India’s Accommodation in the Emerging International Order: Challenges and Prospects

Abstract

This article has two-fold goals: to develop a coherent concept of accommodation and explicate variable shaping the process of accommodation; and to analyse and evaluate the challenges and prospects of India’s accommodation in the emerging international order. It defines accommodation as a ‘state strategy’ and ‘process’. It figures out six determinants viz. the sphere of influence, structural variables, convergence/divergence of national interest, perception and intention towards the international order, political and socio-cultural values, and costs of non- accommodation. Instead of addressing the process of accommodation from accommodation-seekers’ perspective, the article investigates the issue from accommodators’ perspective. Therefore, rather than describing traditional foundations of India’s claim of accommodation, i.e. population, territory, military, and democracy, it illustrates conditions under which the established power accommodate rising powers. By comparing and contrasting India’s interests, principles, and values vis-à-vis the USA and China, it demonstrates how differing strategic calculations, economic and commercial interests and divergence in political socio-cultural norms and values, China is posing or may pose challenges to India’s accommodation. It suggests that India needs to strike a balance between the declining America and rising China. It will have to learn how not to turn China from an adversary to an enemy. A prudent strategy for India will be to balance China, however, in the non-military, i.e. diplomatic, political and economic realms. Nevertheless, the engagement dimension should not be marginalised, actual or even perceived.

Keywords

Accommodation international order balancing rising powers the established power policy of containment

Introduction

There is a difference between India’s perceived self-image and its perception abroad. India perceives itself as civilisational state aspiring to become a leading power while regarded a ‘poor and middle power’ (Ayres, 2018, p. 25). Underlining this divide, Barry Buzan has noted that ‘it is difficult to find many voices outside India that either accord it the status of great power or allow it to trade on its potential for development’ (Buzan, 2004, p. 61). The divide may be a result of persisting belief that India’s ‘leadership role in the international order remains much more constrained than that of secondary powers’ (Mazarr et al., 2017, p. 109). However, military modernisation, acquisition of the nuclear weapon, rising share in international organisations and more recently, membership to Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Wassenaar Arrangement have forced scholars and policymakers to rethink their approach (See Saran, 2017; T. C. Schaffer & H. B. Schaffer, 2016). Now some scholars have started believing that India’s rank in the international order is changing from a minor player to major power (Ayres, 2018, p. 6). Nevertheless, a question still haunts: will the change in scholarly recognition be translated into international recognition and accommodation in the international system peacefully? Last 500 years history shows that the relationship between the established and rising powers remained mired in Thucydides Trap,¹ as out of 16, only on 4 occasions, rising powers were accommodation without war (Allison, 2017).

In this background, this article seeks to answer two questions. What is accommodation and which variables determine the prospects of accommodation? What are major challenges to India’s accommodation? To explicate the concept of accommodation, its determinants and to underscore major challenges, it is divided into four sections. The introductory section explains the context and paves the way for the study. The second defines the concept of accommodation. Instead of conventionally describing foundations of India’s claim such as population, territory, military and democracy, this section explicates six variables—sphere of influence, structural variables, convergence/divergence of national interest, perception and intention towards the international order, the political and sociocultural values, and costs of non-accommodation—that largely determine whether a rising power will be accommodated or not. The third section underscores how these six variables provide opportunity and/or pose challenges to India’s accommodation. The concluding section analyses India’s prospects of accommodation and suggests what needs to be done in this regard.

Accommodation and Its Determinants

Accommodation is defined and understood differently. Some define it as an instrument of peaceful power transition while others as a process. Robert Ross sees accommodation in the context of alignment pattern and attaches great significance to geography and military power. To him, if military power of accommodation-seeker is strong, prospects of accommodation are greater; but if military power is weak, the prospects of balance are greater (Manicom & O’Neil, 2010, pp. 27–28). Accommodation refers to a process in which states (the established and rising powers) recognise the status of a rising power and decide to include it in the international system with accordingly role and responsibility and, in exchange, the accommodated state willingly agrees to give up its revisionist intention, at least for a short term.

Here accommodation is used in two ways: as a strategy and as a process. Accommodation as strategy refers to a state’s carefully crafted policy to maximise its national interests while ensuring peaceful power transition in the international system. At this level, the accommodator may agree to recognise the status of a rising power or decide against it. As a strategy, it is used by the established and rising powers in three scenarios. First, as a strategy of the established power, it stands for the established power’s policy whether it is willing to give membership and due role and responsibilities to accommodation-seekers in the international order or decides against it. Second, accommodation is also as a strategy of rising powers to adjust status among rising powers themselves. Status adjustment among rising powers is equally important because if two or more regional states are rising simultaneously, peaceful power transition will also depend on how they adjust their status mutually. It is possible that the established powers accommodate rising powers peacefully, but rising powers fail in adjusting their status peacefully. In case of failure, they may enter into a regional war which may escalate and destabilise the international order. Consequently, the significance of status adjustment among rising powers can neither be ignored nor undermined. Finally, rising powers also use accommodation vis-à-vis the established power. For instance, David C. Kang has defined accommodation as a strategy, through which ‘a secondary state attempts to cooperate and craft stability with a great power’ (Kang, 2007, p. 53).

Accommodation as a process is the second step in peaceful power transition. Once the established or rising powers decide to accommodate a rising power, accommodation as process comes into action. Defining accommodation as a process, T. V. Paul has propounded that accommodation ‘implies that the emerging power is given the status and perks associated with the rank of great power in the international system, which includes in many instances a recognition of its sphere of influence, or the decision not to challenge it militarily’ (Paul, 2016, p. 5). There is disagreement over the meaning of status and perks. Somewhere else, with others, Paul has defined status as ‘collective beliefs about a given state’s ranking on valued attributes’, which include ‘wealth, coercive capabilities, culture, demographic position, socio-political organization, and diplomatic clout’ (Larson, Paul, & Wohlforth, 2014, p. 7). Clarifying where to give status and perks, Larson et al. (2014, p. 7) have stated that the status ‘manifests itself in two distinct but related ways: as membership in a defined club of actors, and as relative standing within such a club’. Thus, accommodation according to Paul implies not only giving the membership but also giving due role in it.

However, limiting the scope of accommodation to the multilateral fora could not be regarded as sufficient because most important decisions in international politics are often taken outside the multilateral fora. The extension of the role and responsibility beyond the institutional apparatus is also important from the legitimacy point of view. Even if the rising power is accommodated in the multilateral realm and given perks associated with it but denied outside it, sooner or later newly accommodated state may feel betrayed and turn back to the revisionist path. Such a turn may push the international order once again in turmoil. Therefore, the extension of the role and responsibilities must include various issues being debated and solved even outside the multilateral institutions.

There are six variables that determine the process of accommodation. These can be put in perspective as follows:

The Sphere of Influence

The sphere of influence² is an important variable that determines the prospect and degree of accommodation. If the accommodating and accommodation-seekers have distinct spheres of influence and they mutually respect each other’s sphere, the prospect of accommodation increases. Even if there is an overlapping but the accommodator is willing to accept accommodation-seekers’ claim within its sphere of influence, or the accommodation-seeker agrees to not challenge the accommodator’s sphere of influence, the latter may accommodate the former. In contrast, if the accommodators’ and accommodation-seekers’ sphere of influence converge and the established power is adamant on not conceding its sphere of influence to a rising power and/or the rising power willingly decides to challenge the established power’s sphere of influence, the prospect of accommodation becomes quite grim, leading to inevitability of conflict.

For instance, in the seventeenth century, the conflict between England and the Dutch Republic becomes inevitable because England challenged the freedom of navigation and free trade, the pillars of Dutch supremacy. The Dutch were adamant on not conceding or sharing its sphere of influence with England. Dutch leader Johan de Witt declared that ‘“we would shed our last drop of blood” before we “acknowledge [England’s] imaginary sovereignty over the seas”’ (de Witt cited in Allison, 2017, p. 107). On the other hand, England claimed sovereignty in its neighbouring seas and by enacting Navigation Act in 1651, retained exclusive right to regulate trade in its colonies. The Dutch regarded these actions as a major challenge to their domination that eventually resulted in breakout of three wars in last quarter of the seventeenth century.

Structural Variables

States behaviour in the international system is constrained by structural variables. Rising powers’ behaviour and its implications for international and regional order are key to understand the accommodators’ strategy towards them. The accommodator’s response is determined by ‘the type of regional order that a leading state prefers and the type of power shift that it believes is taking place’ (Montgomery, 2016, p. 3). If the rising power seeks to establish an order based on a distinct and opposite set of principles, norms and values that may undermine the international order, the established power will prefer containment. The rejuvenation of the ‘quad’ is regarded as containing China because the later is posing or perceived as posing challenges to the established order in the Asia-Pacific.

According to the preponderance-of-power realism, the established power ‘favor parity in peripheral regions’; therefore, they ‘oppose any nations that try to achieve primacy’ (Montgomery, 2016, p. 7). If a dominant regional power is likely to challenge the international order but is being challenged by a challenger in the same region, to strike a balance of power in the region, the established power may accommodate the challenger of the dominant regional power. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Britain had maintained primacy in the Far East. But when Russia became third largest naval power and started expanding towards the Korean peninsula, Britain felt its primacy in the region threatened. To retain primacy, by supplying ‘naval reinforcements’, Britain assisted Japan in crushing Russia (Claar & Ripsman, 2016, p. 158).

Convergence or Divergence of National Interest

The convergence or divergence of national interest is another important variable in determining accommodation process. The prospects of the accommodation increase ‘if the challenger is not perceived as threatening to the declining great power’s core interests, at least over the short term’ (Claar & Ripsman, 2016, p. 152). Although the convergence or divergence can take place at various levels, yet, three domains are crucial: perceived security threats, economic competition or interdependence, and alignment pattern. First, if the accommodators and accommodation-seekers face similar threats and the former find it difficult to cope individually, then they may accommodate the accommodation-seekers to tackle the challenge collectively. Common threat of the USSR was an important variable that pushed the USA to accommodate China in the 1970s. In contrast, if they face diverging threats, the possibility of accommodation decreases. The USA and its allies failed to accommodate Japan in the 1930s because they ‘viewed Japan’s search for territorial expansion in China and, later, South East Asia, as predatory and dangerous’ (Taliaferro, 2016, p. 173). The diverging national interests pushed the USA to join Britain and the Netherlands in containing Japan through imposing sanctions.

Second, if accommodators and accommodation-seekers have specialisation in producing the same goods and services and vie for same sources of natural resources and market to sell their product, the prospects of accommodation will be grimmer. In contrast, if they produce different goods and services and sell in distinct markets; the prospect will be brighter. Even if the states concerned produce the same goods and services but extract raw material from different sources and sell finished goods in different markets, it will not hinder the prospects of accommodation. The case of colonial India represents a good example, where Portugal, Britain and France fought bloody wars in the seventeenth and eighteenth century to control natural resources and market. Finally, alignment pattern also affects the process of accommodation. If an accommodation-seeker has an alliance or close relationship with other accommodation-seekers against the accommodator and may pose threats to accommodator in future, the accommodation of the states in question will be difficult. In contrast, if the accommodation-seeker is in an alliance with or has a close relationship with the accommodator, either the established power or other rising power, the prospects of accommodation increase significantly.

Perception and Intention Towards the International Order

Another variable significantly affecting the prospects of accommodation is accommodation-seekers’ perception towards the international order: whether it is ‘poised to reinforce, establish, undermine, or overturn the type of local order that a leading state prefers’ (Montgomery, 2016, p. 17). Accommodation-seekers’ prospects of accommodation will be brighter if it is status quo, willing to accept ‘the existing ordering principles of the international system’ (Chan, 2004, p. 216), and ‘its goals are non-threatening, it might coax the existing great powers to accommodate its rise’ (Claar & Ripsman, 2016, p. 172) and agrees to ‘preserve the essential characteristics of the existing international order’ (Schweller, 1998, p. 24). China’s accommodation in the World Trade Organization became possible only when it embarrassed liberal economic policies and ‘re-endorsed Deng’s reform policy’ to build ‘a socialist market economy’ (Zhang, 2015, pp. 18–19).

In contrast, if the accommodation-seeker is a revisionist state, seeking to ‘undermine the established order for the purpose of increasing their power and prestige in the system’ (Schweller, 1998, p. 24), the prospects of its accommodation will recede. If the accommodation-seeker has values and principles different and contrary to the existing international order, it can provide an alternative to the existing international order. The presence of an alternative vision offers an incentive to accommodation-seeker to establish an order reflecting her own norms, value and principles. Such revisionist accommodation-seekers can establish a parallel order that may undermine or replace the current international order. Such states are more likely to be contained. American containment policy towards the USSR during the Cold War and today’s China could be cited as examples. In both cases, the USSR and China offered an ideological and political alternative to the norms and values underpinning the current liberal international order.

Political and Sociocultural Values

Political, social and cultural values play a significant role in determining the accommodators’ strategy. Similarity leads to a favourable or at least less threatening perception. It is believed that ‘if the states in question share similar domestic political structures and ideological outlooks, it may make accommodation more likely, whereas a large difference between the states might make confrontation more likely’ (Claar & Ripsman, 2016, p. 152). About British accommodation of the USA in the early decades of the twentieth century, Charles Kupchan (2010, p. 105) has rightly noted that Britain and America were ‘liberal polities. Their governing institutions were structured to check and balance power, ensure the rule of law, and discourage the exploitation of political advantage’. In contrast, divergence may culminate in a policy of containment because generally, similarity creates attraction while divergence distraction. Distraction may lead to a suspicious or adverse perception that will weaken the prospect of accommodation. But neither similarity always leads to accommodation nor divergence to containment. The US accommodation of China in the 1970s is a good example.

The Costs of Non-Accommodation

The perceived cost also affects accommodation. If the cost of containment is lesser than accommodation, the accommodators prefer containment because rational actors do not want to share its position and prestige easily. But if the cost of containment is higher than accommodation, the accommodator’s preferred strategy may be accommodation. There is a tendency among accommodators that despite the cost of non-accommodation being high, they prefer containment because when the issue of prestige comes into the way, cost becomes secondary. However, when the cost of containment or non-accommodation becomes extremely high, the accommodators are forced to find buck-catcher³ or accommodate. This is the reason why accommodation-seekers use a strategy called costly signalling meaning ‘to show the hegemon what it really wants as well as how seriously it wants them’ (He, 2016, p. 203).

The cost of accommodation depends on various factors such as the possession of nuclear weapons, the presence/absence of a regional rival of the rising power and the potential of the rising power to challenge the existing order and establish a new international order. The chances of accommodation increase if the established and the rising powers possess nuclear weapons because nuclear deterrence and assured mutual destruction increase the cost of containment significantly. Second, by providing an instrument to containment, the presence of a rival of the dominant regional power decreases the cost of non-accommodation. China’s accommodation in the 1970s and presence of regional rivals in case of Security Council reforms are two pertinent cases in this regard. Ultimately, it can be deciphered that the higher the cost of non-accommodation, fairer the chances of accommodation; the lower the cost of non-accommodation, grimmer the chances of accommodation.

Challenges to India’s Accommodation

Shifting Balance of Power in Asia

As the power in the international system is distributing and ‘the pivot of international politics is shifting from the Euro-Atlantic zone to Asia-Pacific’ (Chandra, 2017, p. 108), a resurgent China under Xi Jinping has started challenging American domination and seeking to alter status quo in the Indo-Pacific. On the other hand, the USA is trying to balance China’s rise and limit its influence by maintaining status quo or slowing down the pace of change. To this end, the USA needs a regional balancer or buck-catcher. At a time when the weakness of Australia and Japan as counterweights to China is evident, it is believed that ‘India’s emergence as a great economic success story will provide … a possible strategic counterweight to China’ (Pei, 2011). Given its geostrategic location, historical enmity and inherent tensions with China, India is being regarded as the right choice to balance China. The way ‘India stood up to its muscle-flexing neighbour in a 10-week border standoff’ (Chellaney, 2017) on the Doklam issue has further convinced US policymakers about the viability of the Indian option. These strategic calculations push the USA to accommodate India.

However, the most powerful challenge to India’s accommodation comes from China because ‘Washington’s embracement of India as a strategic partner drives fear into Chinese strategists who see India as America’s counter-balancer against China’ (Pei, 2011). Chinese perception of India as potential challenger may lead former to block India’s bid for accommodation. Moreover, India’s accommodation by the USA is not so simple as it appears because the USA will continue to support India’s bid until it pursues a policy to contain China’s rise. The shift in present American policy towards China or any compromise between China and the USA will reduce India’s strategic importance for the USA. India’s prospects will become grim if American policymakers realise that India is no more interested or unable to balance China or they find a more appropriate balancer. American support to India’s bid for accommodation will last till India continue containing China.

India’s Sphere of Influence

As a rising state, India is eager to protect and willing to expand its sphere of influence. India regards South Asia as its sphere of influence and seeks to further expand it in the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia. Like other regional powers, ‘India is very sensitive about any presence of external Great Powers in South Asia’ (Brewster, 2016, pp. 4–10). To protect its sphere of influence in South Asia, ‘India has sought primacy and a veto over the actions of outside powers’ (Mohan, 2006). With the enlargement of a blue-water navy, India has sought to expand its influence in the Indian Ocean, and with active support from Singapore and Vietnam, it is also trying to enter into the South China Sea. In the extended neighbourhood regions, ‘India has sought to balance the influence of other powers and prevent them from undercutting its interests’ (Mohan, 2006).

India’s sphere of influence appears to diverge with the USA while converging with China. There is hardly any convergence of the spheres of influence between India and America. India ‘no longer suspects Washington of trying to undercut its influence in the region’ (Mohan, 2006). In contrast to undercutting India’s influence, the USA wants India’s influence to expand in the Indo-Pacific region (National Security Strategy, 2017, p. 47).

Pertaining to India’s sphere of influence in South Asia, China is of the view that ‘India would have important (but not exclusive) influence in South Asia’ and expects from India that it will leave ‘China preeminent in East and Southeast Asia’ (T. C. Schaffer & H. B. Schaffer, 2016, p. 260). In recent years, China’s presence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean has increased. Some smaller neighbours have sought China’s support to neutralise India’s dominance. China has developed and further developing critical infrastructures like ports and monitoring and installing intelligence gathering technologies in these states. Given the historical enmity and antagonistic relationship with China, India ‘views any Chinese attempt to strengthen its relationships with India’s neighbours as threatening’ (Pu, 2017, p. 152). In coming years, India’s presence in Southeast Asia and Asia-Pacific may challenge Chinese perceived exclusive sphere of influence and the international community may see increasing tensions between India and China. Such converge of the sphere of influence will adversely affect the mutual perception, which may eventually result in a containment strategy from China.

India’s Perception and Intentions Towards the International Order

Accommodation-seekers’ perception and intention towards international order shape accommodators’ response to accommodation-seekers’ bid for accommodation. India’s norms, values and principles are largely consistent with current US-led international order.⁴ Intentionally, it is not a ‘revolutionary power that seeks to overthrow the current order’ (Wojczewski, 2017, p. 112). Rather, it is interested in ‘upholding a liberal international order’ (Saran, 2017, p. 202). It is of the view that ‘the organizing principles around which the world order is identified … like respect to the principle of state sovereignty, sovereign equality, territorial integrity, non-use of force and non-intervention in internal affairs, are deemed as sacrosanct’ (Murthy, 2010, p. 211). Therefore, instead of overthrowing the current international order, ‘India seeks to shape the world order in ways that enhance India’s status and ensure its socio-economic transformation’ (Wojczewski, 2017, p. 120). At best, it ‘aspires to a seat at the table’ (Sinha, 2016, p. 226). Although India’s economic system is not entirely congruent with the current international economic order. But in the post-Cold War era, India has ‘initiated a gradual process of economic liberalisation, including reducing restrictions of imports, a major liberalisation of foreign direct investments (FDI) and the introduction of greater competition in various sectors of the Indian economy’ (Wojczewski, 2016, p. 100). Consequently, it has gradually started converging. And states having ‘political regimes, economic systems, social systems and human rights regimes in line with the existing international order are less likely to be revisionists while those with distinct visions are more like to be so, as they believe they are discriminated against’ (Chandra, 2018, p. 16).

However, this does not mean that India’s position is completely in line with the USA. India ‘still objects to interferences in the internal affairs of other states, even though it has endorsed globalization’ (Wojczewski, 2016, p. 108). On the relationship between human rights and state sovereignty and territorial integrity, India’s stand differs from American position. Unlike the Western urge to breach the principle of state sovereignty to protect people from atrocities, India agrees only to an exceptional breach either with the consent of the host state, self-defence, as a last resort, or with proper authorisation from the UN Security Council (Bass, 2015; Puri, 2012, para 6; United Nations, 2011, p. 18).

India’s political and economic system is in contrast to the Chinese system. De facto, Chinese political system is an authoritarian system with a single party while Indian is a multi-party democracy. The Chinese model of economic development ‘is more statist in orientation’,⁵ primarily because ‘a disproportionate amount of its GDP is produced by the state-owned sector’ (Basu, 2017). It also puts ‘emphasis on financial and political controls’ (Huang, 2010, p. 33). Through disinvestment in public sector enterprises and opening of the retail sector for private sector investment, gradually, India is moving from a ‘mixed economy’ to a privatised, less regulated and open market economy while China is marching from Deng Xiaoping’s reform to what President Xi Jinping has called ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ (Kondapalli, 2017). However, unlike the Chinese model that ‘offers an alternative to the policy toolkit offered to developing countries’ (Kondapalli, 2017; Yağci, 2016, p. 30), ‘India’s foreign policy discourse does not articulate an alternative vision of the world order that could replace existing institutional arrangements’ (Wojczewski, 2017, p. 121). In the absence of an alternative vision of international order, India is less likely to become a revisionist state. Chinese perception is that this divergence may hamper its vision of international order if realised in future. Such belief and perception will push China to block India’s accommodation.

India’s norms and values are slowly marching towards the attainment of parity with the current international order. The Indo-US nuclear deal and India’s inclusion in the MTCR and Wassenaar Arrangement has further reduced India’s revisionist intent. Even where there is a divergence, it is not too wide to not to be managed amicably. Given the growing convergence, India neither wants to overhaul nor overthrow the current international order. This convergence may push the USA to accommodate India in the present order. But India has significant differences with China. Chinese decision makers may also perceive India’s liberal values as a long-term competitor. If allied with the USA, Indian norms and values strengthen liberal values that are significantly different from Chinese values. This may incentivise China to prevent India’s accommodation.

Divergence in Political and Sociocultural Values

India is the largest democracy in the world, where every citizen has the right to participate in the political process by voting, contesting elections and forming political parties or becoming a member of one of them. Through the rule of law, periodic elections, decentralisation of powers, freedom of the press and vibrant civil society, the roots of democracy are further deepening. India is gradually moving from procedural to substantial democracy. Moreover, incorporating ‘democracy’ as a foreign policy goal (Bandyopadhyaya, 2003, p. 59) and participating in the Community of Democracies and UN Democracy Fund, India’s approach is converging towards the USA. Socially, India was a plural hierarchical society, organised around the Varna system which was further subdivided into thousands of castes. But Constitution has superseded traditional discriminatory practices and had granted rights and liberties to individuals, groups and religions against individuals and state. Post-independence, Indian society has been organised around liberal principles, where the individual is at the core and enjoys constitutionally granted rights, liberties and other entitlements. For instance, Article 14 of the Indian Constitution provides equality before the law and equal protection of the law to every citizen while Article 17 prohibits the practice of untouchability (Basu, 2008), a defining feature practised in the Varna and caste system. The Constitution provides a remedy against discrimination based on traditional social practices such as caste, race, gender and religion (Basu, 2008, p. 98). Its practice in any form will be a punishable offence under relevant laws, especially under the Untouchability (Offences) Act, later on, amended as Protection of Civil Rights Act (Basu, 2008, p. 99). Moreover, the Indian government has taken several steps to strengthen individual and civil society even at the cost of the state (Tellis & Mirski, 2013, p. 8). The Right to Information (2005) that seeks to introduce transparency through providing information about government’s programmes and policies sought by citizens is foremost in this regard.

Chinese political and social values are largely in contrast to the Indian system. Unlike India, China is an authoritarian state with a single-party system. Elections take place, but the contest takes place only among Communist Party candidates. Dissenting voices and freedom of the press are suppressed. The organising principles of Chinese and modern Indian societies also diverge. Unlike Indian society that is open, Chinese society is a close society. In the liberal and Indian societies, the individual is prior to society, but in the Chinese scheme, society is prior to the individual. China strongly believes that ‘sovereign rights will always be more valued than individual rights’ because Chinese society is organised around the collective, that is, group or society (Tellis & Mirski, 2013, p. 8). Moreover, in the context of India’s rise, ‘whether India’s democratic and entrepreneurial model of development is a viable alternative to China’s autocratic statist model’ is one of the most fiercely debated issues among Chinese elites (Pei, 2011).

At this juncture, although the difference between Indian and American political and social values at micro-level persists, however, there is a growing convergence at the macro-level. For instance, on democracy promotion, their opinion converges. On human rights, although India ‘placed less emphasis on human rights than the United States or other Western powers have’, however, its stand on universal character of human rights is not in contradiction with the West (Mazarr et al., 2017, p. 112). Underlining the convergence between the Western and Indian social and political values and its implications for India’s accommodation, Minxin Pei has noted that ‘because of its democratic political system and private-sector entrepreneurial dynamism, India’s rise is warmly welcomed in the West’ (Pei, 2011). But given the divergence with China, the latter may not extend a warm welcome that the West has offered to India.

Chinese (Mis)Perceptions

The role of perception and misperception in international politics has been established: a favourable perception pushes for accommodation while adverse leads to blocking. There are numerous factors that fuel Chinese misperception towards India. India’s nuclearisation,⁶ its entry into the South China Sea, the Tibet issue and Dalai Lama’s asylum are a few of them. However, three factors make China more suspicious towards India. First, India’s increasing strategic cooperation with America, Japan and some Southeast Asian states against the backdrop of China’s rise is raising the alarm in Beijing. The rejuvenation of the quad⁷ and the signing of the Indo-US Logistic Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) are two major issues of concern for China. Generally, ‘India is not a priority of Chinese foreign policy’ (Randol, 2008, p. 219) because it ‘is not a serious threat’ (T. C. Schaffer & H. B. Schaffer, 2016, p. 260). But Chinese elites ‘obsessively worry about India’s role as a strategic counterweight that could be used by the West in containing China’ (Pei, 2011). Second, the Chinese sensitivity about visits by high-profile foreign and Indian dignitaries to areas in the contested Sino-Indian boundaries, especially in disputed territories like Arunachal Pradesh. On numerous occasions, China has expressed concern over visits by foreign and Indian dignitaries to the disputed areas. Pertaining to a proposed visit to Tawang by the Dalai Lama recently, China ‘warned India that the visit … would cause “deep damage” to Sino-India ties’ (Aneja, 2017).

Finally, the expansion of joint military exercise, namely MILAN and Malabar, and inclusion of the USA, Indian and Japanese navies is further deepening the suspicion. Today, the USA holds more joint defence exercises with India than with any other country (Chellaney, 2017). In a balanced response to Malabar 2017, China officially expressed ‘no objection to normal bilateral relations and cooperation among relevant countries’ but expressed a hope that ‘this kind of relations and cooperation is not directed at any third party and are conducive to regional peace and stability’ (Krishnan, 2017). But the Chinese state media depicted it as ‘a threat to China’s security concern’ and economic interests in the Indian Ocean region (Krishnan, 2017). The joint military exercise becomes more pressing in the light of a Chinese survey (2010) in which ‘India was seen as the number three threat, behind the U.S. and Japan’ (Pei, 2011). Moreover, the recently resolved Doklam issue will have an enduring impact on the Chinese perception of India. In this regard, Ye Hailin has underlined that the ‘Doklam incident has successfully changed China’s view of India from that of a friend to a rival’ (Yang, 2017).

The rising misperception regarding the intentions behind Indo-US cooperation has significant implications for India’s accommodation in the emerging international order. If China believes that either India is part of the US coalition to contain China, it will use its influence to block India’s accommodation wherever possible. In such a situation, India’s entry to the multilateral fora like the ‘Security Council and Nuclear Suppliers Group’, where the decision-making process is consensus-based, would be a hard nut to crack.

The Cost of Non-Accommodation

Accommodation-seekers often issue costly signals to increase the cost of non-accommodation. Regarding costly signalling, India has approached America and China differently. Instead of issuing costly signals to America, India has approached it in cooperative manner. The cost of non-accommodation for the USA would be high if India refuses to be part of balancing coalition, be it formal or informal, because in such a situation, the USA will have to contain China without India. But perhaps it is not the case. In contrast to the USA, India has issued costly signals to China: if you are reluctant or unwilling to accommodate us, we may form a coalition, though an informal or soft, to contain your expanding influence, especially in Indo-Pacific. To send costly signals, after Nuclear Suppliers Group debacle, India is participating in the rejuvenated quad and signed logistic share agreements with the USA, France, Singapore and Indonesia. China has regarded these signals very high and was forced to convene a meeting of Indian Prime Minister Modi and Chinese President Xi at Wuhan to moderate the pace of emerging balancing behaviour in Indian foreign policy. But how this costly signalling vis-à-vis China will help India’s cause is still not very clear. However, Wuhan meeting may be regarded as softening of Chinese stance.

Conclusion

In the light of earlier discussion, the prospect of India’s accommodation appears neither quite grim nor too bright. The prospects of India’s accommodation by the USA are brighter but not because of benevolence. The sociopolitical and cultural similarities, shared security threats, divergences of the sphere of influence, high cost of non-accommodation and India’s status quo intention may pave the way, but US strategic interests shaped by structural variables are paramount. The USA appears to be clear in its goal: empower, enable, accommodate and prepare India to balance rising China. In the American grand strategy, India’s conceived role is of a buck-catcher. Through accommodation, the USA wants to elevate India’s status to balance China’s rise because weak India may not be effective in containing China. Regime change (2017) in Washington initially seemed to derail India’s mission accommodation because the rolling back of the Pivot to Asia policy and Trans-Pacific Partnership by the Trump administration was perceived as setback for India. But the beginning of USA–China trade war and appointment of neoconservative hawks on key offices by President Trump is likely to increase the tension with China. In coming years, rising tension will push the USA more robustly than ever to consult its Asian allies to contain China. Despite existing micro-level divergences, the will to contain China will stimulate the USA to accommodate India.

The major challenge to India’s accommodation comes from China, not the USA. There is a significant divergence between the social, political and cultural value systems of India and China. The co-emergence of China and India has made the case further complicated. As emerging powers, both seek new sources of raw material and markets to sustain their growth. Both are eagerly willing to protect and increase their sphere of influence. Both are vying for a sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific. In addition, India offers an alternative to the Chinese value system just as China offers an alternative to India’s existing international order. After the 19th meeting of the Communist Party of China, it appears that ‘China is in no mood to compromise’ and it is expected that ‘any attempt to contain or check China would be effectively met’ (Narayanan, 2017). India’s participation in the recently rejuvenated quad may lead China to perceive India is joining hands with the USA, Japan and Australia to contain it. These factors may lead to inevitability to the conflict between two states because since 1500 ad in only 25 per cent cases, rising powers were accommodated peacefully while in remaining, the issue was resolved through war. These things make India’s prospect of accommodation grim.

In the meantime, the future of accommodation will largely depend on the way India crafts its policy to navigate these troubled waters. India’s dilemma is about what kind of policy it should adopt. If it enters into close cooperation with the USA, China will block its bid. If it refuses to balance China, America will not endorse its cause. A prudent policy on India’s part would be to enter into a constructive engagement with the USA and China simultaneously. Since Indian foreign policy is in the age of multi-alignment, it will be prudent to strengthen the strategic partnership with China and the USA on the basis of national interests. Vis-à-vis China, India will have to learn how not let turn differences into disputes and make adversary an enemy. India should ‘act with prudence, not provoking a conflict with stronger power while building one’s strength’ (Saran, 2017, p. 148). India must balance China’s rise; however, the balancing should be limited to the economic, political and diplomatic realms because while balancing militarily, the chances of turning differences to disputes and adversarial relationship into enmity are higher.

While forging a close partnership with the USA, Indian policymakers should keep in mind that to rejuvenate its defence industry and pass the buck to India, the USA can sell arms to India and endorse some of its causes. However, it is possible that ‘it can do little if fighting erupts in Ladakh or Arunachal Pradesh, India will be on its own’ (Ghoshal, 2013, p. 118). India should neither excessively indulge in nor leave an overt impression that it is part of the US strategy to contain China. In the meantime, India should also not be obsessed with the Chinese perception to the extent to distance itself from the USA and other allies. Maintaining a balance is though not a guarantee of India’s accommodation; however, the prospects are brighter in going with this option.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

An earlier version of this article was presented at an international conference on “India’s Ascendency in the Emerging World Transitional Dynamics: New Upsurges, Strategic Challenges and Opportunities”, jointly organised by Shyam Lal College and Nehru Memorial Museum and Library on 26-27 October 2017.

The author acknowledges the extremely useful suggestions of Vikash Kumar, Deepak Bhaskar Saurabh Mishra, Chandramoni Bhattarai, Resham Lal, and Pramod Kumar on earlier versions of the article. He expresses a deep sense of gratitude to the Journal’s in-house editors and peer reviewers for their constructive suggestions. He also appreciates the comments of the session moderators and participants of the conference.

Notes

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