The Iberian Peninsula and the First World War: Between neutrality and non-belligerency (1914–1916)

I. The Sarajevo crisis and the Iberian Peninsula

The war experiences of Portugal and Spain – a neutral and a latecomer to the conflict – cannot be seen separately from the impacts generated by a wider European war, namely those provoked by a crisis of hegemony of the liberal monarchy in Spain, and the end of the republican experience in Portugal, after the military coup of 1926. This article seeks to analyse the political and diplomatic effects of the outbreak of the First World War on the Iberian Peninsula, considering the relationship between Portugal and Spain in the context of the (dis)equilibria of power caused by the Sarajevo assassination in the summer of 1914, and the debates over neutrality and belligerency present in both countries between 1914 and 1916. My argument is that although both countries considered the outbreak of the conflict in 1914 as an opportunity to regain lost international and European influence, they choose, however, different political approaches to pursue it: Spain assuming a neutral position and Portugal adopting a belligerent one, fighting alongside Britain from 1916 onwards.

The Portuguese Republic had not yet completed its fourth year when, on 28 June 1914, the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, were assassinated by Gavrilo Princip, in Sarajevo. The Portuguese army had only three training practice phases, was in the midst of a reorganization and, as such, was more honed towards internal defence than any sort of intervention in Europe or Africa. Portugal, furthermore, did not possess any weapon factories and ‘[. . .] the artillery and infantry were lacking in number to begin any campaign’. ¹ Spain had a similar scenario, since the Spanish armed forces proved incapable of recovering from the negative impacts of the war with the United States, which constituted a valuable argument for the country to stay out of a European war. ²

Portugal and Spain displayed different and distinct rates of development in the early years of the twentieth century. This difference clearly emerged in terms of economic growth, levels of literacy and positioning towards the economia mundo. Despite the seriousness of the crisis experienced towards the end of the nineteenth century, Spain was able to gain some advance over Portugal, where the levels of illiteracy remained higher coupled with lower levels of public investment in rail and road networks and where balancing the budget was a perennial problem subject to systematic discussion but with constantly postponed resolutions.

The 1890s were marked by traumatic events for both countries: the British ultimatum of 11 January 1890 had demanded the withdrawal of Portuguese military troops from the regions of Chinde, Makololos and Machonos (currently Zimbabwe), and the war between the United States and Spain had resulted in independence of the last of the overseas Spanish colonies: Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines. However, despite all difficulties, while the Portuguese monarchy was able to keep its sovereignty over Africa, Spain ended up losing its American empire. ³ According to the Valladolid Professor Vincent Gay Forner, the advancement of this European imperialism led by Britain, France and Portugal was seen as a serious threat by Spain. ⁴ The Spanish monarchy was forced into redefining its international position, abandoning its hitherto tradition of isolation, and attempting to secure the diplomatic support of London, Paris and Saint Petersburg to maintain the integrity of its territorial sovereignty and, simultaneously, gain room for manoeuvre in Morocco and Tangiers ⁵ . In both countries there was present a debate on the idea of national crisis and national decadence, which in Spain ended up being absorbed by the so called ‘restoration system’, but in Portugal could not be separated from a necessary political change. In both cases, this feeling of decadence was presented as the living proof that the Iberian Peninsula was backward, undeveloped and divorced from progress. ⁶

The idea of a diplomatic approach between Portugal and Spain, supported by such Portuguese republicans as the former ambassador in Madrid José Relvas, gained shape during the months of July and August 1914; the Iberian union was then seen as the only means capable of saving Portugal and Spain from decadence, crisis and external threat. The outbreak of the European war and the different positions adopted by the two countries ended the project, giving place to the ‘Spanish danger’ and Madrid’s supposedly annexionism aspirations. ⁷

II. Iberism vs the ‘Spanish danger’

The problems underlying the relationship between Portugal and Spain within a context of war in Europe were approached by the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs as early as July 1914. In talks with Lancelot Carnegie, Freire de Andrade asserted that the relations between the two countries should be ‘[. . .] friendly and intimate’ and dispelling any annexationist scenarios that Spain might be harbouring – ‘[. . .] Spain already had troubles enough of her own without wishing to add to them by attempting to annex her neighbour’ ⁸ – defended the agreement of an alliance which was to feature the conclusion of commercial treaties as its first step. In fact, at the beginning of August, in the letter he sent to Edward Grey, Winston Churchill described the position of the Admiralty as regards the balance of powers on the Iberian Peninsula:

[. . .] if we had to choose between the friendship of Portugal and the friendship of Spain, that of Spain is of the greatest value. [. . .] The King of Spain is strongly attached to England and France, and Spain might easily be made to range herself against the Germanic Powers. On the other hand, it is more than likely that Spain will take this opportunity of annexing Portugal. Portugal also has minor useful services to render us, [. . .] not equal to those which would be derived from a Spanish alliance. [. . .] We certainly do not want to get so involved with them that if Spain attempts to annex them, we are expected to make exertions on their behalf, or to consider ourselves offended by what Spain has done. ⁹

In his letter in reply, sent on the following day, Edward Grey disagreed with the position presented by Churchill and made recourse to history to justify his position:

It is true that the King of Spain in his impulsion and rather irresponsible way has some time ago given expression to the idea that he might feel compelled to intervene in Portugal for the purpose of restoring the Braganza dynasty. But all that we know of the history of Spain and Portugal should make us hesitate to believe that a policy of annexation has been seriously contemplated or that it would have any chance of success. To look upon the King of Spain’s vague plan as indicating any hardened tendency in Spanish foreign policy would, I feel sure, be a grave error. ¹⁰

We should recall here that throughout the previous year, Alfonso XIII had attempted, unsuccessfully, to sign a treaty with France that would guarantee him the right to freely intervene in Portugal, ¹¹ Grey nevertheless maintained that Spain would be incapable of annexing Portugal, recalling the disaster of 1898 and the lack of capacity this demonstrated regarding the administration of its own colonial empire. ¹²

Spanish diplomacy, in the voice of the Marquis of Lema, reacted almost immediately, expressing indignation at the insinuations over a hypothetical intervention in Portugal, considering this ‘[. . .] offensive to the Spanish dignity’. ¹³ Lema guaranteed Hardinge that the greatest wish of the Spanish government was the maintenance of friendly relations with Portugal, highlighting the importance of the strategic unity of the Iberian block. ¹⁴ But in 1915 Vincent Gay wrote that he dreamt of a new Iberia, covered with the same flag from Barcelona to Lisbon. ¹⁵ Following the arguments of Antón del Olmet and Rafael de Labra, for Gay the only way to achieve ‘Iberian harmony’ was the annexation of Portugal by Spain. This idea was also associated with the desire of a territorial expansion in Morocco. ¹⁶

At the beginning of April 1915, in an interview granted to the correspondent of Diário de Notícias, in Madrid, Prime Minister Eduardo Dato declared that

[. . .] the government of Spain not only does not shelter any hidden purposes against Portugal but holds its neighbouring country in the greatest of sympathy and consideration, and only wishes that it prospers and lives with us with the greatest of intelligence. ¹⁷

The Spanish government should not display any lack of interest regarding the crisis that Portugal was going through:

[. . .] Spain wishes, above all else, that Portugal remains independent; but in the case that the political passions and discord render the normal existence of the Portuguese nation impossible, we would intervene to ensure that no country, other than Spain, disembarks their troops in the neighbouring kingdom [. . .] the intervention of Spain in Portugal would not mean anything other than the desire and the duty of Spain to ensure the destiny of the Portuguese race and nation, restoring to those territories a regime of peace and tranquillity that is able to return to the Portuguese the prosperous state of other, happier days. ¹⁸

The threat of the ‘Spanish danger’ would nevertheless end up re-emerging just a month later on 14 May 1915 – the first day of the revolution led by the Democratic Party that would overthrow Pimenta de Castro opening the way for Portugal’s military intervention in the European front of the war – when the Marquis of Villasinda requested support from Lancelot Carnegie on the sending a vessel to Lisbon to protect the Spanish colony. In January 1915, President Arriaga invited General Pimenta de Castro to form a government and to oversee the forthcoming electoral process, his appointment, unconstitutional, effectively brought to an end all talk of going to war; on the 14 May, Pimenta de Castro succumbed to an uprising of sailors and civil revolutionaries before he could hold elections and influence their outcome. ¹⁹

Three Spanish vessels were then deployed to Portugal, arriving in the Tagus on 17 and 18 May. ²⁰ The military attaché of the Spanish delegation to Lisbon was peremptory in justifying this position:

These preventive measure are necessary not to conquer a country but rather to guarantee, given the case, the life of peoples of the colony, who cannot be under the auspices of carbonaris that take as their prey, for murder and for hatred, Spain. ²¹

The Minister of Portugal to Madrid, Augusto de Vasconcelos, then sought out Arthur Hardinge, head of British diplomacy to the Spanish capital, and expressed a favourable position regarding the departure of the vessels anchored in the Tagus, abandoning Lisbon out of the fear that their presence might give rise to strife in the Portuguese capital: ‘[. . .] he seemed to fear that German “agents provocateurs” might occasion some unpleasant incident at Lisbon, much as an insult to the Spanish flag, or an assault by the rabble on Spanish soldiers’. ²² Hardinge ended up setting out the concerns of Augusto de Vasconcelos to the Marquis of Lema, then Minister of the Spanish State, who was dismissive and asserted that ‘[. . .] it would be a great mistake for the Spanish or British men of war to leave the Tagus at present’. ²³

The Spanish units were accompanied by two more arriving from Britain and France even though the latter would nevertheless end up staying in the Tagus only for 24 hours. The Spanish vessels were to abandon Lisbon on 24 May. The presence of Spanish military units in Lisbon would end up getting leveraged by propaganda that pointed the finger at the Spanish threat and ended up strengthening the arguments of the interventionists. At the beginning of October, the Ambassador of Germany to Madrid informed the Minister of State, the Marquis of Lema, of Portugal’s intention to join the war on the side of Britain and France. On the 10th of the same month, on the pretext of a request by the French government for Portugal to send artillery pieces – the Democratic Party imposed the conditions that the equipment be accompanied by Portuguese troops – Edward Grey then wrote out a memorandum inviting Portugal to abandon the ‘ambiguous’ position it held and place itself actively on the side of Great Britain and its Allies. ²⁴ This situation elicited new doubts with regard to the Portuguese position in a report then sent to the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Edward Grey; the British Ambassador to Spain, Arthur Hardinge, indicated that Great Britain had advised Portugal to assume: ‘[. . .] an attitude of benevolent neutrality’, concluding that

[. . .] her co-operation might entail on us increased responsibilities in regard to the protection of her colonies, but that as the latter would probably be endangered by the victory of Germany, she perhaps felt she had more to gain than to lose by actively supporting the allies. ²⁵

Given the attitude of Portugal, Lema again reiterated that it was not the intention of Spain to break its neutrality in a position that the Minister of State would see reaffirmed 2 days later by the President of the Council, Eduardo Dato. ²⁶ In a clear reaction to the Portuguese position, the aggressive diplomacy of Germany spread the rumour that Britain had rewarded Portugal for its involvement with the promise of seizing Galicia, a rumour that was swiftly denied by the Minister of Portugal to France, João Chagas. ²⁷

In response to this memorandum, the Minister of Portugal in London, Manuel Teixeira Gomes, questioned Edward Grey with regard to the attitude of Portugal towards Germany and received the following reply: ‘That we should not declare any state of war prior to the embarkation of the first troop contingent. As regards financial assistance for Portugal, this was agreed in principle’. ²⁸ The neutrality of the Iberian Peninsula was, in truth, a political orientation that was better suited to London with British diplomacy then understanding that the belligerence of Portugal might trigger an imbalance in the powers prevailing on the Iberian Peninsula and drive Madrid to take a stance alongside the Central Empires.

On 23 November, the Congress of the Republic approved a proposal that authorized the Government to intervene whenever it deemed most convenient. As had happened on 7 October, Congress, sitting in an extraordinary session, endowed the government with full powers to engage in its foreign policy but this did not result once again in any diplomatic rupture with Germany. In the midst of all these ongoing developments, we cannot overlook the words of the Minister of Portugal to London, Manuel Teixeira Gomes, and the way in which he pragmatically pointed out the most immediate consequences of Portugal entering the war: ‘In the financial situation that our Country is facing, immediate preparations for war [. . .] imply inevitable ruin [. . .]’. ²⁹ Teixeira Gomes then moved swiftly to follow this up by declaring any such intervention as extremely improbable. ³⁰

We should here also refer to the efforts and diligences carried out by the President of the Republic, Manuel de Arriaga, in seeking to nurture a climate of consensus among the three main political parties (Democratic Republican Party, Evolutionist Republican Party and the Republican Unionist Party) capable of bringing about the understanding necessary to the organization of a national ministry. The republicans were, however, divided over the entrance of Portugal into the war: the interventionists, led by the leader of the Democratic Party, Afonso Costa, defended the need for Portugal to join the side of the Entente, while the non-interventionists maintained that Portuguese troops should be dispatched exclusively to the African colonies. The Socialist Party and the anarchist and syndicalist movements, despite their lack of numerical expression, held social influence and had from the outset expressed opposition to any intervention in the conflict. The majority of army officers were also against the sending of troops to the European theatre of war and with Norton de Matos, who would occupy the position of Minister of War between 1915 and 1917, held no doubts and furthermore concluded that the cost of preparing a division for the Western Front would come in at around 35,000 contos, thus, approximately one half of the annual revenues of the Portuguese government. ³¹

Furthermore, the prevailing situation in the Portuguese navy was also not favourable: the Portuguese fleet was reduced in scale – in 1914, there was only one submarine and three destroyers – and, as such, without the assistance of another naval force, was incapable of protecting the Portuguese coastline (. . . ) and the colonial ports or rendering support to the expeditionary forces. ³²

III. ‘Iberian Harmony’: between neutrality and non-belligerence

Neutral and non-belligerent societies had to legitimate themselves within total war, they had to also reflect on the role played by their respective nations ³³ and build an Iberian narrative to support it, a discourse sustained in international objectives. In this matter, Spanish neutrality and Portuguese non-belligerence, until 1916, should always be analysed as specific foreign policies, and within the frame of the public ongoing debate ‘decadence vs regeneration’.

Even through the early days of August of 1914, the Portuguese press carried no reference to the involvement of Portugal in any hypothetical European war; at the beginning of the previous month, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Augusto Freire de Andrade, had come out in defence of drafting an alliance between Portugal and Spain with the approval of Great Britain. In the letter that he sent to Edward Grey, the British minister in Lisbon, Lancelot Carnegie declared that what Freire de Andrade had told him was

[. . .] in the interests of both countries, as well as those of Europe generally, that the relations between them should be friendly and intimate [. . .] He was in favour of making an alliance with Spain, and the first step in that direction would be the conclusion of a commercial treaty [. . .]. ³⁴

Freire de Andrade, in a circular sent to the government and to the Ministers of Portugal in London and Madrid, took a very clear position regarding the difficulties associated with any intervention by the Portuguese army in the war: ‘And just what would be the assistance that we might give to organised and prepared troops? In the light of the great masses of men involved in operations, this assistance would only be small’. ³⁵

In the telegram sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sidónio Pais, then the head of the embassy of Portugal to Berlin, disclosed: ‘About us, no one knows but the Germans think that, sooner or later, we will have to participate in the war, and they assume such a participation will not be favourable to them’. ³⁶ Portugal and Great Britain have been allies since 1373 through the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty, the oldest defensive diplomatic alliance worldwide, which impelled the Portuguese government (a minority cabinet supported by the President of the Republic, Manuel de Arriaga), to act in coordination with the British monarchy. In truth, British support was held up as a key factor for the international recognition the Republic ³⁷ had received when the new regime was proclaimed in 1910.

On 2 August, Teixeira Gomes informed the head of Portuguese diplomacy that the Under-secretary of State Sir Eyre Crowe understood that Portugal should remain neutral without, however, making any such declaration, ³⁸ in a clear violation of the resolutions handed down by the second Hague Conference of 1907, ³⁹ which had explicitly stated that in a situation of war, a state might only declare neutrality or belligerence. ⁴⁰ The taking of this position would enable London to avoid a situation of equality among all belligerent nations, inherently resulting from any declaration of neutrality, and therefore still be able to request logistical support from the Portuguese, should such be required. In turn, the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Freire de Andrade, maintained that ‘Not declaring neutrality, with such a declaration not required under international law, we are neutral, and we should comply with the duties of neutrality’. ⁴¹ This position was not, however, at all clear, and on 3 August, news of the British declaration of war on Germany was received with some disquiet. ⁴² In Berlin, Pais continued to ignore the government policy and stuck to assuring German diplomats: ‘[. . .] our position of keeping out of the conflict, unless obligations in the Treaty, the text of which I did not know of, force us to adopt another path’. ⁴³

On 4 August, in a telegram addressed to the head of the British delegation in Lisbon, Lancelot Carnegie, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, warned Portugal not to proclaim its neutrality, ensuring that ‘in case of attack by Germany against any Portuguese possessions, the Government of His Majesty would consider itself bound by that stipulated by the Anglo-British alliance’. ⁴⁴ Great Britain correspondingly sought for Portugal to remain neutral without, however, making any such declaration. Behind the position taken by the British government was the understanding of the strategic importance of the Atlantic and African ports and how these might be of assistance to the Royal Navy, as well as the possibility of gaining authorization for the passage of British troops through Portuguese colonial territories. Three days later, the President of the Ministry, Bernardino Machado, gave a speech to the Congress of the Republic. The declaration made by Machado maintained loyalty to the commitments assumed within the scope of the alliance, and, abstaining from declaring neutrality it made clear that there was no intention of any rupture between the Portuguese government, Germany or the Austro-Hungarian Empire. We should recall that for the diplomatic strategy of London, the Bernardino Machado declaration enabled Portugal to play the role of ‘collaborative ally’ able to supply artillery pieces or guarantee the safe passage of troops without, however, emerging directly into confrontation with the Central Powers, a stance that was indeed also perceived favourably by Germany. ⁴⁵

Nevertheless, the external political situations assumed by Portugal continued to remain unclear. The Portuguese ambassador in Berlin, Sidónio Pais, affirmed his ignorance of the government’s position, limiting himself to ensuring his German diplomatic peers: ‘[. . .] our orientation is to conserve ourselves away from the conflict, apart from obligations under the Treaty, whose text I am unaware of, forcing us to take another path’. ⁴⁶ In turn, the ambassador of Portugal in France, João Chagas, did not have any doubts and freely stated: ‘[. . .] the imprecision of Portuguese policy at this moment is producing the worst effect on the opinion of this country [. . .]’. ⁴⁷ Chagas argued that Portugal should declare itself a belligerent, abandoning any idea of neutrality.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a circular addressed to the other members of government and to the ministers of Portugal in London and Madrid, justified the underlying reason for the attitude of Portugal:

[. . .] we do not declare neutrality because, having a treaty of alliance with Britain we should not do so, for this reason, from one moment to the next, whenever requested by Britain, we might have to fail on the duties of being neutral. This aid has not however been sought by Britain and has thus not been requested and has even instead constantly recommended we show prudence. And why? Out of its own timidity or perhaps fear that we do not give it to them? Certainly not as our declarations have been peremptory. However, the truth is that the aid that we might give to Britain is actually small and would not compensate for then having to be obliged to come and defend our territory and also that of our colonies [. . .] We should not become indifferent to the indications of the British Government and, furthermore, its clear wish that we advance with the greatest prudence and without excesses as demonstrated in the verbal recommendations made through the pronouncements of its Representatives [. . .]. ⁴⁸

The Spanish government’s declaration of strict neutrality was published on 7 August 1914 in the Gaceta de Madrid. ⁴⁹ It was a declaration that obliged not only the State but the Spanish subjects, as well, to strict neutrality. As Martorell Linares puts it, it was the State that had to safeguard the ‘neutrality of popular manifestations’ ⁵⁰ too. One should also mention that the idea that Spain should not get involved in the conflagration was shared almost by the entire society immediately after the outbreak of war; however, it soon started to be questioned, especially because it became associated with the idea of inaction and inertia. ⁵¹

Two days later, in a letter again addressed to Maura, Dato once again affirmed: ‘Only the fact of an aggression would move us from our neutrality or any communication that was addressed to us in terms of an ultimatum, to provide our active contribution to some of the belligerents’. ⁵² Javier Ponce considers that this declaration of neutrality was a proof of the country’s impotence ‘[. . .] with a backward economy, an inoperative political system, an unsuitable army [. . .] and a fleet uncapable to defend its long and defenceless Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts against any enemy attack’. ⁵³ In this way, Dato thus removed any doubt that might still have been existing around Spanish involvement in the European conflict with the agreements signed with France and Britain having after all proven circumscribed only to Morocco. This official declaration of neutrality by the Spanish state also met a positive response from the Allies given that this would enable Madrid to take a role in organizing talks and negotiations and diplomatic meetings. Furthermore, the geographic and economic position of the country also emerged with enhanced value at the outbreak of war. In addition to its location between the western Mediterranean and the Atlantic, Spain bordered France and this facilitated the frequent movements of Spanish workers to French factories and thereby offsetting rising difficulties over the shortage of appropriate labour. The declaration of neutrality had been accompanied by the guarantee to the French government that every request for supplies would be taken into consideration. We should also highlight that Spain was not only the largest of the neutral European countries but also the most self-sufficient in minerals and in foodstuffs.

It was following the first battle of Marne, in September, that a pro-Entente Spanish movement, supported by intellectuals and the Republican and Socialist parties appeared in a clear confrontation with the Germanophiles led by the Juan Vázquez de Mella. ⁵⁴ A clear division of the society was then in place. Alberto Cavanna, the founding father of the first sociedad maurista in Valladolid, fought for the Germans in the war. ⁵⁵

On 23 November, the Republican Congress approved a proposal authorizing the Portuguese Government to intervene in the war whenever it deemed convenient. Similar to what happened on 7 October, when Congress, in an extraordinary meeting, granted the Government the power to conduct foreign policy, however, once again, this did not result in a diplomatic rupturing of ties with Germany. The Republicans had been divided over the participation of Portugal ever since the war first broke out: with the interventionists, led by the leader of the Democratic Party, Afonso Costa, defending the need for Portugal to intervene alongside the allies, while the non-interventionists understood that Portuguese troops should be deployed exclusively to the African colonies, a position that did not experience any change after March 1916 when Germany declared war on Portugal.

Between September 1914 and January 1915, the importance of the Iberian Peninsula to the Entente coincided with monitoring the communications and transactions of the Central Empires in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. ⁵⁶ In an article published in the press, Cáceres Cervantes compared the ‘Portuguese problem’ to the ‘Moroccan question’:

[. . .] one and the other integrally affecting our nationality, for these causes, we cannot ever ignore them nor shall Europe allow us to abdicate on our rights [. . .] As from the moment when the British Empire no longer represents such an obstacle to this major work, Spain should prepare to definitively enact its union with Portugal and aspire to domination of the African coasts of the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, forming an empire from which the Hispanic race may give to the world more proof of its genius and demonstrate that we are not a decadent race but rather a people who may still attain great political and social enterprises. ⁵⁷

Germany was also favourable to the declaration of the Spanish government and swiftly sought to neutralize, to the greatest possible extent, any attempt of cooperation between Spain and the Entente, which led German diplomacy to proffer Alfonso XIII the guarantee of economic aid during the hostilities and whatever political support necessary on signing peace agreements. ⁵⁸ The Central Empires sought to protect their economic interests in the country: 84 German and 23 Austrian vessels had sought out shelter in Spanish waters when war broke out in Europe, also leading them to engage in an active policy of destabilization, infiltration and sabotage so as to harm and undermine the interests of the Entente on the Iberian Peninsula. ⁵⁹

Spanish public opinion almost immediately split into Germanophiles and pro-Entente; on 19 August, the Count of Romanones signed off an article published in the press entitled ‘Hay neutralidades que matan’ ⁶⁰ in which he listed the reasons why he considered that Spain could not declare itself neutral and should take a stand alongside Britain and France without however ever defending belligerence:

Spain, even that something else is published in the gazette is, as a consequence of its economic and geographic misfortune inside the orbit of attraction of the Triplice Aliance; to state the opposite is to close the eyes to evidences; Spain cannot be neutral because when the time comes organized interests would not let her [. . .]. ⁶¹

Romanones considered that an involvement in the war might grant Spain the possibility to enlarge its territorial possessions in Morocco and reconquer Gibraltar. Following the declaration of neutrality, Great Britain and France thus emerged as the guarantors of Spanish stability in the Mediterranean.

Germany, through its representative in Madrid, Ratibor, mobilized newspapers, such as El Mundo, El Debate, La Tribuna and El Correo Español, as vehicles for propaganda against the Allies. ⁶² In turn, Italy considered that its interests would be harmed should Spain opt for belligerence, fearing that this would result in its ports being made available to the Entente or that the connection between France and its colonies in Africa would take place through the Iberian Peninsula. ⁶³ The Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sanches de Toca, even went as far as asking the Minister of Portugal to Madrid, Augusto de Vasconcelos, whether Portugal would be interested in ‘[. . .]requesting war materials from Spain before then delivering them, of its own accord, to Britain’, a proposal that Vasconcelos accepted on the spot. ⁶⁴

Throughout the war, Spain, according to the analysis of García Sanz and Ponce Marrero, would never remain neutral both because the country was not able to be, and others would not allow this in any case. ⁶⁵

IV. The end of Iberian neutrality

On 13 August, Lancelot Carnegie requested that the Portuguese government authorize the passage of troops through Chinde (Mozambique) on route to Nyasaland (current Malawi). ⁶⁶ Subsequent to this request, the Minister of Portugal to London, Teixeira Gomes, implied to Eyre Crowe that Portugal maintained the ambition of retaking Kionga – a small territory located on the border of German East Africa occupied by a German naval force on 16 June 1894 – without however ‘[. . .] showing any intention of providing any compensation for the favour dispensed’. ⁶⁷ In total, 1,525 men were mobilized for Angola and another 1,477 for Mozambique at a time when the Portuguese army numbered only a few more than 31,000. ⁶⁸

The first incident between Portugal and Germany in Africa had happened as early as 24 August 1914 in the north of Mozambique, in Maziúa in Rovuma, when the head of a border post was shot dead on emerging from his room, surprised in the middle of the night by the forces arriving from neighbouring German East Africa. ⁶⁹ On the day before, the Germany under-secretary for foreign affairs still attempted, through the intermediation of the United States ambassador to Berlin, to obtain the neutrality of Cameroon, French Equatorial Africa, German East Africa, Uganda, Nyasaland and part of Rhodesia, with a proposal, nevertheless, declined by both the British and the French. ⁷⁰ Due to the ambiguous position that Portugal had maintained since the beginning of the conflict, unable to make any declaration over its belligerent or neutral status, both the expeditions were organized by the Ministry of the Colonies, and not by the Minister of War as this action did not result from any declaration of war against Germany or its respective allies. Hence, the measures taken by Portugal, with the approval of Great Britain, were presented as merely preventive measures in defence of the colonies all the while Spanish diplomacy failed to take any position regarding the involvement of Portugal in a war in Africa nor did it indicate how this campaign might result in the country’s entrance into the European theatre of war. It is in this sense that we need to understand the affirmations of Bernardino Machado when, in an interview, he conceded to the representative of Spain in Lisbon that Portugal was not a neutral country but rather an ally that might at any moment be invited by Great Britain to intervene on the European front of the war. ⁷¹

Bernardino Machado was thus perfectly aware as to the need to maintain cordial relations with Spain, and hence, it comes as no surprise that the neighbouring country received an invitation to accompany close up the diplomatic manoeuvrings behind the requisition of the German and Austrian vessels located in Portuguese territorial waters. Indeed, the government of Madrid confidentially requested the head of Portuguese diplomacy in the Spanish capital to keep them informed

[. . .] of the project of the Portuguese Government as regards the appropriation of German ships present in Portuguese ports, being willing to exchange impressions on the matter and indicate in their projects just how many such vessels exist in Spanish ports, with both Governments studying the best means of appropriation. ⁷²

The Spanish government also requested of Portugal ‘[. . .] as a high favour, that they pass on this formula, while in a confidential manner, so as to study if it may be applied to vessels detained in Spanish ports’. ⁷³ The response of the Portuguese government arrived through the voice of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Augusto Soares, and was fairly explicit:

We would be honoured to satisfy the desire of the Spanish Government but, for the meanwhile, there is nothing definitive. Britain has not proposed any formula to us. The negotiations remain pending. Just as soon as the formula is agreed, I shall notify Your Excellency. ⁷⁴

Following the declaration of war by Great Britain on Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, some 734 German vessels had taken shelter in neutral waters with around 70 (approximately 242 000 tonnes) anchored in Portuguese ports. Britain’s worsening shipping situation led it to cast an eye over the dozens of modern ships, which had taken refuge in Portuguese waters in 1914. At the end of December 1915, the Portuguese merchant fleet was made up of only 471 vessels, accounting for a total of 91,859 gross tonnage, and with the production capacity of Portuguese naval shipyards (the largest was in Viana do Castelo) at no greater than 4,600 tonnes per year, the Prime-Minister Afonso Costa was then asked by the British to seize the ships and put them at London’s disposal. On 23 February 1916, a detachment of the Portuguese Navy boarded the German and Austrian ships harboured in Tagus estuary and, with due military honours, raised the flag of Portugal. ⁷⁵

At the beginning of March, Augusto Soares requested that the Minister of Portugal in Madrid inform him of

[. . .] the impressions of the Spanish Government regarding our requisition of the German ships and the dispositions of the same Government should we enter into belligerence. I would ask if he could ascertain discretely and without commitment whether this Government would willingly accept taking on the protection of Portuguese interests in Germany, should relations be broken. ⁷⁶

On 9 March 1916, Germany declared war on Portugal. ⁷⁷ On this same day, Augusto Soares sent a telegram to the Minister of Portugal in Madrid in which he requested the Spanish Government ‘[. . .] to take charge of the interests of Portugal in Germany. I am certain this shall be accepted’. ⁷⁸ Only in August 1918 and following a long history of ships sunk by German submarines did the Spanish government, presided over by Antonio Maura, notify the Germans that from then onwards Spanish ships that were sunk would be replaced by Germans of equal tonnage that were taking refuge in Spanish ports. ⁷⁹

The entrance of Portugal into the war was perceived with apprehension by Spain. Romanones feared that this position taken by the neighbouring country would render Spanish relations with the Allies difficult, considering this embarrassing to the Spanish government. The prime minister also feared the effects of the entrance into Spain of German residents in Portugal, expelled in the wake of the declaration of war:

The irruption of fresh bands of Germans from Portugal in Spain, is also calculated to add to this country’s internal problems [. . .] it is as yet too early to make any suggestions on the subject, but it would certainly be desirable that these immigrants from Portugal should be discouraged from settling in large numbers in Galicia, Leon or Spanish Estremadura. ⁸⁰

There also remains the background that had emerged as early as October 1914 when some Spanish newspapers, such as El Correo Español, ridiculed any Portuguese military intervention on the European front. ⁸¹

On 24 May 1916, the Minister of War, Norton de Matos published a decree that ordered the military conscription of all citizens, without any exception, aged between 20 and 45 years. This resulted in the mobilization of the C.E.P. (the Portuguese Expeditionary Corp) and the C.A.P.I. (Independent Heavy Artillery Corp). C.E.P. and C.A.P.I. together made up of over 55,000 members, including soldiers, officers and support staff, who were sent off to France. Portugal abandoned its position of ambiguity that had been ongoing since 1914, and officially entered into the war on the side of the Entente, bringing a close to the supposed ‘neutrality’ of the Iberian Peninsula.

V. Conclusion

Over the course of 2 years, and on countless occasions, Portugal gave Germany the grounds for evoking a rupture in neutrality and advancing with a declaration of war, but Germany never did so, justly fearing that it would lose not only the vessels anchored in Portuguese ports but also influence over commercial interests and industrial strategies that the country had proven able to advance both in Portugal and in its colonies. Alongside these arguments came the reality that, in March 1916, the armies of the Entente were in an extremely delicate position on the western front: in February, the battle of Verdun had begun with its devastating impacts that would immediately be felt by the French army that increasingly needed more manpower to fight in the trenches to offset the rising number of casualties on the battle front.

Berlin took advantage of the situation to challenge Madrid to abandon its neutrality and proffering the danger of some eventual Portuguese-British assault on its western borders. The entrance of Portugal into the war was perceived by some sectors of Spanish society as a constant threat to national security and a factor fostering its own annulment as a truly Atlantic country and trapping it into a Mediterranean dominated by other powers. However, the manoeuvres of Germany were not to result in any changes in attitude on behalf of the Spanish government. Romanones ended up giving precise instructions to the Spanish diplomatic representation in Berlin to act in keeping with the declarations made by the Marquis of Lema in October 1914; Spain would not be abandoning its position of ‘strict neutrality’, which it had constantly maintained ever since. Portuguese diplomacy nevertheless feared that the orientation taken by Spain might lead to two dangers:

Romanones, however, refused a policy of aggression towards Portugal and expressed a favourable position towards gradually deepening political, economic and diplomatic relations between the two countries in a clear defence of ‘Iberian harmony’. Romanones thus chose an approach, a pathway, that of the ‘[. . .] alliedophile neutrality that he wanted for Spain’. ⁸²

In a letter sent by Carnegie to Grey, the diplomatic representative of Britain to Lisbon set out clearly what he deemed to be the main problem of Portugal regarding Spain:

The frontiers are not natural but conventional. For this reason, the people here are the same as those in Portugal. It is strange however that neither Spain nor Portugal know each other. On this account a certain misunderstanding exists which in Portugal amounts to apprehension and even suspicion in regard to Spain. Portugal thinks that a Spanish peril exists and perhaps believes that she might be invaded by Spain, but it is certain that there is no Spanish politician who thinks of such a thing. ⁸³

The entrance of Portugal into the war still further exposed the weaknesses in the Spanish foreign policy; its conservatism and the defensive strategy, and the limited reach of its government and quite certainly enabling Lisbon to take a politically different route to the orientations issued by Madrid even while this overall orientation stemmed from the political coordination by the regime over the period since its foundation on 5 October 1910.

As this paper has shown, neutral and non-belligerent societies needed to legitimate themselves within total war, Spain and Portugal built a narrative to sustain their respective foreign policy positions, and in, both cases, their decisions were framed by the public debate ‘decadence vs regeneration’, that continued to be present in both countries, despite, in the Portuguese case, the overthrow of the monarchy and the proclamation of a new regime in October 1910.