Russia Returns to the Indian Ocean: Exploring the Expanding Strategic Presence

Abstract

Russia is a major global power and has global interests. In the last few years, Russia has been silently establishing itself as a key stakeholder in the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean Region where it has significant political, economic, military and strategic interests. These four drivers provide us a framework to understand Russia’s activities in the region. Russia has announced that it will establish a military base at Port Sudan in the Red Sea. The base marks the return of Russia to the Indian Ocean. Over the years, Russia has deepened strategic partnerships with key regional states, participated in anti-piracy operations and carried out regular naval exercises. It has been a vocal critic of the concept of the Indo-Pacific. For India, Russia’s growing engagement with the Indian Ocean Region is a complex phenomenon. India and Russia are strategic partners but have divergent views about China, Indo-Pacific and the Quad. It remains to be seen how the war in Ukraine will affect Russia’s presence in the Indian Ocean.

Keywords

Geopolitics Indian Ocean Region Indo-Pacific Eurasia Quad India

Introduction

In November 2020, Russia announced its plans to establish a military base on the Red Sea coast of Sudan. The base at Port Sudan, Russia’s first in Africa, will host 300 soldiers and up to four naval warships. The agreement was signed for 25 years, and in exchange Sudan will receive arms and military equipment (Sukhankin, 2021). For Sudan, the Russian base will mean a political commitment and a military partnership with a major global power. The base will allow Russia to acquire a firm foothold in the Red Sea and help it to restore its influence in the Middle East and Indian Ocean. The base is likely to emerge as a ‘significant new operational location for Russia’s nuclear submarines’ (Daly, 2020). The establishment of the base signals the return of Russia to the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean Region.

Russia has always sought to obtain access to the warm water ports of the Indian Ocean (Marshall, 2019, pp. 12–13). In the nineteenth century, Russian attempts to move southwards from Central Asia were a key reason behind the strategic anxiety of the British Raj in India (Ingram, 1980). Later, in the 1970s, the Soviet Navy had become active in the Indian Ocean, as the British naval withdrawal East of Suez had created a power vacuum in the region (Millar, 1970). Soviet Russia had also built-up strong defence relationships with many littoral states which allowed them to have access to their naval bases. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 rang alarm bells in Western capitals as control over Afghanistan would have allowed Soviet Russia to threaten energy supplies from the Persian Gulf. In both these cases, the Russian attempts to acquire a firm foothold on the Indian Ocean failed. Therefore, the latest Russian attempt to return to the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean by opening a base in Sudan is significant.

The base at Sudan is not an isolated development in the Russian global calculations. In fact, since its participation in the anti-piracy efforts off the Horn of Africa in 2008–2009, Russia has gradually expanded its strategic horizons and has taken measured steps to increase its presence in the Indian Ocean. It intervened militarily to save the Assad regime in Syria and has strengthened its strategic and military partnerships with Indian Ocean states such as Iran and South Africa. In 2021, with India’s support, Russia joined the Indian Ocean Rim Association as a dialogue partner (Gurjar, 2021).

Arms exports facilitated by its domestic defence-industrial base, well- developed military technological capabilities, a key position in the global energy markets and a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) are major sources of Russian power. Building on these strengths, Russia is expanding its influence in the crowded geopolitical space of the Indian Ocean. While the discussions about the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean usually focus on the United States, India and China, Russia is silently establishing itself as a key player. The present article makes a case to look at the Russian activities more closely in the evolving geopolitics of the Indian Ocean.

There are three key reasons to examine Russia’s engagement with the Indian Ocean: First, while discussing Russia’s foreign and strategic policy, the focus turns to the wider Eurasian geopolitics. However, Russia’s expanding presence in the Indian Ocean remains relatively under-studied. Second, in the debates around the evolving strategic rivalries in the Indian Ocean, Russia is largely conspicuous by its absence. Third, for India, Russia’s emerging role in the Indian Ocean is a complex phenomenon. Russia is a traditional friend of India. However, Russia’s strained relationship with the West and its increasingly closer ties with China and Pakistan present challenges for India. Therefore, Russia’s role in the Indian Ocean is of interest for India.

The article is structured in seven parts. Following the introduction, the article analyses the key drivers for Russia’s interest in the Indian Ocean. It then explores Russian moves that signal the return to the region such as its participation in anti-piracy efforts. Russia’s maritime doctrine of 2015 is a key document that outlines the broad contours of its approach towards the Indian Ocean. Therefore, the article takes a closer look at the doctrine. Subsequently, the focus turns to Russia’s major activities, including the presence of Russian mercenaries, with respect to the strategically important Indian Ocean littoral states such as Mozambique and Madagascar. In recent times, Russia’s naval exercises with Iran, China and South Africa in the Indian Ocean was an important development in the regional geopolitics and are analysed in some detail. The article then moves to explore the implications of Russia’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean for India. Both powers are re-shaping their strategies and, therefore, the unfolding dynamics needs to be unpacked. Finally, the discussion of the Indian Ocean invariably turns to the question of the Indo-Pacific, and the article looks at the Russian position on the Indo-Pacific.

The article was written before the Russian invasion of Ukraine and, as the situation is still evolving, it has refrained from making any assessments of the likely impact on Russia’s presence in the Indian Ocean.

Drivers of Russia’s Indian Ocean Engagement

Russia is a key political and military actor in the geopolitical space between the Baltic Sea and Northeast Asia. Apart from maintaining its pre-eminence in the peripheral space, known as ‘near abroad’, Russia has global strategic interests such as maintaining a forward military presence in key regions, expanding Russian influence and challenging, wherever possible, the influence of the Western powers. These interests provide a framework for understanding Russia’s engagement in the Indian Ocean. Russia’s return to the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean is driven by four key, inter-related factors: political, economic, military and strategic (Muraviev, 2021).

Political

In the past, Russia had made active efforts to expand its political influence on the Indian Ocean littoral. During the Cold War, Soviet Russia extended generous support to the Communist parties and regimes as well as to anti-colonial national liberation struggles across the Indian Ocean littoral. Ethiopia, Somalia, Mozambique, and Yemen were some of the key Soviet allies in the region (Woodward, 2002, pp. 136–143). Even now, Russia seeks to expand its political influence in the Indian Ocean through its growing military presence and strategic partnerships.

Russia is a permanent member of the UNSC and holds the veto power. It can provide diplomatic and political cover for its friends and allies. For example, the Soviet veto and support in the UN proved quite useful for India in the 1950s and the 1960s when it was facing a hostile Pakistan and unfriendly Western powers (Simha, 2016). Russian political (and more crucially, military) support proved to be critical for Syria’s Assad regime to stay in power. In the last few years, Russia has used its veto to block UNSC resolutions about Syria, Yemen, Myanmar and Zimbabwe (Associated Press, 2011; Security Council Report, 2020).

In the case of norms and values governing international affairs, Russia supports the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of a state and does not support interventionist Western ideas like the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). (However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has complicated matters.) For many regimes in the Indian Ocean littoral, which are under pressure over the erosion of democracy, for suppressing dissent and liberties, and/or engaged in internal conflicts, Russia has emerged as a sought-after diplomatic partner (Mohan, 2019).

Economic

Russia has proven technological capabilities in strategically important sectors such as energy, mining and nuclear technology (Muraviev, 2021). It is one of the largest producers and exporters of oil and gas, and it seeks to shape the global energy markets. Russia’s economic growth and domestic stability is closely linked to the price of oil and gas in international energy markets (US Energy Information Administration, 2017). Therefore, stability in the Middle East and ensuring the security of the sea lanes of communications (SLOCs) through which the global energy resources are transported is in Russia’s national interests. This imperative pushed Russia to participate in the anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia since 2008–2009 and to make efforts for acquiring bases near the maritime chokepoints like the strait of Bab-el-Mandeb.

Russia supports its national energy companies such as Rosneft and Lukoil that are eyeing the Indian Ocean littorals for expansion (Gupte & Griffin, 2019). Russia is also interested in exporting civilian nuclear technology. It is building nuclear power plants in countries such as India, South Africa and Bangladesh (World Nuclear Association, 2021). It is making a big push to market its nuclear technology to African countries such as Rwanda, Ethiopia, Zambia, Sudan and Uganda (Hairsine, 2020). Building and operationalising nuclear power plants takes decades and, therefore, partnership in nuclear energy signals prospects for a long-term partnership. Russia seeks to double its trade with Africa by 2025 to cross $40 billion to expand the economic footprint of Moscow. It has interests in fishing as well as in the exploitation of the seabed resources of the Indian Ocean (Muraviev, 2021).

Russian companies are eyeing the Indian Ocean countries to extract gold and other strategic minerals. The Russia–Sudan partnership is an excellent example of this endeavour. In exchange for the base, Sudan hopes to attract Russian investments in its telecom, agriculture, aviation, energy and mining sectors. Sudan is one of the most ‘gold-endowed’ countries in Africa, and Russian technology and investments would be useful in extracting gold (Sukhankin, 2021). These economic interests necessitate further Russian engagement with the Indian Ocean littoral states.

Military

Russia has two fundamental military interests in the Indian Ocean: arms exports and strengthening partnerships to maintain a forward military presence including the base arrangements. Russia is home to one of the most sophisticated defence industrial sectors in the world. It is the second largest arms exporter after the United States. During 2016–2020, Russia accounted for 20% of the global arms exports, and its customers were based in Asia, Africa and the Middle East (Wezeman et al., 2021). Arms exports cannot be separated from the close political and military partnerships and influence that Russia has managed to build with its client states. Russia is entering new arms markets like Pakistan, which so far had relied on Western military equipment (Iwanek, 2019). Through steps such as participation in anti-piracy efforts, extending support to Syria and conducting regular military exercises with regional states, Russia has steadily increased its security presence in the Indian Ocean. Russian interest in establishing a base in the region is well-known and is discussed in some detail in subsequent sections.

Strategic

Russia is an independent power centre in world affairs and can prove to be valuable in fending off and balancing Western influence. It is a strategic rival of the United States and sees itself as the United States’ peer competitor. As in the past, Indian Ocean is a key strategic theatre in this competition and its importance will continue to increase. Russia’s global strategic interests, which stretch to regions such as South America, Africa and the Indian Ocean, and its great power ambitions are likely to push it to engage more actively with the Indian Ocean littoral states (Muraviev, 2011). A forward military presence in the key geopolitical spaces of the Indian Ocean and sustained politico-economic engagement with the regional states will help Russia to protect its vital interests and to project itself as a global power. As per the 2015 maritime doctrine, Antarctica has been identified as an important region for Russian national interests, and the role of Indian Ocean as a connector assumes strategic significance (Russia Maritime Studies Institute, 2015).

Russia Returns to the Indian Ocean

The clearest signal that Russia sent out regarding its return to the Indian Ocean was in 2008–2009. During 2007–2012, piracy off the coast of Somalia had emerged as a major problem for the security of global shipping. As a response to the growing instances of piracy and its danger to the global economy, major powers including the United States, Britain, France, China, Japan, India and Australia sent their navies to the region (Stavridis, 2017, pp. 117–118). Russia too sensed an opportunity in this endeavour.

Since the disintegration of Soviet Russia in 1991, Russian navy had not taken an active interest in the Indian Ocean. It even relinquished its naval base at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. However, since 2001, Russia gradually began to send its warships to the Indian Ocean for long-range deployments (Muraviev, 2011). In 2008–2009, it seized the opportunity to send warships to the region to participate in the global anti-piracy effort. Since then, Russia had maintained non-permanent but regular deployments in the region (Melvin, 2019, pp. 12–13).

Taking the engagement with the region a step further, the Russian navy explored the possibility of establishing bases in Yemen and Libya (Reuters, 2009). A base in Yemen would have been useful in fortifying Russian presence in the Western Indian Ocean (WIO) and would have projected Russian influence in the Northwest Indian Ocean. Russia had decided to modernise its base in Syria as well. The collective impact of these steps pointed towards the gradual return of Russia to the Indian Ocean.

However, the turmoil and political instability unleashed by the Arab Spring of 2011–2012 in Libya and in Yemen probably forced Russia to shelve its plans of opening bases in these countries (Ramani, 2020). Meanwhile, Syria, Russia’s closest ally in the Middle East, too was engulfed in the Arab Spring and, subsequently, in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In 2015, in order to save the embattled Syrian regime, Russia decided to intervene militarily in the region. Russian intervention was crucial in tilting the balance of power in favour of the Assad regime. The Syrian intervention bolstered Russia’s global image as a credible politico-military partner (Petkova, 2020).

Russia was in talks with Djibouti, the tiny African nation that hosts military bases of the United States, France, Japan and China. However, Djibouti refused to host the Russian base as it did not want to become a playground for a proxy war between the major powers (Melvin, 2019, p. 13). At the same time, the Red Sea coastline had become a geopolitical hotspot and there were eager nations willing to host a foreign powers. In 2017, during the visit of the then Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir to Russia, the news of an incoming Russian base surfaced. Sudan and Russia signed an agreement to make it easier for the Russian navy to visit Sudanese ports (Muraviev, 2020). For Russia, Sudan could become a gateway for increasing its African engagement as well as for providing a base to further enhance its Indian Ocean outreach. Russia was also in talks with Eritrea, another Red Sea state, to build a logistics support facility (Melvin, 2019).

It should be noted here that compared to a military base, which generally entails long-term security commitments and deployments of troops and strategic assets, logistics support facilities are usually smaller. They are useful primarily for refuelling and resupplying. Given the negative connotations associated with the term ‘military base’ and the political implications of allowing a foreign power to establish a base, the term ‘logistics support facility’ is usually preferred.

Russian naval presence in the Indian Ocean is different from that of the other major powers. Unlike the United States or France, Russia does not deploy a large number of troops and assets to the region. The limits imposed by the Russian naval capabilities is a factor to be considered in this respect. Although the Russian navy has experienced ‘a rebirth’ since 2008, it is still not in a position to ‘exercise sea control in distant regions of the globe’ (Niemi, 2021). However, Russia has well-developed capabilities in terms of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) as well as ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). Russian presence in the Indian Ocean is considered as ‘high-profile long-distance naval deployments’ (Niemi, 2021).

Facilities in Sudan and Eritrea facilitate a greater Russian presence in the region. It allows Russia to monitor the military build-up by other major powers in the region. Greater Russian presence opens up diplomatic possibilities for littoral states that are facing the pressures of strategic rivalries between global and regional powers. As Russia continued its quest for a military base in the Indian Ocean, it unveiled the maritime doctrine in 2015. The doctrine indicated Russia’s priorities and clarified Russian thinking. In the context of Russian activities in the Indian Ocean, the doctrine needs to be considered in some detail.

Russia’s Maritime Doctrine of 2015

As per the doctrine, the goals of the national maritime policy are to ‘implement and safeguard the national interests’ of Russia in the ‘World Ocean’ and to ‘reinforce the standing of the Russian Federation among the leading maritime powers’ (Russia Maritime Studies Institute, 2015, p. 7). Russia intends to take greater interest in international maritime affairs, and it seeks to attain the status of a major global power in the maritime domain as well.

The navy is one of the important instruments of Russian foreign policy as it maintains strategic presence as well as ‘shows the flag and demonstrates military capabilities’ (Russia Maritime Studies Institute, 2015, p. 18). The Russian navy ‘takes part in combating piracy; in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations’ that ‘meet the interests of the Russian Federation; and enables Navy ships and vessels to enter ports of foreign states’ (Russia Maritime Studies Institute, 2015, p. 18). The navy is tasked ‘to establish and maintain favourable conditions on the World Ocean by military means’ to implement the core priorities of Russian national security (Russia Maritime Studies Institute, 2015, p. 17).

The maritime doctrine identifies six regional priority areas: Atlantic, Arctic, Pacific, Caspian, Indian Ocean and Antarctica. Russia considers ‘development of friendly relations with India’ as the most important goal of the National Maritime Policy’ in the Indian Ocean (Russia Maritime Studies Institute, 2015, p. 28). However, it does not mean that Russia’s Indian Ocean policy is India-centric. Russia is also focussed on ‘strengthening positive interaction with other states of the region’ (Russia Maritime Studies Institute, 2015, p. 28). Russia seeks to expand ‘shipping, joint activities with other states in the spheres of exploration of offshore hydrocarbon fields, and construction of undersea pipelines’ (Russia Maritime Studies Institute, 2015, p. 28). Moreover, Russia would like to pursue a policy that will be aimed at the ‘transformation of the region into a zone of peace, stability and goodwill; periodically or as necessary, ensuring the naval presence of the Russian Federation in the Indian Ocean; providing security for maritime activities, including combating piracy’ (Russia Maritime Studies Institute, 2015, p. 29). In future, the Russian navy will continue to maintain its presence in the Indian Ocean as it will help to ‘strengthen positions’ of Russia in the region (Russia Maritime Studies Institute, 2015, p. 29).

Russia issued its National Security Strategy in 2015. The strategy refers to the littoral regions of the Indian Ocean such as the Middle East, Africa and South Asia (Muraviev, 2021). Building on these two documents, a broad framework of Russia’s Indian Ocean strategy is apparent. Russia has always been an important power in South Asia, and it seeks to continue playing that role. In the context of naval deployments, Russia appears keen to ensure a forward presence as well as to carry out military diplomacy through port visits. It seeks to solidify its position in the regional geopolitics. Russian analysts have hinted at its capabilities and interest in carrying out anti-terrorism, anti-piracy, anti-trafficking and disaster relief operations in the Indian Ocean (Kuzmina, 2019). The maritime doctrine was another step in the making of the Russian policy towards the Indian Ocean. Russia appeared keen to expand its regional engagements in the framework of its global interests.

Expanding Engagement in the Indian Ocean

In the last few years, Russia’s engagements in the Indian Ocean have been growing steadily. Russia has gradually rebuilt its influence in the region and has emerged as a serious geopolitical player. Russia brands itself as a non-threatening actor in regional geopolitics and a state that can act as a ‘political power broker and a mediator’ (Muraviev, 2011, p. 214).

Russia seems particularly interested in deepening its strategic ties with the states in the broader WIO region such as Sudan, Mozambique, South Africa and Madagascar. As the major global powers including the United States and China are bolstering their strategic presence in this region, Russia too needs to step up its efforts. A foothold in the Indian Ocean littoral Africa is likely to prove to be a key launchpad for Russia.

Just as in Syria, since 2017 Russia has helped the embattled regime of the Central African Republic (CAR) in its fight against the rebels. The Russian military support has been crucial in bolstering the capabilities of the regime (Ramani, 2021). Apart from supplying weapons, Russia extended its support by sending the Wagner Group mercenaries (Ramani, 2021). However, CAR is not the only country that saw the presence of Russian mercenaries. Reportedly, Russian mercenaries were also operating in Sudan, Yemen, Syria, Libya, Mali and Mozambique (Fasanotti, 2022).

For Russian interests in the Indian Ocean, Mozambique is a strategically important country. Rich in offshore natural gas resources, Mozambique links the African mainland with the Indian Ocean through the Mozambique Channel. During the Cold War, Soviet Russia had provided generous support to the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), a liberation movement turned political party, on the basis of ideological solidarity (McGregor, 2019). However, Soviet Russia was aware of the geopolitical importance of Mozambique’s location. FRELIMO is in power in Mozambique even now and had turned to Russia in its fight against the Islamist rebels in the northern region of Cabo Delgado.

In 2019, Wagner Group mercenaries were deployed to Mozambique to support the military operations against the rebels. There have been doubts about the effectiveness of the Russian mercenaries as the conflict in Mozambique is escalating (Sixto, 2020). Meanwhile, Russia’s Wagner Group, which is a private military contractor (PMC) and, reportedly, is close to the Kremlin, has been playing a key role in Russia’s security engagements abroad. The deployment of such mercenaries allows Russia to further its foreign policy objectives with a potential deniability if the situation worsens. In 2019, Mozambican President Philip Nyusi flew to Russia and signed a number of agreements to further strengthen the energy- and security-related ties. Following his visit, apparently, a non-governmental organisation linked with the Wagner Group began to promote the incumbent president through social media outreach and publicising polls favourable to the regime (Sauer, 2019).

On the eve of the 2018 elections, the then president of Madagascar, Hery Rajaonarimampianina, met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Yevgeny Prigozhin, widely believed to be the founder of the Wagner Group. After the meeting, Russian operatives were sent to Madagascar to help the regime (Schwirtz & Borgia, 2019). It was reported that Russia was keen to establish a military base in Madagascar.

In October 2019, Russia organised the first ever Russia–Africa Summit at Sochi to enhance the strategic relationship with the continent. The summit was attended by more than 3,000 African delegates including 43 heads of state of government. All the African countries sent their representatives to the summit (Defense World, 2020). Vast opportunities exist in Africa for the export of Russian capabilities in technological, mining, nuclear and energy sectors. Countries such as Rwanda, Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Africa are willing to partner with Russia in these sectors (Eyssen, 2019). Russia reckons that Africa is a huge military market and presents growing opportunities for Russian weapons exports. Algeria, Egypt and Sudan are already major buyers of Russian weapons (Kondratenko, 2020). There is potential for increasing Russia’s engagement with the African security sector.

Naval Exercises in the Indian Ocean

In 2019, Russia took its Indian Ocean engagement a step further and conducted two naval exercises in the WIO. Both exercises were significant for optics and signalled the evolving regional geopolitics. Russia and China joined South Africa in the trilateral naval exercise near the Cape of Good Hope. What’s more, in a first-of-its-kind operation, South Africa also hosted two long-range, nuclear capable Tu-160 Russian bomber aircraft. They were accompanied by a delegation to further strengthen the defence ties between Russia and South Africa (Martin, 2019). Russia and South Africa are partners in the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and have been steadily boosting their politico-military co-operation.

The navies of Russia, China and Iran conducted joint exercises in December 2019 in the Gulf of Oman. The exercises included live fire drills and counter-piracy operations (Fazl-e-Haider, 2020). In the last few years, Russia and China have emerged as major economic partners for Iran (Reuters, 2019). The naval exercises were a signal to the United States and its allies of the emerging politico-military alignment in the Indian Ocean geopolitics. Such exercises serve Russian and Chinese interests as they aspire to increase their presence and activities in the Indian Ocean, whereas partnering with these two major powers helps in thwarting the Western attempts to isolate Iran (Mastro, 2020). Therefore, it was a win-win initiative, and it further demonstrated the Russian intent in the Indian Ocean.

In early 2021, the Russian navy conducted naval exercises with Pakistan and Iran. Russian naval warships visited Pakistan for the multi-national “Aman-2021” exercises for which even the NATO countries including the United States were invited (The Express Tribune, 2021). Russian participation in these exercises suggested its growing interest in the Indian Ocean as well as an improving relations between Russia and Pakistan. Following these exercises, the Russian navy conducted a bilateral naval exercise with the Pakistani navy (The News, 2021).

Russia and Iran conducted Exercise Maritime Security Belt, which included units from the Iranian navy as well as from the elite Revolutionary Guards. The objective was to ‘enhance the security of international maritime trade, confront maritime piracy and terrorism, and exchange information’ (VOA News, 2021). Russia, Iran and Pakistan have significant stakes in the future of Afghanistan post US withdrawal and, therefore, Russia’s engagement with these two states is growing steadily.

It was speculated that the Indian navy would also join Iran and Russia in their bilateral exercises. Although the Indian navy denied such reports, it highlighted the complicated nature of India’s relationship with Iran and Russia (Indo-Asian News Service [IANS], 2021). Perhaps the news was deliberately leaked to gauge responses from various interested quarters such as Pakistan, India, China and the United States—countries that have stakes in the geopolitics of the northern Indian Ocean as well as are important stakeholders in Eurasia.

India–Russia Strategic Partnership and the Changing Geopolitics

Since the 1950s, India and Russia have built a strong strategic partnership and, despite the several ups and downs in their domestic affairs as well as in the international environment, the two countries remain solid partners. For Russia, India is a key partner in Asia and in the Indian Ocean. India and Russia are engaged in BRICS, Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO) and Russia–India–China (RIC) trilateral dialogue. The inclusion of India (and Pakistan) in SCO as full members and Sri Lanka’s status as a dialogue partner has brought the Indian Ocean within SCO’s ambit as well (Kuzmina, 2019). Influential Russian analyst Dmitri Trenin has argued that a maritime corridor could be developed between Mumbai and Murmansk (Trenin, 2020). It invariably envisages Indo-Russian cooperation in the Indian Ocean.

For India, Russian support in military modernisation and in building India’s defence industrial base is crucial. Defence co-operation is a key pillar of the India–Russia strategic partnership. Russia-supplied weapons systems are a mainstay for India’s armed forces. Both countries are engaged in the joint development of missiles (like BrahMos) as well as fifth-generation fighter aircraft (Lalwani et al., 2021). Recently, despite American warnings, India purchased the S-400, the world’s best air defence system, from Russia. However, the ongoing war in Ukraine has complicated India’s defence ties with Russia.

Russia has also been a key partner in building the naval capabilities of India. Soviet Russia had leased an SSN in the late 1980s that gave the Indian navy valuable experience in operating a nuclear-powered submarine. Russia leased another SSN in 2012, and the third SSN will be leased in 2025. (It remains to be seen whether India will go ahead with the SSN deal after the invasion of Ukraine and the Western attempts to isolate Russia.) India’s INS Vikramaditya, an aircraft carrier, which is key to projecting India’s growing maritime power in the Indian Ocean, is of Russian origin. Russia has sold frigates to the Indian navy. Furthermore, it has played a key role in designing India’s first indigenously built SSBN, the INS Arihant (Lalwani et al., 2021).

Russian weapons systems form about 85% of India’s overall weapons platforms and are essential for India’s national security and foreign policy objectives (Lalwani et al., 2021). In the last two decades, India is gradually diversifying its defence partners and is buying platforms from countries such as the United States, France and Israel. The growing defence partnerships with these countries is a signal of India’s changing foreign policy orientation. India is aware of its expanding strategic convergence with the United States and is investing significant political capital in further deepening the relationship (Mohan, 2021).

In fact, in the context of the changing geopolitics of the Indian Ocean and Eurasia, old assumptions and alliances are progressively becoming obsolete. From the Russian point of view, China and Iran are key partners in undermining Western influence in the region, while Pakistan is a useful actor in Afghanistan. Therefore, Russia is re-positioning itself in response to the changing geopolitics of the region. Russia is leveraging China’s emergence as an important player in the Indian Ocean to further enhance its own presence. However, India still remains the one of the most important strategic partners for Russian foreign policy.

From India’s standpoint, Russian presence in the Indian Ocean need not necessarily be viewed as a negative development in its security dynamics. However, Russia’s staunch opposition to the concept of the Indo-Pacific remains a worrying factor.

Russia and the Indo-Pacific

While discussing the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean, its interconnections with the Pacific need to be considered as well. The ‘Indo-Pacific’ is evolving as a single geopolitical region with the amalgamation of the strategic concerns of the Indian and Pacific Oceans (Kuo, 2018). Major powers such as the United States, Japan, Australia, France and India are re-shaping their strategies and are re-positioning their diplomatic and military focus towards the Indo-Pacific.

However, Russia and China are opposed to the coining of the term ‘Indo-Pacific’. They believe that Indo-Pacific is a new tool in the strategy of containment and that it serves the interests of the United States and its allies. It reminds Russia of the Cold War-era American security alliances (Koldunova, 2019). However, Russia is as much a Pacific Ocean power as it is a Eurasian power. Russia’s Far East territories, located in the northern Pacific, facilitate a greater Russian role in the geopolitics of the Northeast Asia.

Despite its growing engagements in the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific, Russia opposes the geopolitical framework of Indo-Pacific as an ‘artificially imposed concept’ (Melvin, 2021, p. 12). President Putin had said, in the context of the Indo-Pacific in October 2019, that ‘an attempt is made to create some kind of a bloc-based organisation, I believe, first, this is un-Asian to begin with and is at odds with the current state of affairs in Asia’ (Kremlin, 2019). Russia does not support the creation of ‘new blocs such as Europe or North Atlantic after World War II’ and it thinks that the Indo-Pacific is likely to do that (Kremlin, 2019). Foreign Minister Lavrov in 2020 observed that Indo-Pacific ‘is an attempt, I think, to reconfigure the existing structures of the Asia-Pacific Region and to move from ASEAN-centred consensus-seeking forms of interaction to something that would be divisive’ (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation, 2020). He stressed that the concept was coined to ‘contain China. And it is not even hidden’ (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation, 2020).

India has attempted to assuage Russian concerns regarding the Indo-Pacific. In 2020, India’s Ambassador to Russia D. B. Venkatesh Verma has said that ‘we see Russia as a very important Pacific power … Just like Russia has an interest in the Indian Ocean, we have an interest in the Pacific Ocean’ (Peri, 2020). He added that, ‘we are looking at Indo-Pacific as a geographic continuum for cooperation and for certain principles that we want this region to be free and fair for everyone’ (Peri, 2020). India considers the Indo-Pacific as a logical next step to further strengthen strategic ties with Russia (Basu, 2020).

Russia has displayed its discomfort towards the Quadrilateral Security Initiative, also called the Quad, which is championed by India, the United States, Japan and Australia. Russia considers the Quad as an anti-China initiative and, therefore, at the current juncture, it cannot support the Quad (Kireeva & Kupriyanov, 2020). Russia is following a dual-track approach: it is increasing its presence in the entire Indo-Pacific region with a special eye on the Indian Ocean and, simultaneously, is standing firm with China in opposing this concept.

Concluding Remarks

Russia is a global power and has expansive interests spanning across the globe. Russia’s engagements with the Indian Ocean Region are part of its strategy to expand its global presence. Its participation in the counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia beginning in 2008–2009 was a clear indication of the emerging Russian strategy towards the Indian Ocean. Since then, Russia has continued to bolster its presence in the region. Its approach towards the Indian Ocean is driven by four key and inter-related factors: political, economic, military and strategic.

Russia seemed particularly interested in establishing a military base in the WIO. Sudan has agreed to host a Russian base in the Red Sea, which will allow Russia to monitor regional developments, especially the military build-up by major powers, up close. In the last few years, Russia has gradually expanded the scope of its activities in the region. It has extended politico-military support to Mozambique. It has engaged with African states through the Russia–Africa Summit of 2019 and is keen to expand its economic and military partnerships in the region. Furthermore, Russia is expanding its presence in the Indian Ocean through instruments such as naval exercises. Indicating the changing regional geopolitics, Russia has carried out naval exercises with China, Iran, Pakistan and South Africa.

For Russia, India is a major strategic partner in the Indian Ocean Region. India is uniquely positioned to leverage both Russian and Western interests in the region. However, Russia’s growing strategic partnership with China and its criticism of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ and ‘the Quad’ presents challenges for India. Russia believes that the Indo-Pacific and the Quad are essentially anti-China constructs and, therefore, it cannot support them at the current juncture. Russia is itself a Pacific Ocean power and is taking a greater interest in the Indian Ocean. Therefore, Russian opposition to the Indo-Pacific seems odd. So far, efforts to assuage Russian concerns have not yielded any results. In the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its likely implications, it would be interesting to observe the next steps in Russia’s Indian Ocean strategy.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

References

Associated Press. (2011, 5 October). Russia and China veto UN resolution against Syrian regime. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/05/russia-china-veto-syria-resolution

Basu

(2020, 28 July). India wants Russia to join Indo-Pacific initiative to signal it’s not just a US-centric plan. The Print. https://theprint.in/diplomacy/india-wants-russia-to-join-indo-pacific-initiative-to-signal-its-not-just-a-us-centric-plan/468853/

Daly

J. C.

(2020). Russian naval base in Sudan: Extending Moscow’s influence in Middle East and North Africa. Eurasia Daily Monitor, 17(168). https://jamestown.org/program/russian-naval-base-in-sudan-extending-moscows-influence-in-middle-east-and-north-africa/

Defense World. (2020, 4 August). Russia seeks to establish military bases in 6 African nations. Defense World. https://www.defenseworld.net/news/27582/Russia_seeks_to_Establish_Military_Bases_in_6_African_Nations#.YEk81JMzanT

Eyssen

B. V.

(2019, 23 October). Russia’s comeback in Africa. Deutsche Welle: https://www.dw.com/en/russias-comeback-in-africa/a-50946116

Fasanotti

F. S.

(2022, 8 February). Russia’s Wagner Group in Africa: Influence, commercial concessions, rights violations, and counterinsurgency failure. Brookings: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/02/08/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/

Fazl-e-Haider

(2020, 17 January). The strategic implications of Chinese-Iranian-Russian naval drills in the Indian Ocean. Jamestown Foundation: https://jamestown.org/program/the-strategic-implications-of-chinese-iranian-russian-naval-drills-in-the-indian-ocean/

Gupte

, & Griffin

(2019, 22 October). Analysis: Russia looks to Africa to broaden its global energy influence. https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/102219-analysis-russia-looks-to-africa-to-broaden-its-global-energy-influence

Gurjar

(2021, 23 November). Russia’s Indian Ocean pivot. Deccan Herald: https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/russias-indian-ocean-pivot-1053726.html

10.

Hairsine

(2020, 30 June). Russia’s nuclear play for power in Africa. Deutsche Welle: https://www.dw.com/en/russias-nuclear-play-for-power-in-africa/a-54004039

11.

Indo-Asian News Service. (2021, 18 February). Reports of Indian Navy part of Iran-Russia maritime drill false. The Economic Times.

12.

Ingram

(1980, April). Great Britain’s great game: An introduction. International History Review, 2(2), 160–171.

13.

Iwanek

(2019, 16 May). Russia’s looming arms sale to Pakistan sets up a dangerous game. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/russias-looming-arms-sale-to-pakistan-sets-up-a-dangerous-game/

14.

Kireeva

, & Kupriyanov

(2020). Russia and Quad Plus. Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, 3(5), 210–228.

15.

Koldunova

(2019, 6 May). Russia’s Ambivalence about an Indo-Pacific Strategy. East-West Center. https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/russia%E2%80%99s-ambivalence-about-indo-pacific-strategy

16.

Kondratenko

(2020, 29 May). Russian arms exports to Africa: Moscow’s long-term strategy. Deutsche Welle: https://www.dw.com/en/russian-arms-exports-to-africa-moscows-long-term-strategy/a-53596471

17.

Kremlin. (2019, 3 October). Excerpts from the transcript of the Valdai International Discussion Club session. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61719

18.

Kuo

M. A.

(2018, 25 January). The origin of ‘Indo-Pacific’ as geopolitical construct. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/the-origin-of-indo-pacific-as-geopolitical-construct/

19.

Kuzmina

(2019, 22 March). Russia and the Indian Ocean security and governance. Russian International Affairs Council: https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/russia-and-the-indian-ocean-security-and-governance/

20.

Lalwani

, O’Donnell

, Sangerstrom

, & Vasudeva

(2021, January). The influence of arms: Explaining the durability of India–Russia alignment. Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, 4(1), 1–41.

21.

Marshall

(2019). Prisoners of geography: Ten maps that tell you everything you Need To know about global politics. Elliot & Thompson.

22.

Martin

(2019, 24 October). Russian Tu-160 bombers arrive in South Africa. Defence Web. https://www.defenceweb.co.za/aerospace/aerospace-aerospace/russian-tu-160-bombers-arrive-in-south-africa/

23.

Mastro

O. S.

(2020, 16 December). Russia and China team up on the Indian Ocean. The Interpreter. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/russia-and-china-team-indian-ocean

24.

McGregor

(2019, 29 October). Why Mozambique is outsourcing counter-insurgency to Russia: The historical relationship. Jamestown Foundation. https://jamestown.org/program/why-mozambique-is-outsourcing-counter-insurgency-to-russia-the-historical-relationship/

25.

Melvin

(2019). The foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa Region. SIPRI. https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-04/sipribp1904.pdf

26.

Melvin

(2021, May). Russia and the Indo-Pacific security concept. RUSI. https://rusi.org/publication/emerging-insights/russia-indo-pacific-security-concept

27.

Millar

(1970). Soviet policies south and east of Suez. Foreign Affairs, 49(1), 70–80.

28.

Mohan

C. R.

(2019, 26 November). Delhi needs to engage with Moscow on the unfolding Sino-Russian naval partnership. The Indian Express.

29.

Mohan

C. R.

(2021, 27 May). What S Jaishankar’s New York visit says about Indo-US ties. The Indian Express.

30.

Muraviev

(2020, 30 November). Russia’s red star in the Red Sea. The Interpreter. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/russia-s-red-star-red-sea

31.

Muraviev

(2021, 15 March). Russia wants to be a power to be reckoned with in the Indian Ocean. The Interpreter: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/russia-wants-be-power-be-reckoned-indian-ocean

32.

Muraviev

A. D.

(2011). Shadow of the northern giant: Russia’s current and future engagement with the Indian Ocean Region. Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, 7(2), 200–219.

33.

Niemi

(2021, 1 April). Naval forces of great powers. Russian International Affairs Council: https://russiancouncil.ru/en/blogs/seppo-niemi-en/historical-navalism-navigare-necesse-est/

34.

Peri

(2020, 15 July). Pacific a pivot for ties with Moscow: Indian envoy. The Hindu.

35.

Petkova

(2020, 1 October). What has Russia gained from five years of fighting in Syria? Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/10/1/what-has-russia-gained-from-five-years-of-fighting-in-syria

36.

Ramani

(2020, 7 December). Russia’s Port Sudan naval base: A power play on the Red Sea. RUSI. https://rusi.org/commentary/russia-port-sudan-naval-base-power-play-red-sea

37.

Ramani

(2021, 12 February). Russia’s strategy in the Central African Republic. RUSI: https://rusi.org/commentary/russia-strategy-central-african-republic

38.

Reuters. (2009, 16 January). Russia plans navy bases in Libya, Syria, Yemen: Report. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-navy-mideast-idUSTRE50F3H120090116

39.

Reuters. (2019, 8 December). Iran unveils ‘budget to resist US sanctions’ with help from $5bn Russian loan. The Guardian.

40.

Russia Maritime Studies Institute. (2015, January). The 2015 maritime doctrine of the Russian Federation. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=rmsi_research

41.

Sauer

(2019, 19 November). In push for Africa, Russia’s Wagner mercenaries are ‘out of their depth’ in Mozambique. The Moscow Times. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/11/19/in-push-for-africa-russias-wagner-mercenaries-are-out-of-their-depth-in-mozambique-a68220

42.

Schwirtz

, & Borgia

(2019, 11 November). How Russia meddles abroad for profit: Cash, trolls and a cult leader. The New York Times.

43.

Security Council Report. (2020, 16 December). The veto. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/the-veto.php

44.

Simha

R. K.

(2016, 1 November). Veto No.100: How Russia blocked the West on Kashmir. https://www.rbth.com/blogs/stranger_than_fiction/2016/11/01/veto-no100-how-russia-blocked-the-west-on-kashmir_644137

45.

Sixto

(2020, 24 August). Russian mercenaries: A string of failures in Africa. Geopolitical Monitor. https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/russian-mercenaries-a-string-of-failures-in-africa/

46.

Stavridis

(2017). Sea power: The history and geopolitics of the world’s oceans. Penguin.

47.

Sukhankin

(2021, 12 May). Russian naval base in Sudan stays for now: What happens next? https://jamestown.org/program/russian-naval-base-in-sudan-stays-for-now-what-happens-next/

48.

The Express Tribune. (2021, 13 February). Pakistan-hosted multinational military drill kicks off. The Express Tribune.

49.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation. (2020, 15 January). Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks and answers to questions at a plenary session of the Raisina Dialogue international conference, New Delhi, January 15, 2020. https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3994885

50.

The News. (2021, 21 February). Pak, Russia navies conduct ARABIAN MONSOON 2021 exercise. The News.

51.

Trenin

(2020, 1 May). How Russia can maintain equilibrium in the post-pandemic bipolar world. Carnegie Moscow Center: https://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/81702

52.

US Energy Information Administration. (2017, 31 October). Russia. https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/RUS

53.

VOA News. (2021, 16 February). Iran, Russia start naval drill in Indian Ocean. Voice of America. https://www.voanews.com/middle-east/iran-russia-start-naval-drill-indian-ocean

54.

Wezeman

P. D.

, Kuimova

, & Wezeman

S. T.

(2021). Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2020. SIPRI.

55.

Woodward

(2002). The Horn of Africa: State, politics and international relations. I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd.

56.

World Nuclear Association. (2021, May). Nuclear power in Russia. https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-o-s/russia-nuclear-power.aspx