information on every move made by their antagonists. To make the most of this valuable information the consular body needed legal instruments which would blur the traditional barriers between the political and economic spheres, clearly extending their field of operations. Between 1914 and 1916, when the use of embargoes in neutral countries lacked an unambiguous legal definition, the personal and professional profiles of each head of the service, together with the specific features of the productive and trade sectors in each district, determined the differences in the implementation of de facto blacklists throughout Spain. One of the best examples of the significance of the system of blacklisting in that context occurred in the Spanish Levante, and especially in the district of Malaga. Its dynamism in commercial terms, and its connection with the prime redistribution centre of Spanish goods in the Mediterranean, Barcelona, and the main ports of France, Italy, and North Africa, made it the spearhead of that kind of intervention in Spain. The very important role played by the British consul, Henry Montagu Villiers, led to his promotion at the end of the war to head the British trade mission in Spain and Portugal.
In local markets, on the other hand, Franco-British competition highlighted a more fundamental problem afflicting their business strategy in Spain. From the outset their undisputed hegemony over their enemies distorted the purpose of the fight. In this situation the French found themselves on unequal terms regarding proposed methods of intervention, mainly the development and use of blacklists. The structure of the Spanish merchant navy and the British monopoly on the supply of coal in Spain and de facto control over the infrastructure of international trade (ships, communications, and financial services) gave much more power to the veto of their main allies than to their own. The British system displayed remarkable forcefulness as well as versatility, allowing for variations according to the specific profits arising from each intervention.
However, the average levels of collaboration fell far short of the aims proposed in the Inter-Allied Economic Conference held in Paris in June 1916. The British emerged particularly strongly during the war, and they also overcame setbacks resulting from manipulation of the energy market by restricting the supply of coal. The inroads made by US coal were the main challenge in this respect. However, the latter’s impact was short-lived, given the overwhelming British hegemony in the supply and demand for coal. Furthermore, local personal animosities and business rivalries led to the proliferation of false allegations of trading with the enemy. These problems seriously affected the British. Their blacklists were the most feared, and their consulates became the epicentre of countless allegations, even if these were not always sufficiently well founded. As a result, the time dedicated to settling cases and to checking information lengthened. To respond to such contingencies, in late 1916 London outlined a series of very comprehensive standards for the treatment of consular intelligence. The situation, however, gradually changed after 1917 when Lloyd George’s cabinet promoted administrative reforms in the Foreign Office and Board of Trade by establishing a new protocol for the management of commercial information. In this second stage, formal procedures designed to streamline the system predominated. The machinery for the collection and management of intelligence was improved in order to combat fraud and to achieve the desired united economic front, albeit with mixed results.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
I would like to acknowledge Prof. Sir Hew Strachan, who spent extra time helping me to improve the manuscript writing style, and Prof. David Stevenson, for his suggestions regarding an earlier version.
Funding
This article could not have been written without the support and funding of the research programme The Mediterranean in Spain’s International Relations during the First World War (HAR.2010–16680).
1
See the classic works M. Tuñón de Lara, La crisis de la Restauración: España, entre la Primera Guerra Mundial y la Segunda República (Madrid, 1986); J.L. García Delgado, S. Roldán and J. Muñoz, La formación de la sociedad capitalista en España (Madrid, 1973); J.A. Lacomba, La crisis española de 1917 (Madrid, 1970).
2
H.P. van Tuyll van Serooskerken, The Netherlands and World War I: Espionage, Diplomacy and Survival (Leiden, 2001); M. Abbenhuis, The Art of Staying Neutral: The Netherlands in the First World War, 1914–1918 (Amsterdam, 2006); J. Hertog and S. Kruizinga, eds, Caught in the Middle: Neutrals, Neutrality, and the First World War (Amsterdam, 2011); S. Kruizinga, ‘Government by Committee: Dutch Economic Neutrality and the First World War’, in James E. Kitchen, Alisa Miller and Laura Rowe, eds, Other Combatants, Other Fronts: Competing Histories of the First World War (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 99–124.
3
R. Fernández de la Reguera, España neutral, 1914–1918 (Barcelona, 1967); F. Díaz Plaja, Francófilos y Germanófilos: Los españoles en la guerra europea (Barcelona, 1973); G.H. Meaker, ‘A Civil War of Words: The Ideological Impact of the First World War on Spain, 1914–1918’, in H.A. Schmitt, ed., Neutral Europe between War and Revolution, 1917–1923 (Charlottesville, VA, 1988), pp. 1–66; F.J. Romero Salvadó, Spain, 1914–1918: Between War and Revolution (London, 1999).
4
R.M. Carden, German Policy toward Neutral Spain, 1914–1918 (New York, 1987); P. Aubert, ‘La propagande étrangère en Espagne pendant la Première Guerre Mondiale’, in Españoles y franceses en la primera mitad del siglo XX (Madrid, 1986), pp. 357–411, and ‘L’influence idéologique et politique de la France en Espagne de la fin du XIX siècle à la Première Guerre Mondiale (1875–1918)’, in J.R. Urquijo Goitia and J.P. Etienvre, eds, España, Francia y la Comunidad Europea (Madrid, 1989), pp. 57–102; J.-M. Delaunay, ‘España trabajó por la victoria’, in V. Morales Lezcano, G. Cardona and J.-M. Delaunay, eds, España y la Gran Guerra (Madrid, 1985), pp. 16–22; J.-M. Delaunay, ‘La mer dans les relations franco-espagnoles au début du XXe siècle’, Relations Internacionales LX (1960), pp. 457–472; J.-M. Delaunay, ‘Les crédits Urquijo et la France en guerre’, Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez XX (1984), pp. 339–53; J.-M. Delaunay, ‘L’action diplomatique des pays belligérants en direction de l’opinion publique espagnole durant la Première Guerre Mondiale’, Opinion Publique et Politique Extérieure, 1915–1940 (Rome, 1984), pp. 229–34; J.-M. Delaunay, ‘Heurs et malheurs d’une compagnie étrangère en Espagne: La Société française des Pyrites de Huelva, 1912–1923’, in Españoles y franceses, pp. 41–50; J.-M. Delaunay, Des palais en Espagne: l’École des hautes études hispaniques et la Casa Velázquez au coeur des relations franco-espagnoles du XXe siècle (1898–1979) (Madrid, 1994).
5
The projects supervised by F. García Sanz have studied this crucial aspect: Espionage and International Relations: Allied Intelligence Services in Spain during the First World War (BHA2002-01143); Counter-espionage, Security and International Relations in Spain during the First World War (I+D BHA 2006-01933) (2006–9); The Mediterranean in Spain’s International Relations during the First World War (HAR.2010-16680). He is currently preparing a history of Spain during the Great War. See F. García Sanz, España en la Gran Guerra: espías, diplomáticos y traficantes (forthcoming). More specifically for an insight into the naval blockade around the Canary Islands, see F.J. Ponce Marrero, ‘El bloqueo aliado y el control de la navegación en Canarias en vísperas de la Gran Guerra’, Anuario de estudios atlánticos LVIII (2002), pp. 133–52, and Canarias en la Gran Guerra, 1914–1918: Estrategia y diplomacia. Un estudio sobre la política exterior de España (Gran Canaria, 2006).
6
This is shown in C. Dejung and A. Zangger, ‘British Wartime Protectionism and Swiss Trading Companies in Asia during the First World War’, Past & Present CCVII (2010), pp. 181–213, at p. 187. See also P. Dehne, ‘“From Business as Usual” to a More Global War: The British Decision to Attack Germans in South America during the First World War’, Journal of British Studies XLIV (2005), pp. 516–35, and On the Far Western Front: Britain’s First World War in South America (New York, 2009).
7
E.g. ‘Willard Straight was one of many Americans who believed that England’s commercial ambitions abroad had been a principal cause of the war. Although a vice-president of J.P. Morgan and Company and a strong supporter of the British, Straight was convinced, nevertheless, that England had prepared for the conflict “with the hope of smashing Germany’s foreign trade, not fearful because it was a real menace to British commerce, but because Englishmen believed that all trade is theirs by Divine Right”’, in B.I. Kaufman, Efficiency and Expansion: Foreign trade organization in the Wilson administration, 1913–1921 (Westport, CT, 1974), p. 173.
8
For instance, we could see what has been written about ‘German’ as an elusive concept in the ‘Memorandum by Mr. Nugent on certain Aspects of the Proposal to extend the Prohibition of Trading with the Enemy to Neutral Countries’, [152742], Kew, The National Archives (TNA), FO 833/18.
9
A. Tena, ‘El sector exterior en la economía española’, in A. Carreras and X. Tafunel, eds, Las estadísticas históricas de España siglo XIX y XX (Madrid, 2005), pp. 615, 621.
10
Why the Allies won remains an open issue. One school of thought emphasizes the strength of the Allied system of distribution to keep front and home adequately supplied; another has challenged this finding. See J. Winter and A. Prost, The Great War in History (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 109–10. From a more specific economic approach to this issue, see G.-H. Soutou, L’or et le sang: Les buts de guerre économiques de la Première Guerre Mondiale (Paris, 1989), and N. Fergusson, The Pity of War: Explaining World War I (New York, 1999).
11
For more information on the commercial conflicts in the south of Spain, see case studies in C. García Sanz, La Primera Guerra Mundial en el estrecho de Gibraltar: Economía, política y relaciones internacionales (Madrid, 2011), pp. 89–119.
12
We follow here results presented previously focusing on the regional scale in García Sanz, La Primera Guerra Mundial, pp. 89–119.
13
Luigi Arduini, Rome, Archivio del Ministero degli Affari Steri (AMAER), Archivio del personale pos. V dei Consoli, 1913–18, busta 385/884.
14
Trading with the Enemy (China, Siam, Persia, and Morocco) Proclamation, 25 June 1915; Trading with the Enemy (Neutral Countries) Proclamation, 29 February 1916.
15
We should emphasize the position held by the Conservative MP Leslie Scott, with his various interventions during the heated discussions over the abandonment of the guaranteed principle of freedom of trade. L. Scott, Trading with the enemy: The effect of war on contracts (London, 1914). For more information on the same theme, see also E.W. Osborne, Britain’s Economic Blockade of Germany, 1914–1919 (London and New York, 2004), pp. 28–42. On the discussions arising among different sectors of the British administration concerning the application of the Trading with the Enemy Acts to neutral countries, see J. McDermott, ‘Total War and the Merchant State: Aspects of British Economic Warfare against Germany, 1914–1916’, Canadian Journal of History XXI (1986), pp. 61–76, and ‘Trading with the Enemy: British Business and Law during the First World War’, Canadian Journal of History XXXII (1997), pp. 201–20.
16
See D. French, British Economic and Strategic Planning, 1905–1915 (London, 1982), pp. 98–123. A recent approach to British pre-war planning is in N. Lambert, Planning Armageddon: British Economic Warfare and the First World War (Harvard, 2012), pp. 142–72.
17
Regarding British economic policies, see also H. Akitomi, ‘The British Trade Policy Plan during the First World War: A Modified “Imperialism of Free Trade”?’, Journal of European Economic History XXXV (2006), pp. 617–43.
18
On 9 December 1915 the steamship Pedro Pi, from Genoa, unloaded 18 blocks of cement onto the quay at the port of Malaga. A police officer discovered inside them lead boxes containing rifles and cartridges bound for French Morocco. The Germans presumably intended to distribute them among the native insurgents.
19
Miles to Hardinge, 6 December 1914, TNA, FO 185/1197.
20
‘German Campaign in Spain’, The Times, 10 November 1914, p. 7.
21
Santi to Geoffray, 19 April 1915, Nantes, Centre des Archives Diplomatiques (CADN), Madrid Ambassade, sub-serie Archives Anciennes 484.
22
Murison to Villiers, 2 Feb 1916, TNA, FO 185/1302.
23
Herstlet to Grey, 4 May 1915, TNA, FO 185/1305; Villiers to Delcassé, 23 August 1915, CADN, 484.
24
Villiers to Grey, 28 March 1915, TNA, FO 185/1306; Delcassé to Geoffray, 1 March 1915, CADN; Directorate of Political and Commercial Affairs, Provisions as War Contraband / Direction des Affaires politiques et commerciales, Les vivres comme contrebande de guerre, Europe, no. 122, 484, Archives Ministère des Affaires Étrangères Paris (AMAEP).
25
Villiers to Grey, 28 March 1915, TNA, FO 185/1306.
26
Villiers to Grey, 1 December 1915, TNA, FO 185/1246.
27
Cunliffe to Evans, 23 May 1916, TNA, FO 833/18. See also financial blockade controversies in FO 902/38.
28
La Defensa, 23 November 1916.
29
This was mentioned by Giovanni Modica, 26 January 1919, AMAER, Spagna e Italia, nazioni sorelle, Archivio del personale pos. V dei Consoli, 1913–18, busta 391/895.
30
The searches did not always take place outside the 3 mile limit of Spanish jurisdiction: see C. García Sanz, ‘Gibraltar y su campo: Un estudio regional de las relaciones internacionales de España durante la Primera Guerra Mundial’, Hispania CCXXVI (2007), pp. 567–98.
31
Henry Montagu Villiers, Charms of the Consular Career (London, 1924), p. 197.
32
Smith to Dufferin, 23 March 1915, TNA, FO 369/843.
33
Committee on Restriction of Enemy Supplies, 11 March 1915, TNA, CO 323/690.
34
The Times, 30 July 1918, p. 4.
35
Albert E. Dawson, Bilbao, (undated) 1916, TNA, FO 185/1439.
36
Keyser to Hardinge, 20 January 1915, TNA, FO 185/1234.
37
Keyser to Hardinge, 15 April 1915, TNA, FO 185/1234.
38
Keyser’s impressions on this process are in A.L. Keyser, Trifles and Travels (New York, 1923), pp. 254–6.
39
Geoffray to Delcassé, 2 August 1915, Paris, Affaires Étrangères, nouvelle série, Espagne, Affaires Commerciales, Rapports Commerciaux, no. 88, AMAEP.
40
Marchal to Delcassé, 12 January 1915, ibid.
41
Tinayre to Geoffray, 4 September 1915, CADN, 483.
42
Villiers to Hardinge, 19 February 1916, TNA, FO 185/1304.
43
Villiers to Hardinge, 10 March 1916, TNA, FO 185/1305.
44
Villiers to Hardinge, (undated) April 1917, TNA, FO 185/1320.
45
London Gazette, 2 May 1916 (Statutory List). Removal from the Statutory List, London Gazette, 8 August 1916.
46
It is worth bearing in mind the significant presence of German engineers on its technical staff, including Otto Engelhardt, Johan Rother, Frederick Budde, Oscar Wolf, Ghermann Klahm, Otto Mockel.
47
Keyser to Hardinge, 8 May 1916, TNA, FO 185/1308.
48
Keyser to Hardinge, 9 December 1916, TNA, FO 185/1320.
49
La Defensa, 23 November 1916.
50
Giovanni Modica, 26 January 1919, AMAER, Spagna e Italia, nazioni sorelle, Archivio del personale pos. V dei Consoli, 1913–18, busta 391/895.
51
Dossier Propagande Espagne, 2 October 1918, Paris, Service Historique de l’armée de Terre, 7N201, A.C. 24595.
52
Villiers to Hardinge, 17 February 1916, TNA, FO 185/1303.
53
Keyser to Fleming, 22 October 1915, TNA, FO 185/1244.
54
Smith to Hardinge, 27 September 1916, TNA, FO 185/1317.
55
Gaceta de Madrid, 4 March 1916, pp. 518–19.
56
As stated in ‘Notes of an explanation of “Form K” given to a meeting of secretaries of Chambers of Commerce’, Foreign Trade Department of the Foreign Office, TNA, FO 833/18.
57
Smith to Hardinge, 16 May 1916, TNA, FO 185/1310.
58
Salust to Lambert Brothers, 4 May 1917, TNA, FO 185/1366, Contraband no. 230; the French version of the events is in Paris, Service Historique de la Marine, SSQ60.
59
Villiers to Hardinge, 12 November 1917, TNA, FO 185/1430.
60
Gibraltar, Confidential, 3 December 1918, TNA, FO 185/1516.
61
Contraband Herald, 24 July 1917, TNA, FO 902/35.
62
Contraband Herald, 17 May 1918, TNA, FO 902/35.
63
Villiers to Birch, undated, 1917, TNA, FO 185/1423.
64
Villiers to Hardinge, 20 December 1917, TNA, FO 185/1432.
65
Herstlet to Hardinge, 4 October 1915, TNA, FO 185/1243.
66
Villiers to Hardinge, 23 January 1916, TNA, FO 185/1302.
67
Villiers to Birch, 16 April 1917, TNA, FO 185/1421.
68
Willard to Hardinge, 7 October 1917, TNA, FO 185/1448.
