Role of SCO in the Eurasian Continent

Introduction

The summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), held in June 2018 in the Chinese city of Qingdao, finally consolidated the appearance of a new ‘Big Shanghai Eight’. With an official accession of India and Pakistan to SCO, its capacity has considerably increased. However, the organisation has also faced new challenges, to which the member states must respond rapidly.

Thus, the expansion of the list of members blurs, to a large extent, the SCO area of efforts application. A traditional spotlight, shining for a long time on Central Asian States (CAS), will now inevitably shift towards South Asia. The task of maintaining the basic principles of the SCO functioning and the balance of forces between the major and other members in the organisation, as well as the need for solving the most topical issue for today, mechanisms for financing the SCO projects, remain no less important in the light of the SCO expansion.

Besides, the aggravation of the geopolitical situation in the world is directly reflected in the SCO activities. The rivalry between the big powers, including the SCO members, has moved on to a new footing.

On the one hand, the US-led Western world continues its sanctions policy in relation to the Russian Federation. Judging by the measures taken by the USA and the tit-for-tat responses of Moscow, this confrontation will have a continuing character. On the other hand, Washington has declared a ‘trade war’ against the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Striving to protect their market and producers, the American President Donald Trump is gradually reneging on most of the major agreements, reached previously.

These and other objective factors create evermore opportunities for SCO to become one of the most effective international organisations in the Eurasian continent. For this purpose, SCO should solve a number of internal issues, which put great obstacles to the further development of the organisation.

Having regard to the above, this article provides an analysis of the current state of the SCO activities as well as prospects for the further development of the ‘Big Shanghai Eight’.

SCO Expansion as a Start of Reconfiguration

An inclusion of India and Pakistan in SCO, long-awaited by these countries, has taken place, and this event has caused a big resonance in world politics. Almost all key world media have written of the creation of a powerful Asian multilateral structure, whose ranks include now the four nuclear powers. These numerous publications have created a sense of a truly powerful unified international organisation. But in reality, the SCO expansion seems to have created more questions than ready answers to them. In particular, the inclusion of India and Pakistan has put the question on the agenda: will SCO continue to position itself as a regional organisation or will it become an organisation, whose sphere of influence includes not only CAS, Russia and China but also other states of Eurasia?

As is known, since the date of its creation the main functions of SCO, despite its geographical expanse, is concentrated in CAS. According to the Russian position, the membership of India and Pakistan politically ‘will transform SCO into a rapidly developing centre of power in the multipolar world’ and the most important geopolitical tool, challenging the world order under the leadership of the West.

Meanwhile, the process of adaptation of the new members has begun, and certain questions have come up in the agenda in the course of the first summit with the participation of the new members in Qingdao. In particular, an introduction of the third language as an official one remains an open issue. Without the English language, the work of India and Pakistan becomes rather complicated. However, in all appearances, the old members are not yet ready to make such a decision. At least in Astana and in Qingdao, all signatory documents for the last 2 years have been executed only in the two traditional languages of SCO—Russian and Chinese.

On the other hand, an idea of the necessity to form a certain core group of the old SCO members is often emphasised in the expert community. In the opinion of some Chinese and Russian experts, upon incurrence of controversial points, the final decision will be made, namely in this narrow circle of the old SCO members. Naturally, such an option will meet a negative response of the Indian and Pakistani representatives and, which is equally important, such practice is in complete contradiction to the Shanghai principles.

Herewith, the SCO’s expansion has opened new doors for the first time since its creation. So, for example, at the present stage, it is possible to consider SCO simultaneously in its several new capacities:

SCO provides an institutional framework. It will become the second regional organisation after the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which includes India and Pakistan as permanent members, which will contribute to the integration of the Eurasian region with the South Asian region. India has not previously had an institutional format for the interaction with the Central Asian countries, accounting especially for the absence of common borders with the region. SCO will make it possible to sound out at the multilateral level the possible areas of cooperation, including bilateral projects. Although India has boycotted the ‘One Belt—One Road’ (OBOR) Forum, its membership in SCO allows India to avoid isolation.

Finally, the membership in SCO will provide an impetus to India’s ‘Connect Central Asia’ Policy. This policy was developed in the year 2012 in the course of the First Meeting of the India–Central Asia Dialogue. So far, the five rounds of the dialogue have been held, the latest one taking place in Tashkent 2018.

It is clear that the Pakistani position in SCO will largely duplicate that of China. Pakistan already demonstrates a strong loyalty to the policy of China. At the same time, it has its own economy and energy interests in the Central Asian region. In particular, Pakistan is expecting to implement such major projects as Central Asia South Asia (CASA) 1000 and Turkmenistan Afghanistan Pakistan India (TAPI).

Herewith, it is likely that India and Pakistan will most likely seek to shift the emphasis in the SCO economic cooperation towards developing energy connections and building transport corridors in the southern direction. Summarising the above, one of the inevitable results will be the further expansion of the SCO jurisdiction to South Asia.

As is seen, the SCO expansion that has taken place has certainly launched a process of reconfiguration of the both internal and external character of its activities. On the one hand, the geography itself of the organisation and its share on the global stage are expanding. On the other hand, an objective complication of the internal mechanisms for coordination of the positions, and of the SCO agenda on the whole, is taking place.

Thus, it becomes clear that the new members will somehow bring in their modifications to the strategic agenda of the organisation. In the future, this will most likely require a revision of the SCO Charter.

The Old–New Problems

It is necessary to recognise objectively that with the expansion of the list of members, the scope of the SCO problems has not diminished, and in certain areas, it has even expanded.

Paradoxically as it may seem, a decline in attention to SCO is observed at the present stage on the part of its main initiator and promoter, China. So, in recent years, Beijing has significantly changed its approaches to the further promotion of SCO. First of all, this is connected with the tasks for implementing the OBOR Strategic Initiative. Judging by the main results of the OBOR Forum, held in Beijing in 2017, the Chinese leadership is putting major focus on this initiative. This also applies to the policy of China in Central Asia.

A certain disappointment with the pace of SCO development, accounting especially for permanent blocking of a number of the Chinese initiatives, seems to have completely pulled Beijing away from the idea of the SCO development. This may be confirmed by an unusually weak participation of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the preparation of the fundamental documents of the Astana summit in 2017.

In particular, during all 16 previous years, the Chinese side has taken an active part in the preparation of all key documents for the summit. Each year, Beijing has strived to promote initiatives such as the SCO Development Bank, the SCO Special Account, the SCO Free Trade Zone, and so on. Nevertheless, in recent years, the Chinese side has submitted no important proposals for discussion.

Herewith, one may expect that the further participation of China in SCO will be focused on preventing an excessive activity of India. From this point of view, according to the Chinese experts, the inclusion of India in SCO is even beneficial to China, which will give it an opportunity to hamper Indian cooperation with the CAS. Thus, in the eyes of China, SCO is increasingly assuming the importance of a restraint mechanism.

An old dispute between Russia and China for determining the priority direction of the SCO activities still remains topical. Against the background of the absence of progress in the bilateral relations, the competition between Russia and China is increasing, including that within the SCO. The so-called ‘turn to the East’, announced by Russia in 2014, has come today to a dead end. The bilateral projects, including the ‘Power of Siberia’ gas pipeline, the Kazan-Moscow high-speed railway and others have not achieved any practical implementation. The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEC) and OBOR Conjugation Plan, signed by Mr V. Putin and Mr Xi Jinping in May 2015, remains also on paper. China has not responded up till now to the list of 40 projects, prepared by the Russian government and the Eurasian Economic Commission.

At the same time, views and approaches of Russia and China on Central Asia differ considerably. Although Russia has supported the Chinese initiative of OBOR, expert opinion is not in congruence with that of the official line. The Russian experts feel that so far OBOR has not brought any tangible benefits to their country. In this situation, Moscow is promoting again the alternative ‘Greater Eurasian Partnership’ Project, which incidentally aspires to unite the efforts of structures such as SCO, EAEC and OBOR.

In the same context, a new pair, China and India, with different interests is now appearing. The striving of India to expand its ties with the CAS is observed even today. And this will meet resistance on the part of the (PRC). It is noteworthy that India continues to boycott the OBOR of China. New Delhi is dissatisfied with the plans of the PRC to create the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, which runs through the disputed territories of Kashmir.

The Indian side also emphasises that most of the infrastructure projects within the framework of the OBOR may be used also for military purposes. India’s anxiety is also caused by an active penetration of the Chinese capital into countries such as Bangladesh, Myanmar and Sri Lanka.

The Iranian issue in SCO remains an obvious and not far-fetched problem. The Islamic Republic of Iran, as is known, has been long standing at the threshold of the organisation and can by no means achieve its inclusion in SCO. An issue of inclusion also of Iran in the ‘Shanghai family’ has appeared on the agenda immediately after the official accession of India and Pakistan. As is known, the SCO members can come into a rather tangible antagonism on this issue.

The fact is that Moscow continues to openly press the issue of Iran’s admission to the ranks of the organisation. As noted earlier, at the SCO Expert Forum in Astana, held on 4–5 May 2018, the representatives of Russia have openly offered to approve at the summit in Qingdao an official document on the intentions for the inclusion of Iran in SCO. The proposals to include Iran in SCO by the year 2020 have also been made.

China, in its turn, insists that the admission of Iran to SCO may result in slowing its activities, pointing out to the ‘aggravation’ of Iran’s candidacy due to the Middle East problems and complicated relations with the USA. Herewith, the withdrawal of the USA from the nuclear agreement with Iran has further strengthened the position of Russia, which proposes to immediately include Iran in SCO and make a collective statement against the US sanctions.

Among the Central Asian participants of SCO, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are against the accelerated admission of Iran to the organisation. Uzbekistan apprehends that the admission of Iran as a full member will result in diminishing the role and weight of the Central Asian countries in SCO. Tajikistan, in its turn, accuses Iran of interfering into the internal affairs because of its support for the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), which is banned in Tajikistan.

Meanwhile, it should be admitted that Iran remains one of the most promising regional players for more effective cooperation of the SCO member states in the economic sphere.

Worthy of special attention is SCO’s ability to effectively solve the security issues in its area of its responsibility. For example, the situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan remains the key problem because the SCO members have different views on its solution.

All SCO members without exception recognise that the spate of terrorist activities in Afghanistan requires the SCO member states to take rapid preventive measures in relation to Afghanistan. The concentration of the forces of terrorist groups in the northern regions of Afghanistan is confirmed by the reports of the Western, Chinese and Russian special services. Thus, there is an obvious tendency for shifting instability from the south to the north of the country, where the Taliban forces are strong and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) activity is on the rise.

According to the statistics of Regional Antiterrorist Structure (RATS) SCO, in March 2018, about 3000 ISIS militants have been located in the north of Afghanistan, 80 per cent of them being foreigners, including those from Russia, China and the CAS. The risk of escalating an internal political crisis is increasing against the background of the elections to the Afghan Parliament, during October 2018.

In its new composition, the SCO member states almost completely surround the territory of Afghanistan. Despite this, the prospect of an effective solution by SCO of the Afghan issue remains vague due to the different approaches of each participant. In particular, the following main positions may be distinguished at present:

The Chinese position: Beijing has been actively promoting the ‘China–Pakistan–Tajikistan–Afghanistan’ quadripartite mechanism since 2016. The three participants of this mechanism are the SCO members, and Afghanistan is an observer. Thus, the Chinese side is gradually promoting this mechanism as a key solution to the Afghan issue.

This mechanism so far solves the security issues, related only to the citizens of China, as well as the groups, which have links with the extremist organisations, associated with Xinjiang. But in the future, China intends to join the Afghan peaceful settlement, namely within the framework of the indicated mechanism. So, there is an opinion that China and Pakistan are planning to integrate Afghanistan in the ‘China–Pakistan Economic Corridor’ projects for the implementation of which the former intends to allocate more than US$50 billion.

Meanwhile, it is just under the pretext of countering the threats from Afghanistan’s territory that the Chinese military cooperates closely with Tajikistan.

At present, China provides technical, financial and personnel assistance for the construction of three military commissariats, four military bases, four military headquarters and a training ground for the border troops in Tajikistan. (This sentence approves not about the protection of the state border of Tajikistan with Afghanistan, but about military–technical assistance from the Chinese side to the Tajik border guards).

Moreover, the Chinese side is already taking particular measures in the bilateral format. In the beginning of the year, the representatives of the defence establishments of China and Afghanistan have held talks on the construction of a military facility (according to some reports, a military base) in the area of the Wakhan corridor in the territory of Afghanistan.

The Russian position: the strategy of Moscow in the Afghan direction consists in strengthening the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) with the border that is protected only by the Tajik border guards.

The Uzbek position: since recently, it has scaled up again its activities in the Afghan direction. Judging by the large-scale events, held in 2017–2018 in Tashkent and Samarkand, the Uzbek side intends to further involve more actively such extra-regional players such as the USA and the EU.

As is seen, the indicated approaches practically do not intertwine and, which is equally important, do not include the programme of socio-economic reconstruction of Afghanistan.

New Directions for Strengthening the SCO Role in the Eurasian Space

For the sake of justice, it should be noted that along with the problems and challenges, SCO still possesses a great capacity and new possibilities for successful cooperation. In particular, with the beginning of a new stage in the SCO development in the enlarged composition, several sets of possibilities are available:

The first set includes the possibilities in the sphere of regional security.

The expansion of the organisation, at the same time, provides a possibility to significantly optimise the task of cooperation in the field of regional security, countering terrorism, extremism, transnational crime and illegal drug trafficking. This meets the interests of all member states, as it has been already noted.

In particular, the task of developing a mechanism for responding to crisis and force-majeure situations in the SCO space on the basis of the national structures and RATS seems to be relevant. In this aspect, the new SCO composition will also stimulate the long-felt need for further reforming its internal structures. Of course, in this regard, the specialists advise to apply a rational and careful approach, so as not to damage the main political framework of the organisation.

At the same time, it should be noted that certain shortcomings in this direction remain. In particular, it should be admitted that despite the adoption of the documents and declarations, aimed at countering the unconventional threats and security challenges, their practical implementation is not always carried out to the end. This is evidenced by that conflict-generating potential in the CAS. Historical differences and animosities are slowly being addressed.

At the same time, most of the regional problems are increasing, including those which are due to an external factor. In particular, the geopolitical alignment of forces in CAS is conditioned in these recent times by the intensification of struggle of various global players of the world politics for the spheres of influence.

In this situation, the states of the region tend to maintain the existing status quo and to continue the policy of balancing the interests of the geopolitical forces, which are present in the CAS. Though, it should be admitted that it is rather difficult for the CAS to maintain individually the existing balance, which enhances the necessity for their closer cooperation among themselves, wherein such large regional forces, such as Russia and China, are involved. And now, with the inclusion of India and Pakistan, it becomes possible to involve a wider range of external players for a comprehensive solution of the problems in the SCO space.

Meanwhile, a critical analysis of the SCO activities makes it possible to identify a number of unsolved problems, whose further deepening may entail negative consequences for the member states.

Based on the above, it follows that it would be timely to propose to develop within the SCO framework, a procedure for taking preventive (political and diplomatic) measures for preventing the security threats. For this purpose, it would be expedient to sign an appropriate agreement, which will create conditions for improving the mechanism for making political decisions and providing a prompt response to the emergency situations in the SCO space.

The second set includes the prospects for the implementation of multilateral economic projects.

SCO has a number of obvious advantages, which allow its members to significantly increase the rate of economic interaction. These are the financial and investment opportunities of the dynamically developing economy of China, the technological potential of modernising Russia and the rich natural resources of the CAS.

At the same time, keeping in view of the differences in the development levels and economic structures of the members, a practical cooperation within the SCO framework at this stage should be focused on the implementation of the major projects, which meet the interests of most member states. It is referred to areas such as transport, energy, infrastructure construction, telecommunications and food security. There is also room for both observers and dialogue partners. Today, SCO encompasses the key ports in the East, South and North of Eurasia and includes also an important region in the centre of the continent namely Central Asia.

The confident economic development of the SCO member states would be facilitated by the creation of a mechanism for monitoring the regional economic dynamics and early prevention of crises.

The third set includes the possibilities for the achievement of a synergetic effect and interaction of different projects.

The twenty-first century is characterised by launching and promotion of various geopolitical and regional projects, initiatives and organisations, such as the Greater Eurasian Partnership, EAEC, the OBOR. At the same time, the USA, in conjunction with Australia, Japan and India, is launching an alternative project with a quadrilateral strategic dialogue. The main practical decision of the four is the formation of the so-called Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Development Strategy. The four are already making efforts to win over the other states of the region, thus creating plausibly a half-ring for restraining China.

There is an evident competition between various geopolitical projects, on the one hand, and a tendency to seek coordination and correlation of interests in order to gain a synergetic effect, on the other hand.

It is important to note here, that SCO today is, in effect, the only structure, which unites all the above structures, and it could act as a platform for strengthening the spirit of cooperation.

The fourth set includes the possibilities for reformatting the system of international relations.

Most experts recognise that the new SCO formation brings about opportunities for creating in the future a new type of the system of international relations. Thus, for example, as the Director of the Centre for Post-Soviet Studies of Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Mr S.I. Chernyavskiy writes: ‘SCO, with the inclusion of India and Pakistan, will become an organisation on which an alternative system of globalisation may be based, without hegemons and satellites, neocolonialism and “export of democracy”’ (Sukhareva, 2015).

An analysis of the SCO summits and the content of the documents and declarations, not only on paper but also at the level of meetings and coordination of positions, demonstrate the policy of non-alignment in the SCO activities, its focus on the multipolar world and the rejection of ‘hegemonism’. The Shanghai spirit and the effective consensus principle testify to the availability in SCO of a capacity for reformatting the whole system of international relations.

SCO International Dimension and Its Prospects

In the modern world, the prestige and efficiency of any international organisation is measured by the quantity and quality of the implemented multilateral projects and by the tangible results in one or another sphere. In this aspect, the main tangible result of SCO, according to the experts, is the border issues, solved in the time of the Shanghai Five. Since that time, the organisation unfortunately has implemented no multilateral projects, limiting itself to the declarative activities, evermore becoming a ‘discussion club’ of the member states and the countries, which display their interest in the organisation. In this connection, it would be expedient to highlight a few ideas, which could give SCO a start for achieving more tangible results in the international arena.

It is important to promote the idea of acceptance of the SCO Development Bank, which is stipulated by the task of providing an impetus for the organisation.

The SCO member states deem it efficient to update the economic platform of the organisation, which should account for the following points:

the updated platform should be aimed at strengthening the coordination of the regional associations, already existing in the SCO space and economic initiatives (EAEC, OBOR, BRICS).

Such coordination will allow the SCO member states to use the synergy of various regional integration processes and will ensure real dividends in the spheres of trade and investments.

Acquiring a share in the charter capital of the Bank by India (the seventh economy of the world) and Pakistan will make it possible to prevent the complete domination of China, which increases the possibility that Russia could agree to the creation of the SCO financial structure.

The CAS, as the future Bank members, should pay close attention to the preparation of the regulatory documents, which are in accordance with their national interests.

For this purpose, it is necessary to insist for the inclusion of the best practices of the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and other similar institutions in the Bank Regulations, which allows for the maximum consideration of the interests of the recipient countries.

It must be mentioned, however, there are advantages of India’s closer integration into Central Asia. In particular, it provides a possibility for the coordination of efforts for developing transport and energy corridors in the southern direction. It would be also advisable to promote the idea of using the ‘Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Iran’ railway for the transportation of the Indian goods to Russia and Europe. India is already a member of International North–South Transit Corridor (INSTC), which goes from Mumbai to St. Petersburg via Iran. After all, due to the geographical unavailability of a direct access to Central Asia, the ‘window’ of New Delhi to the region is the territory of Iran, where India is building a large port at Chabahar. In this context, there is an opportunity to consider a possibility of implementing joint projects with India for leasing and purchasing facilities in the port cities of Iran. These investments would strengthen the transit capacity of Kazakhstan and provide an access to the markets of South East Asia.

Apart from this, it is quite obvious that with the accession of India and Pakistan to the organisation, the energy cooperation of the SCO states acquires a new topicality. In this connection, the idea of creating the SCO Energy Club, put forth by Russia in 2006, is returning to the agenda: it probably makes sense to analyse again the idea of the Club for its feasibility with a view to its further resuscitation.

It is important to account for the fact that within the framework of its strategy in Central Asia, India expressed its interest in building pharmaceutical enterprises in the region, and Kazakhstan should translate this possibility into action. In this regard, it would also be advisable to involve the Indian companies in the construction of hospitals, clinics and medical centres in Kazakhstan.

Besides, much is said in the expert circles about the need to strengthen the research component within SCO. In this connection, it would be worthwhile to consider setting up an ‘SCO Brain Trust’. This research centre may be located in one of the member states, where the experts from all member states are represented. The SCO Brain Trust would make it possible to exchange opinions on a systemic basis, to elaborate timely solutions for the development of the organisation and to better understand the standpoints of the other members at the expert level. Financing of the SCO Brain Trust could be promoted within the SCO Development Bank.

As is known, at the present stage, all countries are engaged in the SCO development issues only in the run-up to the SCO summit, which provides no possibilities for systematic study and promotion of the organisation. Within this platform, it will be possible to promote issues of trade and economic development in SCO.

Finally, the accession of India and Pakistan to SCO objectively strengthens the Asian component in the organisation’s activities in the sphere of security, which creates a capacity for consolidating the efforts of SCO and Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia for creating the foundations for the Asian security architecture.

Conclusion

The above-mentioned factors, in the near future, could face a number of changes, which in turn will also impact upon its structure. Based on the analysis made, the following forecast estimates may be assumed:

First, in the short run, the SCO activities should be focused on adapting to the new realities. After the transitional period, devoted to the technical aspects of expansion, the accession of India and Pakistan will sooner or later raise the question of reviewing the SCO internal regulations.

Herewith, this concerns not only the principles of work (granting quotas to India and Pakistan for the formation of the executive bodies, nominating their representatives to the top positions in the SCO bureaucracy, etc.) but also the equality of rights and opportunities between the new members and the founder states of SCO. Eventually, the SCO agenda will be somehow transformed.

Second, in the context of the near future of SCO, an important issue is connected with the achievement of consensus in the process of making decisions, as one of the basic principles of the organisation’s activities. Obviously, it will be difficult to follow the consensus in SCO’s new composition, and this principle could reduce the effectiveness of the organisation. Alternatively, delaying the decisions on the contentious issues for an indefinite future, until the achievement of a general agreement, will become a widespread practice.

Third, focus of China on the implementation of the OBOR projects may lead to the reduction in the importance of SCO as part of the regional policy of Beijing. With such a scenario, the very activity of SCO will be gradually fading away. At present, China is not ready to abandon SCO altogether, as it may hurt its image. However, in the medium term, the participation of China in SCO will be definitely decreasing.

Fourth, a possible reduction in the role of China from an active role in SCO would encourage Russia to try to increase its influence within the SCO space and to impart to it the character of a geopolitical organisation, advocating the anti-Western positions. In general, there is a risk that Russia and China will transfer to the SCO platform their approaches to the West, which are translated by them also through BRICS.

Inclusion of the new members in SCO has opened a new page in its history. It is difficult to forecast the further development of SCO. At the present stage, one thing is clear—the SCO is at the crossroads.

On the one hand, with its expanded membership, SCO aspires to play the role of a unifier of Eurasia, where the key players are likely to coordinate their efforts.

On the other hand, upon the erosion of the organisation’s core through the admission of new members, the SCO’s institutional weak points create a risk that the organisation could turn into a very amorphous structure.

Herewith, the importance of following the non-alignment principles increases for SCO in the current conditions. The external environment of SCO is becoming more complex, and under these circumstances, it is important for Kazakhstan and other CAS not to allow the organisation to become an anti-Western tool of Moscow or Beijing.

SCO acts as an optimal dialogue platform for discussing the regional issues. The Afghan issue also necessitates updating the SCO strategy and tactics in this direction. The renewed team of the organisation has a great potential for a more active involvement in the process of peaceful settlement in Afghanistan. For this purpose, it is necessary to seek opportunities and to find common points in the Afghan strategies of the key members of the organisation.

As for the further expansion of SCO, at the present stage, seems risky. The admission of Iran to the ranks of the organisation could increase internal tension and worsen its integrity. With the resumption of the US energy and financial sanctions against Iran, its inclusion in SCO could become a source of tensions in the relations with Washington and the Arab monarchies as well.

Moreover, the SCO needs a conceptual and organisational update. The current concept of the SCO development as a narrow-focused regional organisation with an emphasis on the security issues does not adequately reflect the new realities as well as various aspects of the new risks and possibilities, which the organisation has received after its expansion. The admission of India and Pakistan to SCO also necessitates reformatting the economic platform of the organisation.

For the CAS, it is significant that the interaction with SCO brings certain success in the geopolitical and strategic aspects. Thus, the presence in SCO of the two regional powers, China and Russia, objectively harmonises their interests and influence, primarily in trade, economic, military and political spheres.

Under the conditions of competition of various geopolitical and regional projects, it is SCO that could, to some extent, become an effective dialogue platform for discussing the existing problems and better clarifying the positions of all parties.

In order to preserve and strengthen the constructive role of SCO, it is important that the member states should strive to ensure the wide use of the existing ‘Shanghai’ mechanisms for the implementation of the OBOR projects. This will make it possible not only to enhance the economic importance of SCO but also to avoid geopoliticisation of its agenda.

Also, with the purpose of ensuring the internal unity, it is necessary to call on the SCO new and old members to preserve the ‘Shanghai spirit’ after the expansion of the organisation. The newly joined members must follow the already established principles and should not bring the problems of bilateral relations to the SCO platform.

Finally, there is no doubt that after entering into a new stage of development, SCO will continue its further development and improvement. Its future shape will be determined by inalterability of the basic principles and continuity of the core lines of activities, accounting for the dynamics of the rapidly changing international situation.

He has been guiding the activities, development, deployment and support of research projects, monitoring of the information field in the region, as well as writing analytical articles.

He used to be the CEO, Center for China in Central Asia Study ‘Synopsis’, Leading expert of the International Turkic Academy, Leading researcher in the geopolitics Services and Regional Research of Nazarbayev Center (the Department for Chinese Studies), Senior researcher at the Department of foreign policy and International security of the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President (KISS).

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.