Cosmopolitanism,Responsibility to Protect and the Libya Intervention: A Reassessment

Introduction

While non-intervention has remained a defining characteristic of the Cold War state relations, the decline in rivalry between the great powers and the amplified nature of violent conflicts in and around Africa have indeed provoked increased concerns for human rights protection. This has therefore led to a series of controversies among theorists, scholars and even practitioners. On the one hand, some scholars have vigorously argued that today’s global security challenges have not only led to increased concerns about human rights violations but that citizenship and human rights issues have assumed a global status. Hence, state sovereignty could be withdrawn when states fail to protect their citizens from crimes against humanity (Brock, 2006, p. 289; Brown, 2002, p. 40; Chandler, 2012, p. 213; Gallaroi, 2010, p. 3; Held, 2010; Robbins, 2012, p. 30; Teson, 1998, p. 128; Weiss, 2004, p. 48; Wheeler, 2000). On the contrary, antagonists of interventionists hold strongly that, in spite of the security challenges witnessed in the world today, intervention through the use of force in the affairs of a state by another state or group of states contradicts the dictates of the Westphalia treaty and by extension the principle of non-intervention as enshrined in Article 2 (4) and (7) of the United Nations Charter (Bellamy, 2008; Branch, 2011; Dunne & Schmidt, 2008; Mamdani, 2009; Wai, 2014; Wheeler, 2002, p. 54; Wood, 2007).

Regardless, the international community has a contentious history when it comes to preventing and halting mass atrocities. Notably, it was a common phenomenon that many states have largely failed to act according to their responsibilities as signatories of the 1948 Genocide Convention. Thus, standing by while civilians were targeted by their leaders, despite their affirmations that such crimes must “never again” be allowed to happen (Stark, 2011). However, with the end of Cold War rivalry, the alteration in the nature of conflict in Africa—with high civilian casualty, rise in terrorist activities and a sigh of relief that resonated chiefly among liberals, moralists, constructivists and cosmopolitans who succinctly argue the increase in the intensity of conflict—has indeed provoked a universalisation of human rights and an erosion of sovereignty. Particularly, cosmopolitans argue that the new wars of today and the consequent security challenges could no longer be viewed from the state-centric prism (Kaldor, 2006; Orford, 2003; Teson, 2001; Weiss, 2004).

The rebellion against the Ghaddaffi regime commenced in February 2011, following closely revolutionary changes that occurred in Tunisia and Egypt. Hence, the worsening situation in Libya sparked a series of international reactions, and this ultimately led to the declaration of resolutions 1970 and 1973, respectively. While resolution 1970 was welcomed, the pronouncement of resolution 1973 and particularly the phrase ‘all necessary means’ and the consequent operations have indeed opened the floodgate for criticisms. Thus, this study, therefore, aims to interrogate the extent to which cosmopolitanism informed the international community’s decision to intervene in Libya through the adoption of resolutions 1970 and 1973, respectively, the successes, challenges and failures of cosmopolitanism in the intervention in Libya and suggest ways on how cosmopolitan ideas aim to resolve the problems of who, why, when and how in authorising future intervention through the responsibility to protect (RtoP). It argues that, undoubtedly, cosmopolitanism played a vital role in informing the debate and the eventual intervention in Libya. However, the inability of the advocates to recognise the role self-interest or power politics plays in determining the decision to intervene or not, among actors, played down the whole idea behind common humanity for economic interest. Hence, cosmopolitanism as an interventionist framework needs to take into consideration the lingering issues of who, why, when and how in authorising intervention through the RtoP, while also finding a mid-point in between international law and humanitarianism.

Cosmopolitanism and Libya Intervention: Theoretical Insights

The idea of a cosmopolitan world resonated among the ancient Greek philosophers. It resonated from the Diogenes to the Cynic and then to the Stoics, who postulated that individuals enjoy the privilege of being members of two different communities: the local community and the international community (Nussbaum, 2002; Vernom, 2010). Although the idea of a cosmopolitan understanding of human security might seem new, its practice has long existed in world history. Philosophers have long debated the idea behind liberty, common humanity and a shared universal value. Locke argues that values such as liberty is freedom is an inalienable right of the individual. And that the grounds upon which such right can be given up is only through the consent of the individual. According to John Locke ‘the only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community, for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living’ (Locke, 2005, p. 58). In essence, there exists a contractual agreement between the ruler and its citizens. Hence, for him, we must consider that all men are naturally in a state of perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possession and persons, as they think fit, within bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man (Locke, 2005, p. 18). On a similar note, others have pondered on how perpetual peace can be attained. In this regard, Immanuel Kant lists three prerequisites to perpetual peace and common humanity. This is premised on the fact that important concepts such as freedom, common legislation and equality resonated from the long held concept of rights. Second, the rights of Nations are premised on the basis of free states. Third, cosmopolitan rights are only limited to, the general state of affairs of universal hospitality (Kant, 1996).

Thus, the whole argument surrounding the cosmopolitan thinking relates to the notion of ‘world citizenship’. And this embraces the whole cosmos or universe and is characterised by the belief that the polis is not a self-sufficient and perfect sociopolitical unit, that moral considerations sustained by a system of natural law is essential and that human beings, despite all their variations, constitute a single human species (Moten, 2007, p. 10). Thus, in a cosmopolitan world order, there would be the existence of an ideal and of a universal moral order. And, ultimately, citizens are automatic members, and this should be based on an impartial consideration of claims of each person who would eventually be affected (Beitz, 1999; Charvet, 1998). Unquestionably, Mary Kaldor points out that the influence of Kant’s Idea cannot be underemphasised in cosmopolitan thought. Since there exist shared rights and obligations in all human community, there must be a conscious attempt at protecting the rights of individuals, and this could be achieved through ‘embracing tolerance, multiculturalism, civility and democracy, and to a more legalistic respect for certain overriding universal principles which should guide political communities at the global level’ (Kaldor, 1999, p. 116).

In his book, Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities, David Held explores how cosmopolitanism has transited from daily practice into becoming a part of the world economy, politics, law and culture. Unlike other schools, Held argues that the true challenge citizens of the world face today are increasingly global and thus cannot be solved within their self-enclosed communities. This for Held is premised on two fundamental cosmopolitan principles. First, citizens are expected to enjoy a high degree of equality. Second, citizens have the right to universal suffrage, and above all, a more decent place to live in (Held, 2010, p. 69). For Held, cosmopolitanism remains the best way of approaching the security of the individual, and this is because, it affirms the ‘test of impartiality and form, moral and political elements upon which all could act’ (Held, 2010, p. 88). He believes that the solution to challenges citizens of the world, especially, in Africa, are confronted with lie in an approach where cosmopolitan principles are further incorporated into our reality, being used to build more a holistic approach.

Thomas Pogge (1992) notes that in order to achieve a cosmopolitan world that would ultimately guarantee the safety of the individuals, the ideal of absolute sovereignty should be discarded. Hence, citizens should be governed both by the immediate government and by the international government. Pogge lists three important points of the idea of cosmopolitanism: individualism, emphasising on the individuals or persons; universality, emphasising the fact that the ultimate concern for cosmopolitanism is universal equality; and generality, suggesting that the individuals are of great concern and not only their fellow religionists. He concludes a reduction in state’s claim to sovereignty will ultimately lead to increased peace and security, reduce oppression and bring about economic justice (Pogge, 1992). Even though cosmopolitan scholars suggest that there is a tension between protecting state sovereignty and the respect for fundamental human rights, and avoiding violent conflict situations, they, however, admit that the goal of protecting human rights should supersede any other consideration (Brock, 2006; Nardin, 2007).

Taking into cognizance, the tension between human rights and the state sovereignty, Brock argues that the view that possible solutions could lie in the adoption of widely accepted frameworks aimed at protecting the helpless civilian population. Therefore, he concludes that the gap between the theory and practice of intervention is likely to diminish if we adopt the recommendations of the world summit document of 2005 (Brock, 2006, p. 289). While Terry Nardin articulates that although common morality forbids us to deny human beings their rights, it equally leaves us with the challenges of deciding who can be assisted, by what means and how much assistance we can provide. He concludes that what common morality does to the society is that it provides us with a way of viewing ethics of humanitarian intervention deeply rooted in a widely shared and rationally defensible conception of human dignity, and these reasons are relatively independent of the contingencies of particular situations (Nardin, 2002, p. 74). Similarly, Peter Singer makes reference to the view that the unending poverty and its resultant effect on citizens and the world at large have indeed provoked the need for an international moral obligation and not just a matter of charity. While not discarding efforts of states, he believes that states needed to do more for the sake of humanity, and it should be an endless and moral obligation (Singer, 2002). In addition, some other scholars have sought to differentiate between the concept of nationalism and cosmopolitanism, justifying their preference for a cosmopolitan world order. For them, what places cosmopolitanism ahead of nationalism is the fact that while nationalists focus more on issues of national concern, cosmopolitans, on the other hand, pay critical attention to human insecurity from a global perspective (Audi, 2009; Vernom, 2010). Specifically, Vernom draws world attention to what he describes as the problem of ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ phenomenon when discussing human rights issues. And for him, there is always the tendency to treat one’s compatriots well and be crude to outsiders or say strangers (Vernom, 2010).

Furthermore, the 1990s marked a watershed for a cosmopolitan understanding of security, particularly in Africa, where it is increasingly becoming apparent that states use sovereignty as a shield to commit atrocities against humanity. For this reason, more than ever before, the international community has persistently reflected on the idea of common humanity arising from overwhelming emphasis on the citizens of the world in respect of their tribe, culture, religion and place of location (Singer, 2002). Although humanitarian intervention is not entirely new, however, since the end of the Cold War, the international community has emphasised and justified the need for proactive humanitarian intervention in the affairs of another state, particularly when atrocities are carried out on the citizens (Powell, 2002). Hence, the affirmation of the phrase ‘never again’ on the part of the international community after the shameful inaction in Rwanda and Kosovo certainly marked a turning point towards a universalisation of human security and moves towards a global civil society (Hehir, 2012), in which case, security concerns led not only to a broader interpretation of the United Nations Charter but also to a shift from state security to human-centred security. States should not be, henceforth, regarded as the end of security but rather a means to accomplish it. Security concerns should therefore be centred on the individual as compared to the state (Booth, 2007).

In The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force, Martha Finnemore (2003) uses armed military intervention as a prism to investigate the shifting character of the international community in the twenty-first century. Particularly, Finnemore paid critical attention to the possible reasons for increased interventions in Africa and to the processes. She concluded that it is not the fact of intervention that has changed, rather the reasons for and meaning behind intervention—the conventional understanding of the purposes for which states can and should use force for the purpose of saving lives (Finnemore, 2003, p. 173). In other words, for cosmopolitans, the use of force is not inconsistent with the United Nations Charter and there exists a moral contractual agreement between the states and its citizens. Thus, the use of force must be encouraged so far as it is geared towards the protection of vulnerable civilians in order to protect their common humanity (Ignatieff, 2003; Teson, 2003). Fernando Teson aptly states that ‘humanitarian intervention is morally justified on a standard assumption of liberal political philosophy: a major purpose of states and governments is to protect and secure human rights that all persons have by virtue of personhood alone’ (Teson, 2003, p. 93). These rights are not only to be recognised, they must also be observed and upheld with utmost dignity by the state or leaders. ‘(w) we all have the obligation to respect those rights; the obligation to promote such respect for all persons; depending on the circumstances, the obligation to rescue victims of tyranny or anarchy, if we can do so at a reasonable cost to ourselves’ (Teson, 2003, p. 94). The need to adopt the cosmopolitan postulations of a universalization of citizens in the world received a further boost through the ideas of scholars such as Francis Deng, Mohammed Sahnoun and Kofi Annan, and this led to the doctrine of the responsibility to protect. In his Millennium Report to the General Assembly, Kofi Annan challenged critics of intervention that, if humanitarian intervention is an assault on sovereignty as widely held, how could have the international community respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica–to gross and systematic violations of human rights that shocks the conscience of our common humanity? (Annan, 2000). Scholars have succinctly argued that today’s force of globalisation is leading to a situation whereby the fate of countries, especially on how their citizens are treated, remains intertwined, thus justifying the Libya intervention (Archibugi, 2004; Chandler, 2002; Held, 2002).

While cosmopolitan ideas justified the application of the RtoP in Libya, it is, however, shrouded in emerging challenges (Stewart, 2011). While he admits to the need to protect civilians in Libya, Pattison however points out that the situation did not seem to be serious enough to provide a just cause for regime change—or, more precisely, forcible regime change—by an external party in support of a rebel movement (Pattison, 2011). Furthermore, some other cosmopolitans have argued that not only is there a right to intervene but those that are in a position to act equally have a duty to do so (Brock, 2009; Fabre, 2012; Kaldor, 2003; Lu, 2006). Specifically, Catherine Lu (2006) posits that in situations whereby the state fails to provide basic goods such as security, subsistence and justice to its citizens, a cosmopolitan global world view has within its powers to call the state to order as well as to intervene to alleviate human suffering. Yet, some others draw up grave implications of applying cosmopolitanism and go on to argue that incorporating Jus Ante Bellum’s principles into the cosmopolitan debate about the use of force will add greater consistency, legitimacy and focus to cosmopolitan humanitarian interventions and how our understanding of ‘intervention’ can better correspond to broader cosmopolitan ambitions (Brown & Bohm, 2013). For Gilmore (2015), the cosmopolitan security approach has challenged the traditional approach to security. He stresses the need to establish a global community policy (GCP) approach based on dialogue, local engagement and a concern for the experience of others.

Background to the 2011 Libya Crisis

Libya, a Roman colony for several centuries, was conquered by the Arab forces in 647 ad during the caliphate of Uthman bin Affan. Following this, Libya was ruled by the Abbasids and the Shiite Fatimids till the Ottoman Empire asserted its control in 1551. Ottoman rule lasted for nearly four centuries, ending with the Ottoman defeat in the Italian-Ottoman war (Ajish, 2011). After being part of the Ottoman Empire for four centuries, the three provinces of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan came under Italian control in 1911. While first known as Italian North Africa, the country received its current name in 1934. The Italian presence came to an end during World War II and after the defeat of Italian troops in 1943, Libya was administered by the Allies until 1951. The British administrated the two former Italian provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, while the French administered the province of Fezzan (Boeke & Zuijdewijn, 2016).

Relatively an unknown young army officer, Ghaddaffi led a troop of army officers in a bloodless coup to overthrow King Idris Al-Sanusi and established Libya as a republic. And, this was largely premised on his vision of a united Arab continent that is free from the vestiges of colonial powers (Black, 2000). Hence the government was accused of corruption, ethnicity and high political patronage. In the early days of Ghaddaffi’s regime, tribal allegiance and total support for the regime was a criterion in attaining political and economic largesse. Hence, under Ghaddaffi, those loyal tribes and families benefitted largely from the political, social and economic spheres. Ghaddaffi was also known for incorporating the trusted tribes in mainstream governance, as well as granting those privileges in terms of security, intelligence and bureaucracy (Ayhan, 2011). More so, there were abysmal records of human rights violations, torture, rape and arbitrary arrest within Libya (Human Rights Report, 2010). And this led to criticism both at the local and at the international levels, leading to a series of sanctions against Ghaddaffi and some key figures in his cabinet.

However, Libya’s worsening situation both at regional and at international levels took a dramatic turn around. This resulted in the reopening of diplomatic ties with Libya, reconsideration of earlier sanctions, lifting of the embargo on Libya’s oil and the readmission of Libya in the committee of nations. This was made possible with Ghaddaffi’s renewed commitment of jettisoning further acquisition of mass weapons of destruction (Kelsey, 2013). Hence, this increased trading partnership resulted in Libya being able to improve on its economy. For instance, within Africa, Ghaddaffi encouraged economic and political development through the establishment of a US$5 billion fund that was invested in hotels, mobile phone companies, mosques and mining companies across Africa. More importantly, Ghaddaffi’s belief in a strong and united Africa for economic prosperity ultimately led to the creation of the African Union (AU) through the Sirte Declaration of 2002 (Adekeye, 2011). In spite of these positive developments, Libya featured persistently in the media for the wrong reasons. There were celebrated cases of unfair distribution of resources among the clans and tribes in Libya. Just as the average individual struggled to survive on a daily basis, the government and its kin networks had more than enough wealth for survival (Sizemore, 2014). Hence, the history of violence in Libya which eventually snowballed into the 2011 uprising is not an entirely new one. Relatively, the presence of persistent challenges such as rights violation, media censoring, political intimidation, high rate of unemployment, insecurity, worsening economic conditions and high poverty has pooled together, thus making the Arab world an unsafe continent to be in (Dalacoura, 2012). And, Libya was not an isolated case of this long-term frustration, which was manifestly demonstrated at the onset of the Arab Spring.

The rebellion against the Ghaddaffi regime commenced in February 2011, following closely upon the revolutionary changes that occured in Tunisia and Egypt. Soon, the number of protesters killed rose from hundreds to more than a thousand. As Ghaddaffi forces gained strength and territory, so the opposition weakened to the extent that it appeared highly likely that it might be swept away in Benghazi, the city at the epicentre of the rebellion. It was at that point that Ghaddaffi threatened the disaffected population there with extinction. The prospect that some thousands of ‘cockroaches’ may be killed was no longer distant but imminent. Following his words, the international community became deeply alarmed. The prospect of massacre and atrocity in Libya at the hands of the regime’s military forces was evident. The United Nations high commissioner for human rights declared her concern and urged the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and Human Rights Council to act. On 25 February, the Human Rights Council established a fact-finding committee to examine the unfolding events and urged the General Assembly to expel Libya from the UNSC membership (Zifcak, 2012, pp. 2–3).

With the deteriorating situation in Libya, especially in rebel-held towns, members of the UNSC felt that there was a need for another resolution to augment resolution 1970. Hence, the most critical moment in the 2011 Libya uprising was the adoption of resolution 1973 on 11 March 2011. Unlike resolution 1970, it called for an immediate ceasefire, while cautioning Ghaddaffi that further attacks against the civilian population in Libya could amount to crimes against humanity. In the preamble of the resolution, the council reiterated ‘the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect the Libyan population’ and recalled the communiqués by the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Arab League and the AU that had requested an end to the violence. In paragraph four of the resolution, the council authorised those member states that would notify the UN secretary general to take ‘all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding an occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory’. Also, it authorised member states to implement a no-fly zone over Libya (paragraph eight). Further measures in the resolution included a tightening of the arms embargo and freezing of asset. Paragraph two—pushed by Brazil, India and South Africa—emphasised the ‘need to intensify efforts to find a solution to the crisis’ (Brockmeier, Stuenkel, & Tourinho, 2016, p. 117).

Estimates of deaths in the 2011 Libyan civil war vary among international organisations, foreign media and even human rights groups. According to Garland (2011), the United Nations reported that 1,000 were killed between the period 15 February and 7 March 2011; World Health Organisation recorded that 2,000 were killed between 15 February and 2 March 2011; and the International Federation for Human Rights reported that 3,000 were killed between 15 February and 5 March 2011. Others like the Libyan Human Rights League reported that 6,000 were killed between 15 February and 5 March 2011; National Transitional Council reported that 8,000 were killed between 15 February and 20 March 2011; and the International Criminal Court reported that 10,000 were killed between 15 February and 7 March 2011. Although the reports of those said to have been killed in Libya were conflicting, one thing was sure—that the lives were lost as a result of the violent protests and heavy offensive of Ghaddaffi army in a bid to regain lost territories. Thus, there are reasonable grounds to argue that the international community was right in considering calls made by the authoritarian dictator—already known for his ruthlessness—to exterminate his political opposition as evidence of intent. This is especially the case since such declarations were matched by growing regime brutality and with the active preparation of the army to surround and enter ‘rebel cities’, starting with the revolution’s stronghold in Benghazi (Berti, 2014). Undoubtedly, this led to a lot of intervention both within and outside, in a bid to avoid the mistakes of Rwanda. The fear that Ghaddaffi’s forces aim to violently retake Benghazi, a stronghold for the anti-Ghaddaffi forces, and the risk of civilian massacres led to concerted calls for the adoption of resolution 1973. Urged on by the Arab League, 10 UNSC members supported resolution 1973 (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Colombia, France, Gabon, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States) and 5 abstained (Brazil, China, Germany, India and Russia). Although the AU did not call for a no-fly zone, all three African members of the UNSC voted for resolution 1973 (Dirk, 2011).

The United Nations was not alone in the call for respect for the fundamental rights of the Libyan citizens. Just as the AU Union consistently worked to find a peaceful solution, it expressly rejected any external military response. The AU adopted a Roadmap for peace on 25 March 2011, which called for an immediate ceasefire and for the implementation of political reforms. The AU also clarified its readiness to deploy a monitoring mechanism as called for in the Roadmap. Although the Roadmap was soon rejected by the National Transitional Council (NTC), as it did not call for Ghaddaffi’s resignation, the AU continued work to implement a political solution for the duration of the conflict. The NTC called the Roadmap ‘outdated’, saying that it failed to take into account the human rights violations already perpetrated by Ghaddaffi forces. Steadfast support for a political solution led the AU to not support the UNSC-sanctioned NATO air strikes, and the union was later criticised for a slow and weak response to the Libyan crisis. The AU later rejected the arrest warrants for Ghaddaffi and others by the International Criminal Court (ICC) as they ‘seriously complicated’ efforts to find a political solution to the crisis. In fact, by only recognising the NTC as Libya’s legitimate governing body on 20 September 2011, the AU was one of the last regional bodies to do so (ICRtoP, 2011).

Not so long into the NATO’s action, praises and criticism began to trail the execution of resolution 1973 and its attendant consequences. In its report, the United Nations Human Rights Council (2011) said that evidences abound of the Ghaddaffi army directly targeting the civilian population, mass-scale rape and torture, as well as the use of unconventional weapons on rebel-held cities. This for them violates international humanitarian law as well as the various conventions prohibiting the use of unconventional weapons in armed conflict. More indication that mass atrocity was imminent came from the comments of Ghaddaffi’s son, where he promised to deal ruthlessly with protesters and declared that the government would fight till it sees that all rats and cockroaches are decimated (Walt, 2011). Premised on the fear that Ghaddaffi would unleash mayhem on civilians, the international community had to intervene swiftly. For Gareth Evans (2011), the intervention in Libya from all indications represents a textbook case of the application of the RtoP.

On the other hand, sceptics of Western liberal interventionism have accessed the Libya intervention through the prism of the principle guiding intervention as specified in the International Commission for Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) document. The question of who has the right authority to intervene in Libya was the first issue raised. In that the ICISS empowered the UNSC to intervene through the use of force; when civilians are faced with life-threatening crimes, the threshold was absolutely met. Nonetheless, Kuperman (2013) argues that although the NATO intervention was prompt, more deaths were recorded as a result of NATO aerial bombardments in Ghadaffi stronghold. In terms of proportional means, though scholars contend that the NATO intervention was proportional to the conflict, regime change and the eventual death of Ghaddaffi became necessary to save civilians (Luck, 2011; Weiss, 2011). The argument that regime change was the goal of the intervention per se holds no water. The intervention was indeed largely characterised by a mission creep, and this has continued to affect further use of the doctrine for civilian protection (Zifcak, 2012).

On whether the intervention qualifies right intention and as a last resort, experts argue that it is clear that other means of dialogue were not adequately exhausted before NATO stepped in. It goes to show that intervening states already had a pre-concluded mind to strike Libya and get rid of Ghaddaffi to ease Europe’s energy needs (O’Connell, 2011). Also for Maximilian Forte (2012), it was clear from the onset of NATO intervention in Libya that regime change was the goal of Western countries. Humanitarian intervention was only employed as a fig leaf. In conclusion, the simple fact that the NATO intervention was planned without an end game and clearly defined goals muddled the international intervention in Libya. Hence, it became unclear as events unfolded if the intervention was aimed at liberating the civilian population or rebels or at overthrowing Ghaddaffi (Walzer, 2011). Undoubtedly, the RtoP challenge in Libya has not only led to criticism of the doctrine but also threatened future usage of the doctrine as evident in Syria, Myanmar and other established cases of violence against civilians.

Responsibility to Protect, Cosmopolitanism and the Libya Intervention: A Reassessment

Since the adoption of RtoP, Libya remains the real first case where the doctrine was fully invoked through resolutions 1970 and 1973, respectively. The NATO intervention in Libya has been hailed as a timely decision on the part of the UNSC through its resolution 1973, which aimed at the protection of civilians through the use of ‘all necessary means’, for the sake of common humanity. Although resolution 1973 excluded the deployment of military forces in Libya, the way and manner in which the intervention was eventually carried out and its consequences have indeed thrown up emerging challenges for humanitarian intervention. For instance, some scholars have thrown their weight behind the NATO use of force regardless of its consequence. Given the intensity of the conflict and the rock solid position of Ghaddaffi to go after those protesting against his regime, only military means could be used to achieve civilian protection (Zifcak, 2012). On his part, Simon Adams (2012) points out that the fear of the dreadful plan to recapture Benghazi—a rebel stronghold—and its consequences of the inhabitants informed the UNSC decision into adopting resolution 1973. He further notes that though some countries such as Russia and China showed some reservation about resolution 1973, their passive attitude to the eventual adoption of resolution 1973 suggests that the world recognised the fact that it had to respond to the crises for the common sake of humanity. While some others have argued that the emphasis on the protection of civilians and civilian-populated areas by the UNSC remains vital. Hence, in affirming the international community’s commitment of ‘never again’, the UNSC was left with no option but to use all necessary means to protect civilians from widespread and systematic attacks by the Ghaddaffi regime (Berti, 2014). The pronouncement of resolution 1973 in the Libyan debacle points to the fact that the Libyan government had an RtoP the civilian population. Hence, the NATO-led military forces were authorised to use any means necessary to support the enforcement of the resolution (Koh, 2011). Undoubtedly, the importance of resolution 1973 goes to show that more than ever before, the United Nations is committed to protection of world citizens in line with its commitment to the doctrine of the RtoP (Williams, 2012).

Furthermore, James Pattison (2011) argues that Ghaddafi regime had shown its readiness to carry out atrocious crimes against his people through the initial killing of 1,000 to 10,000 people. He has also made clear his intent to commit further massacres when he enjoined his supporters to go out in Benghazi to attack the protesters, and this undoubtedly explained the NATO intervention. While cosmopolitan scholars concur that the NATO intervention in Libya represents the acknowledgement of the existence of the RtoP doctrine, and that the international action in Libya sheds new light on the rationale for humanitarian intervention and an attestation to the fact that world leaders seem to be committed to ending crimes against humanity (Stanglin, 2011; Weiss, 2011; Western & Goldstein, 2011) others have described the Libya intervention as a model intervention, in that the intervening forces responded swiftly to a worsening situation that threatened hundreds of thousands of civilians’ rebellion against an oppressive regime. The intervention succeeded in saving or protecting those civilians and ultimately in providing the time and space necessary for local forces to overthrow Muammar Al-Ghaddaffi (Daadler & Stavridis, 2012). The global quest for world citizenship resulted in an inevitable situation, where the international community is left with no choice other than to save humanity from war crimes, ethnic cleansing, genocide and crimes against humanity. Hence, the Libya intervention met the threshold of a just cause, particularly in the wake of the plan of the retake of Benghazi from rebels by the brutal Ghaddaffi forces (Graubart, 2013; Pape, 2012). Specifically, in specific terms, Jonathan Graubart states that ₹Ghaddaffi’s aggressive language did he “no favours”, and the Obama administration forcefully argued that the potential atrocities would stain the conscience of the world’ (2013, p. 85).

On the contrary, some have argued that it is erroneous to assume that the intervention in Libya was carried out to save lives. Against expectations that NATO forces would strictly abide by the rules of engagement and the dictates of resolution 1973, the observable connivance between intervening countries and the Libya rebels to aid weapon smuggling and the eventual arresting and killing of Ghaddaffi in controversial circumstances have not only proved otherwise but also deemed the chances of applying the RtoP for future conflicts (Zenko, 2011). Not long into its military onslaught in Libya, NATO’s strategy swiftly changed into one that embraced and advocated regime change (Zifak, 2012). The conventional wisdom that the Libya intervention was motivated by the need to protect civilians remains deceptive. This is premised on three grounds: first, contrary to wide claims by media reports, Ghaddaffi did not begin the Libya violence by targeting peaceful protesters; second, evidences abound which suggest that Ghaddaffi’s target were not civilians as touted in the media, rather combatants especially in reclaimed towns; and third, from the onset of the crisis, intervening countries’ activities suggested nothing but a regime change. This was evident in the continuous rejection of ceasefire agreements and the open backing of rebel groups to unseat Ghaddaffi, leading to the death of more civilians. Undoubtedly, the Libya intervention has provided three basic lessons for advocates of cosmopolitanism: first, potential advocates should be wary of false media and rebel propaganda of crimes against humanity; second, violent situation that warrants the right intention criteria for intervention could also backfire with dire security challenges; and third, civilian protection can easily be used as a fig leaf to effect regime change (Kuperman, 2013). On a similar note, Findlay (2011) argues that almost immediately, the intervention in Libya altered from civilian protection to regime change. And to make matters worse, there seems not to be any laid-down criteria to distinguish between civilian protection and supporting rebels to unseat their government.

In addition, security experts have criticised the Libya intervention as lacking the basic features of cosmopolitanism on three grounds: first, far from humanitarian concerns, the intervention in Libya was aimed at ending the violence to clear the way for oil production in Libya, for the benefit of European states; second, the perceived fear that Libya under Ghaddaffi would become a potential source and base for funding terrorism; and third, the panic that Ghaddaffi had chemical weapons in his arsenal, which can be used against them. In essence, the economic and security concerns of European states were the catalysts that led to the intervention as compared to a cosmopolitan humanitarian concern (Datta, 2014). Assuming a hard position, Maximiliam Forte (2011) describes the narrative that the use of force was the last resort in Libya as a hoax. For him, not only that the decision to hold Ghaddaffi for human rights violations was mere media fabrication but that the inability of Western countries to arrest the rebels in Libya for committing human violations speaks volume of the nature of the intervention. Hence, the calls for a cosmopolitan justification though the proclamations of resolution 1973 were not only misleading but also misguided. He points out that the whole idea behind the intervention in Libya was far from the protection of civilians; rather, it was aimed at the forceful removal of Ghaddaffi, and this was made possible through the connivance with the Libya rebels. Forte concludes that the intervention ended up in killing more civilians as against expectations. The aftermath of Libya intervention points out that NATO violated the international order and the UNSC mandate. And this partly explains why Russia and China continue to veto any resolution to intervene in Syria, and it will probably undermine the promising prospects of the RtoP doctrine in the UNSC in the near future, especially in the cases that would warrant an intervention (Garau, 2013).

In summary, the need to protect civilians from eminent attacks from Ghaddaffi, especially in Benghazi and other rebel-held towns, implies that the intervention was more of regime change than human protection (Tarnogorski, 2012, p. 4). Intervention in Libya may have been warranted to a certain degree, but the operational and strategic plans showed that NATO-led operations clearly overstepped its mandate as authorised by the UN—which eventually led to the overthrow of Ghaddaffi (Kersavage, 2014, p. 37). Thus, it is therefore not surprising that the NATO intervention in Libya as well as the post-intervention security challenges in Libya have thrown up emerging challenges for the doctrine. And, while the need to protect civilians has remained persistently compelling, the fear that the doctrine would be misinterpreted by intervening states has left a deep vacuum in humanitarian discourse. This partly explains why several security resolutions on Syria have met a brick wall amidst glaring mass atrocity against civilian population.

Cosmopolitanism and the Future of the Responsibility to Protect

Noble as the ideal of cosmopolitanism as an interventionist framework, it has been confronted with a series of challenges. For instance, Ken Booth (2001) argues that a cosmopolitan stance for intervention will not only encourage and justify war but will also erode both the moral and political resources capable of guaranteeing human freedom. There is a tendency that interventions on cosmopolitan grounds would gradually be equated or prosecuted as the global war on terror (Owens, 2005). Thus, cosmopolitan humanitarian intervention contradicts the United Nations and by extension international law. It ‘undermines the universalistic features’ of the United Nations Charter and ultimately plays ‘into the hands of those seeking to undermine international law’ (Cohen, 2006, p. 486). Its quest for the universalisation of human rights has resulted into the misunderstanding and misinterpretation of international law and by so doing justifies the war on the grounds of humanitarianism. And, against expectations, this new form of humanitarianism as championed by cosmopolitans contradicts international law, while also serving as an alternative guide for it (Chandler, 2002). Essentially, for these critics, the premise upon which the Libya intervention was rooted in cosmopolitanism remains deeply flawed with grave consequences, both for the idea and for the doctrine of the RtoP.

Regardless of the condemnation against cosmopolitanism, the unanswered issue which remains at the heart of the Libyan debacle, as well as prospective armed conflict, is the consistently compelling question of how we respond to mass atrocity crimes against the civilian population; what are the consequences of non-intervention when civilians are facing threats, war crime, genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity as currently witnessed in Syria, Myanmar and a lot more countries? For this reason, it’s not very unlikely that the international community would not witness more interventions in armed conflict situations, based on the cosmopolitan principle. And while there are inherent challenges with cosmopolitanism, as it is the case with other theories of humanitarian intervention, there is the urgent need for cosmopolitans to reassess the persistent problem of conceptual ambiguity surrounding new humanitarianism, the justification for intervention, right authority, an acceptable threshold of what constitutes atrocious crimes, how to carry out interventions and importantly committing intervening states to their post-obligation duties.

Consequently, since the rights of the individual have been guaranteed through the declaration of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the cosmopolitan quest for the protection of civilian population should be intrinsically linked with the global trends of distributive justice. Hence, the cosmopolitan’s quest for a global regime for civilian protection must be one that strikes a balance between international law and new humanitarianism. Suffice to say, interventions whenever contemplated by cosmopolitans must take into cognizance that the essence of its action is to save lives and not to win a war. However, when cases arise such that casualty becomes inevitable, this should be reduced to the minimum within both parties in the conflict. And this ultimately suggests that the process of the intervention must be carefully thought out to avoid the destruction of social infrastructure and human lives as experienced in Libya and Cote d’Ivoire. More so, cosmopolitans must do well in laying to rest the conceptual ambiguity surrounding humanitarian intervention and by extension the RtoP. In this way, a prior knowledge of the state of the intervened upon is needed and the nature of the conflict as well as the actors involved. Civilians must be distinctively separated from the belligerents, just as the nature of intervention must be critically analysed. While some violence demands the strict use of force, others do not. And for those violent cases, where force becomes inevitable, it must be proportional and considered as a last resort.

Furthermore, opportunities abound for cosmopolitanism as an intervention framework, if the lingering problem of right intention and right authority is properly addressed in future humanitarian interventions. Recognising that the doctrine of the RtoP places more emphasis on prevention, cosmopolitanism should focus more on addressing those structural problems that lead to the outbreak of violence. Nonetheless, whenever international action to protect civilians from war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and genocide is contemplated, such authorisation should emanate only from the UNSC. In supporting UNSC resolutions, critical observation, well-considered likely prospects and consequences of action and inaction must be considered. Also, whenever humanitarian interventions are carried out, they should particularly aim solely at protecting civilians. Alhough separating humanitarian intervention from the national interest in pursuit of intervening states poses a great challenge to the international community, cosmopolitanism must ensure that states are held to account for their actions.

More importantly, cosmopolitanism needs to keep itself abreast with the diverse nature of world citizens as well as the diversity in their cultural pattern when pushing for humanitarian intervention. For this reason, there must be a common understanding of what the rights are and what nature of rights must be violated to warrant an intervention. In addition, while acknowledging the fact that abusive intervention and end-state problem posed a great challenge to cosmopolitanism, we must also rethink the consequences of inaction in situations where human rights are threatened. In conclusion, there is also a greater need for institutional reforms of both the United Nations and the AU, particularly on their decision-making processes. The international community also needs to encourage multiculturalism, as well as holding intervening states to the task of post-intervention activities which should include peace building, transitional justice, promoting inclusiveness, accountability and above all help ushering in democratic stability. Future interventions need to stick to the principles of guiding the RtoP to avoid the too many problems associated with the Libya intervention. Advocates of cosmopolitanism as an interventionist framework must equally think from beyond mere interventionism to encouraging other soft intervention models such as eradicating poverty, providing humanitarian aid, synergising with regional bodies in addressing the lingering problem of bad governance and providing adequate human security such that the need for interventions does not rise. And, significantly, cosmopolitanism must fashion ways of improving interventions by committing intervening states to their post-intervention obligations.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.