Examining Waltzian Structural Logic and Japan’s Security Policy

Rising and Assertive China

China presents the most pressing challenge for Japan’s security. First, the post-Cold War period witnessed the emergence of China as an economic power with rapidly modernising military. After the post-1978 economic reforms in China, its gross domestic product (GDP) increased from 3678.7 (100 Million Yuan) in 1978 to 827121.7 (100 Million Yuan) in 2017 and the per capita GDP also increased from 385 in 1978 to 59660 (100 Million Yuan) in 2017 (China Statistical, 2016). The flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) into the Chinese market ensured that it multiplied its influence in East Asian region, undermining Japan’s position as a dominant economy in the region.

Second, Japan largely drew it power from its position as the second largest economy in the world. Its economy grew at the rate of 10, 5 and 4 per cent from 1960s to 1980s, the Tokyo Stock Market crash in 1989 stalled the growth. Since the 1990s, the growth rate fluctuated between –5.5 and 2.6 per cent. Japan’s GDP had an incremental growth from 462, 242 (in 10 Billion Yen) in 1991 to 538445.8 (in 10 Billion Yen) in 2016. In addition, the per capita GDP of Japan (Japan’s GDP and per capita GDP, 2018) grew at a slower rate of 3787 (in 1000 Yen) in 1991 to 4241 in 2016 (Japan Statistical Year Book, 2017). The continued recession of the 1990s has significantly altered equation between China and Japan. Japan as the engine of East Asian miracle was challenged and China was fast replacing it. Japan began to trade more with China as their bilateral trade grew from US$ 20.2 billion in 1991 to $737.8 billion in the year 2018 (https://www.jetro.go.jp/en). The Japanese FDI into China increased from US$ 230 million in 1991 to $9.9 billion in 2018 (Japan Trade and Investment, 2017). China overtaking Japan as the second largest economy in the world in 2011 was the last straw that broke Japan’s dominance over Chinese economy, and weakened Japan’s ‘triumph card’ in world politics, that is, economic power.

Third, notwithstanding the security guarantees that the US–Japan Security Pact provided, the emergence of China as a military power has increased the vulnerability of Japan’s security. The military expenditure of China in 1991 was 54.1 billion Yuan, and as a percentage of GDP was 2.4. But, it reached US$ 250 billion in 2018, although it was 1.9 per cent as a share of the GDP (China’s military, 2016). Although Japan’s military expenditure increased marginally from 4329 (billion yen) in 1991 to $46.6 billion in 2018 (Japan’s military expenditure, 2019). The disappearance of Soviet threat diluted the purpose of the extension of US security umbrella to Japan and made the emerging post-Cold War structure in East Asia fluid. Japan grew apprehensive about US security guarantees in the face of growing China’s influence.

Fourth, China’s seemingly provocative actions have further strengthened Japan’s perception of its increased vulnerability. Neither the increased trade between Japan and China nor China’s status as the largest recipient of Japan’s Official Development Assistance had guaranteed any security benefits to Japan. For instance, the dispute over territorial sovereignty of Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea. In 2010, a Chinese fishing trawler collided with a Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) boat near Senkaku Islands. It had caused a major diplomatic row between Japan and China. Moreover, China cut export quotas and curtailed shipments of rare earth materials to Japan, which are vital for Japan’s hi-tech industry. Subsequently, in 2012, Japan bought three of the five islands from its private owner to strengthen its sovereignty claim over the islands. China’s response was swift dispatching vessels and fighters to the area. Major anti-Japanese protests broke out in China, and the Japanese embassy was attacked. China’s assertion of rights over the islands through disproportionate military, diplomatic and commercial reactions confirmed Japan’s apprehension about China’s intentions.

Although Japan enjoys US security guarantees, the possibility of Japan getting entrapped if the hostilities escalate into a conflict with China remains high. Therefore, China’s growing economic clout, rapid military modernisation and acts of belligerence have increased the vulnerability of Japan’s security.

North Korea’s Missile and Nuclear Developments

North Korea’s missile and nuclear developments and failure to comply with non-proliferation norms constituted a direct threat to the territory of Japan. It began with North Korea launching its first ballistic missile Taepodong with a range of 1500–2000 km over Japan’s air space in 1998. Japan’s reaction was swift and heavy: the normalisation talks with North Korea were suspended; flight services were called off and food aid was cancelled (Singh, 2001). Since then North Korea has conducted over 100 missile tests for short-range, medium-range, intermediate, cruise and intercontinental ballistic missiles, including the two nuclear capable submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) into the Sea of Japan in October 2019. Consequently, North Korea’s missile threats pushed Japan to independently review its security situation despite the US security umbrella.

The US President George Bush Jr labelling of North Korea as part of the ‘Axis of Evil’, and revelation about its secret nuclear programme triggered it to withdraw from nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in March 2003. Furthermore, North Korea disallowed the inspection by International Atomic Energy Agency (Kawashima, 2003), and began processing the spent nuclear fuel rods at the Yongbyon nuclear facility. However, the US-led Agreed Framework diffused the situation as Oil and Light-Water Reactors were promised for discontinuance and dismantling of North Korean nuclear programme. But it failed to prevent North Korea from conducting its first nuclear test in 2006, and invited an array of UN sanctions. In addition, North Korea’s development and enrichment of uranium and its weaponisation programme intensified the threat situation for Japan. Since 2006, North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests so far, including a thermonuclear device in 2017.

On the other hand, in spite of the Agreed Framework, Japan doubted the efficacy of US security system due to the complications and difficulties of the US involvement in the crisis. The failure of the Six-Party Talks has accentuated it. The nuclear talks between the US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in 2019 raised the decibels, but appear to be deadlocked. The omission of Japan in the talks is significant as it is the most affected party. Temporary cessation of hostilities failed to prevent the North Korean military activities, nuclear and missile programmes becoming a source of threat to Japan’s security and the region, although Japan disagreed with the United States on exact type of threat it posed. This proximity of missile and nuclear threat from North Korea has considerably increased the vulnerability of Japan.

Legal Reforms

Despite sophisticated weaponry and training, Japanese Self-Defence Force (SDF) lacked experience in combat operations. It was important for Japan to overcome this deficiency to improve the preparedness of its troops. Hence, the opportunity to work closely with US forces in anti-terror operations was crucial, besides strengthening its ties, while addressing the fear of abandonment. And, it was possible only by easing the constitutional constrains on the use of force and the deployment of SDF abroad for military operations.

On 19 September 2001, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi announced Japan’s basic policy: (a) Japan’s future participation in the combat against terrorism would be considered as Japan’s own security issue, (b) Japan would support the United States and act in concert with other countries around the world and (c) Japan would take concrete and effective measures to demonstrate its firm determination (Statement by the Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, 2001). Koizumi’s announcement dispelled US disappointment over Japan’s behaviour during the first Gulf War in 1991, and also drew Japan closer to the United States. Furthermore, the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law that was passed in October 2001 purported to support the armed forces of the United States and other countries to fight terrorism and thus contribute to the achievement of the purpose of the UN Charter (Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law, 2001).

Japan’s willingness to assist the US military was not only aimed at assuring the United States of its support as an alliance partner but also strengthened its relationship with the United States, which addressed an important concern Japan had that is, abandonment by the United States. Simultaneously, Japan also legitimised the deployment of SDF in a war zone on the pretext of its commitment to fight terrorism and to fulfil the UN charter. Even though the SDF was adequately trained and equipped, they lacked the exposure and experience of real-life war situations. Therefore, Japan’s participation in ‘war on terror’ provided an opportunity for its armed forces for the first time since the end of the World War II to rectify its disadvantages.

The Special Measures Law proscribed the SDF from using force exempting the circumstances of imminent danger to the personnel’s life or body. It stipulated the high seas, including the exclusive economic zone covered in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and airspace above and territory of foreign countries as areas of operation (Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law, 2001) for the SDF. However, Japan’s preparedness to dispatch its SDF to the Indian Ocean with the purpose of providing rear-area support for the US forces into a combat zone and outside its homeland failed to provoke any official condemnation from China (East Asia Strategic Review, 2002), even though China is sensitive to Japan’s militarism in the pre-war period. In fact, China seized the opportunity to bridge the differences with the United States by offering assistance in its moves, even if it is symbolic, as China had to counter the Xinjiang separatist movement at home (Watanabe, 2004).

In addition to supporting military action in Iraq, Japan proceeded to enact laws collectively known as the ‘Three Laws Regarding Response to Armed Attacks’ in June 2003. These legislations were aimed to coordinate different levels of governmental structure in armed conflict situations, and create a centralised command structure under the control of the Prime Minister to make decisions in emergency situations wresting the power from the bureaucracy (East Asia Strategic Review, 2004, pp. 220–221). These laws altered the relationship between the national and local governments in case of an armed attack; the Security Council gained preponderance; and the security forces were given additional authority during exigencies. As a result, the authority of the Prime Minister in controlling the armed forces has significantly increased while limiting the influence of Japanese Diet to some extent.

The Koizumi administration has also enacted the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq in July 2003. This law was enacted to fulfil the Resolutions of 678, 687, 1441 of the UNSC. Subsequently, Japanese cabinet approved a Basic Plan Regarding Response Measures Based on the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (East Asia Strategic Review, 2004, p. 226). Junichiro Koizumi’s government cleared this bill in the lower house of the parliament in January 2004 despite widespread public criticism and disapproval and Democratic Party of Japan’s opposition in the parliament. Japanese troops were to be deployed in the Southern Iraqi city of Samawah. This is the first time since the surrender of Japan and its troops have been deployed in a combat zone. The deployment has not only weakened the constitutional constrains on troop deployment abroad but also successfully overcome the anti-militaristic sentiments of the populace.

In a significant move, Japan and the United States had amended the 1996 Agreement Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistical Support, Supplies and Services on 27 February 2004. The amendment replaced the words ‘humanitarian international relief operations’ with ‘humanitarian international relief operations and other operations’ (US-Japan Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement, 2004). As a result, the SDF would be able to participate in international relief operations along with the US armed forces as well as in other operations such as a future confrontation with China arises over Taiwan Straits.

The SDF Law amendment and the Law Concerning Measures Relating to US Military Actions were intended to facilitate US military operations that will operate in accordance with the Japan–US Security Agreement in the event of an attack or imminent attack on Japan (Law, Library of Congress, 2006). The implementation of these laws has drastically increased the scope of the SDF to use force. These legal enactments signify that Japan deftly releasing the constitutional clutches on the use of force and troop deployment abroad.

Augmenting Military Capabilities

Japan’s such proactive diplomacy and willingness to support military action was in line with the new thinking: strengthening its relations with the United States and augmenting its capacity for independent action. Japan deployed SDF in Iraq citing reconstruction and relief as the primary purpose. As a corollary to this, there was a change in the number and quality of the Ground Self-Defence Force’s (GSDF) equipment. The GSDF has acquired the highly sophisticated M-90 main battle tank; the AH-1S and anti-tank and ground attack helicopter; the UH-60JA multi-role helicopter and the upgraded Hawk surface-to-air missile.

Japan Marine Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) has also increased it capabilities. For instance, the number of submarines increased from 16 in 2004 to 22 in 2013. The number of destroyers increased from 47 to 54 for the same period (National Defense Program Guidelines, 2018). Furthermore, Japan modernised and expanded its JCG to enhance its power projection capabilities, and also its ability to project influence. Unlike the JMSDF, the JCG was allowed to fire upon any intrusion to safeguard Japanese homeland (Samuels, 2008). The attempts to enhance the capacity of the JCG were done to circumvent the constitutional constrains on military expenditure. Responding to Chinese carriers and its maritime expansion in the Pacific Ocean, according to National Defense Program Guidelines of 2018, Japan has announced that it was upgrading two of its helicopter carriers, Izumo and Kaga, to transport and launch fighter aircrafts.

The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) was not far behind. The Air Warning & Control Units increased from 8 groups and 20 squadrons in 2004 to 28 squadrons in 2013, and Fighter Aircraft Units from 12 to 13 squadrons in the same period (NDPG, 2018). Furthermore, Japan is buying 45 F-35 stealth fighters in addition to 42 jets already on order, and 18 of them will be short take off and vertical landing variety (Ibid). Besides, Japan has also been improving its intelligence gathering capability through spy satellites, and procuring longer-range Raytheon SM-3 interceptor missiles to strike enemy warheads in space. And, the ASDF is preparing its first space unit to monitor potential adversaries in the space (Ibid). Despite these efforts to increase its military capabilities, it is important to note that Japan’s defence expenditure hovers around 1 per cent of its total GDP.

Engaging North Korea

The deteriorating relationship with North Korea in a volatile situation compelled Japan not only strengthen its military but also negotiate with it. The Koizumi administration tried to unshackle the constitutional restraints on deployment of SDF in combat zones and use of force while attempting to resume normalisation of the relationship with North Korea. To begin with, the Japanese cabinet authorised the SDF to fire upon intruding North Korean spy vessels in 1999 to signify a proactive and autonomous policy (Fouse, 2004). Furthermore, Japan developed its own intelligence gathering capabilities and surveillance satellite system to monitor and track North Korean missile launches as it was dissatisfied with the limited intelligence that the United States had shared with it (Green, 2003). In addition, Japan signed the General Security of Military Information Agreement with South Korea in 2016 to share information of about North Korea without US involvement. However, the pact is under threat as Japan’s relationship with South Korea has been strained recently.

On the other hand, the history of Japan’s talks with North Korea, both bilateral and multilateral, has been chequered. The resuming talks with North Korea was significant because (1) the Bush administration refused to engage Pyongyong bilaterally and (2) to address its core issues: long-range missiles and missing Japanese nationals (Green, 2003). The meeting between Koizumi and Kim Jong-il in October 2002 momentarily restarted normalisation talks between the two countries, which had been stalled since November 2000. Japan apologised for its colonial subjugation and suppression, and North Korea admitted to kidnapping of Japanese citizens and death of five (Mochizuki, 2004-5). Subsequent public outrage in Japan over kidnappings had undone the accrued benefits of the negotiations. The North Korean admission to US officials of its clandestine uranium-based nuclear weapons programme further vitiated the security situation in the region. Moreover, Koizumi’s subsequent visit to North Korea in 2004 failed to yield any substantial results as well.

The multilateral Six-Party talks involving the United States, China, Russia, Japan, South and North Korea made some headway, when North Korea agreed to abandon nuclear weapons and weapons programme and return to NPT in 2005. Soon, it reneged on its pledge, and tested a series of missiles into the Sea of Japan in late 2005 and announced its first nuclear test in 2006 (Timeline: North Korea, 2007). The talks broke down in 2009 quashing Japan’s hopes for a resolution through multilateral mechanism. Until 2017, North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests so far, the last one being a hydrogen device. Furthermore, it has test fired more than 100 missiles of varying rages, the latest being a SLBM in November 2019. While Japan continues its unilateral sanctions imposed on North Korea following missile tests in 2006, North Korea rebuffed Shizo Abe’s recent overtures. As a result, the core issues remain unresolved and the challenges to Japan’s security aggravated.

Entertaining Nuclear Option

The heightened tensions stirred a domestic debate on nuclear option in its security policy. Ozawa Ichiro, then leader of the Liberal Party, warned China that ‘it’s possible for us to produce 3,000 to 4,000 nuclear warheads’ (Ichiro Ozawa Statement, 2002). Japan’s foreign minister Taro Aso not only called for a discussion on Japan’s non-nuclear policy but also insisted that possession of nuclear weapons for defensive purposes was well within the constitutional limits. He also clarified that the government had no plans to breach the Three Nuclear Principles. The Japanese government conducted a secret study titled ‘On the Possibility of Developing Nuclear Weapons Domestically’ which examined the technical feasibility of producing tactical nuclear weapons. The report estimated that a minimum period of 3 years and at a cost of between 20 and 30 billion yen to create a small stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons (Rublee, 2009). Any such attempts in the past would have invited public outrage in Japan, and officials and leaders would have been forced to resign for making pro-nuclear statements.

The muted public reaction has underscored the changing public perception of nuclear weapons, and taboo over the discussion of nuclear weapons in public has been broken. For example, a Yomiuri poll conducted in November 2006 found that 80 per cent of respondents supported the three nonnuclear principles, whereas only 46 per cent favoured discussing the nuclear option. Yet, despite the pro-nuclear sentiments of the politicians, Japan resisted the nuclear option.

The melting of three nuclear reactors at the Fukushima power plant caused by a tsunami following an earth quake in 2011 once again revived the memories of nuclear bombing and precluded any talk of nuclear future. However, North Korea’s defiant testing of nuclear devices and missiles periodically raised security concerns for Japan. The US President Trump’s criticism of the security pacts and abrupt nuclear talks with North Korea without consulting Japan have increased Japan’s uncertainty about US intentions and extended nuclear deterrence (Yoshida, 2019).

Participation in Counter-Proliferation and Missile Defence

As Japan was negotiating with the North Korean nuclear and missile threats, in the midst of Iraq invasion, the United States had unveiled its new counter-proliferation strategy, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), as it found the existing non-proliferation measures were ineffective against emerging threats from non-state actors and states that were in unfriendly terms with it such as North Korea and Iran. The objective of PSI was to interdict illegal transportation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), their delivery system and related materials on the high seas. As Japan became increasingly vulnerable to North Korean WMD, its participation in PSI served two strategic purposes: (1) drew it closer to the United States and (2) offered an opportunity for Japan to enhance the power projection capabilities of the SDF.

The Bush administration withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) came as a blessing in disguise for Japan. The scope of the missile defence (MD) not only included the US homeland and its troops stationed abroad but also its friends and allies. Japan’s need for a MD was pronounced due to recent missile crisis in the East Asian region. Although Japan’s participation in the MD programme dates back to Ronald Regan’s Strategic Defence Initiative or Star Wars programme, North Korea’s launching of missile over Japan’s territory had accelerated it.

Even though Japan cited North Korea as the reason for its participation in MD programme, the apprehensions about causing a domestic and international alarm prevented it from mentioning China as a threat (Buckley, 2003a). The economic ascendance of China would inevitably lead to a confrontation with Japan as they vie for the limited resources and market in the region. Besides, China’s unofficial missile inventories, including Medium Range Ballistic Missiles and one type of Intermediate Ballistic Missile, attest Japan’s apprehension. The possibility of China deploying land-based mobile ballistic missile and SLBM and also the missiles had the capability of carrying both conventional and unconventional warheads (Swaine, Swanger & Kawakami, 2001) has prompted Japan to develop MD in collaboration with the United States.

Japan’s decision to purchase a sophisticated missile system comprising a Standard Missile-3 designed to intercept missiles in mid-course from the sea and the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) designed to shoot down missiles from land, besides committing seven billion dollars to the programme (Buckley, 2003b) reaffirmed its alliance with the United States while strengthening its security in the process. Furthermore, components related to MD were exempted from the ban, Three Principles on Arms Export of 1967 (Japan’s policies, 2010), when the joint research with the United States moves to the development and production stage (Guoliang, 2005). The effectiveness of such a system was questioned and Japan’s collaboration with the United States was attributed to politics than security (Japan’s missile defence, 2006). Still, it was seen as another systematic step in the direction of weakening Japan’s pacifist principles.

Furthermore, the exemption granted to the export of MD components works in tandem with other initiatives that Japan had undertaken to militarise. The increase in the number of Aegis equipped destroyers and the inclusion of PAC3 surface-to-air missiles in the JMSDF is a case in point. Due to the difficulties of developing land-based and space-based MD systems, Japan resorted to sea-based MD system. A sea-based MD system not only protects Japan from incoming missiles but also its collaboration with the United States in command and control of MD had strengthened JMSDF in the South China Sea.

Maritime Initiatives

JMSDF had participated in demining activities in the Persian Gulf following the first Gulf War, and increased its scope during the invasion of Afghanistan by engaging in refuelling, transportation and reconnaissance. But they were devoid of battle experiences.

Japan initiated a robust maritime strategy, especially in South and East Asia. It strengthened its bilateral defence ties with Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam, who also share Japan’s maritime discard with China (Cabinet decision, 2015). The focus of the partnerships was to bolster maritime security cooperation. Japan not only supplied patrol vessels, boats and reconnaissance planes to Philippines but also extended large grants, ¥ 600 million to Philippines and ¥ 38 billion to Vietnam (Hart, 2017), to enable purchases to defend their maritime sovereignty.

Moreover, Japan has participated in a series of bilateral and trilateral military exercises with the United States and South Korea, and became a permanent member of the Malabar Exercise along with United States and India since 2014. JMSDF has been conducting regular exercises with the United States in the Sea of Japan, to strengthen the operational capabilities of its SDF and also to demonstrate its resolve to secure its interests. The Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons has been developed to respond to growing A2/AD challenges from China (Shimodaira, 2018). In addition, Japan was expanding SDF’s Djibouti base, established primarily for anti-piracy operations, for wider operations in the face growing Chinese oceanic activities (Fujiwara, 2018). Recently, in May 2019, Japan, the United States, South Korea and Australia held a first naval drills in the Western Pacific (U.S., Japan, 2019).

Negotiating the Chinese Threat

The identification of China as a threat in terms of ballistic missiles, guerrilla attacks, invasion of Japanese islands and intrusions into Japan’s airspace and territorial waters forced Japan to create a ‘multifunctional’ military capability to streamline the SDF through centralised command, upgrading intelligence and communications functions and creation of a rapid reaction force to respond terrorist threats (National Defence Programme Outline, 2005). The growing tension between Japan and China over gas and oil fields in the East China Sea was also a catalyst.

Moreover, the infiltration of submerged Chinese nuclear-powered submarine into Japanese territorial waters in November 2004 (East Asia Strategic Review, 2006); sighting of five Chinese warships near the Chunxiao gas field in the East Chain Sea in September 2005; and intrusion of Chinese military reconnaissance aircraft into Japan’s Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the same month (Mochizuki, 2007) intensified Japan’s efforts. Japan responded besides procuring Aegis destroyers with Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) interceptors, two helicopter destroyer (DDH) Hyuga-class vessels, which are designed as destroyers and also function as light helicopter carriers. A new P-X replacement for its P-3C patrol and anti-submarine warfare aircraft with an 8000 km range that can reach South China Sea (Hughes, 2009) was also effected. Japan reinforced its air force with the induction of a new F-X interceptor, which included the US F-22 or F-35 and the Eurofighter Typhoon (Hughes, 2009).

In addition, two incidents escalated the tensions between Japan and China, which was already deteriorating. The collusion of Chinese fishing trawler with JCG vessels in the East China Sea, near the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in 2010, and Japanese government buying three of the five disputed islands from the private owner in 2012 set off two rounds of tension between them. China responded sending patrol boats to reassert its claim, and declared ADIZ over an area in the East China Sea that covers the disputed islands in 2013 (China establishes, 2013). Although China defended its action as a measure to protect its territorial interests, and not aimed at any specific country, Japan perceived it as escalation and could lead to dangerous situations (www.bbc.com). Consequently, Japan deployed troops closer to the Senkaku islands and have undertaken various simulation exercises with the United States to retake the islands in case it is captured/occupied by an enemy. Thus, Japan was building its military capabilities not only in response to North Korean missile and nuclear threat but also due to the increase in China’s military assertion and military modernisation.

These developments unravelled the situation in East Asia and created a security predicament for Japan. Although the US extended deterrence was in place, doubts over the credibility of the US deterrence have arisen. The logic being that the possibility of US risking New York to protect Tokyo in case of a North Korean nuclear missile attack was questionable. Japan’s response was comprehensive under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.

Shinzo Abe’s Arrow

Amidst these developments, Shinzo Abe’s LDP government had brought about the most important constitutional change with wider repercussion for the regional security in March 2016—Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security (2016), which would facilitate collective self-defence albeit under certain conditions such as to defend an alliance partner, the United States, or failing so would jeopardise Japan’s security. Furthermore, it has broadened the SDF’s scope, which includes supplying munitions, and operational theatre beyond areas near Japan, if not doing so would affect Japan’s safety (www.mofa.go.jp). The public response was mixed: according to conservative Sankei Shimbun, 57 per cent of the readers thought they were necessary, and liberal Mainichi Shimbun’s respondents believed that they were unconstitutional (Mie, 2016). This single piece of legislation has transformed Japan’s military preparedness in terms of intent and scope. It opened up numerous possibilities for offensive and defensive actions, and worse, escalation of tense security situations into larger conflicts in the region and beyond. Japan has been equipping itself militarily for long should such a situation arise with US approval and assistance (Kausikan, 2017). Yet, the nuclear Rubicon remains to be crossed.