The role of territoriality in the European Union multi-level governmental cooperation framework of Finnish

Abstract

The economic sanctions in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis threatened external cross-border cooperation (CBC) funded by the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) in the summer of 2014. The European Union considered several of the ENI CBC programmes that Finland and Russia participate in for the sanctions list. These programmes are implemented by a multiplicity of actors that include supra-national, national and regional authorities and form a dense actor-network with vertical and horizontal relations. The political relations between the actors are influenced by geopolitical discourses, bordering effects and power imbalances that are conceptualised in this paper as practices of territoriality. Previous research has insufficiently addressed the territoriality of actor relations within the multi-level governance (MLG) structures of CBC. Territoriality is present in MLG in the sense that CBC actors from various political levels significantly contribute to the territorial logic of political power by promoting their own interests towards cooperation practices. The research problem in this paper stems from the alleged non-hierarchical organisation of actors in CBC and argues that MLG policy structures do not render equality among the different actors and that they fail to consider the impact of territoriality. The paper investigates how territoriality influences the actor relations in the MLG structure of ENI CBC and how the actors cope with the frictions that emerge out of territoriality. Qualitative interviews reveal a conflicting system of governance in Finnish–Russian ENI CBC that fluctuates between state centrality and region-based initiatives to address frictions of various territorialit(ies) produced by actors.

Keywords

Cross-border cooperation European Union Finnish–Russian border multi-level governance territoriality

Introduction

The economic sanctions¹ introduced in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis, which started in November 2013 and resulted in the territorial annexation of the Crimean peninsula in March 2014 to Russia, have threatened to disrupt the Finnish–Russian European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) cross-border cooperation (CBC). The nine² Finnish–Russian ENI CBC programmes were part of the European Union (EU) sanction negotiations (European External Action Service & European Commission, 2014: 22). Finland in particular prevented the interruption of these programmes by lobbying for their continuation in Brussels. Nevertheless, diplomatic relations between the EU and Russia were damaged due to Russia’s economic collapse in 2015.

The Ukrainian crisis is the most recent example of how geopolitical transformation can, and has, affected Finnish–Russian CBC. The preceding cooperation framework, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Programme (ENPI), was similarly affected by the Georgian crisis in 2008 and the Orange Revolution in 2004. These situations challenge not only cooperation activities in practice, but also generate various territorialities as a result of the different CBC actors and their rationales towards cooperation governance. The EU–Russian relations are based on a particular agreement of four common spaces³ because Russia refused to be integrated into the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (European Commission, 2004). However, Russia is eligible for funding from the ENI, which is supposed to promote economic, social and environmental development in external border regions (European External Action Service & European Commission, 2014: 4).

The way in which cross-border governance and cooperation contribute to the restructuring of state territory at the sub-national level has been widely discussed (Popescu, 2008: 419). According to Bialasiewicz et al. (2012: 71−72), the macro-regional re-scaling of European space can be largely attributed to the influence of geopolitical events and processes. The complexity of such re-scaling processes arises out of the multi-scalar and network-type governance of transnational cooperation programmes. The Finnish–Russian ENI, for example, includes regional, national and supra-national authorities (Khasson, 2013: 330). These authorities form a multi-level governance (MLG) structure of cooperation in which supra- and sub-national actors are key figures (Faludi, 2012: 202). This paper focuses on these actors and their rationale towards the Finnish–Russian border, which results in varying territorialities and challenges for the cooperation process.

The EU’s approach towards CBC requires a non-hierarchical organisation of actors and responsibilities to allow equal involvement of all actors. Ideologically, the EU promotes this ‘partnership type’ of cooperation in their ENI CBC-related policy documents, emphasising equality between all participating actors (Commission of the European Communities, 2004: 6; European Commission, 2014). In practice however, the EU is still pursuing an ‘assistance type cooperation’ (Khasson, 2013). As a result, EU states continually maintain dominant positions in external cross-border activities (Celata and Coletti, 2015: 12) and frictions, which emphasise the gap between supra-national EU and national state interests, emerge.

The above-mentioned studies focus mainly on the EU’s CBC approach to neighbourhood-based policies and their political ramifications for transnational relations. However, the territoriality of actor relations and their impact on MLG policy frameworks, such as CBC, is another factor to consider (Varró, 2016: 175). MLG as an academic concept is problematic because its goal is to describe governance structures generally without scrutinising their contextual development and formation (Stephenson, 2013: 831−832). This paper contributes to the CBC literature by arguing that MLG, as a policy strategy applied by the EU towards transnational cooperation, fails to recognise the role of territoriality in the formation of actor relations and their impact on cooperation practices. The MLG approach favours the inclusion of sub-national actors. However, Nadalutti (2013: 757) argues that the extent of their involvement ‘remains unclear’ and further attention must be directed towards the ‘political alliances’ emerging within such MLG cooperation frameworks.

Territoriality is conceptualised as a practice between actors by using a relational approach (see Raffestin, 2012). Murphy (2012) suggests that interactions and structural circumstances are closely interlinked and create spatial strategies. Therefore, the vertical and horizontal actor relationships (e.g. EU – Finnish national relations or relations between regional programme managers) in Finnish–Russian ENI CBC are not only subject to the structures of the ENI CBC programmes; the political relations between actors also shape the CBC policy frameworks. Territoriality is defined as an actor practice that (re-)produces power imbalances because it underlies geopolitical developments and bordering effects. These issues have been rarely considered in previous studies on the actor relations in Finnish–Russian ENI CBC.

The analysis focuses on the following questions: (1) How does territoriality influence actor relations in the MLG structure of Finnish–Russian ENI CBC? (2) How do actors cope with the territoriality of ENI CBC? By answering these two questions, it is possible to understand the CBC actor relationship from both a vertical and horizontal perspective and to recognise the consequences of territoriality for relationships within the cooperation network. While the comprehension of actor relations is usually based on political discourses, further attention must be directed towards unveiling the ‘hidden’ networks and alliances that inform and shape cooperation practices.

The selected case study ENI programmes include the Karelian, Kolarctic, South-East Finland–Russia and Baltic Sea Region (BSR), which comprise the entire Finnish–Russian external border. The next section develops a theoretical framework based on the debate on the territoriality of CBC and its effects on the actor relations operating in a MLG framework. This is followed by an introduction of the case study regions, the research materials and the methods of analysis. The subsequent analysis is divided into three main parts: the actor relations within the MLG structure of CBC; the impact of territoriality on the actor relations; and the consequences for programme funding.

Territoriality and its impact on cross-border cooperation actor relations

Two decades ago, Agnew (1994: 58) stated in his discussion on the territorial trap that ‘the territorial state remains the central actor’ because international economic relations are ‘largely determined by the policies of the states’. Since Agnew’s contribution, scholars have worked not only to overcome the territorial trap in the CBC literature by highlighting the relational characteristics of territories (Raffestin, 2012; Sassen, 2013: 26), but also territory’s continued academic relevance (Murphy, 2013). Chilla et al. (2012: 963) argued that ‘though the predominance of national territoriality is questioned, the coverage of political mandates for a given territory is assumed, even in a multi-layered context’. This means that trans-territorial strategies, such as CBC, are operating in a multi-level governmental framework. However, the actors still represent clearly demarcated levels in respect to territorial boundaries, jurisdictions and varying rationales towards the border.

The Finnish–Russian border reflects a particular dichotomy between region-building efforts through cooperation activities and geopolitical security interests translated into border management and control (see Koch, 2015). While the ENI CBC framework enables cross-border activities, they are not intended for substituting border control policies. Rather, CBC policies complement existing border management procedures by reinforcing communication and cooperation across the border. They create a stable and secure border region in which authorities exercise control while maintaining cross-border exchange (see Bialasiewicz et al., 2012: 63). This institutional environment, consisting of different scalar and relational dimensions, creates power imbalances between actors that have different rationales towards the border and cooperation processes. These frictions result in various territorialities defined by power relations.

Newman (2010: 775) argues that states are continuing to develop fixed territories through power relations, but the processes of cross-border flows and emerging actor-networks continue simultaneously. Territoriality underlies variable meanings in the context of CBC in particular because ‘cross-border regions do not have their own territory’ (Chilla et al., 2012: 961). This also means that actors have a diverse understanding towards cross-border governance and cooperation practices. However, territoriality does not only refer to a certain behaviour that originates from organisational and spatial structures. Territoriality is also understood to reveal itself in spatial relations and is ‘the hidden, dissimulated structure of the everyday’ (Raffestin, 2012: 129). Disclosing the relations between governmental actors across levels in Finnish–Russian ENI CBC helps understand their various territorialities.

Murphy (2012) offers a theoretical contribution to understanding the concept of territoriality. His argument builds on Sack and Raffestin’s earlier work by examining how the relational character of MLG is yet constrained by ‘modernist territorial ideas’ and structures (Murphy, 2012: 169). For Sack (1986), territoriality is a spatial strategy where actors achieve certain ends. Raffestin (2012), however, calls for a relational approach to territoriality that captures the increasingly intertwined nature of governance among multiple actors and across different levels (cf. Murphy, 2012: 159). This relational approach to territoriality helps identify the actor’s collective agency and its benefit for the CBC process.

Previous literature (i.e. Lavenex, 2008; Liikanen, 2013) has often conceptualised ENI CBC as a EU territorial strategy designed to gain influence in the Russian neighbourhood. The relational approach proposed by Raffestin emphasises the interaction between the actors and the way in which multiple actors from different levels can support the cooperation process. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise the potentially damaging effect of a dense network with numerous actors. Increasing the number of actors inside a policy network does not always eradicate power imbalances. In some cases, this can create ‘potential bottlenecks’ that have the opposite effect (Dabrowski et al., 2014: 357).

Murphy (2012) suggests that Sack and Raffestin’s approaches are not oppositional but can enhance our understanding of territorial arrangements produced by interactions and structural circumstances that may later transform into a spatial strategy. Applying Murphy’s rationale on territoriality to Finnish–Russian ENI CBC exposes the extent to which actors utilise ENI CBC as a territorial strategy and the way in which they encounter and negotiate territorial practices. Actors in Finnish–Russian ENI CBC are influenced by a certain territorial logic that is built on discourses of friction, inequality and conflict. Finnish sub-national actors are more likely to attempt to overcome frictions stemming from different territorial discourses.

Since the establishment of the ENP in 2004, scholars such as Lavenex and Schimmelfenning (2009) have researched the ENP’s external dimension and the EU’s attempts to form a single voice on the relations with the Eastern Neighbourhood and Russia (see also Christou, 2010; Silander and Nilsson, 2014). The goal of the ENP is to promote the EU’s ideals of good governance (such as fair elections, the rule of law and consideration for human rights) in EU neighbour states (cf. Börzel and van Hüllen, 2014 and Casier, 2011) through mechanisms like ENI funding. The EU Commission has highlighted that the ENI should promote sub-national involvement and focus, in particular, on strengthening the competences of regional and local actors. However, the studies investigating the economics/security nexus of the ENP emphasise the prevalence of state interests by disclosing the power relations between the political scales (Barbé et al., 2009; Casas-Cortes et al., 2012; Perkmann, 2003; Warleigh-Lack, 2006).

The ENI is promoting a non-hierarchical governance structure that is supposed to ensure the equality of all cooperation actors (Khasson, 2013). However, Lavenex and Schimmelfenning (2009: 797) argue that ‘certain types of external governance come close to a hierarchical system and undermine important sections of third countries’ autonomy over their legislations’. Furthermore, they show that a network of actors, as in CBC, ‘does not preclude the possibility of power asymmetries’ (Lavenex and Schimmelfenning, 2009: 797). The EU has attempted to establish a multi-level governmental structure of external CBC in which actors from different levels, and with different spatial agendas, have the opportunity to voice their interests. This can result in political resistance towards cooperation because participants continue to act on behalf of national territorial interests.

The term MLG was developed by Marks et al. (1996) in the context of the Maastricht treaty in 1992. The treaty introduced new structures of EU governance by establishing intergovernmental and supra-national policy areas. By the end of the 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s, MLG was widely used in political rhetoric (Bache and Flinders, 2004: 195; Stephenson, 2013: 822) and researchers were using the concept to explore tensions between national and EU institutions (see Dabrowski et al., 2014). MLG has been utilised by these scholars (i.e. Bache and Jones, 2000) to investigate how the European governmental system is constantly (re)-negotiated between actors representing different territorial tiers. Furthermore, such research questioned the extent to which supra-national, national, regional and local actors are involved in territorially overarching regional policy networks.

Similar to Prokkola’s (2011b: 511) approach to the INTERREG III A programme in the North Calotte region, MLG is useful for understanding the structural framework of Finnish–Russian ENI CBC and its actors. With the help of regional authorities, the EU attempts to create a governance framework unaffected by politico-economic differences (European Committee of the Regions, 2009: 14–15). MLG is understood as an apolitical strategy for CBC that creates non-hierarchical network structures that include the expertise of different policy actors (Stephenson, 2013: 828). However, such networks are subject to complex actor relations, their understanding and re-production of a particular territorial logic derived from experiences and transforming discourses. Therefore, investigating the stability of actor relations during geopolitical crises is particularly relevant for the study of ENI CBC.

Examining actor relationships from the perspective of territoriality can lead to two possible outcomes. Firstly, territoriality and its various practices have only marginal effects on the actor relations and cooperation practices. This would suggest that Finnish–Russian ENI CBC has reached a long-term stability. Secondly, the EU–Russia relations also affect negotiations on the Finnish sub-national levels. Prokkola (2011a) and Brenner (2004) have argued that the re-scaling of state power to the sub-and supra-national levels does not necessarily diminish the role of the national level. This would suggest, in the case of Finland, that all political levels involved in cross-border governance are closely interlinked with and dependent on the central authority in Helsinki.

Soft policies such as cooperation are not immune to foreign relations and geopolitical challenges, as they emphasise power imbalances, frictions and territorial discrepancies in actor relations. Such power imbalances often lead to the reformulation of boundaries and highlight the inequality between the EU and non-EU actors. In spatial terms, external CBC is a relational strategy that accentuates connections between the actors and various motives in processes of integration (cf. Gualini, 2003: 43). However, states still attempt to maintain their authority within the ‘fuzzy’ bounded cross-border regions, causing an overrepresentation of state interests in cooperation practices (see Paasi and Zimmerbauer, 2016).

Browning and Christou (2010: 112) argue that the neighbouring states, including Russia, are characterised as the ‘other’. As a result, the EU perceives the unwillingness of neighbouring states to move in the EU’s direction as ‘suspicious’ or ‘threatening’. Russia, in particular, is often conceptualised as a centre of power (Browning and Christou, 2010) that envelops post-Soviet states, such as Ukraine or Belarus. Browning and Christou (2010: 112) conclude, in the context of the ENP, that ‘friendship here is all about the willingness of the partners to conform to the EU’s own image’. The EU perceives the non-compliance of Russia towards EU rules as endangering their diplomatic relationship. The territoriality of the EU and Russia is divided by margins of power in which several strategies are applied to neutralise the effects each centre exercises on the remaining Eastern European states (see Börzel and Panke, 2014: 1040; Browning and Christou, 2010: 112).

In this way, CBC and its funding opportunities can be recognised as a territorial strategy of the EU to achieve the objectives defined in the ENP and as an incentive to create and reinforce interactions. While CBC regions are intended to be flexible and open to exchange in its various forms, the significance of territoriality in the form of boundary-drawing discourses, national jurisdiction and interests cannot be dismissed. Territoriality within CBC emerges contextually out of the actor relations and their practices, which reflect certain geopolitical developments.

Research design

The Finnish–Russian border regions (see Figures 1 and 2) analysed in this study are characterised by a high socio-economic disparity that has been especially pronounced after the Finnish accession to the EU and the inclusion of Finland into the Single Market.⁴ The ENI currently supports three cross-border programmes that intend to stabilise the economic, social and security situation in the Finnish–Russian border region. The geographic area of the Kolarctic programme is sparsely populated, posing challenges to transport and infrastructure that are to be addressed by the ENI funding. The Karelian programme has a focus on economic development but also deals with infrastructural challenges along the border. The South-East Finland–Russia region, with its geographic proximity to Helsinki and St. Petersburg, contains the most frequented border-crossing points with long queues and waiting times that are targeted by large-scale ENI CBC projects. The BSR programme includes a vast geographic region with environmental, infrastructural and economic challenges that evolve around the sustainable use of the Baltic Sea for each member state.

Figure 1.

Finnish–Russian European Neighbourhood and Partnership cross-border cooperation programmes 2007−2013. Source: NordRegio (2007).

Figure 2.

Baltic Sea Region Programme 2014−2020. Source: NordRegio (2015).

ENI CBC programmes within Finland are structured in a decentralised manner that displays the dynamics between various involved political actors. Responsibilities are divided between the EU (particularly the DG REGIO and DG NEAR of the European Commission and the External Action Service), the Finnish Ministries (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment; Ministry for Foreign Affairs) and the ENI CBC joint management authorities (JMAs) located in the Finnish regional councils of Oulu, Rovaniemi and Lappeenranta. Responsibilities regarding the implementation and management of the ENI CBC programmes are highly dispersed between the actors.

Table 1 summarises the amount of funding the EU contributes to the ENPI/ENI programmes and shows the number of partners and projects in each analysed programme. The data regarding projects is yet incomplete for the ENI 2014−2020 period, as financing agreements with Russia have been signed in December 2016 and calls for projects are ongoing.

Table 1.

Overview of Finnish–Russian European Neighbourhood and Partnership Programmes (ENPI) 2007−2013/ European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) Programmes 2014−2020.⁵

	Kolarctic	Karelia	South-East Finland–Russia	INTERREG Baltic Sea (ENPI/ENI component)
EU contribution 2007−2013 ENPI in EUR	€28.2m	€23.2m	€36.1m	€23m allotted to Russia & Belarus
EU contribution 2014−2020 ENI in EUR	€24.7m	€21.5m	€36.1m	€8.8m(financing agreement not yet signed)
Change in %	(–)12%	(–)7%	No change	(–)61,7%
Number of projects in ENPI 2007–2013	47	66	55	No official contribution of Russian partners in ENPI 2007–2013.
Number of partners in ENPI 2007−2013	92	159	120	No official contribution of Russian partners in ENPI 2007–2013.
Thematic Focus ENPI 2007–2013 (based on number of projects)	Institutional cooperation and cooperation networks (13); Knowledge and technology transfer (13)	Tourism (15); Cultural heritage and arts (13); Sustainable management of natural resources (13)	Education and training (11)	No Russian project participation under ENPI due to missing financing agreements.
Thematic focus ENPI 2007–2013 (based on funding in EUR)	Improving transport connections (€17.6m); Infrastructure (€17.6m)	Transport and mobility (€32.3m); Infrastructure (€29.9m)	Infrastructure (€48.4m); Transport and mobility (€38.2m)	ENPI money not allocated for Russian.
Location joint management authority	Rovaniemi, Finland	Oulu, Finland	Lappeenranta, Finland	Kiel, Germany; Rostock Germany; Riga, Latvia.
Key partners	Public governmental and non-governmental institutions, i.e. universities, city councils, municipalities, independent research institutes, municipal development agencies. For an exhaustive list, see https://www.keep.eu/keep/partner

EU: European Union.

The following empirical analysis is based on semi-structured interviews conducted by the author with key actors who are responsible for the coordination and implementation of the programmes.⁶ Informants were the JMAs of the Karelian, Kolarctic, South-East Finland–Russia and the joint Secretariat of the BSR programme whose members identified their contact persons in the Finnish ministries located in Helsinki. In order to trace their relational networks, the regional and national Finnish participants were asked to identify their main contacts working at the European level in Brussels. These key contacts were interviewed in Brussels. They represent the European Commission (DG REGIO and DG NEAR) and the European External Action Service (EEAS). Interview quotes and the respective institution will be presented during the analysis but the names of the participants will not be identified in order to ensure confidentiality and anonymity.

The interviews provide a perspective of each involved political level, ranging from the sub-national to the supra-national. The interview themes focus on cooperation practices on a day-to-day basis, communication between the actors and perceived decision-making influence, the experience of working across the border and the changes in the programmes in the wake of geopolitical crises. With this information, the article provides a perspective of the actor relations and their dynamics within the MLG framework of cooperation.

The interviews with the European actors responsible for the implementation and decision-making of Finnish–Russian CBC provide a deeper and more nuanced view of CBC than the one available from official policy texts (cf. Koch, 2015), which are often ‘polished’ versions of negotiations and have undergone numerous revisions. Interviews with policy officials offer the additional benefit of discovering day-to-day interactions, challenges and solutions that are not visible in the policy documents. Resonating with the methodological approach of Pinos (2014: 134), who did an analysis of policy documents and interviews to shed light on externalisation policies in Morocco, the interview materials used in this article are scrutinised and contrasted with each other in order to discover the relations between the actors and how these relationships were perceived among the stakeholders. Expert views and statements revealed by interviewees are particularly relevant because they have first-hand knowledge about critical issues, such as EU–Russia relations, the development of Finnish–Russian external CBC and the ENI CBC funding instrument. The interviews are carefully and critically examined and interpreted as situational and contextual articulations of cooperation in the current geopolitical climate.

Actor relations in the Finnish–Russian ENI CBC multi-level framework

Finnish–Russian cooperation was established by the bilateral ‘Neighbourhood Area Cooperation framework’ in 1992 (Ministry for Foreign Affairs Finland, 2009: 2). This agreement is the predecessor of the INTERREG and TACIS programmes that were introduced in Finland after it joined the EU in 1995. The EU formally incorporated the Finnish–Russian cross-border regions into its regional cooperation framework, which, according to Paasi’s (2011) discussion on new regionalism, relied on actions that would be implemented and realised by regional actors. This created a novel form of multi-level and trans-territorial governance that utilised sub-national institutions. The Finnish regional councils of Oulu, Rovaniemi and Lappeenranta represent the combined interests of EU and non-EU states as the JMAs of the Finnish–Russian ENI CBC programmes. The Finnish regional level has always been prevalent in the Finnish–Russian CBC process:

These programmes were always region-based. And this is different in comparison to many other programmes. The national level is of course the key player in both countries (Finland and Russia) but in these Finnish-Russian CBC programmes, they are very much based on the regional level because responsibilities have been assigned from the EU to the joint management authorities regarding the implementation and strategy-building. (Karelia ENI CBC/1)

This governance structure of cooperation, described by the regional spokesperson, is designed to overcome territorial divisions between actors in a relational governmental framework. The goal is to shift away from state-centred perspectives (Bache and Flinders, 2004). However, the Finnish government is characterised by a highly centralised system of appointed regional authorities in addition to strong municipal authorities voted for by the Finnish population. Since regional council members are not elected by the public, discussions of a democratic deficit arose. The JMAs in the regional councils in Finland are considered to act in the interests of the central authority in Helsinki (Fritsch et al., 2015: 2588). The Finnish central state authorities remain therefore key actors in the Finnish–Russian cooperation process despite the JMAs’ location in the Finnish regional councils, creating power imbalances within the ENI CBC programmes.

The Finnish government continues to participate in the selection of large-scale projects, such as infrastructure, that fall under the public domain or are the state’s services. Table 1, for example, shows the prevalence of infrastructural projects. An interviewee from the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment explains that:

So it is understandable, if we are building infrastructure on the state border or roads or something like that, the central administration is of course involved; the regions cannot make such decisions by themselves. Then if it is about setting up a project for a local newspaper, for example, then probably the central power is less involved. (Finnish Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment/4)

The statement above leads to the assumption that the MLG structure in Finnish–Russian ENI CBC is sectorial-based. The willingness of the state to delegate decision-making competences to the sub-national levels depends upon the particular policy sector. Laine (2016: 10) argues that civil society organisations have the tools to organise and finance cooperation by themselves in the Finnish–Russian border area. Still, large investments for cooperation projects financed by public tax revenue require the legitimacy of the state. This leads to additional questions about the MLG structure, because tax revenues are bound to the territorial jurisdiction of the nation-state. The Finnish state remains a main actor in decision-making processes on major ENI CBC projects (such as infrastructure) and thus challenges the MLG structure of cooperation.

In the context of the ENI CBC programmes, the EU’s main goal is to establish a partnership between all actors (Khasson, 2013). Legally, the ENI is based on the transfer of European values into the neighbourhood, therefore challenging a sense of partnership. The achievement of actor equality depends on the eradication of state-centred interests and emphasis on joint solutions. The current organisational structure of CBC, however, suggests that the EU is still focused on its overall goal to ‘change Russia’ (Laine, 2016: 9). This also leads to a friction of territorial strategies, as Russia is another power centre with its own ‘sphere of influence’ in Eastern Europe (Browning and Christou, 2010: 112). The position of non-EU actors (i.e. Russian governmental actors) remains dependent on the EU’s willingness to share certain responsibilities within the programmes. One challenge that has been identified in relation to the participation of Russian partners in ENI CBC is connected to their perceived inexperience with EU rules:

I think the most important issue for these non-EU countries is to cooperate, and to get the money in order to have possibility to cooperate. But of course it is something new for them and for us, they also have to change. They know more or less the ENI regulations but they did not know the ERDF (European Regional Development Fund) of the INTERREG or things like that, it is for the member states. (DG REGIO/2)

The EU actors’ expectation that Russian partners should change, or adapt EU rules in order to secure funding, illustrates the assistance-type cooperation of the ENI. Russia has not been included in the ENP framework because the Russian government refused to receive technical assistance that would help promote EU values (Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs/4). Nevertheless, Russia is eligible for EU funding under the ENI cooperation framework and Russian partners financially contribute to the programmes. The EU has to create a cooperation model that promotes equality in order to satisfy Russian partners. However, they are constrained by a system of governance that still relies on an ‘assistance-type cooperation’, which has a restraining impact on the joint management structures (Khasson, 2013: 339). Interviewees from the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs highlighted this in term of Russian officials’ strong response to previous ENPI CBC negotiations:

The Russians felt a little bit hurt that they were treated in those negotiations in the same group as the other neighbourhood countries […]. This idea that they are the ones getting aid. The Russians had already made a decision that they would put quite a lot of funding into the ENI CBC programme and their point of view was that they cannot be treated in the same way as any aid-receiving country. (Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs Finland/3)

Browning and Christou (2010) referred to EU neighbour states as ‘outsiders’ that have a ‘constitutive’ influence on the EU’s security agenda and borders. The EU’s normative power in the neighbourhood and Russia thus depends upon the neighbouring state’s willingness to implement proposed reforms through the ENI. As a result, both the EU and Russia enter into a mode of resistance that further strains their diplomatic relationship and the formation of balanced decision-making structures (see Stoddard, 2015: 557).

The balancing act played by Finnish sub-national actors should, however, not be underestimated. In congruence with Dabrowski et al.’s (2014: 355) findings, the regional level in Finnish–Russian ENI CBC is an appropriate scale for strategic planning, information exchange and trust creation. However, in the context of Finnish–Russian ENI CBC, the influence of the Finnish regional actors on the establishment of the ENI programmes is still considered marginal and mediated through the Finnish national level, as explained by a regional actor:

I do not know if we can affect those issues (on the EU level). But of course, if we are working together and cooperating with the other Finnish programmes we can put more pressure on the Commission to inform them about our ideas […]. We work very intensively with the Foreign Ministry of Finland and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment and together we address some issues to the Commission, if there are some needs. (Kolarctic ENI CBC/2)

The Finnish regional actors are aware of their impact on decision-making tasks if they manage to pool their interests and jointly present them to the national authorities in Helsinki. Popescu (2012: 127−128) has argued that the task of governing cross-border regions can be ‘overwhelming’ because of the large number of regional, national and supra-national actors involved. He shows that this can overshadow the end goals of the projects because of the challenge in coordinating actions amongst actors at multiple levels and identifying the relevant representatives. Cooperation with non-EU actors is particularly challenging. In some instances, the perception is that Russian governmental actors are unfamiliar with the working structures of the EU. During past cooperation periods, the tasks of the Finnish regional councils were not formally established. According to a regional spokesperson, this caused misunderstandings:

Now also those regional responsibilities changed and we had had some difficulties already related to this, for example regarding the specific position and tasks of the regional councils in Finland which act as the managing authorities of these ENI CBC programmes. Russia is not familiar with this kind of organisational body at all. (South-East Finland – Russia ENI CBC/3)

In the case of Finnish–Russian ENI CBC, the multi-level governmental organisation has not reduced the role of the Finnish state. Rather, central authorities in Helsinki were given the crucial role of mediating between the sub- and supra-national levels. Furthermore, the horizontal relationship between the Finnish regional levels and the Russian ministerial level responsible for the cooperation also demonstrates the significant task of the JMAs to maintain a relationship with the Russian partners throughout crises. In contrast, the horizontal relationship and communication between the EU institutions and the JMAs is reduced to formal reports that exemplify the rigid framework of ENI CBC. Tassinari (2005: 398) has noted that cooperation across the EU border has ‘prevented the exclusion of Russia’. However, the previous analysis rather suggests that the recent cooperation framework has not improved the status of Russia within the ENI. Rather, the EU continues to manoeuvre its external policies regarding the neighbouring states between partnership and assistance.

Actor relations under stress: Impact of territoriality

Fritsch et al. (2015: 2584) have argued that the Finnish–Russian ENI CBC programmes are in their ‘operation and cooperation largely kept free of historical baggage and geopolitical questions’. This argument conveys the perception of an apolitical MLG structure of Finnish–Russian ENI CBC. However, the following analysis shows that actors and their relations are highly influenced by power relations and imbalances in which cooperation practices are interlinked with territorial questions. The MLG structure of CBC appears to be an idealistic policy structure imagined by the EU. Harrison (2008: 929) criticised the apparent state-centrism in region-building processes because the ‘regional tier of government is simply seen as another layer of bureaucracy’, a bureaucracy defined by the large number of actors in the CBC network (Popescu, 2012). The sub-national ENI CBC actors have effectively become competitors for EU funding (see Laine, 2016: 4).

In addition, regional actors are subject to shifting diplomatic relations between the EU and Russia. The Finnish regional level, in particular, has to negotiate the territoriality of CBC with Russian partners to overcome the strained discourses caused by the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. Finnish–Russian ENI CBC programmes and previous ENPI programmes have been vulnerable to wars and conflicts in the Eastern neighbourhood:

The revolution (Ukrainian Orange Revolution, 2004−2005) and Georgian crisis (2008) both had an influence on our activities. First at that time when we were starting to convert the INTERREG programmes to the neighbourhood programmes and then at that point when we wanted to launch the ENPI programmes; it had an impact on the financing agreements. (Karelia ENI CBC/1)

This statement shows the impact of territoriality on transnational cooperation frameworks (see Murphy, 2008: 13). The regional level attempts to relativise inequalities between different partners as a result of broader geopolitical developments that do not typically concern sub-national actors. However, Russian partners have shown interest in keeping negotiations with the JMAs free of broader political issues. The following statement describes a situation in which a representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry tried to resolve the tense political situations at a meeting with the Finnish sub-national actors:

When this situation started to become more difficult, and we were wondering if we can continue to work for preparing the new programme, he said ‘at this table, where we are sitting, we continue the works as it should go on and the other are making political decisions on other tables. And we concentrate on our work’. (South-East Finland – Russia ENI CBC/3)

Even though the regional programmes were challenged by the political decision to introduce economic sanctions against Russia, the Finnish ministries and regional programme managers continue to pursue cooperation across the border. Thus, continued cooperation may contribute to an overall de-escalation of the situation between the EU and Russia. The thematic focus of ENI CBC is de-politicised in the sense that objectives on ‘hard’ policy domains, such as migration or security, are absent from the programmes.

Raffestin (2012) aptly reminds us that the relational approach to territoriality contributes to a better understanding of the intertwined nature of governance across different scales. Perkmann (2003: 157) states that during the study of cross-border regions ‘it is precisely the process of construction that matters’. CBC is supposed to create a cross-border region that transcends the conceptual borders by focusing on commonalities rather than territorial differences. To achieve this, Finnish–Russian ENI CBC programmes are designed to concentrate on shared infrastructural, environmental and socio-cultural issues that exist on both sides of the border. At the same time, they are intended to focus less on one-sided issues, such as the development of civil society organisations in the Russian border regions, or hard policy domains, such as border security and undocumented immigration (Laine, 2016).

Regional interviewees in Finland consider the Finnish–Russian border a mental boundary rather than a physical barrier to cooperation (see Laine, 2014: 68). The mental boundary is a cultural division, complicated by an underlying understanding that the Finnish and Russian population has been interconnected but also divided throughout history (Laine, 2014: 73). Questions about the border and areas of potential friction (i.e. human trafficking and drug trafficking) exist predominantly at higher political levels. Regional Finnish actors are more concerned with ensuring the projects are not affected by territorial practices, arguments and conflicts:

In practice we can say that this cooperation is the one that really deals with all these unnecessary attitudes, hostile attitudes, which exist on the national and EU level. They (Finnish and Russian programme partners) only think that there is a normal person on the other side and they do not think that we should be enemies because ‘I am from Russia and you are from Finland’. (South-East Finland – Russia ENI CBC/3)

Within their day-to-day communications, regional actors are responsible for establishing a sense of trust among the project partners by creating favourable conditions for all participants during the cooperation (see Johnson, 2009: 186). Finnish sub-national actors are frequently engaged in cross-border activities with Russian partners. As a result, they are entrusted with preserving the cooperation network despite the harsh geopolitical climate. Punitive sanctions, as in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis, may disrupt financial opportunities and revoke the legitimacy of cooperation practices. However, past cooperation periods have proven the creativity and capacity of sub-national ENI CBC actors. They have been able to find alternative strategies for including Russia into projects. The BSR programme, which did not achieve the financing agreements in the ENPI (2007–2013) period with Russia, found ad-hoc solutions that allowed Russian project partners to participate:

So they were involved in the project but not with ENPI funding and there were several different solutions for how they were involved and how intensely, involvement can mean many things of course. They were not called partners but associated organisations. For example the Swedish innovation fund has been providing funding for the Russian partners. (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment/4)

During the effort to protect Finnish–Russian ENI CBC from the sanctions, the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment acted as mediators between the ENI CBC programmes and the EU by representing national interests and defending them in Brussels. Crisis situations destabilise actor relationships most notably on the supra- and national governmental levels, as appropriate responses to violations of international law are decided by the EU Council (i.e. the 28 EU member states). The analysis, however, shows that Finnish–Russian ENI CBC reached a certain level of stability in which the immediate impact of geopolitics (i.e. Ukrainian crisis) did not influence programmes. The Finnish regional actors have a close relationship with Russian partners and this ensures the continuation of cooperation activities. Most project partners are public bodies and institutions and, therefore, the economic sanctions had less of an impact than could have been anticipated if private businesses were involved.

Geopolitical challenges are not immediately affecting Finnish sub-national actors who are responsible for the implementation and management of the ENI CBC programmes. This is supported by the fact that the programmes are implemented for a seven-year period. Structural changes to the programmes are retrospective and occur during negotiations for subsequent funding periods. This, however, also leads to a certain rigidity of the CBC programmes as they cannot respond to immediate changes. One example is the funding amount for Russian and Belorussian partners in the BSR programme. While the funding amount for the previous ENPI 2007–2013 period was €23m, the ENI 2014−2020 allocation decreased to €8.8m because the financing agreements have not been successful with Russia in the previous period.

The thematic focus of ENI CBC projects is another way to explain the defence of ENI CBC programmes by the Finnish ministerial level in Brussels. During the ENPI period, the thematic focus of projects was towards the extension of cooperation networks and a focus on good practices and common values. Thus, Finnish–Russian ENI CBC is disconnected from security or border management issues. Territoriality of Finnish–Russian ENI CBC is therefore most noticeable in subtle changes in interpersonal interactions (Raffestin, 2012: 129) and the outspoken attempt of the regional level to remain focused on the projects instead of delving into discussions about broader political crises.

Negotiation strategies of ENI CBC actors on the example of financing agreements

All Finnish officials involved in CBC have stressed the importance of Russia’s financial contribution to the ENI CBC programmes. The financing negotiations take place after the EU Commission approves the ENI CBC programme proposals. The agreements must be finalised a year after initial approval. All interviewees have highlighted the financing agreements as a major factor in the maintenance of the cooperation. Interviews with the JMAs have indicated that projects were selected and launched two years after the official start of the ENPI CBC 2007−2013 programmes. This delay caused problems because the projects were not able to achieve their objectives by December 2013. As a result, the JMAs requested the European Commission that the projects be granted additional time; for some until summer 2015. Popescu (2008: 431) has referred to the scalar conflict of territorial logics that were also experienced by the individual ENI CBC programmes:

This is something we have to tell the European Commission and of course the Russian side…if we use a lot of time negotiating the agreements, which is of course important, the implementation time is shortened. (Karelia ENI CBC/1)

The complexity of these financing negotiations for the current ENI CBC period between the EU and Moscow has increased. The sanctions levied because of the Ukrainian crisis are directly linked to complications in trade relations between Russia and Finland. According to Finnish trade statistics, both imports and exports from and to Russia decreased by 33% in 2015 (Tulli, November 2015). Furthermore, in January 2015 Russian tourists in Finland decreased by 50% compared to January 2014 (Finnish Commerce Federation, October 2015). Economic relations with European states and Finland, in particular, have subsequently forfeited some of their former attractiveness in economic sectors, particularly tourism and trade of goods. The JMAs are concerned that Russia is shifting its focus to similar regional cooperation agreements with states like China (Kolarctic, ENI CBC2). An interviewee from the EEAS suggests the economic sanctions have had a crucial impact on the economic stability between the EU and Russia:

The sanctions do have an impact because, for example, with regard to transport or trade routes, the Russians are not viewing them as important as before, they do not push forward trade reforms. We are experiencing most challenges regarding the ENI CBC programme implementation in the sector of transport. (EEAS/2)

This statement shows the effect of the sanctions on economic well-being in Finland and how it can alter CBC between both states – particularly given the fact that projects on mobility and infrastructure were key themes in the ENPI period. A regional Finnish interviewee mentioned that the sanctions also pose practical challenges for programme financing:

I heard that in other programmes there might have been some problems with the money transfers because of some banks which are now on the sanctions list. But in our programme we have not faced that problem yet. Of course that is one big issue, if the financial flow of the bank transfers would be affected by the sanctions in the future. It might cause difficulties for us. (Kolarctic ENI CBC/2)

The Finnish regional actors usually encourage the timely achievement of financing agreements so projects are launched according to the schedule set in the programming documents. If projects do not follow the approved schedule, they may experience financial deductions of unused funds in future programme proposals. For example, the BSR had more than €14.2m of unused funds due to the failure of the financing agreement with Russia during the ENPI period 2007−2013 (see Table 1) (Finnish Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment/4). This money is missing from the current ENI period.

Paasi and Zimmerbauer (2016) have studied the territorial/relational interplay in Finnish planning practices and argue that planners need to think in terms of open or porous borders even though their practices are determined by bounded territorial units (see Stead, 2014: 683). Similarly, Finnish–Russian cross-border actors have to deal with the territorial practices of the EU in the relational sphere of cooperation. The EU can delegate some competences to the Finnish regional level, but certain decisions (i.e. financing) have to be made anonymously by all 28 EU member states. However, the EU is willing to shift some of the responsibility for project selection to the JMAs – which underlie Finnish national interests. This leads to the interlinkage of territorial/relational aspects influencing the relationship between the Finnish national and regional actors. However, it also provides the regional authorities with new opportunities to reformulate cooperation with Russia, because the Finnish state and the EU have a great interest in including Russian partners into the cooperation. In particular, the long-term stability of cooperation activities within the ENI provides the JMAs with an argument to increase their scope of decision-making responsibilities in the future.

Prior to the introduction of the ENPI programmes, the EU relied on a system based on the principle of conditionality. Non-EU states gained privileges in the EU single market if they complied with EU rules set by the European Council (de facto the member states) (Lavenex, 2008). Together with the ENP framework, the EU created a funding instrument that not only requires the financial contribution of non-EU partners but also encourages sharing their expertise, expectations and concerns with EU members. The way the partners from non-EU states are being acknowledged must change because they consider themselves equal partners – not aid recipients. The Russian national interests must be recognised in future CBC programming periods and the Finnish regional level may become an ideal mediator to communicate the needs of the regions to the EU bureaucrats who are establishing the programmes in Brussels.

Conclusion

The aim of this article has been to study the role of territoriality in the actor relations in Finnish–Russian ENI CBC. Territoriality is not only approached as power relation spatiality (see Raffestin, 2012: 125), but also as an actor practice in consequence to geopolitical developments. The actor-focused perspective applied in this paper helps one to understand the underlying territorial characteristics of the Finnish–Russian CBC programmes and has unveiled the frictions in territorialities within the CBC network. While the EU promotes the MLG framework of cooperation in policy documents, the efficiency of MLG as a structure for ENI CBC has to be reconsidered, particularly in crisis situations. Finnish–Russian ENI CBC follows a particular territorial logic in which political powers influence but also derive from actor relations. The actors are contributing to the territoriality of CBC on the different governmental levels by re-producing prevailing geopolitical discourses or the territorial technicalities of the cooperation process. Despite the EU’s efforts to create a partnership between all actors on the ground, the diplomatic relations between the EU and Russia overshadow attempts of the JMAs to include Russia into decision-making processes and to recognise their interests regarding the cooperation programmes.

Despite the supra-national ENI CBC programmes developed by the EU, the analysis reveals the central role of the Finnish state in the framework of Finnish–Russian ENI CBC programmes and shows that the national authority in Helsinki acts as a mediator between the sub- and supra-national levels. This shows the dominance of the Finnish state and its attempts to maintain sovereignty over its territory. The Finnish–Russian JMAs, which are crucial during the establishment and maintenance of a working relationship between all partners, are mainly communicating with the EU through the Finnish national ministerial level. Thus, Finnish regional actors do not perform an influencing role on the actions taken by the EU towards the neighbourhood and Russia. Key decisions are yet administered by the state and driven by national interests, rather than regional or local concerns, despite the EU’s claims to strengthen the sub-national involvement in MLG policy structures (European Committee of the Regions, 2009: 3). The JMAs, located within the Finnish regional councils, continue to act as the representatives of Finnish state interests towards its own territory. Thus, this paper concludes that territoriality in Finnish–Russian ENI CBC is based on a territorial logic that is influenced and re-produced by actor relations and their reaction towards geopolitical crises and other re- and de-bordering effects. Hence, territoriality is a major factor to take into consideration when studying actor relations in the context of ENI CBC.

The EU promotes a strong sub-national involvement; however, Finnish regional interests towards economic cooperation, tourism development and other activities are challenged by national security interests towards Russia. Russia is yet positioned as ‘the other’ within ENI CBC, which is also reflected by the cooperation practices that are still perceived to provide assistance to the Russian border regions (see Khasson, 2013). The EU’s decision to introduce sanctions against Russia was taken by all 28 EU member states and Finnish lobbying by the Foreign Ministry prevented the ENI CBC programmes being included. Thus, national territorial interests have a large impact on CBC activities. Furthermore, the regional actors are contributing to the de-politicisation of cooperation activities by thematically focusing on improving technicalities and institutional arrangements of the cooperation framework. Regional actors prefer, also because of their lack of competence in crucial decision-making processes, to separate between cooperation practices on the ground and the diplomatic relations between the EU and Russia determined in Brussels and Moscow. Nerveless, the Finnish JMAs have an important mediating task between EU and non-EU actors. The JMAs have the advantage to overcome tense rhetoric between the EU and Russia by focusing on the thematic objectives pre-defined in the programmes and thus ensuring a continuation of the projects. This contributes to the overall stabilisation of certain cooperation areas with Russia.

MLG as a political approach was supposed to overcome hierarchies by delegating tasks evenly across the different actors, but the analysis shows that the spatial agenda-setting responsibilities are still centralised and dominated by territorial practices. ENI CBC is a fitting example that shows how the EU attempts to utilise the soft policy of CBC to influence the political development in its neighbourhood. Thus, the EU and its member states extend their political reach within the relational network of activities that require transnational cooperation across borders. This involves the mobilisation of supra-national and sub-national actors whose relations cannot be conceptualised within fixed spatial entities but, instead, the territorial space of cooperation is shaped by these relations.

The analysed ENI CBC programmes are spaces of cooperation in which – ideologically – the Finnish–Russian border should not be an obstacle and national interests towards the border regions should merge. Empirical investigation for this paper, however, finds that even though the border is merely an administrative obstacle and relatively freely crossed by the programme stakeholders, national interests still dominate the thematic scope of Finnish–Russian ENI CBC. This becomes particularly evident during geopolitical challenges, such as the Ukrainian crisis, in which the CBC programmes were exploited by both the EU and Russia as possible leverage and were threatened with interruption by including them in the sanctions list. The perception of the Ukrainian crisis and its impact differs among the actors involved in ENI CBC in the sense that the sub-national actors refrain from concentrating on ‘high politics’, while the EU institutions focus on the international repercussions for Russia’s actions.

The governance of the ENI CBC regions relies on a sensitive balance between the transnational institutional structures and the shared responsibilities of the actors. The actor relations must be acknowledged and recognised without losing sight of their key function, which is to ease territorial tensions by bringing together different governmental and non-governmental actors. In this way, the Finnish regional councils can add to the efforts to create partnership-type cooperation because they are aware of context-bound transnational differences within the CBC regions. In addition, further involvement of the neighbouring states into CBC implementation and management negotiations could expedite the accomplishment of the funding agreements and thus the timely finalisation of projects with long-term prospects for EU–Russia relations. The study of the EU–Russia cooperation programmes in this paper has disclosed the Finnish perspective. Future research avenues include studying the Russian response towards the ENI CBC funding structures in order reveal the impact of EU-led cooperation strategies on EU–Russia relations.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Anssi Paasi and Dr. Eeva-Kaisa Prokkola for their comments and feedback on previous drafts. I also thank Prof. Thomas Conzelmann, Dr. Elisabetta Nadalutti and Fredriika Jakola for our fruitful discussions. The constructive comments and advice given by the anonymous referees have been a great help in further strengthening the paper.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was funded by the Academy of Finland (#307348) and supported by the Centre for Excellence (CoE) RELATE.

Notes

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The role of territoriality in the European Union multi-level governmental cooperation framework of Finnish–Russian cross-border cooperation

Abstract

Keywords

Introduction

Territoriality and its impact on cross-border cooperation actor relations

Research design

Actor relations in the Finnish–Russian ENI CBC multi-level framework

Actor relations under stress: Impact of territoriality

Negotiation strategies of ENI CBC actors on the example of financing agreements

Conclusion

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

Declaration of conflicting interests

Funding

Notes

References