Abstract
The recent political developments in the Arab world, in general, and in the North African states like Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, in particular, develop new enthusiasm on the interaction between Islam/Islamism/Islamic movements and democracy; especially with the institutions and practices of western liberal democracy. Islamist groups have become a critical factor in the larger politics of those states and the central focus of any serious debate on political liberalisation and democratisation in the Arab world. The 1990s witnessed a revival of Islamism in the political sphere through the increasing participation of Islamists in elections and the democratic process. It has raised some new debates on the fundamental question of the compatibility of Islam and democracy. Such debates, at times, challenged the dominant western pre-supposition that Islam and democracy are incompatible. It has become crucial in the widely discussed ‘post September 11’ global context where many groups in the west project Islamism and Islamic movements as the biggest threat to modern liberal–democratic states. The Algerian experiment with democracy in the late 1980s, which this article discusses in detail, was the first such experiment in the Arab world where Islamists actively participated in a liberal democratic election process. The developments that had taken place after the victory of Islamists in this election were crucial in framing an Islamist approach to democracy thereafter.
Introduction
As a consequence of the ‘Arab Spring’—uprisings in North African states like Tunisia, Egypt and Libya—Algeria also faced some protests in the country. Inspired by the Arab Spring, opposition parties, religious groups and labour unions mobilised people all over the country and protested against the authoritarian regime. They demanded a change in the political system, greater democracy and more participation in politics. As an immediate response to the demands of the agitators, the government lifted the 19-year-old state of emergency and promised fresh parliamentary elections. While the agitations in Tunisia and Libya, the neighbouring states of Algeria, ended with the expulsion of the dictators and a true regime change, in Algeria, hardly any qualitative change occurred in the politics of the state. Despite these agitations/protests, Algeria has remained relatively stable even after such massive developments/changes in the region.
Weakening of traditional power structures and wider demands for political participation are two important aspects of the political scenario in the Arab world in general and North Africa in particular especially in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries (Anderson, et al. 1997; Arun 1990; Asef 2007; Esposito 1992; Mahfoud 1990; Metin 1997; Anderson 1997; Amin 2012). What we see today in states like Egypt, Libya and Tunisia and other Middle Eastern states is the result of the revival of Islamic movements and their active participation in the emerging political scenario in the region. Historically, Islam played an important role in the consolidation of political systems in the North African region (Owen 1992; Bromley 1999). Many scholars have argued that the Arab world is lacking certain conditions which are necessary for the promotion of a liberal democracy and development of democratic institutions (Hamdi 1996). The developments related to political liberalisation/democratisation in Algeria in the 1980s and the role played by Islamist parties is the focus of this article. The article analyses the role of the Front Islamique Du Salut (Islamic Salvation Front—FIS), the largest Islamic organisation in Algeria, which has actively participated in Algerian politics. Similarly, FIS was the first and one of the very few Islamic movements that participated in a liberal–democratic election process and became victorious. 1 However, the organisation could not access power as the military backed authoritarian regime in Algeria declined to devolve power and subsequently banned the organisation. The ruling regime blamed Islamist groups for the failure of the democratisation process in the state and even cited Algerian experiences for suppressing Islamic politics in the region as a whole (Heristchi 2004). Such positions of keeping Islam and Islamic parties away from political process have got wider support from western powers. As a result, the region was subject to enforcement of a type of political regime highly authoritarian in nature (Ehteshami 2007). Besides, the post-9/11 developments reshaped the priorities of Western powers in the region and new debates on Islam and democracy got momentum.
Islamism and State Formation in Modern Algeria
The growth of Islamic movements in Algeria is the result of a historic process, which started since the expansion of Islam to North Africa and the popularisation of Islam as a religion among various tribal groups (Esposito 1997). Development of an organisational structure to Islamic movements is closely connected with the reform in Islam and the popular resistance against French colonialism (Brown 2000; Boubekeur 2008). The first manifestation of Islamic resistance against colonialism in the region was the movement of Abd al Qadir. 2 It is true that, apart from religion, there were many other socio-economic and political reasons behind the protest of Abd al Qadir. However, the major force that unified people was the cultural/religious identity based on Islam. The religious traditions, which are part of the day-to-day life and consciousness of the people, resulted in the dominance of this identity in the anti-colonial movement and this functioned as the main ideological base of such a resistance. Thus Islamic ideals, symbols and institutions offered inspiration and powerful instruments of mobilisation for those who challenged French domination in Algeria (Shanin 1997; Assam and Esposito 2000).
The Islamic ideology functioned in Algeria in different ways during different phases of the national movement. Various reformist movements within Islam were major imperatives behind anti-colonial resistance. Islam functioned as a mobilisation force since the very beginning of the colonial occupation of Algeria and the movement formed by Abd al Qadir continued through various Islamic groups. Salafism was the major influential force and the theoretical foundation of all Islamic movements in Algeria (Brown 1994; Ayubi 1982; Boubekeur 2008). Though it was a religious reformist movement which formed against maraboutism, it finally created a religious nationalist consciousness among the Algerian Muslims (Ghanim 1992; Howe 1992; Esposito 1992; 1997) which gradually developed as a national movement and challenged the very structure of the state established under French colonialism.
The ideas and writings of Islamic thinkers like Hassan al Banna, Sayyid Qutb and Abdul Mawdudi influenced the Algerian Islamic movement to a large extent. The anti-Western slogan of Sayyid Qutb was very important in the Algerian context (Hugh 1988; Moussalli 1992; Nettler 2000). The formation of the Association of Algerian Muslim Ulema by Abdul Hsamid Ben Badis was a milestone in the Algerian national history as it placed Islam at the centre of the national ideology of the Algerian people. The movement joined with other nationalist elements and played a leading role in the fight against French colonialism. It increased the political activism in the name of Islam, which emerged as a major trend during the later phases of the anti-colonial struggle (Deeb 1994; Taylor 1998).
The importance of religion in the post-colonial Algeria is closely linked with its legacy in the struggle for independence. This struggle had strengthened Islamic consciousness among the Algerian Muslims. Later the declaration of the war of independence in 1954 brought Islam to the centre of nationalism (Brown 1994; Assaydine and Heireche 1992). Even the colonial regime recognised the Islamic identity of the Algerians as they were provided French citizenship ‘within the Muslim law and customs’.
The decolonisation and shift of political, administrative, economic and military power to Algerians created an entirely new situation in the country. From the very beginning, religious elements started demanding the total Arabisation of school education and public services (Assaydine and Heireche 1992). According to them, the major objective of the formation of the National Liberation Front of Algeria (FLN, in 1954) and the War of Independence (1954–1962) was the creation of an independent Algerian state within the framework of Islamic principles (Tlemcani 1986; Sadiki 1997, 2004; Hugh 2011). However, the ruling regime neglected the demand and followed a more secular state system based on the Western pattern, easily identified with the colonial system. In short, the ruling elite in post-colonial Algeria propagated a secularist vision of the state which was more French than Algerian in its substance.
State primacy over society was an important feature of post-colonial national order in the Arab world (Anderson, et al. 1997). The reason is the rentier nature of the state that is still predominant in the region. A rentier state provides all services to people by using the massive oil revenue and ensures legitimacy of the ruling regime. A secular nationalist order was imposed over people in most of the Arab states through the use of force by the army, police and other security apparatus of state (Sadiki 1997, 65–68). Military domination was visible in the ruling apparatus since the very beginning. In the post-colonial state in Algeria, the national assembly was frozen and prominent nationalist leaders like Hajji Massali and Mohammad Boudiaf were expelled from the ruling FLN-led government by those who were backed by the military (Quandt and Armacost 1998; Quandt 2002). Later, the new constitution of 1976 restored the ‘popular’ National Assembly, though the assembly remained ‘unpopular’ and ‘undemocratic’ as the military elements dominated in it. The new constitution made the state more undemocratic as it rejected a multi-party election and allowed only FLN candidates to contest in the elections (Mohamedou 1998; Mortimer 1991).
The independent Algerian state lead by the FLN was a secular state, certainly not an Islamic state, though religious establishments were integrated with the state. The welfare policies of the state and the land redistribution to farmers increased the level of de-politicisation among the Algerians. This was further expanded through the state policy of ‘no taxation no representation’. The slogan ‘development and order’ was also used to prevent the political participation of the masses. All these helped in making a ‘stability effect’ in the political order until the early 1980s.
State monopolisation of religious institutions created dissent among the clergy and the believers. When the dissent strengthened, the ruling regime changed its strategies and came up with certain new policies to appease the religious opposition (Keane, 2002). The Arabisation of education, which was one of the major demands of the Islamic elements in the early years of independence, was finally accepted by the state. 3 Besides, the state declared Friday as an official holiday and established official radio stations for Islamic preaching. It was further expanded by the introduction of the Algerian family code in 1984. Though Islam was put under strict state control, these policies of state popularized a discourse based on Islam in Algerian society and deepened the influence of Islam in Algerian politics (Ghanim 1992; Shanin 1997; Taylor 1998).
The single-party authoritarian ‘socialist’ state that emerged in post-colonial Algeria had extensively used Islamic symbols to lend legitimacy to the regime (Hugh 1992; 1996; Entelis 1995; Boubekeur 2008). Till 1980, the state successfully managed Islamists through the Ministry of Religious Affairs and all potential challenges from the Islamic opposition were neutralized. Over the period, the official secular nationalist trend diminished from and the Islamic influence increased in the public sphere (Roberts 1988; Howe 1992; Mortimer 1996). Islam was becoming the guiding principle of the socio-political life of a vast majority of Algerians. Islamic movements used both mosques and the streets to challenge the authority of the regime, which they viewed as illegitimate. The growing dissatisfaction of the people and the consolidation of the same under an Islamic ideological framework gradually led to the increase of the influence of Islamic movements in Algeria. One major reason of this development was that the secular nationalist experiment in Algeria was a blind imitation of the Western model and many believed that it was not suitable for Algeria where the people, socio-political system and cultural formations were deeply rooted in Islamic principles and values (Hamdi 1996).
During the colonial period, the modernisation of Islam and the anti-colonial resistance were two sides of the same coin (Brown 1994; Assaydine and Heireche 1992). This brought fundamental transformations within Islam and its interaction with the state. But in the post-independent period, the state has taken over all institutions of civil society such as the courts, the press, trade unions, economic institutions and religious institutions (Asef 2007). Religion became part of the state. The secular elite control both the state and religious institutions, including the appointment of Imams in the official mosques (Ghannouchi 2000, 97). The ruling elite used Islam to consolidate power and maintain their authority. This was not a happy marriage as the state maintained a secular character, though some ‘cosmetic’ reforms were brought in to address the demands of the religious opposition.
In spite of the westernisation and secularisation of politics and society and the rapid spread of industrialisation and Arabisation, there was certainly enough tradition left to feed a potential religious reorganisation (Perry 2002; Amin 2012). Islam remained at the centre of state discourse. This, along with the crisis in the economy and the decline of state socialism culminated in open anti-state protests in Algeria (Esposito 1997; Shanin 1997). By the 1980s, the cultural and the moral opposition of the Islamists were translated into a growing political context.
Islamic forces started reorganising themselves in the 1980s and there emerged clear differences between the state and Islam. However, this has developed into an open protest in the late 1980s with the widespread popular agitations (riots) of 1988 (Arun 1990; Heristchi 2004; Roberts 2011). Unlike the recent protests in North African states like Tunisia, Libya and Egypt which was popularly known as the Arab Spring (Amin 2012; Pratt 2011), the protests in Algeria, which later transformed into riots, were neither for an Islamic state nor for the establishment of democracy. The issues discussed during the first phase of the protest had nothing to do with religion. They highlighted the pathetic socio-economic conditions and the sufferings of the people. Moreover, the political developments that took place after riots were the essential outcome of these miserable socio-economic realities of the post-independent Algerian state. These riots had paved the way for constitutional reforms and the formation of numerous political parties which facilitated a political liberalisation and democratisation process in the state (Heristchi 2004; Mohamedou 1998; Quandt and Armacost 1998).
The Political Impact of the Riots in the 1980s
The situation in Algeria was totally transformed since the 1980s which destabilised the prevailing order. The national economy had faced a serious crisis as the national income had substantially come down due to the fall in oil prices in the international market. It ultimately led to the collapse of state welfarism through which the order had been maintained and the state/ruling class enjoyed legitimacy after the end of French rule. The immediate impact of the crisis on the national economy was an increase in foreign debt, an increase in the unemployment rate, distributional inequality and a housing crisis. Combined with inefficient and corrupt authoritarianism, it politicised people and gradually the legitimacy of the ruling regime was under question (Ayubi 1995; Ayubi 1996; Tlemcani 1986).
The popular uprising of 1988 was an essential outcome of the contradiction between the increasing demands of the people and the decreasing ability of the government to satisfy such demands. The government made certain efforts through policy reforms to address the situation. 4 The major policy reforms were decentralisation and privatisation of industries—popularly called the islah (reform) and infitah (openness)—all in the economic sector (Sadiki 1997, 68). They reversed the state-centric socialist economic policies introduced by President Boumedienne, aiming to tackle the deteriorating economic conditions of the state.
It is clear that a political reform that can lead to greater democratisation was not the goal of the ruling group. But the ideological shift reflected in the new policies—from FLN socialism to an open-market economy—was sufficient for aggregating popular demands for more participation in politics/government. De-legitimisation of the Algerian ruling elite and increasing political instability and social discontent were the major outcomes of this ideological shift (Entelis 1997). The 1980s witnessed a major transition in the economic, political and social spheres of Algeria which contributed to the larger politicisation of people. The riots of 1988, which was the outcome of this politicisation, resulted in the introduction of new democratic institutions though they did not sustain for long (Mohamedou 1998; Takeyh 2003; Roberts 2011).
The most important outcome of the riots in 1988 was the transformation of the Islamic movement into a mass movement (Entelis 1995; Esposito 2006; Arieff 2013). This also led to the emergence of the Islamists as a major social and political force in Algeria. The overwhelming popular rejection of the FLN-run degenerated state administration demonstrated the rift between state and society. The riots broke the domination of the FLN, which was one of the three pillars of power along with the state and the army. Following the riots, the Islamist opposition overwhelmingly occupied a space in Algerian politics by cornering all other forces (Mortimer 1991, 574–575). The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) played as a broad, and non-cohesive, coalition of Islamist groups.
After the riots, the then President Chadli Benjedid conducted a referendum for the adoption of a new constitution for the country. According to the official sources, 83.08 per cent of the voters participated in the referendum and 92.27 per cent of them supported the new constitution. The new constitution legalised the end of the socialist era, installed a multi-party system in Algeria and removed censorship over the press (Mohamedou 1998). The introduction of many new political parties was one of the important developments facilitated by the new legislation.
Article 39 of the 1989 constitution provided freedom of expression, association and organisation. Certain rights like the right to unionise and strike (Articles 53 and 54) and the right to form associations of a political nature (Article 40) further strengthened the democratic nature of the constitution. It was a critical shift from the 1971 constitution where official permission was required for the establishment of any kind of public association—including mosques (Mortimer 1991, 577). The dropping of the references to socialism and the inauguration of a market-based economy were other important aspects of the new constitution. By this, the Algerian state shifted to a new capitalist pattern of economic development, which redefined the state–society relationship.
One major outcome of the new constitution was that it abolished the identification of the state with the FLN. The FLN–state relationship was fundamentally redefined. The army was also excluded from all types of political functions such as building of socialism and running the state administration. The senior members in the administration were asked to be relieved from the FLN central committee and the role of the army was limited to the defence of the state (Roberts 1996). The ban on strikes of public sector employees was removed. These constitutional developments functioned as the base of political liberalisation and became the channel of the democratisation process. The political liberalisation and the formal introduction of the multi-party system in Algeria gave ample space to the opposition forces—mainly Islamists—to participate in the political process of the state (Ruedy 1994, 236).
It is important to note that, a top to bottom approach was operated throughout these developments as the structure of the Algerian state was basically ‘liberalized authoritarian’ (Entelis 1986). The absolute control of the ruling class over the government and the economic activities were the major cause of this particular situation. Besides, the process of the development of certain political institutions such as political parties, elections, parliament and other elected bodies was an integral part of any democratic experiment (Roberts 1996). In Algeria, such developments are manipulated and strictly regulated by the regime in power. As it indicates, under these circumstances, a bottom to top approach in the democratisation process was not possible at all.
Emergence of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and Democracy Debates
The formation of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was the result of riots and the subsequent political liberalisation in late 1980s. FIS was an amalgam of different Islamist groups ranging from moderates to extremists/fundamentalists and there had been crucial differences among them on different issues. The organisation could consolidate Islamic sentiments, which had existed in the country for many decades (Entelis 1994; Heristchi 2004; Anderson 2006). Due to the representation of different groups, the organisation emerged as a dominant political player in Algeria within a short span of time. Popular verdicts of elections held in Algeria in the 1990s underlined this fact (Kapil 1990).
The political programme of the FIS, popularly known as the ‘Revealed Word’, emphasises the significance of the Quran and prophetic traditions along with the socio-economic and cultural agenda of the organisation (Ibrahim 1991). The objective is proposed as the formation of an Islamic state based on Sharia and the statements in the programmes are substantiated by quotations from the Quran (Ibrahim 1991; Ayubi 1995). It is very clear that there is an inherent contradiction between the FIS programme and the objectives of the organisation. The programme considers Sharia as its foundation and extensively uses Islamic terminology throughout the programme. It concentrates on cultural and religious aspects that are more important in the formation of an Islamic State. Contradictory to this, the economic programme of FIS is more close to a market-driven economy, which encourages the private sector and global participation in economic activities.
It is true that the FIS usage of the ‘Revealed Word’ does not actually reveal more about the socio-economic problems that the Algerians faced. The elements of democracy which are mentioned in the programme of the FIS are superficial because the fundamental political rights of man such as the right to choose the leadership and administer are expressed in an Islamic vision (Ibrahim 1991). It also dismisses the freedom to form political parties on the basis of different ideologies. As per the programme, elections can be conducted only within the framework of Islam (Entelis 1995). In short, the programme of FIS is unclear on the accountability of the government to the people who elected them.
The internal debates in the FIS on participation in elections are also critical. There was a clear in-house division within the FIS on the very concept of democracy 5 and how to engage with that (Anderson, 2006). Though one prominent group within the FIS proposed some democratic measures to form an Islamic state, the majority position was that Sharia should be considered as the law of the land (Mortimer 1996). The group led by Ali Bellhedj was against the concept of democracy and the institutions under it like political parties, elections, etc. But the moderates in the FIS, led by Maddani were in favour of democracy in the sense that they supported elections as a mode to capture power and the subsequent establishment of an Islamic state (Takeyh 2003). But the latter lost the game as the democratic option became a distant possibility when the military captured power and refused to declare the election results in the early stages of the democratic experiments.
With the dominance of Bellhedj in the FIS, the tension between Islamists and secular nationalists was uncovered. The activities of the FIS in the provinces where they won in the first stage of elections were against the spirit of the democratisation process because they used the new space to expand their Islamist ideology which was anti-democratic in nature. This is the situation which the army interfered in politics as a protector of the secular and democratic character of the state. The intervention of the army in Algerian politics sabotaged the democratic process in the very beginning itself and popular sympathy turned towards the Islamists.
Dozens of new political organisations were formed that were supposed to solve the democratic deficit. The FIS got legal recognition on the basis of a new constitution on 16th September 1989 (Mortimer 1991, 579). Two other Islamic parties—Hamas and Al-Nahda—were also formed with the FIS. The FIS was very popular among students and the educated class. As a result, most of the universities, schools and colleges of the country were highly politicised. Social, economic and political problems faced by the society were well articulated by new Islamic parties, especially the FIS. Besides, they deepened and widened their influence in the religious spheres of the country. Overall, by the end of the 1980s, the socio-economic situation of the country was highly suitable for Islamist groups.
It is very clear that the ideology of the FIS was against a secular nation. The FIS accused that the then Algerian state was an anti-Islamic state. The FIS leadership, including the moderates like Maddani, projected Islam as the only solution for the socio-economic problems of the Algerian society. They projected the party as a divine expression of the popular will. During the elections they proclaimed that ‘to vote against FIS is equal to voting against Islam/God’ (Mahfoud 1990). It was certain that the theocratic views of the FIS were against the secular traditions and democratic practices. This fundamentalist–secularist dichotomy was the root cause of military intervention in Algerian politics in 1992 (Mortimer 1996).
Though Chadli Benjedid restructured the political system, he himself controlled all the institutions/instruments of state power. The revoking of the ban on the formation of political parties was conditional. Parties exclusively based on religious, regional and professional interests were not allowed to function (Mortimer 1991, 580). But, in spite of all its religious orientations, FIS was given recognition and allowed to participate in the elections. It is expected that the FIS could be neutralized by the proliferation of other parties and also by the moderates within the organisation. Some Islamic parties like Islamic Movements for Democracy in Algeria and Hamas were also influential (Bonner 2005). All these parties had played a major role in the democratisation process in Algeria, despite the fact that there were critical ideological and political differences among them. 6
Hardliners among both the Islamists and the FLN started diluting the newly created democratic space. An extraordinary party congress of the FLN was held in November 1989 at the initiative of the anti-reformist hardliners in the organisation, which can be considered as the first step to sabotage the election process. They strongly criticised the compromising policies of the government with the Islamists. However, their attempts to stop reforms had failed as they could not manage to get majority support in the politburo. On the other hand the hardliners in the opposition movements, especially the FIS, also started misusing the newly emerged liberal political space which endowed them with the right to strike, freedom of expression, freedom of associations, etc. A number of strikes were organised by them even for trivial reasons. Interestingly none of these parties addressed fundamental economic and political issues such as the remedies to economic maladies and more political participation/democratisation in their course of action. Rather, fundamentalist sentiments were more visible in the strikes. 7 As a result, the democratisation/liberalisation process was diverted from its real objectives. In short, the ruling regime was surrounded by secularist hardliners in the FLN from within and orthodox/ fundamentalist elements among the Islamists from outside.
FIS and Popular Elections: Islamists Engaging Democracy
On the basis of the new constitution, the first multiparty elections—elections to local and provincial councils—in the history of independent Algeria were held in June 1990. As the major opposition party, the FIS could successfully capitalise the anti-FLN sentiments. 8 FIS got 54.25 per cent of the polled votes and a majority of the seats in 55 per cent of the local councils (853 communes out of 1540) and the FIS got 66 per cent of the provincial councils (32 provinces out of 48). The FLN got only 28 per cent of the votes (Kapil 1990; Mortimer 1990; Mohamedou 1999; Takeyh 2003).
The logical conclusion of elections to local and provincial councils in Algeria was historic as it was the first successful liberal democratic electoral process in the Arab world with multi-party participation (Anderson 2006). In the election, the FIS replaced the FLN as the largest political party in Algeria. However, the election did not strengthen democratic values in Algerian politics. The reversal of reforms and the increasing use of religion in politics were the immediate consequences of the election. A prominent group in the FIS—Ali Belhedj and his supporters—themselves questioned the legitimacy of democracy and declared that democracy was not an Islamic concept. They demanded that Sharia should be the constitution of the state (Takeyh 2003).
After the victory in the local elections, the FIS supporters started violating state laws and started openly challenging the government. The FIS demanded the dissolution of the National Peoples’ Assembly (NPA) for the formation of a full-fledged Islamic state. The two newly elected town councils forcefully closed movie theatres and secular education institutions. Girl students and women in Western dresses were harassed in streets by men associated with the FIS (Mortimer 1991, 586, 1997; Mohamedou 1999). Though Abbassi Maddani tried to project the moderate face of the FIS, his efforts failed because most of the municipal councils won by the FIS were under the control of the fundamentalist elements in the party. This development gave space for the army—the most undemocratic element—to re-intervene in Algerian politics. In short, the beneficiaries of the democratisation process themselves have created certain hurdles to the functioning of democracy (Anderson 2006).
Confident after their victory in the local and provincial council elections, the FIS demanded immediate election to the parliament. In order to put pressure on the government, the FIS declared an indefinite general strike on 25th May 1991, which lasted till 7 June with numerous incidents of violence and violation of laws (Mortimer 1997). Maddani demanded the resignation of Chadli Benjedid for the failure of the government in controlling the law and order situation. In this context, the government declared an emergency in the country and even warned about cancelling the proposed parliamentary elections. The FIS suffered extensive repression and many of their leaders were imprisoned. However, Benjedid was not ready to go back from his commitment to conducting parliamentary elections despite the fact that there was lot of pressure on him to give up elections, both from the military and the hardliners within the FLN.
On the other hand, the FIS called for a jihad against the state and created a series of intentional provocations to the security forces (Mortimer 1991, 587). However, the first phase of the much-awaited and twice-postponed parliamentary elections was finally held on 26 December 1991. In the elections, whereas the Islamist parties succeeded in forming an unofficial grand alliance, the mainstream secular parties failed to form any anti-Islamic coalition. The internal differences within the FIS—between moderates and hardliners–were kept aside under the pretext of elections. Further, the FIS demonstrated a type of Islamic rule in the provincial and municipal levels since 1990. This helped them to consolidate and capitalise on the religious sentiments of the people. On the economic policy side, interestingly, the FIS campaigned for extreme free market policies, abandoning of subsidies and privatisation of industries.
The ‘Group of Eight’—an electoral group of secular forces formed by the RCD, RDA and the Algerian Movement for Justice and Development and some other small parties was the third actor in the parliamentary elections. They, with the FIS, opposed the government’s attempt at irregularities in the elections. Their major demand was to conduct presidential elections along with parliamentary elections. Anyhow, the elections were held in a highly tense situation of violent clashes and strikes. In the first phase of elections, the FIS got 47.26 per cent of the votes and 188 of the 340 seats where elections were held. The FLN got 23.38 per cent votes and the Group of Eight got 7.4 per cent votes (Magrella 1999, 12–14).
Soon after the completion of the first phase of elections, the army demanded the removal of prime minister Hamarougche who was the architect of the new electoral law, which gave a chance to the Islamists to participate in the elections. The army pressed the government to cancel the scheduled presidential elections. It is observed that, if the second round of elections were to be conducted, the FIS would have come to power with a landslide victory. 9 The army started initiating strong actions against the agitators—mainly Islamists—and those who engaged in civil disobedience. Through a direct intervention, the army expelled Hamarougche and appointed Ahammad Ghozali as the new Prime Minister. Ghozali declared a fresh ‘free and clean’ election and also the revision of the controversial ‘Redistricting Bill’. 10 With the support of the army, an interim government was formed with the members of the FLN as ministers. On the other side, the Islamist opposition, who were denied power after victory in the elections, turned against the army and even gave a call for jihad against the army controlled government. They ruled out any possibility of sharing power with other parties as they had the clear mandate of the people (Sadiki 1997, 2004; Takeyh 2003). In short, the political situation in Algeria became more complex after the first phase of the 1991 parliamentary elections which itself was abandoned half way.
The Impact of the Democratic Experiment in Algeria
The three-year-long democratic experiment in Algeria ended with the direct intervention of the army on 11th January 1992. President Chadli Benjedid was forced to resign, the elections were cancelled and the National Assembly was dissolved. A three-member High Council of State (HCS) was formed to run the administration with Mohammad Boudiaf, a war veteran, as the chairman and Ali Kafi (the president of the War Veteran Association) and Major General Nezzar (Minister of Defense) as members. The army took control of the newspapers and mosques. The FIS-controlled provincial councils were dissolved and the organisation was formally outlawed and many FIS leaders were arrested and imprisoned. 11 These attempts amounted to a total reversal of all democratic processes in Algeria initiated in the early years of 1990. The radical elements in the FIS turned in favour of an armed struggle against the regime and they got an upper hand within the organisation. Some other Islamic groups like the Groupe Islamiqe Army (GIA), the Movement Islamique D’ Algeria (MIA) and Armee Islamique du Salute (AIS) also became very extreme in their ideology and militant in their operations.
A new council—the Council Consultatif Nationale (CCN)—was formed to function as parliament with Mohammad Boudiaf as chairman (Ruedy 1994, 230). Boudiaf tried to reconstitute the democratic government and the multi-party political system in the state. His initiatives to restore democracy invited strong opposition from the army and the hardliners in the FLN. The Islamists started terrorist activities and threatened to forge a civil war. At the end, Boudiaf was assassinated by some extreme elements in the military and political power in Algeria was totally taken over by the military after a small interlude of elections and parliamentary experiments. Consequently, the FIS changed its strategy and proclaimed that a coup can be the only way to establish a just, rightful and true Islamic state (Choueiri 1997, 74; Quandt and Armacost 1998; Takeyh 2003).
The army regained its position in the Algerian political system and functioned as if it was the only agency which could guarantee national security. Similarly, the army also projected that only it could protect democracy and secularism in Algeria (Roberts 2011). They started direct action against the extreme Islamist elements by branding them as a threat to national security, secularism and democracy. At times, this moved to a street fight between the army and Islamists. It is also important to note that not only the army, the radical elements among the Islamists also tried to stop any more elections by engaging in violence, because they feared that a victory in democratic elections might strengthen the support base of the moderates within the organisation (Mortimer 1991, 592–593).
One of the striking elements of Algeria’s short passage through democracy was that the religious groups functioned at the forefront of democratic organisation, mobilisation, participation and representation. They opted for democracy both at the procedural and functional levels. The end of the democratic experiment resulted in the re-emergence of an authoritarian regime and the re-imposition of its hegemony over state and society. After the coup of 1992, the Algerian military acted only to maintain its hold on political power. There was no sincere attempt to re-establish democracy in the state. These developments have curtailed the chances of a genuine liberal democratic transition in Algeria.
Understanding Islam—Democracy Discourse from the Experiences in Algeria
The conflict between Islamists and the Algerian regime is helpful in understanding the ongoing debate on Islam and democracy. As we have discussed, there are contradictory positions on democracy and elections within the rank and file of the FIS. However, the popular sentiment was in favour of democracy with popularly elected representative institutions that could ensure political expression and protect the secular nature of the polity.
The compatibility of Islam and democracy is to be understood on the basis of various interpretations. It is to be remembered that no ideology is rigid and there is enough scope to interpret and reinterpret an ideology. 12 Islam was used to legitimise single-party authoritarianism, military dictatorship, monarchy/royal absolutism and even democracy in various countries in the Arab world where the vast majority of the people follow Islam (Esposito and Piscatory 1991, 434). However, Islam shows a general disregard for Western models of democracy mainly due to cultural and political reasons. However, this cannot be considered as a total rejection of the concept democracy itself.
Fazlur Rahman, a modern Islamic scholar, interpreted the concept of democracy in Islam in a modern context (Rahman 1999). According to him, shura (consultations), ijma (consensus), ijitihad (independent judgment) and qiyas (analogical judgment) are the key concepts of democracy in Islam. Shura is considered as the centre of any discourse on democracy in Islam. Shura is a consultative body of scholars engaged in law-making. The groups, which support democracy, argue that Islam is inherently democratic as it is against autocracy. The concept of ijma or consensus is the collective judgment of the ulama. According to this interpretation, there is freedom of choice in Islamic society. Society is the final authority to take decisions on the proposals submitted to them. Ijtihad or independent reasoning ensures the freedom of believers to interpret Islam (Rahman 1999). Therefore, the authority of religion in an Islamic society is founded on the freedom of ijtihad, which provides a large space for innovation and creativity. An ijtihad that is accepted by the majority is usually adopted by the ulama. This challenged the monopoly of the clerics in the interpretation of the Holy Law. The concept of qiyas gives a Muslim the right to interpret the Holy Law on the basis of rationalism. Fazlur Rahman argues that some of the cardinal principles of modern democracy like equality, private property and the right to criticise unjust rulers are the inherent rights of a believer and the same is ensured by the Quran (Rahman 1999).
The concept of bay’ah is another important character of Islamic democracy. Bay’ah is a pact written on behalf of the people by the leading members/head of the society. It emphasizes the rights of the people to control the discretionary powers of the ruler. It proposes free will of people to ensure the legitimacy of the regime because the pact is valid only if the leader abides by certain responsibilities towards people (Rahman 1999; Nettler 2000). Muhammad Azad—another Islamic thinker—argues in favour of legislative assemblies with direct or indirect representation of the people. This interpretation emphasises the equality of men and women in the political process. He also proposes general elections to a majlis with universal adult suffrage (Azad 1980, 45). On the other side, there are many Islamic scholars—like Shykh Fadallah Nuri of Iran and Saiyyd Qutb of Egypt—who strongly objected to these modernist Islamic views on democracy. They out rightly rejected the concepts of equality and popular sovereignty. In their interpretation, such concepts are anti-Islamic because God is the only sovereign and there cannot be equality between believers and non-believers.
Prof. Muhammad Talibi, a leading contemporary Islamic thinker, is totally against all attempts to associate the concept of shura with democracy (Nettler 2000, 55). Talibi argues that shura is from a time when no conception of democracy existed. For Talibi, democracy is the voice of many (people). It is associated with the notions of universal human rights, freedom of expression, religious pluralism and equality before the law. Shura is not similar to this though reflecting some elements of true democracy like the concern for subjects and their views—an integral part of the idea of consultation which Fazlur Rahman speaks of. Talibi finds the Quran’s basic Islamic values as components of democracy which constitute a sort of bridge between Islam and modern democracy. While making these observations, he underlines the point that democracy never existed in the Islamic world in the modern sense. The political and the religious are two separate conceptual categories and not related to each other.
It is clear that, in the formation stage, the ideological framework of the FIS is highly influenced by various modernist interpretations of democracy in Islam. It gives a clear picture of the democratic set-up, which could be provided by the Islamists. The ideas of Algerian Islamic scholar, Malik Sennabi, on basic objectives of the Islamic faith influenced the FIS. According to Sennabi, in Islam man is free and not meant to be enslaved; Islam liberates man from servitude. Similarly, Islam prohibits a believer from enslaving others (Shanin 1997; al Ghannushi 2000). For him, jihad is the constant endeavour to struggle against all forces of political and economic tyranny.
Ali Belhedj—a preacher-turned-leader of the FIS—was the major proponent of militant Islam in Algeria. Though he did not support democracy per se, he justified his group’s participation in the elections and argued that elections could be used to affirm the role of Islam in public life and to combat injustice. He objected to the democratic principle of majority rule and opined that rights and justice could not be quantified (Esposito and Piscatory 1991, 436).
According to Bernard Lewis, Turkey is the only democratic country in the Islamic world (Lewis 1993, 89–93). A comparison between Turkey and Algeria would be interesting here. Unlike in Turkey, the Islamists in Algeria took an anti-state and anti-regime stance since the very beginning. When Turkish nationalism and Turkish identity sidelined religious identity in Turkey, Islamic identity got equal importance in Algeria with an Algerian nationalist identity. Above all, in Algeria, the call for democracy has not been hand-in-hand with the establishment of a set of institutions, which could have ensured peaceful political change in response to evolving needs (Howe 1992, 97).
In the Arab world, a new trend of nationalist radicalism, which kept away from militancy, emerged during the late 1980s and 1990s. The supporters of this trend argued that any form of parliamentary democracy is not Westernization (Esposito and Piscatory 1991, 428). Moderates in the FIS in Algeria are a good example for this line of thinking. Islamist organisations like the FIS realised the need for and utility of working within the political system. They attempted to come to terms with modern democratic practices like elections and representative institutions like parliament (Roberts 1992, Anderson 2006). Many Islamist groups in Turkey, Egypt, Sudan, Pakistan, Bangladesh and other parts of the Islamic world started thinking on the same lines. Islamic parties/groups were at the forefront of demands for a multi-party system and representative elections in many authoritarian countries (Esposito and Piscatory 1991, 431). They participated in elections which were conducted in a liberal democratic manner; got elected to parliaments and in some cases even joined the cabinet. At times they even co-operated with secular groups.
What is evident here is that parliamentary democracy could have materialised in Algeria through the integration of moderate Islamic viewpoints with a parliamentary system. Unlike the way it was projected by both the ruling secularists and the opposition Islamists, an Islamist victory in the elections was chiefly due to popular opposition to the FLN-led authoritarian regime. It was not a support to the radical Islamic ideology or for the introduction of Sharia. Democratisation was unavoidable in Algeria. But, the uncontrolled, unplanned and untimely transition from a monolithic political system to pluralistic politics was the major reason for the crisis. This destabilised the state and weakened political institutions. The radical elements, both in the FIS and the FLN, created an unstable political environment, a sufficient reason for the intervention of the army. 13
The discussion about democracy and Islam constitute the key discourse in the Algerian political system. Islam denies the separation of state from religion. At the base, it recognises politicised faith and the totality of religion in the life of every Algerian. Religion is the source of individual and collective identities. On the other side, the democracy which was installed in Algeria by the secular elite was only a decorative one and no actual power-sharing mechanism has been encouraged (Esposito and Piscatory 1991, 102). For the ruling elite, political modernisation was nothing but radical secularisation and the separation of religion from all aspects of public life. When the democratic choice of the Algerian people went against the interest of the secular ruling elite, undemocratic measures became acceptable to them.
A decade of civil war between the Algerian government and Islamic militant groups came to an end in late 1990s. The military coup in 1992 discredited the moderate wing of the FIS in the rank and file of the organisation because of their over-trust in electoral institutions. The radical elements, especially those who formed the GIA could easily capture the organisation and they started a militant resistance. Currently, the country has a democratically elected government, though the military, in practice, remains the real power centre. Though there were some incidents of violence by and resistance from Islamic groups, by and large, the status-quo has remained for last 15 years with the military backed president and prime minister ruling the state. There was a major amendment to the constitution in 2008 which removed the clause restricting the presidential term to two terms. The amendment was to facilitate the re-election of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika for a third term. Though opposition parties agitated and accused it of being autocratic, the amendment was introduced and the president was re-elected for a third term in 2009.
The uprisings in the neighbouring Tunisia and Egypt had their impact on Algeria. People started demanding more democratic rights and political participation. Consequently, the government was forced to withdraw the emergency law that was in place in the country for more than a decade. Eventually, parliamentary elections were also held in the year 2012. Except for the FIS, which was outlawed, other mainstream Islamic parties formed a front–the Green Algeria Alliance 14 —and participated in the elections. But, in a poor performance, the Islamic parties gained only 49 of the 462 seats in parliament. They accused the elections of being unfair where only a 42 per cent turn-out for polling (Faucon 2012).
Despite occasional protests and agitations, politics in Algeria has remained relatively stable for more than a decade now. The fourth-time election of Bouteflika as president in the year 2014 sparked some tensions and protests in some parts of the country. But the protests were not massive and widespread and therefore, could not challenge the existing political equations.
Conclusion
Any logical conclusion of the parliamentary election process of 1991 would have made Algeria the first multi-party democratic polity in the Arab world with a government led by an Islamist party. The liberal policies adopted by the state—though they could not survive for long—and the elections in 1990 and 1991 would have led the state from a single-party authoritarian polity to a liberal multi-party democratic one. But, the collapse of the democratic experiments and the subsequent military takeover sabotaged this possibility. The victory of the FIS in the democratic elections underlined the potential of Islamism to be developed as an alternative political force in the region. It also opened a new possibility of using religion as a tool by Islamists to gain political power in a democratic political space. Many believed that the participation of the FIS in elections was merely a tactic to capture power. This suspicion is strengthened by the words and deeds of radical elements within the FIS, especially after their victory in the local elections held in 1990. But the major question whether Islamic groups—including the FIS and Islamic Brotherhood—are ready to accept modern liberal democracy as a form of governance r emain unanswered.
For the last two decades, there is hardly any move in Algeria to initiate democracy. The moderate elements in the FIS were weakened and sidelined within the organisation as the organisation has changed its strategy after the denial of power. The extremist elements followed violent means and started an open fight against the state. The protection of the existing power configuration is the only aim of the regime/government. The military acted only to maintain its hold on political power, and legitimise its role as the protector of secularism through preventing Islamist extremists from capturing power. As a result, the continuous violation of civil rights, a higher level of human rights violations, the absence of a fair judicial system and unending violent protests have become the order of the day in Algeria. This de-legitimised the process of democracy and further undermined the possibilities of any restoration of the democratic process in Algeria. As the popular elections held in 1991 were sabotaged, the Algerian state missed a historic opportunity to form a true democratic political system by facilitating creative engagements between Islamic parties and modern parliamentary democracy. The success of the democratic experiment and the active involvement of the FIS in the politics of Algeria as a legitimate political force would have certainly changed the destiny of the state and would have been a way forward for the wider democratisation of the Islamic world in general and the Middle East and North African region in particular.